



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A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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PREFACE

This study is the product of research performed in the Division of the Social Sciences of the University of Chicago, under contract with Human Relations Area Files, Incorporated, New Haven, Connecticut.

The aim of this monograph was to present a balanced account of the contemporary social, economic, and political relations in Czechoslovakia and to trace the development of present-day institutions to their chief historical antecedents. Primary emphasis has been placed upon postwar Czechoslovakia and the impact of sovietization, and to a somewhat minor degree on the period between the wars.

The present political position of Czechoslovakia made a first-hand study impossible and prevented the gathering of certain empirical materials which are available in secondary sources only incompletely. To the extent to which the study shows unevennesses in presentation they are due, we feel, to this factor, as well as to limitations of time allotted to it, and the fact that the various sections were composed not collectively, but individually. Although many efforts of this sort do not yield a happy amalgam, we are confident that this attempt will, in spite of some shortcomings, provide a useful working paper.

The scope of this manuscript is extensive, considering the above limitations, the variety of topics, and the complexity of social phenomena and social processes which it was felt necessary to analyze. Most existing undertakings are either too specific or too general. This collection of essays attempts a felicitous compromise of these extremities without sacrificing significant benefits of either. The major themes which run throughout the material are: the emergence and consolidation of the totalitarian state; the process of "sovietization;" and the increasing absorption of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet empire in eastern Europe.

It was necessary in many instances to define and describe "what was" in order to be able to ascertain how the relatively unrestricted society differs from the imposed Gleichschaltung. The historical

approach was, therefore, used in a few instances. However, the major portion of the work derives from the analytical dictates of the individual disciplines. This applies to both the pre-Soviet and the "People's Democratic" eras. The evolutionary approach was undertaken where fruitful but the fragmentary nature of much of the data made this difficult, and in many instances tenable developmental hypotheses could only be proposed. At all times an attempt was made to document material, since the controversial nature of the subject matter and gaps in reliable information throw any treatment open to amateur criticism. Marxian terminology was avoided or explained as far as possible, or where used was employed for purposes of literary style. In instances where professional jargon was used this was deemed desirable as being more comprehensive and labor-saving. In any case, clarity of expression was striven for.

We owe thanks to the following persons and organizations:

Dr. Margaret Mead and the Institute for Intercultural Studies at Columbia University for having made available to us the files of the Czechoslovakian area project, conducted under a grant from the Human Resources Division, Office of Naval Research; Dr. Pavel Korbel and Dr. Viliam Pauliny of the Committee for a Free Europe, New York; The Czechoslovak Institute in Exile; Dr. Jiří Kolaja for supplying certain materials on sociological problems; Donald Starsinic of the University of Chicago for drawing the maps; and Miss Yvonne Phillips of the University of Chicago for editing and styling the manuscript.

The typing of the various drafts of this study was done by Mrs. Frances Piven, assisted by Betty Klingaman, Mrs. Eleanor Lensen, Vivian Lober, Rodney Carl Lowell, Mrs. Margaret Meyerson, Debbie Mines, Margaret Munch, Mrs. Barbara Nelson, Mrs. Josephine Smith, and Carl Wolz.

Bert F. Hoselitz

GEOGRAPHY¹

The Name

Czechoslovakia (Československo) was created on October 28, 1918, out of several parts of the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire. The establishment of the republic was the result of joint efforts of Czechs and Slovaks, the two leading ethnic, and closely related, groups of the new country. The name was first written Czecho-Slovakia, but presently the hyphen disappeared, an indication of the desire at least on the part of the Czechs to have a truly single nation. The hyphenated name was reintroduced in the autumn of 1938, as dissatisfied Slovak leaders took advantage of the government's submission to Germany at the Munich Conference and secured extensive autonomy for Slovakia. In March 1939 Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech parts of the country, without the "Sudetenland" which had been annexed to Germany the previous October in pursuance of the Munich Agreement, were transformed into a German "protectorate." Slovakia was established as a separate and formally independent state, but was in fact subordinated to German policy. The re-establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II saw the adoption once again of the undivided name.

Inter-war Czechoslovakia also included a third region: Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which lay east of Slovakia, contained primarily Ruthenians (Ukrainians), and along with Slovakia had been for centuries under Hungarian rule. Never completely integrated into Czechoslovak life, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was ceded to the U. S. S. R. in 1945 at the latter's request.

Before 1918 the Czechs were more generally known abroad as Bohemians, after the name of the principal part of their lands. Originally Boihaemia, the name Bohemia was given by the Romans, who

¹Based on Harriet Grace Wanklyn, Czechoslovakia (London: G. Philip, 1954).

it from a tribe which extended from Bavaria into the southern part of the present Bohemia.² However, the name which the Czechs themselves give to the western portion of Czechoslovakia is Čechy, after a Slavic chieftain who is supposed to have led his people to their subsequent home sometime in the fifth century A.D.

Natural and Administrative Divisions

Bohemia is the only geographically unified region of Czechoslovakia. Moravia-Silesia, in the center of the country, forms a transitional zone between Bohemia and Slovakia. Usually this transitional zone is referred to simply as Moravia (Morava), since the Silesian area includes only two districts, Ostrava and Opava. Slovakia (Slovensko) blends easily into the Hungarian Plain to the south.

Slovakia is the only one of the main inter-war regions of Czechoslovakia to retain administrative distinctness today, the administrative boundaries between Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia having been abolished in 1949. The change of 1949 also included the establishment of nineteen regions over the entire country, each region, or kraj, being named after its leading city. The territory of each region tends to coincide with local natural features and patterns of communication, and sometimes, in addition, with a locally dominant economic activity. Nine of the regions are in Bohemia, four in Moravia-Silesia and six in Slovakia. Politically and economically the most important are Prague, Brno, Ostrava and Bratislava.

There is a further administrative subdivision into districts, or okres, there being seventy-four of these.

Notwithstanding the centralizing change introduced in 1949, the traditional division between Bohemian and Moravian Czechs persists in the common activities of life.

²Aleš Hrdlička, "Czechoslovaks," in Robert Kerner, ed., Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948).

Location, Area and Boundaries

Czechoslovakia is a long narrow country of about 49,000 square miles, and therefore a little smaller than the state of Illinois. Its maximum length is about 500 miles; its maximum width is 175 miles. Sharing two upland systems which approach each other on a northeast-southwest line that runs through the middle of the country, Czechoslovakia lies between approximately 48° and 51° north latitude. Because of the overall northwest-southeast slope of the country, Prague, which is at the center of Bohemia, is almost exactly on the 50th parallel; but Brno, the second largest city and located a bit west of the east-west midpoint of the country, is just north of the 49th parallel. It is from east of Brno that Czechoslovakia makes its great southern thrust to the Danube. West to east, Czechoslovakia lies between 12° and $22^{\circ}30'$ east longitude.

Czechoslovakia's boundaries give her six neighbors, two of which-- West Germany and Austria--are not under the influence of the U.S.S.R. The meeting with West Germany is along the part of the western border which runs from the country's westernmost tip along a steep northwest-southeast line until a three-way junction with Austria is reached northwest of Linz.

About one-half of the southern boundary of Czechoslovakia is with Austria. This boundary proceeds essentially east from the junction with West Germany (Bavaria) for about seventy miles and then turns sharply northward, in which direction it continues for some fifty miles. A sharp eastward turn follows, the boundary then running for about 100 miles to the Morava River. The boundary with Austria is now the line of the south-flowing Morava until the latter joins the Danube northwest of Bratislava. Then the Danube is the boundary, but it is only a few miles down from the Morava-Danube junction that Czechoslovakia and Austria come together with Hungary. An interesting result of the shape of the Czech-Austrian border is the enclosure of Austria's capital, Vienna, by Czechoslovakia on all but the southern side.

The remaining half of Czechoslovakia's southern boundary is with Hungary. Like the Austrian, it is an irregular frontier, following the eastern flow of the Danube for about 140 miles until just before the river makes its ninety degree turn southward towards Budapest. At this point, the Czech-Hungarian boundary turns northward, and, after only about twenty-five miles, proceeds east and northeast for some 230 miles to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Czechoslovakia's short eastern boundary with the Ukraine was, before 1945, the internal line between Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. At that time, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, overlooking the Hungarian plain to the south and inhabited mainly by Ukrainians, was ceded to the U. S. S. R., whose government then proceeded to integrate it with the Ukrainian S. S. R. By this action, also, the pre-1945 boundary between Czechoslovakia and Rumania disappeared.

Czechoslovakia marches with East Germany along a small length of its northern frontier, which, like the boundary with West Germany, begins at the westernmost point of the Czech lands but then runs north-eastward. The boundary follows mountain crests as far as the upper south-flowing Nysa (Neisse in German; Nisa in Polish), which also separates East Germany from Poland.

The remainder of the northern boundary is with Poland, and here too it follows mountain crests, with the exception of the Moravian-Silesian border.

In view of the great difference in size and power between Czechoslovakia and the U. S. S. R., their common frontier must be considered disadvantageous for the smaller country, entirely apart from the political complexion of its government. But given the Communist nature of the Czech government, the presence of the U. S. S. R. at the eastern door--and it is a door, for U. S. S. R. troops can command the passes which lead from Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia into Slovakia--makes it more difficult than otherwise either for Czechoslovaks to depose their government or for Czech national Communists to act against the present pro-U. S. S. R. Communist leadership.

In part a function of its proximity to the U.S.S.R. are Czechoslovakia's relations with its other Communist-governed neighbors. As long as these neighbors are subservient to U.S.S.R. policy, they are in effect extensions of U.S.S.R. territory, although it must be recognized that subservience of the leaderships of East Germany, Poland and Hungary, while clearly useful to the U.S.S.R., does not guarantee loyalty to U.S.S.R. interests on the part of their populations. If the position be taken that East Germany, Poland and Hungary are physical extensions of the U.S.S.R., then Czechoslovakia faces the U.S.S.R. along by far the greatest portion of its border--along the entire northern frontier, and around the eastern to include half of the southern.

Relief and Hydrography

Czechoslovakia is formed of a ring of bordering mountain ranges and their enclosed valleys and plains. The western part of the country is defined by the ranges of the Bohemian Forest (Český les and Šumava), the Ore Mountains (Rudohoří), and the Sudeten Mountains (Krušnohorský). All of these ranges are under 10,000 feet in altitude and exhibit the rounded forms characteristic of the Hercynian system (carboniferous-Permian age). Within the mountain wall lies Bohemia, with its core in the rather hilly plain of the Elbe (Labe) River around Prague. On the southeast, this plain abuts on the Bohemian-Moravian Highland, a hilly rather than mountainous division. (The topographic unity of Bohemia is paralleled in the cultural distinctiveness of the region).


Southeast of Bohemia, beyond the Bohemian-Moravian Highland, Moravia occupies the plains of several southward-flowing streams, tributaries of the Morava, which flows into the Danube. The topography of Moravia is gently rolling to flat plains.

A hilly section, the so-called Little and White Carpathians (Bílé Karpaty), separates Moravia on the east from Slovakia. Slovakia is a land of rugged hills and mountains of no great height (mostly from 5,000 to 10,000 feet), with the highest peaks at about 14,000 feet.

The center of the country is occupied by the Low Tatra Mountains; the Beskyds and the High Tatra Mountains lie along the northern border. These ranges are mainly of Tertiary age, which accounts for the roughness of their relief. A number of river valleys of modest breadth are found in the south, of which the most important are those of the Vah, the Hron, several branches of the Ipel, whose main stream flows east-west just across the border in Hungary, the Rimava, and the Ondava. These form a northern extension of the great Hungarian Plain. The Slovak Tatra Mountains are extremely picturesque, wild and rugged, and resemble the Alps in miniature.

All of the streams of interior Bohemia are tributaries of the Elbe (Labe), and flow in toward the center of the country. The Elbe leaves Czechoslovakia through a narrow gap in the Ore Mountains (Rud^ohoří). In a similar way, the Moravian streams are tributaries of the Morava, which drains off into the Danube. Some of the larger Elbe tributaries in Bohemia flow in fairly wide valleys, reaching deep into the mountains. Notable among these are the Ohře (with the important town of Cheb), Berounka (with Plzeň), and Vltava (Moldau), on whose lower course Prague is located. The small but economically important Silesian section of northern Moravia belongs topographically to the Oder system (with the industrial city of Moravská Ostrava).

In many areas of Bohemia and Moravia, the rocks are locally of peculiar kinds, and produce varied and picturesque expression in one landscape. There are a number of localities of karst (limestone) with sink holes, caverns, and underground drainage; volcanic rocks, which produce in northwestern Bohemia spectacular cliffs and gorges; granite, etc.



Climate

Czechoslovakia's climate is much affected by local relief, but also shows the influence of the westerly wind system off the Atlantic, the pressure systems of the Eurasian continental interior, and the Mediterranean.

During most of the year westerly winds blow over the country, bringing moisture from the Atlantic, but precipitation varies a great deal with altitude. The hillier sections get the most rain, and some lowland areas are quite arid (Prague receives only a little over twenty inches annually). The months of maximum precipitation are July and August, and the minimum falls in the period January-March.

Temperatures are also much influenced by local relief, but by latitude as well. Moravia on the whole is much warmer than either

Bohemia or Slovakia because of the effect of air from the Mediterranean. In all parts of the country the winter is moderate, and summer is not very hot. Spring is quite cool, but autumn is still a warm period. Slovakia and sometimes the rest of the country are affected in winter by movements of cold air from the east.

Because of rough topography strong winds are not of great importance, but local air movements produce notable effects. The föhn, a hot dry wind blowing down from the hills, occurs in most of the country. There is also a downslope movement of cold air in winter (air drainage).

The fogs of the lowlands are a characteristic feature of Bohemia and Silesia. Quiet air in protected pockets often produces radiation fog at any season. Cloudiness is also high, being commonest in summer.

The snow cover lasts three months or even more in a good part of the country, but is of shorter duration in the Elbe valley of Bohemia and in Moravia. The streams usually freeze over for two months or more.

Vegetation

Three major vegetation types occur in Czechoslovakia: deciduous broadleaf forest, coniferous forest, and grassland. The distribution of these types closely corresponds to topographic conditions.

A coniferous forest composed largely of fir, but with spruce, pine, birch and other species in some situations, occupies the higher and rougher mountain slopes in Bohemia and Moravia and part of Slovakia. These forests are especially developed on northward slopes of the mountain. In places there are still large strands of almost virgin coniferous forest, notably in the Tatra.

Deciduous broadleaf forest occurs in lowlands and more protected locations throughout Czechoslovakia. The commonest species are beech, maple, oak, and birch. In Slovakia there are big stands of almost pure beech woods. The deciduous broadleaf forest was probably once much more extensive, but it has given way to farming land.

Moravia and especially Slovakia have small areas of grassland that are associated with topographic extensions of the Hungarian plains.

Soils

The chief soil type is the brown forest group, developed on a great variety of parent materials and moderately podzolized. These soils are of medium agricultural utility. In spots here and there in Bohemia and Moravia there are deposits of loess, or fine calcareous material of good fertility, accounting for some of the best farming lands of Czechoslovakia.

Alluvium in the valleys of the rivers is also valuable for agricultural use. Most of Czech and Slovak agriculture is concentrated on alluvial and loess soils of the lowlands. In southern Moravia and Slovakia chestnut prairie soils occur which are of great economic value and are completely utilized.

The mountains have stony infertile soils.

Mineral Resources

Czechoslovakia has a rich variety of mineral resources which permit a correspondingly varied set of industrial activities. Large coal deposits exist in Bohemia around Plzeň, Rakovník, and Kladno, and in Moravia around the cities of Moravská Ostrava, and Karviná. In addition, there are extensive lignite fields in the western border area. Slovakia has no coal, but it does have some lignite deposits. Near both the Bohemian and Moravian coal districts are substantial iron deposits. In Bohemia these deposits lie between Plzeň and Nučice; in Moravia they occur west of Moravská Ostrava. Slovakian iron ore is found in the eastern half of the region near Slovinky, Gelnica, Cucma and Rožnava, with antimony nearby. Iron pyrite deposits, supplementing the superior iron ore, exist in modest quantities in western Slovakia, and in the above mentioned Slavakian iron ore district. Tungsten (wolfram) is mined in the west at Schoenfeld.

Among the most important metallic minerals in Czechoslovakia from the standpoint of contemporary warfare are the very rich radium and uranium deposits at Jáchymov in western Bohemia.

Important copper deposits are mined in Slovakia. Even more extensive deposits are located in Bohemia west of Žacléř. Long-worked gold fields exist in western Bohemia between Kašperské Hory and České Budějovice; to the north of this region near Příbram; in Moravia around Bruntál; and in central Slovakia near Banská Štiavnica, Kremnica, and Magurka. Silver deposits are still mined to some extent in western Bohemia. Tin is mined in small quantities near Karlovy Vary. A final metallic resource which should be mentioned is lead, which is found near Příbram, southwest of Prague.

Naphtha wells, near Gbely and Hodonín in the Moravian-Slovakian border area constitute the only kind of petroleum resources in Czechoslovakia.


Czechoslovakia also possesses substantial clay (kaolin) resources in the Karlovy Vary and Plzeň districts, quartz in the Bohemian Forest, granite along the Elbe and Vltava rivers, and important salt deposits in Slovakia.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA LAND USE AND MINERALS





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


MINERALS

- C COAL
- L LIGNITE
- O PETROLEUM
- Fe IRON
- G GRAPHITE
- U URANIUM
- Cu COPPER
- Pr GOLD, SILVER

LAND USE

-  SUGAR BEETS, WHEAT, BARLEY, DAIRYING
-  GRAINS
-  GRAINS, POTATOES
-  FORAGE CROPS




48 EACH ADMINISTRATIVE REGION BEARS THE NAME OF ITS CAPITAL.

Sources: 1. H. Wanklyn, *Czechoslovakia*, London, G. Philip & Son, 1954.

2. J. Bartholomew, *Times Atlas of the World*, Vol. III, 1955, Plate 62.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

TRANSPORTATION NETWORK



Source: J. Bartholomew, *Times Atlas of the World*, Vol. III, 1955.

THE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In comparison to many of the other countries of eastern and central Europe, Czechoslovakia endured perhaps fewer of the ravages of war which so directly affected the population movements and growth of peoples elsewhere. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the Nazi tyranny was imposed on the peoples of Czechoslovakia almost two years before it ground down the other nations of Europe, and almost three years before it fell briefly on the western glaxis of the U. S. S. R.

In that time important changes in the numbers, location, and composition of the population of the Czechoslovak Republic had already taken place. Throughout the war German labor recruitment and extermination of the Jews significantly affected the nation's population. And finally, when the war ended, territorial revisions and population transfers produced a new Czechoslovakia insofar as the national structure of the state was concerned.

It is this new Czechoslovakia which should receive the most attention; yet it is the new Czechoslovakia about which the least is known, partly from lack of data and partly from unavailability of existing data secreted by a suspicious and fearful regime in "democratic" Czechoslovakia. In spite of the scarcity of material on current conditions in Czechoslovakia, the following may have relevance for an understanding of the people and the country they inhabit.

Growth and Distribution of Population

Population Growth and Density

The Population of Czechoslovakia Today and Yesterday. On January 1, 1955, the Czechoslovak Republic had an estimated population of **13.0** million people. This equalled the population of the Republic revealed in the first census taken on February 15, 1921. The present population, however, lives in a territory reduced by the loss of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (ceded to the U. S. S. R. in June 1945) from a prewar area of 140,493 sq. km. (54,244 sq. miles) to its present 127,827 sq. km.

(49,354 sq. miles). The average density of population, therefore, is somewhat higher than in 1921. Population density as of January 1, 1955, averaged 101.7 persons per sq. km. (39.26 persons per sq. mile). This compares with a density of 97 persons per sq. km. (37.45 persons per sq. mile) according to the census of March 1, 1950.¹

Czechoslovakia's population density in 1950 was somewhat above that of most other countries of eastern Europe. It exceeded substantially the density of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia; and Rumania; was moderately higher than that of Poland; and was about the same as Hungary. In this respect Czechoslovakia more nearly resembled the moderately industrialized countries of western Europe such as Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland. While its density was slightly higher than that of France it was much below that of such heavily populated countries as Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, its density is approximately five times that of the United States.²

Since its establishment as an independent state, and even before in the territories later included within it, Czechoslovakia has experienced a slow but steady growth of population, but at a constantly declining rate. Between 1921 and 1930 the country had an annual average gain of 0.8 per cent and an overall increase during this period of 7.7 per cent compared with a general European average increase of 9.0 per cent in the decade 1920-1930. In the following decade the Czechoslovak average annual population gain dropped to 0.5 per cent, again well below the European (exclusive of the U.S.S.R.) average. The actual figures on population

¹Walter Wynne, Jr., The Population of Czechoslovakia (U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 3 [Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953]), pp. 3-40, and Table 1, p. 43.

²Ibid., p. 15, and Table 2, p. 44.

increase in the 1921-1951 period are shown in the following table.

Table 1
POPULATION CHANGES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1921-1951*

Date	Population	Change since the preceding date				
		Net change	Natural increase			Net migration and error
			Net	Births	Deaths	
2/15/21	13,003,000					
12/1/30	13,998,000	995,000	1,177,000	3,220,000	2,043,000	182,000
1/1/39	14,612,000	614,000	529,000	2,078,000	1,549,000	85,000
5/22/47	12,165,000	-2,448,000	743,000	2,475,000	1,732,000	-319,000
1/1/48	12,209,000	44,000	91,000	181,000	90,000	-47,000
1/1/49	12,279,000	71,000	147,000	289,000	142,000	-76,000
3/1/50	12,340,000	61,000	149,000	317,000	168,000	-88,000
1/1/51	12,455,000	115,000	123,000	242,000	120,000	-8,500

*Ibid., Table 1, p. 43. Does not include Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, nor, before 1947, the Bratislava Bridgehead acquired from Hungary with a population of 3,739 in 1941.

Population Changes During World War II and After. Before the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany in 1938 there had been a long-term shift of population within Czechoslovakia which resulted in the steady displacement of Germans by Czechs, even in the most Germanic areas of Bohemia-Moravia.³ The natural increase of the Sudeten-Germans was even lower than that of the Czechs. The internal migratory shifts from the countryside to the cities and from the south to the north and northwest were at the same time encroachments of Czechs on Germans. As a result the "language frontier" was slowly being pushed back at the expense of the Germans. The reinforcement of the Czech minorities in the remainder of the country, and the elimination of German

³This section is based largely on Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move. War and Population Changes, 1917-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 201-204, and Wynne, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

"language islands" followed from this purely natural population shift. These changes, which began as early as 1880, merely continued after 1918. The natural increase in the districts of Bohemia later included in the annexed Sudetenland averaged 7.3 per 1,000 during the decade 1921-1930. Not only was this below the average rate of growth for Czechoslovakia as a whole, but even this moderate rate of increase was due mainly to a strong in-movement of Czechs into formerly largely German areas. This trend continued after 1930, and the German census of 1939 recorded 125,000 recent Czech immigrants in the Sudetenland (in spite of the outward movement of Czechs from that area in considerable numbers in 1938-1939).

Further attenuating the Germanic character of the Sudetenland was the emigration of Germans from that area to the Reich. Some 200,000 Sudeten Germans were registered in Germany by 1938.⁴ By October 1938 an official German source gave the number as 250,000, indicating that additional tens of thousands had entered during 1938.⁵ In the brief period between the annexation of the Sudetenland and the swallowing up of the remainder of Czechoslovakia by Germany, economic conditions became much worse because of the severance of economic ties with Bohemia. Under these circumstances emigration to the Reich proper from the Sudetenland was further stimulated. Not only was the barrier of a political frontier eliminated after a time, but the German government set up employment offices to recruit workers for positions in Germany. In the period between the Czechoslovak census of 1930 and the German census of 1939, the Sudetenland suffered a migratory loss of 317,000, mainly to Germany proper.

The further political changes which took place in 1938 and 1939 created additional population shifts of some importance. The secession of Slovakia from truncated Czecho-Slovakia resulted in the expulsion of about 150,000 Czechs from that area, among them many officials and

⁴Reichsarbeitsblatt, May 5, 1941, as quoted in ibid., p. 202.

⁵Ibid.

civil servants. This reflected the long-standing Slovak grievance concerning the preponderance of Czechs in all government posts in Slovakia. On the other hand, the annexation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and parts of Slovakia by Hungary resulted in the expulsion of some 100,000 Slovaks and Czechs from these areas.

With the incorporation of the remainder of Bohemia and Moravia into Germany as a "protectorate" in March 1939, a new wave of migration engulfed these provinces. Hitler's declaration that Bohemia and Moravia had "for a thousand years" belonged to the Lebensraum of the German people was the opening move in a new German immigration to that territory. The number of Germans increased with the progressing program of Germanization. Simultaneously with the movement of Germans into Bohemia-Moravia, a considerable movement of Czechs into Germany and Austria took place in the months following annexation. Between March and June of 1939, 52,000 Czechs were hired for work in Germany (including Austria) and 40,000 Slovaks were also recruited. Throughout the war about 600,000 Czech workers were sent to work in Germany. Not all of them remained throughout the war. The annual average number of Czechs taken to Germany during the war was about 265,000.⁶ Slovak workers were also shipped to Germany as laborers. Their total number amounted to between 100,000 and 140,000.⁷ In the period before the outbreak of World War II the overwhelming majority of German immigrants to Bohemia-Moravia came from Germany proper, especially from Prussia, but not from Austria. On the other hand, most of the Czech workers went to Austria, a large colony of them being established at Linz.

⁶L. Chmela, Hospodářská okupace Československa (Prague: Orbis, 1946), p. 123.

⁷J. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p. 172.

During the war the movement of Germans into Czechoslovakia continued, but the new arrivals were no longer settlers as had been the original immigrants. Most of the newcomers after the beginning of the war came as war refugees from the bomb-shattered cities of western Germany. An additional number represented part of the recalled Volksdeutschen from southern and eastern Europe. Most of these newcomers, as well as the settlers who came during 1938-1939, fled Czechoslovakia before or at the end of the war. About 800,000 Germans are estimated to have been involved in this particular movement.⁸

Of the approximately 3.5 million Germans in Czechoslovakia at the beginning of World War II about 2,645,000 were listed by the Czechoslovak Statistical Office as still in the country on June 30, 1945. Over 800,000 more were accounted for by the half-million or more⁹ who went into the German army and the 300,000 who fled from Czechoslovakia as refugees before the advance of the Red Army to Germany and Austria.¹⁰

In pursuance of the decision taken at the Potsdam Conference that "the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in . . . Czechoslovakia . . . will have to be undertaken . . .," the Czechoslovak government instituted energetic measures designed to accomplish this objective.¹¹ The transfer of the Germans was initiated

⁸Ibid., note 26, p. 284; Wynne, op. cit., pp. 8-9. Gregory Frumkin also uses the figure of 800,000 as the number of Germans who entered Czechoslovakia during the war. Most of these, he claims, were women and children. Population Changes in Europe Since 1939 (New York: Kelley, 1951), p. 51.

⁹Frumkin, op. cit., p. 51, estimates this number at 600,000.

¹⁰Kulischer, op. cit., pp. 282-84.

¹¹The Czechoslovak government in exile had formulated plans for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans quite early in the war. Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population Transfers 1939-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 457-58.

at the end of January 1946, and according to the official announcement of the ministry in charge of the transfer, it was completed with the departure of the last German transport on October 20, 1946.¹²

The number of expelled ethnic Germans has been officially put at 2,400,000. Later it was reported that 2,674,000 Sudeten Germans had moved to Germany. This figure includes, besides the organized transfer from Czechoslovakia, wartime refugees who fled to Austria and were subsequently transferred to Germany, Sudeten Germans who went to Germany before the beginning of the organized transfer, and those who moved there afterwards. In March 1947 it was reported that about 250,000 Germans remained in Czechoslovakia.¹³ Before the transfer it was assumed that about half a million "good" Germans would be permitted to remain. "Subsequently, however, the Czechoslovak authorities showed an increasing unwillingness to trust the members of a minority consisting of four-fifths of active Nazis." On the other hand, many non-Fascist Germans preferred voluntary repatriation to a process of "Czechization." The Germans who remained in Czechoslovakia were exempted for another reason, originally unforeseen--they were indispensable workers. The labor shortage, after the expulsions were carried out, was particularly serious, since it concerned mainly skilled workers in industry, the building trades, and agriculture. An attempt was made to fill the gap with Czechs and Slovaks who came from abroad at the invitation of the Czechoslovak government.¹⁴

¹²Kulischer, op. cit., p. 284; Frumkin, op. cit., p. 52. Actually, as is pointed out in the following section, expulsions continued as late as 1950. The announcement of the completion of the transfer of the Germans may have been motivated by a desire to appease the population who were clamoring to be rid of the Germans. It may also have been thought that those who remained would not be expelled but would remain. Also, many German skilled workers were retained for the work of reconstruction and expelled after completing their jobs.

¹³Wynne, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁴Kulischer, op. cit., pp. 284, 287. For the later policy of the Communist government of Czechoslovakia toward the remaining Germans see infra.

Apparently the need for Germans as skilled laborers in later years lessened since the German minority was allowed to diminish even further. By 1948 the number of remaining Germans was estimated as not more than 180,000.¹⁵ In 1950 it was reported that an additional 25,000 Germans were allowed to leave Czechoslovakia under a scheme to reunite broken families.¹⁶ By 1952 the number of Germans left was only 100,000.¹⁷ It is possible, however, that the figure put out by the Czechoslovak government immediately after the war might have been distorted by the political necessity of placing before the people a creditable record of swift, efficient, and complete expulsion of Germans. At the present time Czechoslovak exile sources place the number of remaining Germans at about 200,000.¹⁸

Other significant changes took place as a result of several exchange of population agreements entered into by the Czechoslovak government with the governments of the U. S. S. R., Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Two agreements involving population exchanges have been concluded with the Soviet Union. The treaty of June 29, 1945,¹⁹ which ceded Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to the U. S. S. R., containing a provision on voluntary population exchange. Czech and Slovak residents of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia were to be permitted to opt for Czechoslovak citizenship and leave for Czechoslovakia. Ukrainians resident in Czechoslovakia were to be allowed to opt for Soviet citizenship and move to Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Neither Czechs and Slovaks, most of whom had left the area after its temporary annexation by Hungary, nor the Ukrainians residing in the rest of the Republic, seem to have taken much advantage of this opportunity. On the contrary, Ukrainian residents of Sub-Carpathian

¹⁵ Wynne, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ New York Times, August 7, 1952.

¹⁸ So estimated by Mirko Valenta, "Němci v. komunistickém Československu," published in the Czechoslovak exile journal Tribuna, VI (Sept.-Oct. 1954), 6-7.

¹⁹ For text of the treaty see The American Review on the Soviet Union, VII, No. 1 (November 1945), 64-65.

Ruthenia infiltrated by thousands into Czechoslovakia, particularly after the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church was separated from Rome and forcibly reunited with the Orthodox Church.²⁰

On July 10, 1946, a second agreement on population exchange was signed by Czechoslovakia and the U. S. S. R. It entitled Soviet citizens of Czech and Slovak ethnic origin living in Volhynia Oblast⁹ of the Ukrainian S. S. R. to emigrate to Czechoslovakia. Once again Czech citizens of Ukrainian, and now also Russian and Belorussian, backgrounds were offered an opportunity to opt for Soviet citizenship and residence. The transfer of the Czech colonists who had gone to Volhynia in the 1860's and 1870's was carried out between January 29 and May 13, 1947, and involved the entry into Czechoslovakia of 33,101 persons. No information on the movement of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, or Belorussians from Czechoslovakia to the U. S. S. R. has come to light,²¹ but it would be highly doubtful if any voluntarily moved to the Soviet Union.

On the same day that the second population exchange agreement was signed with the U. S. S. R., Czechoslovakia entered into an agreement with Rumania on the transfer of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks from that country to Czechoslovakia. Thirty thousand persons have applied for repatriation. Furthermore, the Yugoslav government agreed in principle to the repatriation of more than 100,000 Czechs and Slovaks from Bosnia. By October 1946 large numbers of repatriates from Yugoslavia and Rumania were reported.²²

²⁰ Kulischer, op. cit., note 35, p. 287. This may partially account for the relatively large number of Ukrainians estimated to still live in Czechoslovakia.

²¹ Kulischer, op. cit., pp. 282-88.

²² Ibid., p. 288. An enquiry addressed to the Institut pour la politique et l'économie internationales in Belgrade elicited the following reply from Dr. A. Magarešević, Director, Division of International Law, dated May 21, 1955.

Referring to your letter of February 7th, 1955, concerning exchange of population between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,

Czechoslovakia's eagerness to become a "national" state of Czechs and Slovaks after the war is well illustrated by her negotiations with Hungary over the exchange of the Magyar and Slovak minorities in each country. An agreement reached on February 27, 1946, provided for an exchange of equal numbers of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and Slovaks from Hungary. As the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia far outnumbered the corresponding Slovak minority in Hungary, 500,000 (according to the Czechoslovak government) to 652,000 Magyars (according to the Hungarian government) in Czechoslovakia against about 100,000 Slovaks in Hungary, there remained the problem of what to do about the remaining Magyars. The Czechoslovak government decided to "solve" the problem by transferring to Hungary an additional 200,000 Magyars (making 300,000 in all to be transferred to Hungary) and by a "return into the Slovak community" of 200,000 considered as Magyarized Slovaks. This would have accounted for the entire half million Magyars admitted by the Czechoslovak government as resident in the Republic. The Hungarian government, however, refused to accept additional numbers of Magyars beyond the 100,000 covered in the exchange agreement of February 27, 1946, fearing that her economy would be ruined by the influx. Hungary also protested against the denationalization of the remaining Magyars in Czechoslovakia.

The Paris Peace Conference made no decision in this matter and the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, signed February 10, 1947, referred the

I would like to inform you as follows:

1. There are not existing here statistical or other data giving exact figures of those who left Yugoslavia.
2. The exchange of population was based on a Protocol, concluded in Belgrade November 13, 1948, but this protocol was denounced by Yugoslavia on February 23rd, 1950.

Parties to direct negotiations for the solution of the Magyar problem in Czechoslovakia.²³

²³Kulischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-89. The Czechoslovak government insisted that the remaining Magyars not covered by the 1946 exchange agreement must either become Slovak in language and thought or else be dispatched to Hungary. In January 1947 the Hungarians complained that Magyars were being carried off from Slovakia to Czech lands for forced labor. The Czechoslovak government replied that this was normal recruitment of voluntary labor, that those to be exchanged under the 1946 agreement were exempted and untouched, and that those Magyars who elected to abandon their special minority rights in such matters as schools and language did not come within the terms of the agreement. The Czechoslovaks blamed the Hungarians for the fact that no exchanges had yet taken place. Hungarian protests failed to stop the removal of Hungarians from Slovakia to Bohemia-Moravia, whereupon a number of nocturnal incidents occurred, as Hungarians crossed the frontier to help their compatriots to reach Hungary. Those wishing to do so did not appear to have much difficulty in stealing away, but the results suggested that no great number desired to do so.

On March 2, 1947, the Hungarian foreign minister arrived in Prague to discuss the situation and agreed that the exchange should begin at once. However, his insistence that all movement of Magyars from Slovakia to central Czechoslovakia should be suspended until the exchange should be completed caused the talks to be broken off from March 7 to March 24. Upon resumption it was agreed that the exchange should begin on April 8; complications caused final agreement to be delayed until the end of May. Further difficulties arose and on July 17 discussion began again in Budapest, where it was agreed that the exchange should be effected between August 7th and September 7th. In fact, little was accomplished, and further offense was given to the Hungarians in May 1948 when the use of the Hungarian language was banned in all churches in Czechoslovakia. In September, however, the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party resolved in favor of giving Czechoslovak citizenship to all loyal Hungarians, and in November it was announced that Hungarians who had been removed to Bohemia might return to Slovakia and recover their lands. At this time the break between Tito and the Cominform came into the open and may have led to a general tightening up of relations between the Communist satellite states. Whatever the reason, tension between Hungary and Czechoslovakia over the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia slackened toward the end of 1948. Peter Calvocoressi (ed.), Survey of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 171-72.

At the end of the war, and even before, the Czechoslovaks had begun expelling Magyars. Among the first to go were 24,000 who had entered Czechoslovakia after November 2, 1938. In addition, from the end of the war until about June 30, 1946, about 33,000 Magyars of Czechoslovak citizenship were expelled to Hungary. These 33,000 came under the terms of the 1946 exchange agreement. In the same year Czechoslovakia received from Hungary about 9,000 Slovaks who also came under the agreement. In 1947 another 31,000 Magyars left Czechoslovakia for Hungary under the exchange plan, and some 33,000 Slovaks arrived in Czechoslovakia. By the end of 1947, therefore, a total of 88,000 Magyars, of whom 64,000 were members of the prewar Magyar minority and thus came under the exchange of population agreement, had been transferred to Hungary. In return 42,000 Slovaks of Hungarian citizenship were repatriated to Czechoslovakia. Some 60,000 Slovaks still remained in Hungary and about 36,000 Hungarians in Czechoslovakia awaiting exchange under the 1946 agreement. "Possibly other movements to and from Hungary have occurred, but no indications of such activity have been found," at least not up to the end of 1954.²⁴

Distribution of Population

Regional Distribution.²⁵ Czechoslovakia's population of 12.2 million in 1947 was distributed as follows: 8.8 million were in the Czech regions, and 3.4 million were in the Slovak regions. The Czech regions contained 72.0 per cent of the total population, while the Slovak regions constituted 28.0 per cent. In 1930 the Czech regions had 76.3 per cent of the population of the country at that time, and the Slovak regions had 23.7 per cent, that is, 10.7 million and 3.4 million respectively. Thus between 1930 and 1947 the proportion, as well as the actual number, of the population living in the Czech regions declined, principally because of the exodus of the ethnic Germans, whereas the proportion of the population residing in Slovakia increased. A further consequence of the

²⁴Wynne, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁵This section is based largely on Wynne, op. cit., pp. 15, 46.

population change in this seventeen-year period was that the average density of population fell from 135 to 111 persons per sq. km. in the Czech areas. In Slovakia, however, the average density increased slightly from 68 to 69 persons per sq. km. Despite the reduction of population, Czechoslovakia in 1950 was one of the most densely populated countries in eastern Europe.²⁶

Of the nineteen administrative regions into which Czechoslovakia is divided, thirteen are in the Czech region and six in the Slovak region. All except one of the thirteen Czech regions showed a net population decline between 1930 and 1947. Only the region of Gottwaldov showed an increase in this period--from 575,000 to 594,000, a gain of 3.3 per cent. The Gottwaldov region, it should be noted, is closest of all the Czech regions to Slovakia and may have shared the Slovak rather than the Czech experience during the war. The major reason for the difference, however, was that Gottwaldov, of all the Czech areas, showed no net migratory loss, while at the same time it continued to experience natural increase at the pre-war rate, or at an even higher rate.

As would be expected, the regions which showed the greatest population decline were those which had a large German population before the war. Such regions as Karlovy Vary and Liberec, which lost 52.2 and 35.7 per cent respectively of their prewar population, were the Sudeten border areas in the extreme west and northwest part of Czechoslovakia. Four other border regions in the Czech regions--České Budějovice, Plzeň, Ústí nad Labem, and Olomouc--lost almost a quarter or more of their prewar population. Of the twelve regions showing percentage drops in population as compared with 1930, only the Prague region, with a decline of 1.0 per cent, had a loss of less than 10.0 per cent. The regions from which were drawn the settlers who resettled the vacated Sudeten region were those which had suffered relatively the least loss of population. This would indicate that the population declines in the formerly heavily German areas were even greater in the period immediately following the expulsions, and before resettlement from the central areas of Bohemia-Moravia took place, than the 1947 Czechoslovak census figures reveal.

²⁶See supra.

In Slovakia, on the other hand, only two of the six regions showed any loss at all, and these were quite small. In Banská Bystrica the loss was 1.6 per cent and in Košice the decline amounted to 2.5 per cent. These two regions adjoined the Hungarian border and it was from them that most of the Hungarians and some Germans were expelled. These regions also contributed migrants to the Czech region.²⁷ The other four regions showed gains, though only in the Bratislava region which had an increase of 6.5 per cent was the rise more than minor.

The overall figures for regional population change from 1930 to 1947 reveal that the Czech region declined in population from 10,674,000 to 8,762,000, a drop of 17.9 per cent. The Slovak region increased from 3,324,000 to 3,402,000, an increase of 2.4 per cent.²⁸ Changes in regional distribution since 1947 are shown on the following page (Table 2). It will be noted that the figures for 1954 apparently indicate a reversal of the previous trend toward an increasing proportion of the total population in the Slovak region. However, it must also be remembered that the figures for 1954 are highly speculative, based on far from complete data, and therefore subject to a high probability of error.

Rural-Urban Distribution.²⁹ The population of Czechoslovakia in 1947 was slightly more rural than urban. The rural population--defined as persons living in localities of fewer than 2,000 inhabitants--constituted 51.1 per cent of the total, and the urban segment comprised 48.9 per cent. In 1930 the rural percentage was 52.6 and the urban proportion was 47.4 per cent. The intervening period was thus not marked by any significant shift one way or the other. In absolute numbers both segments were smaller in 1947 than in 1930: rural, 6.2 million in 1947 as against 7.4 million in 1930; urban, 5.9 million and 6.6 million, respectively.

²⁷ Palic, "Povojnové populačné presuny v Československu," Československý přehled, I No. 10 (December 1954), 21.

²⁸ Ibid, 20; V. Palic, "Povojnový vývoj obyvatelstva na Slovensku," Československý přehled, II No. 1, (January 1955), p. 6.

²⁹ This section based largely on Wynne, op cit., pp. 15-17 and Table 8, p. 47.

Table 2
CHANGES IN REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION SINCE 1947

Year	Czechoslovakia	Regions			
		Czech		Slovak	
		Number	Per cent of total	Number	Per cent of total
1948 (January 1)	12,209,000	8,791,000	72.00	3,418,000	28.00
1949 (January 1)	12,279,000	8,833,000	71.93	3,447,000	28.07
1950 (March 1)	12,340,000	8,860,000	71.81	3,480,000	28.19
1951 (January 1)*	12,455,000	8,923,000	71.64	3,532,000	28.36
1952					
1953 (January 1)†	12,700,000				
1954 (January 1)†	12,800,000	9,172,000 [§]	71.66	3,628,000 [‡]	28.34

* Data from 1948 to 1951 from Wynne, op. cit., Table 1, p. 43.

‡ Population forecasts, ibid., p. 40. Also Palic, "Povoijnové populačné presuny v Československu" op. cit., p. 21, Palic estimates 80,000 more for 1954.

† Figure for the end of 1953 given by Antonín Zápotocký, President of Czechoslovakia in a speech at Bratislava on August 30, 1954. Palic, "Povoijnový vývoj obyvateľstva na Slovensku," op. cit., p. 8.

§ Obtained by subtracting the figure for Slovakia from the total Czechoslovak population.

The characteristic out-movement from rural areas, where birth rates were high and economic opportunities low, was under way in Czechoslovakia long before the several provinces were united in the Republic in 1918; it continued in considerable force in the first decade of the nation's existence. Growth of the largest cities was very marked, and the relative contribution of natural increase and net migration between 1921 and 1930 for cities of 100,000 or more in 1930 may be seen from the following table:

Table 3
NATURAL INCREASE AND MIGRATION IN CITIES, 1921-1930*

City	Population		Per cent increase		
	1930	1921	Total	Through natural increase	Through migration
Prague	349,000	677,000	25.4	3.0	22.4
Prague suburbs	135,000	85,000	59.1	11.2	47.9
Plzeň	115,000	108,000	6.2	1.4	4.8
Brno	265,000	222,000	19.5	3.6	15.9
Ostrava	125,000	114,000	10.2	6.4	3.8
Bratislava	124,000	93,000	32.9	6.1	26.8

* Wynne, op. cit., p. 15.

The smaller cities were also growing rapidly during this decade. In most instances in-migration was of greater importance than natural increase. The strong movement toward the cities actually caused a decline in the population of many rural districts as the outward urban movement exceeded the excess of births over deaths.

This city-ward shift continued in the 1930's though its volume was considerably reduced as a consequence of the economic depression of those years. After 1938 the "normal" movement was interrupted by political events, and the distribution of population in 1947 was partly a consequence of the expulsion of the Germans and the subsequent resettlement of the vacated areas.

In terms of population distribution by size of locality, the changes between 1930 and 1947 showed a general, though not marked, increase in cities of 50,000 and over. On the other hand, cities of between 5,000 and 50,000 did not change significantly during these years. Localities of 2,000 to 5,000 in size were only 14.6 per cent of the total population in 1947 as compared with 16.9 per cent in 1930. Rural centers and villages of less than 2,000 population had a smaller share of the total population in 1947 than they had in 1930. These rural localities suffered an absolute loss of 1.1 million persons. When taken together with the loss experienced by cities in the 2,000-5,000 size range (588,000), the total decline for all inhabited localities of 5,000 population or less is about 1.7 million. While these smaller localities comprised 69.5 per cent of the total population of Czechoslovakia in 1930 they accounted for 94.3 per cent of the decline in the total population of the country between 1930 and 1947.

Little is known of the process of urbanization in Czechoslovakia since 1947. The data made available from the Czechoslovak census of March 1, 1950 conveys little in this respect. However, some recently published works in Czechoslovakia evidently have used unpublished data from the 1950 census and this is available at second or third hand.

Figures on population development in cities of 10,000 or more population indicate that these places experienced a rise in number amounting to about 228,000. Twenty-three Bohemian cities showed an increase of 119,400;³⁰ twenty-six Moravian towns had a net growth of 63,650;³¹ and twenty-five Slovakian cities increased by some 46,000 persons.³² In addition, some 24 Bohemian cities maintained a stable population between

³⁰M. Blažek, hospodářská geografie Československa (Prague: 1954), as cited by V. Palič, "Niekoľko údajov o vývoji obyvateľstva v Čechách a na Moravě, I," Československý přehled, II, No. 4 (April 1955), 14-15.

³¹Blažek, op. cit.; cited by Palič, "Niekoľko údajov o vývoji obyvateľstva v Čechách a na Moravě, II," Československý přehled, II, No. 5 (May 1955), 11-14.

³²Blažek, op. cit., as cited in Palič, "Povojnový vývoj obyvateľstva," na Slovensku, Československý přehled, II, No. 2 (Feb. 1955), 16-20.

1947 and 1950.³³

When it is noted that the urban growth of cities of 10,000 population and above was some 53,800 more than the total population increase in the intercensus period between May 22, 1947 and March 1, 1950 (which was 175,000), it is apparent that the steady decline in population of the rural countryside continued. Indeed, with the emphasis on industrialization and the unattractiveness of agriculture in Communist Czechoslovakia today, there is every reason to believe that this trend has accelerated in recent years.

Composition of the Population

Age and Sex Composition

Changes in Age and Sex Structure, 1930-1947.³⁴ The seventeen years between the censuses of 1930 and 1947 produced a population whose age structure varied considerably from that indicated in the earlier enumeration. One striking feature of the Czechoslovak population is the ageing that occurred. The median age of the population in 1930 was 27.7 years; by 1947 this had increased to 31.2 years. The number of persons under thirty dropped from 54.2 per cent of the population in 1930 to 48.3 per cent in 1947

During this time the very youngest age group, children under five, remained in almost the same proportion of the total population in 1947 as in 1930--9.4 per cent as against 9.3 per cent. However, in absolute numbers there was a drop of 200,000 in this age group from 1.3 million in 1930 to 1.1 million in 1947. Children of ages five to nine constituted a much smaller proportion of the total population in 1947 than they did in 1930--7.6 per cent, as against 10.1 per cent at the earlier date. This difference is even more striking when seen in terms of the actual numbers. There was a decline of over one-third in this age-group, from 1.4 million to 928,000.

³³ Blažek, op. cit., cited in Palic, "Povojnový vývoj obyvatelstva v Čechách a na Moravě, I," Československý přehled, II, No. 4 (April 1955), 14-15.

³⁴ This section based on Wynne, op. cit., pp. 21-22. No data is available on age and sex structure since 1947.

In the next five-year age cohort, ages ten to fourteen, the number was approximately the same in 1947 as in 1930--881,000 and 883,000, respectively. In relation to the total population, however, the 1947 group formed a higher percentage than it had in 1930--7.2 per cent as against 6.3 per cent in 1930.

Persons fifteen to twenty-nine numbered 2.9 million and constituted 24 per cent of the population in 1947; they were both relatively and absolutely less numerous than in 1930. In the earlier year they amounted to 28.5 per cent of the population and numbered 4.0 million persons.

In the age group thirty to forty-four, we find that the number was 114,000 less than in 1930 but that the proportion increased from 20.7 per cent to 23.0 per cent by 1947. Among people of older ages--forty-five to sixty-four--the number was about the same in 1947 as in 1930. The relative proportion, however, increased from 18.3 per cent to 21.1 per cent. The same trend is seen in statistics concerning persons aged sixty-five and above. In spite of Czechoslovakia's population losses during the inter-census period, there were as many people of these ages as in 1930. The general ageing trend, in part reflecting the population loss, is confirmed by the respective proportions of the total population the sixty-five and above age group comprised in 1930 and 1947--6.7 per cent in 1930 as against 7.6 per cent in 1947.

In most age groups no regional differences are apparent. However, this is not true of the very youngest ages, where there is a striking disparity. In 1947 the Czech region had a slightly higher proportion of children under five years than in 1930 but a considerably smaller proportion in the five to nine-year-old group. In the Slovak region, however, the proportion in each of these age groups was markedly smaller in 1947 than it had been in 1930. This relative decline is the more surprising because in spite of the smaller population base in Slovakia the birth rate there was higher than in the Czech region.

The population of Czechoslovakia in 1947 contained 5.9 million males and 6.3 million females, or 94.4 males for every 100 females. Analysis of the population by five-year age groups shows males to be

more numerous than females in each age group under twenty years and females more numerous than males in all age groups above twenty years. The disparity between the two sexes becomes increasingly marked in the upper age groups, and it is most noticeable in the group of persons of sixty-five years and older.

Measured in actual numbers, females in 1947 outnumbered males by 348,000. Most of this excess occurred at ages forty-five and above. In the age groups twenty to forty-four years, women outnumbered men by 85,000; however, this disparity rose to 196,000 in ages forty-five to sixty-four, and to 118,000 in the ages above sixty-five.

The ratio between males and females was about the same in 1947 as in 1930: 94.4 and 94.1 men per 100 women. Sex ratios in the Czech and Slovak regions in 1930 were identical, and remained the same in the Czech regions for 1947. The Slovak area had a slightly greater number of men in 1947--95.4 per 100 women.

National Composition

No official data relating to the national structure of the Czechoslovak population is available subsequent to the last prewar census of December 1, 1930. Nevertheless, enough is known about population development in Czechoslovakia to enable us to make fairly accurate estimates for the postwar period.

The characteristic feature of the prewar Czechoslovak population was the highly heterogeneous make-up of its nationality structure. Czechs and Slovaks constituted approximately 66 per cent of the total population; Germans comprised some 22.5 per cent; Hungarians (Magyars) almost 5 per cent; and then in order of number came Russians and Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, and others (Gypsies, Rumanians, etc.). The table on the following page clearly delineates the ethnic diversity of prewar Czechoslovakia (including Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia).

Table 4
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
BY MOTHER TONGUE, CENSUS OF DECEMBER 1, 1930*

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Czech and Slovak	9,755,961	66.24
German	3,318,242	22.53
Hungarian	713,472	4.84
Russian and Ukrainian	564,940	3.84
Jewish (Yiddish)	201,255	1.37
Polish	100,255	.68
Other	74,971	.50
Total	14,729,000	100.00

*Based on Wynne, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26 and Table 18, p. 65; Jean Mousset, *Les Villes de la Russie Subcarpatique (1919-1938)* (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1938), p. 36.

By December 31, 1938, the population had increased to about 15,375,000.³⁵ Assuming that the nationality breakdown of 1930 remained unchanged (and there is no reason to expect any significant variation) the national structure of the Republic was substantially as follows at the end of 1938:

Table 5
ESTIMATED NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
BY MOTHER TONGUE, DECEMBER 31, 1938*

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Czech and Slovak	10,184,575	66.24
German	3,464,047	22.53
Hungarian	744,163*	4.84
Russian and Ukrainian	590,410	3.84
Jewish (Yiddish)	210,641	1.37
Polish	104,552	.68
Other	76,876	.50
Total	15,375,264	100.00

*Some 24,000 Hungarians who entered Czechoslovakia after November 1938 are not included in the total for December 31, 1938.

³⁵Based on an overall population increase of 4.385 per cent by 1938 over 1930. Derived from data in Wynne, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia had about 763,000 population at that time.

It should be noted that in both of the tables on national composition the figure for persons of Jewish nationality did not correspond to the actual number of Jews based on the criteria of religion. According to religious faith there were 345,255 persons of Jewish faith residing in Czechoslovakia in 1930. While the instructions for registering nationality in the 1930 census strictly enjoined using mother tongue as the criterion, Jews were always to be permitted to register as of Jewish nationality regardless of mother tongue.³⁶ Actually, many Jews registered as being of other nationalities, often as German in Bohemia or Moravia or as Hungarian in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.³⁷

The events of the war and the postwar population transfers significantly changed the composition of nationalities in Czechoslovakia. With the transfer of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union under the treaty of June 29, 1945,³⁸ a great majority of Ukrainians and Russians were eliminated from the Czechoslovak national picture. The large prewar German minority likewise disappeared, through expulsion, however, not territorial transfer. The Jews in Czechoslovakia suffered the same fate as did Jews throughout Nazi-dominated Europe. By the time of the May 22, 1947 census, even the 55,000 survivors of the German extermination camps had been more than halved by immigration to Palestine, the United States, and elsewhere. Hungarians now assumed the position of the most numerous national minority in the Republic. Although subject to repatriation and expulsion in numerous instances, this group still numbered an estimated 630,000 at the time of the 1947 census. We have no information on the experiences of the prewar Polish minority, and it is assumed that they continued to increase at the 1930-1938 rate.

³⁶Wynne, op. cit., note 1, Table 18, p. 65.

³⁷This phenomenon is discussed by Mousset, op. cit., pp. 36-37; and Edgar p. Young, Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy (London: Gollancz, 1938), p. 102.

³⁸For the text of this treaty see The American Review on the Soviet Union, VII, No. 1 (Nov. 1945), 64-65.

Similarly, no data is on hand concerning minor groups such as Gypsies, Rumanians,³⁹ etc. It is assumed that these peoples also continued to increase at the prewar rate.⁴⁰ The following table illustrates the estimated national composition of Czechoslovakia as of May 1947.

Table 6
ESTIMATED NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
BY MOTHER TONGUE, MAY 22, 1947

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Czech and Slovak	10,943,000	89.96
Hungarian	630,000	5.18
German	250,000	2.06
Russian and Ukrainian	128,000	1.06
Polish	108,000	.89
Jewish (Yiddish)	25,000	.20
Others	80,000	.66
Total	12,165,000	100.00

In subsequent years there was a further diminution of the minority nationalities. The exchange of Hungarians for Slovaks in Hungary continued throughout 1947, and by the end of the year the total repatriated to Hungary after the end of the war had reached 88,000. Of these, 64,000

³⁹ An exchange of population agreement was signed between Czechoslovakia and Rumania on July 10, 1946, providing for the transfer of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks from Rumania to Czechoslovakia. See supra. It is not known whether the Rumanian minority in Czechoslovakia was likewise afforded the opportunity to leave for Rumania. The small number of Rumanians in prewar Czechoslovakia lived mainly in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

⁴⁰ Assuming increase for minority groups at the prewar rate means that the totals for these groups so estimated must be taken as maximum figures since it is likely that any deviation from the prewar rate would have been a downward one in view of the abnormal war conditions during most of the 1938-1947 period. The marked upward swing in the rate of natural increase which has taken place since the end of the war would not have had time to influence significantly population growth by the Spring of 1947.

were members of the prewar Magyar minority and 24,000 were those who had entered Czechoslovakia after November 1938. The number of Hungarians remaining in Czechoslovakia in 1954 may be estimated as between 580,000 and 600,000.⁴¹ In September 1948 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia announced a policy of restoring Czechoslovak citizenship to loyal Hungarians. Thereafter the Magyar problem no longer created difficulties between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.⁴²

The number of Germans in Czechoslovakia at present may also be estimated as between 100,000 and 200,000.⁴³ A policy of cultural "autonomy" for national groups in the Republic was adopted in 1949 by the Communist Party and government. In August 1951 further expulsions of Germans was halted and in May 1953 all Germans who had previously lost their Czechoslovak citizenship had it automatically restored.⁴⁴

In 1950 the number of Jews remaining in Czechoslovakia was estimated at no more than 16,000.⁴⁵ In spite of difficulties which since 1949-1950 have been placed in the path of those Jews who wish to emigrate from Czechoslovakia, it is likely that even this small number has

⁴¹V. Palic, "Povojnový vývoj obyvateľstva na Slovensku," Československý přehled, II, No. 1 (Jan. 1955), 10, offers the estimate of 592,400 Hungarians forming 4.7 per cent of the total population.

⁴²Supra, note 23.

⁴³The 100,000 figure is given in the New York Times, August 7, 1952. Valenta, op. cit., p. 7, estimates 200,000 in 1954. Kulischer, "Population Changes Behind the Iron Curtain," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science No. 271 (Sep. 1950), p. 108, spoke of persistent reports in the Spring of 1949 of the planned return of 300,000 expelled Sudeten Germans from the Soviet zone to Czechoslovakia. "In spite of an official denial by Tass, the news was repeatedly confirmed, and the first groups, consisting of returned expellees as well as Reich Germans, were reportedly already settled."

⁴⁴Valenta, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

⁴⁵Wynne, op. cit., p. 26.

shrunk further. No information is available on the minor nationalities except for Ukrainians and Gypsies. Palic has estimated that there were 163,850 Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia in 1950, who formed 1.3 per cent of the total population at that time. He has also given the number of Gypsies in 1954 as 105,000, most of them concentrated in eastern Slovakia.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Palic op. cit., p. 10.


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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 1947

Source: 1. Bartholomew, *Times Atlas of the World*, Vol. III, 1955, Plate 62.
 2. *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1954, p. 903.



LANGUAGE

Two distinct languages are spoken in Czechoslovakia, Czech and Slovak. However, the differences between these two languages are so insignificant that there is no barrier to mutual communication. A Czech and a Slovak can communicate with each other much more easily than a Spaniard and a Portuguese, a Norwegian and a Swede, or a Russian and a Ukrainian. Linguistic differences between Czech and Slovak are phonetic and morphological rather than syntactical and lexicographic. There are few words and idioms in each language which are not intelligible to those who speak the other language. Translations from one language into the other would have little success on the literary market; neither in literature nor in linguistic circles is there felt a need for a differential dictionary. Slovak is taught in Czech schools only in Czech language classes, and the time devoted to it is minimal; the same is true of the teaching of Czech in Slovak schools.

The consciousness of the similarity of the two languages was so strong that until recently Czech and Slovak were considered a single language (Czechoslovak) even by the best Czech, Slovak and foreign linguists. Differences were explained as due to the process characteristic of the differentiation of dialects.¹ This view was particularly strengthened by the fact that as recently as a hundred years ago Czech was used as a literary language in both the Czech provinces and in Slovakia, and that several leading Slovaks helped to build it up during the time of the Czech renaissance at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The outstanding linguists of that period had no doubts about including Slovakia in the territory of Czech language, which they sometimes called the Czechoslavic language.²

The first attempt to introduce an independent literary Slovak language at the end of the eighteenth century was unsuccessful because

¹Pavel Bujnák (ed), *Slovenský naučný slovník*, (Bratislava: Tiekovský, 1932).

²Arne Novák, *Stručné dějiny literatury české* (Olomouc:1946), p. 139.

of the lack of interest on the part of educated Slovaks. The formal separation of the two languages occurred sixty years later. It was not an expression of efforts to emancipate Slovak from the Czech language, but a measure designed to prevent the Magyarization of Slovaks.³ But even then two outstanding Slovaks of that period, Kollár and Šafárik, refused to accept the linguistic separation and continued to write in Czech.⁴

The idea of a single language persisted until the late thirties of the twentieth century, in spite of the fact that both linguists and writers had reconciled themselves to the existence of two literary languages. Under the influence of the leading Czech linguist, Jan Gebauer⁵, a theory of a single Czechoslovak language divided into two literary languages and several dialects was proposed. It is noteworthy that the Slovenský naučný slovník (Slovak Encyclopedia) of 1935 was still using the term československý jazyk (Czechoslovak language), accepting Gebauer's explanations.⁶ Shortly before World War II, the single-language theory was repudiated by linguists, and the division between Czech and Slovak languages was established approximately at the ethnic borderline.

It is assumed that both languages originated in the early Middle Ages and that they had started to differentiate in the original Slavic fatherland, i. e., before the fourth to seventh century A. D. After that period Czech and Slovak emerged as two languages of the same linguistic group, which may be called Czechoslovak in contrast to other Slavic linguistic groups--the Polish group (Polish, Kashubian and the languages now dead, spoken by former inhabitants of the Baltic and Elbe regions), the Russian group (Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian), the Yugoslav group (Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian), and the Bulgarian group (Bulgarian, Macedonian

³Bujnák, op. cit., pp. 189-90.

⁴Ibid.

⁵J. Gebauer, Historická mluvnice jazyka českého, I. (Prague: Tempský, 1894).

⁶Bujnák, op. cit.

and Church Slavonic). Together with Polish and Lusatian, the Czechoslovak group constitutes the Western Slavic group.⁷

Czech has always been richer, more developed, and more widely spoken than Slovak. The first traces of Czech can be found in Church Slavonic and Latin texts from the eleventh century; the first literary work in Czech was written at the beginning of the fourteenth century. At the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century there appeared so many Czech writings that a need was felt for standardization of the literary language. This task was accomplished by Master Jan Hus, who established the central Bohemian dialect as the literary language. It was purified grammatically during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the schools of the Bohemian Brethren.

Beginning in the thirteenth century Czech was exposed to the influence of German, which was introduced in Bohemia and Moravia by the settling German immigrants in the border regions. The danger of Germanization substantially increased after the Thirty Years' War when Bohemia lost its independence, particularly in the eighteenth century when Czech disappeared completely from the cities and German was the only recognized language in schools and government.

Dobrovský's Czech grammar, written as a monument of a quasi-extinct language, marks the beginning of the Czech national renaissance.⁸ From the beginning of the nineteenth century Czech underwent a rapid development, aided by the rationalist and romantic reaction to enlightened absolutism and by deep social changes like the abolition of serfdom, industrialization and urbanization. At the end of the century it attained the status of a modern European language and was equipped with literary and scientific vocabularies. During its development Czech further differentiated from the common core of Slavic languages.

As are other modern languages, Czech is an abstract concept

⁷J. Holub and F. Kopečný, Etymologický slovník jazyka českého (Praha: Státní nakladatelství učebnic, 1952).

⁸Novák, op. cit.

subsuming the literary and common languages, geographic dialects and slangs of various social groups. Most Czechs speak the common language (obecný or mluvený jazyk); it is a compromise between the literary language and the dialects and has developed under the impact of the mass communication media.

Of the Czech dialects, there are four in Bohemia: Central Bohemian, spoken in the region of Prague; East Bohemian, spoken in northeast Bohemia and including the podkrkonošský sub-dialect; South western, including the chodský sub-dialect spoken in and around Domažlice and the doudlebský sub-dialect spoken in the region of České Budějovice; Czech-Moravian, which forms a transition to Moravian dialects and is spoken in the region of Polička. Moravia has four: the Moravian-Czech dialect of the western border of Moravia; the hanácký dialect in Central Moravia; the Moravian-Slovak, moravsko-slovenský, dialect, including the valašský dialect of eastern Moravia and the Moravian-Slovak dialect proper, called slovácký, in use in southern Moravia; the lašský dialect, which is a transition to the Silesian dialects and is spoken in northern Moravia. There is one group also in Moravian Silesia. The differences among dialects are mainly phonetic and morphological, and there are no difficulties in mutual communication. On the other hand, traces of dialect in common Czech easily identify the speaker's local origin.

Various occupational and other groups in larger cities developed their own slang. The slang and argot of the Prague underworld is particularly rich.

The separate and slower development of Slovak was due primarily to the fact that from the beginning of the tenth century up to World War I Slovaks lived under Magyar rule. The first traces of written Slovak appeared in the fourteenth century, three centuries after Czech entered the realm of literature. During the fifteenth century, literary Czech was brought to Slovakia by exiled Bohemian Brethren and was readily accepted, reaching a peak at the beginning of the seventeenth century with the arrival of a wave of Czech exiles. In 1790, however, Antonín Bernolák, a Catholic priest, attempted to establish the Western Slovak dialect as the Slovak literary language, presumably in order to strengthen the Catholic Church in Slovakia and to stop the influence of Czech Protestants. In spite of the

fact that the Western Slovak dialect is very close to Czech, Bernolák's attempt proved to be a failure.

The beginnings of present-day literary Slovak date back to 1844 when Central Slovak became the literary language under the influence of Slovak leaders Štúr, Hodža and Hurban. They made this decision in order to mitigate insurgent Magyar nationalism and the forceful effort of the Hungarian government to convert Slovak to a dialect spoken only by backward highlanders. Nevertheless, their action was accepted generally only in 1852 when the original phonetic orthography was replaced by a system closely resembling Czech orthography. In 1875 Hurban himself tried to return to literary Czech which he called (as did Kollár) staroslovenčina, the Old Slovak.⁹ But under the pressure of Magyarization there arose enthusiastic new defenders of Slovak, and literary Slovak gained complete recognition by the end of the nineteenth century. However, a thorough Slovak grammar and dictionary have not yet been written.

In the course of its development, Slovak was not carried as far away from the common Slavic basis as was Czech or Polish, and therefore it is more easily comprehended by speakers of other Slavic tongues. It has preserved many of the phonetic and morphological characteristics common to all Slavic languages. Because of some similarities with the Yugoslav languages, Slovak was incorrectly included by some linguists (for example, Czambo) in the group of Southern Slavic languages.

The linguistic borders of Slovak are approximately identical with the political frontiers of Slovakia in the north and the west. In the south the Slovak linguistic territory stops approximately at the line formed by Bratislava -- Nové Zámky -- Košice-Užhorod; in the northeast it reaches approximately to the line between Poprad and Užhorod.

Of the thirteen million inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, one-fourth to one-third consider Slovak their mother tongue. However, Slovak

⁹Bujnák, op. cit.

linguistic territory is much more distinctly divided into a great variety of dialects. This is a consequence of the long absence of a literary language, a lack of Slovak schools and the lack of a common cultural center before the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic. There are great differences between Western Slovak, which merges almost unnoticeably into the Moravian-Slovak and valašský dialects (the Slovak Encyclopedia counts the latter two as Slovak dialects), and the Eastern Slovak dialect, which makes a similar transition into Ukrainian. Usually three main groups of dialects are recognized, each having a number of sub-dialects: Western (regions of Bratislava, Nitra and Trenčín), Central (regions of Orava, Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, Turčianský Svätý Martin, Zvolen, Nové Hradky and Gemer) and Eastern (regions of Spiš, Šáris, and Zemplín). Slovak slangs are fewer and poorer than Czech ones.

For Czechs, language has been a symbol of national individuality for centuries. An intimate and almost sentimental relationship between Czechs and their language has been expressed in numerous poems and treatises defending or glorifying the language. The struggle for "language rights" was a main political issue before the Thirty Years' War and again from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II. It was primarily this strong attachment to the language, in spite of a variety of local vernaculars, that unified Czechs during the period of their national renaissance and molded them into a nation. The encroachments upon Czech during the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia were a main cause of Czech hatred of Germans. Similarly there is today a great deal of resentment against the strong emphasis on Russian and against Russification of the Czech language.

Among Slovaks language became a universal national symbol only in the thirties. Up to that time the strong attachment to Slovak was common only among nationalist intellectuals and professionals. The introduction of mass communication media to the rural communities, growth of schools and the increasing political participation of the peasants resulted in a decreasing use of dialects, lessening of local patriotism, and the growing consciousness of belonging to the larger national group. In that period differences between Slovak and Czech acquired political significance, and the intense feeling about Slovak came to characterize the desire for political

and cultural autonomy.

Of other languages spoken in Czechoslovak territory, Hungarian is most important today. It is the common language in the region of the southern Slovak plains along the rivers Danube and Tisa. Ukrainian is spoken in northeastern Slovakia, along the Carpatho-Ukrainian and Polish borders. It is the most privileged minority language at the present time. German, which was the mother tongue of three and a half million inhabitants until 1945, lost its privileged position with the transfer of the Sudeten Germans. At present there are only isolated German islands in and around the industrial cities of western and northern Bohemia and Moravia. The smallest linguistic group is Polish, which is spoken in the district of Český Těšín.

The government recognizes only Czech and Slovak as state languages. Nevertheless, all minority groups enjoy at present a certain degree of cultural autonomy: they have their own national and secondary schools, newspapers, theaters and associations.

The ethnic diversity of prewar Czechoslovakia and the obligatory curriculum in schools contributed to the development of bilingualism or even trilingualism (in Moravian Silesia and eastern Slovakia). Among Czechs the most common second language was, and probably still is, German, which was obligatory for all pupils over the age of nine before World War II and during German occupation, from the first school year. In 1945 the teaching of German was abolished, only to be introduced a few years ago in the secondary schools as an elective course. In Slovak schools Hungarian was frequently given preference over German.

Since the Communist coup d'état Russian has taken the prewar role of German in schools and has become increasingly important for civil servants, industrial managers and other people in positions of importance. So-called "circles [Russian language]" have been established in factories, offices, collective farms, etc. A great number of Russian books, newspapers and periodicals is imported daily from the Soviet Union and distributed to schools and other establishments. ^{The} Technical language has been strongly influenced by Russian, and many Russian expressions have been introduced even into Czech and Slovak scientific dictionaries. ¹⁰

¹⁰See for example František Trávníček, Slovník jazyka českého (Fourth edition; Prague: Slovanské nakladatelství, 1952).

Apart from German, English and French are the most commonly known western European languages. They are offered as elective subjects in secondary schools, colleges and universities.

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HISTORY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO WORLD WAR I

The history of the Czech struggle for a linguistic, cultural and political identity can be considered as a defensive contest against Germanism and German institutions. The Czechs began their active association with the French traditions at the beginning of the reign of the House of Luxemburg (1310-1437), and that orientation remained despite the "Drang nach Osten." Jan Hus is a symbol of popular reaction to Germanization and is honored by both Catholics and Protestants as a national hero. Pan-Slavism was largely an abreaction to the oppressive conditions of the eighteenth century, a wish-fulfillment movement which envisioned a big Slav state to counterbalance the big Teuton one. It was never taken seriously by the practical founders of the Czechoslovak Republic.

R. W. Seton-Watson says of the nineteenth century that "The struggle has swayed to and fro over almost every yard of ground in the country, and it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that every Czech inscription over a tailor's shop or on a mailbag represents a contest between Czech and German."¹ The stubborn resistance of Bohemia is expressed in Palacky's famous quotation: "Before Austria was, we were, and when Austria no longer is, we still shall be." This statement, delivered after Vienna had refused Czech requests for state recognition, marks the evolution of opinion from federal status to an independent Czechoslovak state. It was quoted frequently by Masaryk after World War I started.

Certainly equally epic and perhaps more heroic was the Slovak thousand-year resistance to Magyarization. The heaviest pressures came after the Ausgleich of 1867, when Hungary applied a vigorous assimilation policy. Perhaps the one lasting effect of this policy was to drive the Slovak intelligentsia to Czech schools and unite Czechs and Slovaks in their desire for separatism.

¹Robert W. Seton-Watson, German, Slav and Magyar: A Study in the Origins of the Great War (London: Williams and Norgate, 1916), p. 163.

Early History to the Extinction of the House of Přemyslid²⁵

The first evidences of Slavic political organization in the historic provinces took place under the leadership of a certain Samo. This tribal union existed ca. 623-657, during which time it managed to fight off aggression by the Avars and the Franks. The union did not survive its creator. The next state of any size was the Great Moravian Empire (second half of the ninth century to 906 which reached its climax under Svatopluk 870-894). It was finally destroyed by a migration of Asiatic peoples. This period is important in that the Greek missionaries Constantine and Methodius brought Christianity to the west Slavs in the "Church Slavic" dialect (863) against the opposition of the German clergy. However, soon after Methodius' death (885), Pope Stephen reimposed the ban on Slavic liturgy. Significant also is the fact that after 906 Slovakia was, save for two brief interludes, under the domination of Hungary.

The rise of Bohemia took place gradually in the ninth and tenth centuries. Boleslav I (929-967) carried on constant warfare against the encroaching Germans but was eventually forced to accept a position in the Holy Roman Empire. He participated in one of the great battles of the Middle Ages with Otto the Great against the heathen Hungarians at Lechfield (955), which prevented their further penetration into Italy and Germany. The eleventh and twelfth centuries were filled with dynastic rivalries and repeated "contacts and conflicts" with Polish and German armies many times invited into the country by various competing branches of the Přemyslid²⁵. During this period the influence of the Germans was intensified by the penetration of colonists, who brought with them their own code of laws, the increased importance of the German clergy, and the intermarrying of the Bohemian princely houses with German princesses. Otakar I (1197-1230), due to divisions within Germany, made the Bohemian king an important factor in Germany and gained some privileges in Church affairs. In 1212 the Golden Bull of Frederick II confirmed the right of the Bohemian princes to elect their own ruler. Under Václav I (1230-1253) the power of the Germans increased. During the reign of Otakar II (1253-1278) Bohemia reached the height of its territorial expansion, which included Bohemia-Moravia, Silesia and Styria to the Adriatic, but Otakar was forced to surrender much of his territory under the

attacks of the German emperor. During this time the famous silver mines at Kutná Hora and Jáchymov were opened, which made Bohemia one of the richest countries in Europe. After the death of Otakar II Bohemia became immersed in Polish and Hungarian affairs, and the last Přemyslide, Václav III (1305-1306), was murdered en route to Poland to suppress a revolt of the nobles.

The House of Luxemburg (1310-1378) to White Mountain (1620)

John of Luxemburg (1310-1346), who had married Elizabeth, the sister of Václav III, the last Přemyslide, was absent most of the time from his kingdom. He died at the Battle of Crecy. Since he was largely indifferent to the internal affairs of his kingdom, much power defaulted to the nobles. However, there was a gradual flowering of culture which blossomed under John's son Charles I (1437-1478). Charles was also the German emperor Charles IV. His reign is known as the "Golden Age" of Bohemian history. Charles issued a series of charters which guaranteed to Bohemia secular independence, gave the King of Bohemia first place among the secular electors of the empire, and determined Bohemian dynastic succession. Charles promoted cultural refinement, promulgated a code of laws and built the University of Prague (1348), the first university in central Europe.

Under Václav IV (1378-1419; Václav I as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire) Bohemia gradually lost its position in the Empire. The Hussite movement, a powerful symbol of Czech national unity, grew up as a reform and protest against the excesses of the Catholic Church; it necessarily had a strong anti-German flavor. After Jan Hus was burned at the stake (1415) the nation began to form into armed camps, and when Sigismund was proclaimed King of Bohemia the reformers broke into two groups to oppose him. The Pope proclaimed a Bohemian crusade, but the German armies were repeatedly defeated by the military genius of Jan Žižka and Procop the Great. However, civil war broke out between the two factions, the Praguers (moderates), and the Taborites (radicals). The Taborites were defeated and the Praguers were granted many of their reforms by the Pope at the Council of Basel. After Sigismund's death (1437) there were a few years of confusion while a young nobleman, Jiří of Podebrad, a Hus-

site prince, suppressed the Taborites and consolidated his own power. He was elected king (1459), but his reign was marked with resurgent nationalism, difficulties with the Pope and with Matthias of Hungary. During his reign his brother Lukas organized the Unity of Czech Brethren on the basis of the philosophy of Chelčický. Masaryk admired this institution as a combination of strength and humility.

During the reign of Vladislav II (1471-1516), also King of Poland and Hungary, internal affairs in Bohemia were neglected and the influx of Germans began again. The nobles became excessively powerful and the peasantry sank to a condition of near serfdom. His son Louis (1516-1526) ascended the throne at the age of ten. Things continued as under his father except that during his reign the growth of Lutheranism further complicated matters. After his death in battle with the Turks on the field of Mohacs, the Bohemian Estates elected Ferdinand of Hapsburg, brother of Emperor Charles V, as king. This inaugurated a period of Hapsburg rule which was to last with slight interruption until the end of World War I. Ferdinand followed a policy of Germanization and Catholicism in Bohemia while the Reformation movement and Lutheranism were becoming powerful in Germany. Military action was required on several occasions to keep both the Estates and townsmen in order. Ferdinand was extremely unpopular in Bohemia. He introduced Jesuitical violence into Bohemia before the end of his reign.

Maximilian II (1562-1576) succeeded Ferdinand. He was milder toward Protestants than his father had been, but the influence of the Catholic court increased steadily. Under Rudolf II (1576-1612) the lines of religious antagonism became more sharply defined. The country became richer in works of art and intellectual tradition, but the entire period from 1526-1620 was one of continual deception by the Hapsburgs for the purpose of receiving taxation, of increased influence and wealth for the Catholic court at the expense of Protestant majorities in the towns and of enforced Catholicism. The erratic rule of Rudolf was ended by another Hapsburg, Matthias (1612-1618), who forced him off the throne. Matthias, however, was old and childless. He did manage to secure the throne of Bohemia for his cousin Ferdinand, a Catholic bigot whose intention to impose Catholicism by force was all too soon manifest.

The famous "Defenestration of Prague" (May 23, 1618) was the Protestants' answer to administrative abuses. A group of nobles under the leadership of Matthias of Thurn marched to the castle in Prague, and after a heated altercation with the representatives of the Hapsburgs the nobles threw them out of the window and appointed their own governors. The Catholic forces in south Germany allied with Spain proved too powerful and Baron Tilly of Brabant defeated the forces of the newly-elected Bohemian king Frederick V of the Palatinate at White Mountain (Nov. 8, 1620). The situation even then was not hopeless, but Frederick and his generals lost their courage and fled. Thus at the end of 1620 all of Bohemia was in Ferdinand's hands. Much of the Thirty Years' War which followed was fought over Bohemia, and the nation lost over two-thirds of its population and almost all its nobility, nearly all its lands were handed over to Catholics, and the Jesuits burned almost all the indigenous literature and produced nothing to replace it. The Czech nobility was largely wiped out and was replaced by Austrian, Spanish and Italian nobles. The treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of hostilities; it found Bohemia decimated, Catholicized and in the hands of large foreign noble landholders.

Westphalia (1648) to the Beginning of the "National Rebirth" (1790)

The people of Bohemia had their liberties reduced substantially; Prague became just an administrative center rather than the capital of an autonomous state within the Empire. The power and numbers of the Germans increased tremendously during this period. The country was made to contribute heavily to campaigns to liberate Hungary from the Turks, and during the wars of the Austrian Succession Prague was actually taken by Bavarian and French troops. Bohemia had to contribute continually to Maria Theresa's campaigns for Silesia. These necessities called for an extension of Viennese bureaucracy and administrative centralization. The Jesuit order was abolished and the Bohemian peasant revolt of 1775 showed Maria Theresa the need for reform. Her successor, Joseph II (1780-1790), reformed the school system, freed the peasant from personal bondage and granted religious toleration. He

encouraged industry and commerce and made an attempt to abolish internal tariffs. by 1790, however, Joseph had abolished the use of the Czech language in schools, government and church.

During the era of the "enlightened despots" Maria Theresa and Joseph, an attempt was made at religious, economic and social reform. This was undertaken by extending the bureaucracy, which was German, and rigorously consolidating the central government. The German language was also forced on the Empire as the official language for unity and expediency. This contributed greatly to the revival of Czech national consciousness.

Rebirth of National Consciousness (1790-1918)

Before the French Revolution exported the heady draughts of rationalism, several incidents occurred which contributed to the Bohemian reaction. The imposition of the German language on Slav populations as the official tongue, the publication of several tracts on Czech language and culture and the establishment of a chair of Czech language at the University of Prague were important, but most significant was the gradual movement of rural Czech-speaking people to the cities with the growth of economic centralism. After the Napoleonic interlude, the imposition of the repressive Metternichian police state reduced the expression of national sentiments to romantic poems and stories in Czech and translations of foreign classics into Czech. The movement felt the influence of the German romantic poets such as Herder and Lessing. After over 900 years of submersion in Hungary, the Slovaks participated as vigorously as the Czechs in this intellectual revival. Ján Kollár and Pavel Šafařík (Slovaks) and Dobrovský and Palacký (Czechs) were the leading figures, but there were many lesser lights who participated.

The feeling of national consciousness grew out of the attempt to preserve culture and language. Eventually this movement came under German fire. Palacký influenced the impotent Bohemian Diet to request restoration of the status of the pre-1620 Kingdom of Bohemia and to give the Czech language equal status with German. In this he was assisted

by Karel Havlíček, an influential journalist whose imprisonment, exile and death were perhaps as important as his literary gifts. On the eve of the '48 revolutions in Slovakia the Magyars imposed the Hungarian language upon the Slovaks and denounced them as allies of the Czechs. To cope with this danger the Slovak leaders Štúr and Hodža re-established the dialect of Central Slovakia as the literary language to unite the Slovaks and allay Magyar persecutions.

In Prague the revolution of '48 lasted only a few months. The demands of the Czechs were voiced by the Czech Diet and were personally espoused in Vienna by Count Stadion. In addition, Palacký demanded a federated state and refused to go to the Frankfurt Diet because its purpose was to bring Bohemia into the German Reich. Instead he called the first Pan-Slav congress in Prague in June and proclaimed the solidarity of Slavs in demanding equality with other peoples in the Empire. The revolution in Prague was quashed by military force and the Congress disbanded. On June 17 Windischgrätz declared a military dictatorship over Bohemia. Order having been restored, partially with the assistance of Russian arms, a police state administered by Germans (later called the Bach system), was introduced. Austria's difficulties were manifold. The rise of Prussia and her victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870-71), plus her excellent relations with Russia, threw Austria at the mercy of this new master of central Europe. Though reforms were seriously needed in the Empire, nothing could be done for fear of alienating the German minority. Hungary won its bid for self-determination within the Empire in 1867, and the dual monarchy was established. This left the majority of Slavs underrepresented and at the mercies of the Hungarian and German minorities.

Palacký's policy was to preserve Bohemian statehood within the Austrian Empire, but it was equally to preserve the Empire on a federal basis. He saw the major threat to the Empire as aggressive Germanism insisting on its ancient prerogatives. The nobility of Bohemia, including such men as Thun and Schwarzenberg who were seeking to preserve their own freedom of action in Bohemia, assisted Palacký and the liberals. The Czech bourgeoisie and nobility made a common

cause in the Diet.

After long deliberations Hungary gained its recognition in 1867. The Czech Diet agreed to accept this if similar provisions were made for Bohemia. This was opposed by the Germans and Magyars, but the Hohenwart ministry attempted to find some sort of compromise, largely dealing with language requirements in the civil service in Bohemia. The compromise proved unsatisfactory to the Germans and the ministry in Vienna collapsed. At this point Palacký began to think that Czech autonomy was the only answer. Later, in 1897, Badeni succeeded in pushing through a law on the parity of Czech and German languages in Bohemia, and in 1898 laws divided Bohemia into Czech and German language districts. In 1907 the right to universal parliamentary representation was secured largely through Socialist pressure, though representation was far from equal. However, the Viennese ministries from that time on ruled largely by decree and without parliamentary majorities.

The Slovaks suffered heavily after Hungary gained its authority. They were deprived of schools, national organizations and literature, and an attempt to Magyarize them was vigorously pursued. In addition, economic privation forced thousands to flee to America, and many more drew nearer the Czechs.

In the early sixties, Czech leadership split into the "Old Czechs" led by Palacký and the "Young Czechs" who claimed Havlíček as their spiritual forebear. After Palacký's death (1876) the old Czech Party was on the downgrade. It was led by the able Rieger. Masaryk entered the lists as an independent; however, the bourgeois-romantic attitude of the "Old Czechs" drove him and his party, the "Realists," into the "Camp of the young Czechs." In 1890 Masaryk was elected to the Austrian Parliament on the ticket of the "Young Czechs" and the "Old Czechs" did not succeed in gaining a seat. Masaryk broke from the "Young Czechs" in 1893, however.

Masaryk's "Realist Party" was in actuality a select group of intellectuals who sought to raise not only the level of the idea of Czech uniqueness but sought to educate the countryside as well as the city. He viewed Czech independence within the framework of a federal Austria, which no doubt contributed to his idea of a postwar central European federation. He acknowledged Palacký's concept of the national Czech ethos, feeling that its true expression was in Czech Hussitism and institutionally in the Unity of Czech Brethren.

During World War I both Czechs and Slovaks proved to be poor comrades in arms for the Austrians. Entire units deserted to fight for the Russians. At home German excesses in spy-hunting among the Czechs and Slovaks caused many executions, and regiments were harshly treated by Germans of Magyar units for refusing to fight against the Russians. Opinion at home gravitated to eventual separation. One could not hope for cooperation within a federal state after such cruelty. The Maffia grew up as a secret organization connecting the home front with refugees and public opinion abroad. Masaryk, Beneš, Štefánik, Kramář and many others were important leaders in this organization.

A significant body of opinion grew up in America among the hundreds of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks in this country, which no doubt made it easier for Masaryk to gain the ear of President Wilson. The influence of the exile Czechs and of their army in the field, the famous "Czech Legion," had a direct influence on Wilson's Fourteen Points. The idea of separation had definitely been accepted both at home, abroad and by the western Allies.

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ETHNIC RELATIONS

From Ethnic Diversity to National State

The Czechoslovak Republic, as it was created in 1918, consisted of five major ethnic groups: Czechs and Sudeten Germans in the western provinces, Slovaks in Slovakia, Carpathian Ruthenians (Ukrainians) in the Carpathian Ukraine and Hungarians in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine. In addition there were small groups of Jews, Poles and Gypsies. The relative strength of these groups was as follows: Czechs comprised about 51 per cent, Slovaks about 16 per cent (together 66.91 per cent), Germans 22.32 per cent, Ruthenians (Ukrainians) 3.79 per cent, Hungarians 4.78 per cent, Jews 1.29 per cent, Poles 0.57 per cent and Gypsies 0.22 per cent. There were significant differences among these groups not only in language, but also in their social structure and dominant value orientation.

If one wants to speak about Czechoslovak society of prewar times, he must bear in mind that it was a pluralistic society something like Switzerland, held together not by common language, but largely by common frontiers, a democratic way of life, a common army, central government, bureaucracy, common school system and to some extent by common enemies. The dominant group, comprised of Czechs and Slovaks and conceived of until the late thirties as a single Czechoslovak nation, adhered to the idea of a national state and considered other ethnic groups as minorities. Attempts at converting a centrally organized state to a federation were a main cause of friction between Czechs and Germans in the west and Slovaks and Hungarians in the east, finally leading to disruption of Czechoslovak unity under the increasing international pressure and later open intervention of Nazi Germany, Poland and Hungary. The smaller ethnic groups, although living side by side with Czechs and Slovaks for centuries, never became fully integrated into the Czechoslovak

¹E. P. Young, Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy. (London: Gollanz, 1938), p. 365.

society. . . Neither the possession of full minority rights nor cultural affinities with the Czechoslovak group brought about their adaptation to the new state.

The end of World War II found Czechs and Slovaks reunited and striving to establish a national state without the difficulties of the multi-ethnic society. The revisionistic Sudeten German group was transferred to Germany and about one-fifth of the Hungarian population was removed to Hungary. The loss of the Carpathian Ukraine increased the ethnic homogeneity of the present population. While in 1930 the minorities comprised 33.09 per cent of the total population of Czechoslovakia, in 1947 they totaled approximately 1,200,000, i. e., about 10 per cent of the total population.² Most of them are concentrated in compact areas of southern and eastern Slovakia.

The Concept of a Czechoslovak Nation

The Czechoslovak Republic as it existed between 1918 and 1938 was built on the principle of a single nation with two equal branches, the Czech and the Slovak, each guided by the idea of national unity, each cultivating its own language and its own cultural traditions. Officially very few things were considered uniquely Czech or Slovak; according to the constitution the official language of the Republic was also "Czechoslovak," although constitutional provisions were made for the official use of Czech in Czech regions, and of Slovak in Slovak regions. Many Czechs were ready to accept the new collective conception of "Czechoslovak" either because they sincerely believed that cultural differences between the two ethnic groups would soon disappear or because the new concept assured them the fiction of a majority in a state of multiple nationalities, the possession of a greater state, and cultural and economic expansion.³

²W. Wynne, Jr., The Population of Czechoslovakia (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 26.

³W. Kolarz, Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe (London: Gollanz, 1946).

Question: If you were introducing yourself to a foreigner, would you say that you are a Czech or a Czechoslovak?

Replies:	Czech	Czechoslovakian	Don't know
	52%	45%	3%

It is difficult to speculate about how much Czech public opinion has changed in recent years. But it may be assumed that it has not undergone any profound shifts after the institution of the Communist regime brought about an unprecedented centralization of state affairs, mass organizations and economic activities and thus leveled some differences between Czechs and Slovaks.

In order to understand the present relationship of the two nations properly, it is necessary to review briefly the development of their social structures before 1918, their political orientations and the processes of acculturation they were exposed to, and to follow these trends up to the present.

Czech National Renaissance

A basic characteristic of central Europe is the diversity and intermingling in a narrow area of various ethnic groups of unequal size, different social composition, culture and aspirations. The result has been the forcible or peaceful conquest of smaller or less developed groups by the larger ones or by those possessing a higher cultural and economic level. This situation is characterized by explosive nationalism and shifting ethnic borders with strips of "no man's land" converted to one or another nationality according to circumstances.

Thus Czechs were transformed from a well-known nation to a half-forgotten rural people after the Thirty Years' War. Beaten by an army of Catholic nations, the Czech Protestant aristocrats were executed or had to emigrate. Their estates were for most part handed over to an international aristocracy, and the Czech masses were gradually reduced to the status of serfs. Most cities were completely Germanized and the

Czech language was reduced to the status of a vernacular spoken only by peasants, artisans and servants. Without an aristocracy, which in feudal times represented the nation, the Czechs were condemned to anonymity.

The process of Czech national renaissance started with the break-up of the feudal order. Its first impetus came from the Romantic literary revival and from the rediscovery of Czech medieval history. The scientific interest of a few linguists, folklorists and ethnographers changed in the forties of the last century into a national movement led by historians, journalists and poets. Both generations of the Czech leaders of this movement were given financial support by the Bohemian aristocracy, which saw in the movement a backing of its claims to greater independence from the Austrian monarchy.

But the massive reconquest of Bohemia and Moravia by the Czechs started only with industrialization and the emancipation of the serfs in 1848. Sugar and textile industries, coal mining and iron works were in evidence by the beginning of the nineteenth century, mainly in the territory inhabited by Germans. Subsequent migration of the Czech agrarian population into industrial regions gradually led to a change in the ethnic composition of cities, to the development of a Czech working class and bourgeoisie, and in many instances to the complete or partial submergence of the German urban population. During the seventies the national struggle between Czechs and Germans had become a social struggle between the German employer and the Czech working man; after the turn of the century it was intensified by competition between Czech and German industrialists, bankers and shopkeepers, and by the boycotting of German products by Czechs, and vice versa. A similar development occurred in the country, where the group of rich Czech peasants grew in numbers and was eager to buy up the land of German estate owners. In addition, the lesser Czech bureaucracy and Czech railway employees grew in proportion to the size of the Czech population of Bohemia and Moravia. Thus, the national movement ceased to be an exclusive affair of a few intellectuals and became a matter of concern for the majority of the population.⁵

⁵Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans (London: Oxford University Press, 1938).

The struggle for jobs was accompanied by an increased desire for Czech schools, theatres and associations. The quick and intensive industrialization of the sixties and seventies created a school conflict where none had existed before, and led to a gradual increase in the number of Czech elementary schools and high schools. In 1882 the Czech university in Prague was re-established--originally founded in 1348--and in 1899 the Czech Technical College was established at Brno. In 1881 the first Czech opera house was built in Prague. Czech literature and music flourished; the grounds were laid for Czech scientific institutes.

Since the sixties Czechs have had their own political parties, the leaders of which defended most vehemently the rights of the Slavic minorities in the Austrian Diet. The leadership group was composed almost exclusively of intellectuals until the end of World War I. The romantic, nationalist, economically conservative, pro-clerical and Pan-Slavist group was succeeded by liberals, social reformists, realists and positivists looking with contempt at high bureaucracy, aristocracy, the Austrian court and the Catholic hierarchy. Most of them were critical of the Pan-Slavist movement and up to the outbreak of World War I they stood for a federated democratized Austrian empire. Their egalitarian and democratic principles were at first a projection of the romantic conception of the Hussite period and a reaction to the centuries of oppression. With the exposition of Czech medieval history by the historian and political leader Palacký, "pride in John Hus became eagerly conscious and pride in the mission of his people to struggle for truth and light against the obscurantism and greed of popes and emperors."⁶ A common peasant background, aversion to "higher society," and increasing contact with French democrats helped to strengthen their democratic traditions. The foundation of the Austrian social democracy and of the Czech Agrarian and Socialist parties at the end of the nineteenth century only intensified the populist ideology of the Czech political leadership. The masses were active in the national and social struggle in associations like Sokol, a variety of clubs, religious organizations, and trade unions as well as in political parties.

⁶Ibid., p. 27.

During the course of the nineteenth century, the homogeneous Czech peasant society was transformed into a differentiated society with a small layer of intellectuals, professional politicians, industrialists, bankers and large estate owners at the top; a rapidly growing middle class composed of small factory owners, tradesmen, middle bureaucracy, teachers and wealthier peasants; a large industrial proletariat, and a large, although diminishing, stratum of small peasants, peasant workers and artisans. While the countryside still remained conservative, especially in Moravia where the Catholic Church exerted great influence, it was steadily drawn into the orbit of urban liberal or social reformist ideology. Of the industrial workers only a part could be considered an industrial proletariat in the Marxian sense, since the majority of them worked in small enterprises and lived in small towns or villages where they gained part of their livelihood from farming. Nevertheless, Marxism and reformist Czech Socialism influenced them greatly, in spite of the importance of Czech nationalism to them. The middle class, which with the intellectuals and the small upper class contributed to the nineteenth century renaissance of Czech history, cultivated a liberal, reformist ideology and above all the idea of national autonomy. The original national antagonism between Czech countryside and German cities gave way to incipient antagonism between the middle and lower classes, kept in the background by the focusing of attention of all strata on common national goals.

Although the majority of Czechs did not free themselves from the feeling of humiliation imposed by the Bohemian and Moravian Germans, their industrial, intellectual and agricultural progress gave them self-confidence and a feeling of independence. It was their fortune that the three million Germans living in Bohemia and Moravia had very little in common with each other until they became a minority in the Czechoslovak Republic.⁷

The transition from being a part of the Austrian empire to the Czechoslovak Republic was a gradual one for the Czechs. Primarily it

⁷Ibid.

meant political independence. Because of previous national and social development, popular regard for the democratic way of life, and accumulation of experience in the conduct of political affairs and self-administration, it was not a transition from passive negativism to self-government.

Slovaks Under Hungary

The development of the Slovaks was substantially different. Conquered by Hungarians in the tenth century, they lived for a thousand years as poor peasants and shepherds with no political representation of their own. The Slovak aristocracy became Magyarized in the Middle Ages; the cities were originally German and later Hungarian in character and in language. The policy of forcible Magyarization which started in the middle of the nineteenth century kept the Slovak peasant population backward and poverty-stricken; it led to a large-scale migration of Slovaks to foreign countries, especially the United States. Unlike the situation in Bohemia and Moravia, the agricultural population migrating to the cities was gradually assimilated to Hungarian culture. In the Slovak countryside, the patriarchal society and feudal relationships between the peasant and his masters (aristocracy, clergy, intelligentsia) persisted until 1918. There was practically no Slovak middle class and a very small intelligentsia. According to the Slovak sociologist Štefánek, between 1913 and 1917 there were only 334 Slovak families, concentrated in 39 towns and villages in Slovakia, concerned with the arduous task of reviving their nation.⁸ According to the estimate of the Slovak newspaper Národné noviny, there were no more than a thousand families in 1910 who were actively or passively interested in preserving the national identity of Slovaks.⁹ Although neither of these estimates is accurate, it indicates the enormous political passivity of an ethnic group numbering about two million.

⁸A. Štefánek, Základy sociografie Slovenska (Bratislava: Slovenská akadémia vied a umení, 1944), pp. 1939-41.

⁹A. Štefánek, "Novoslováci," Sociologická revue, IV (1935), No. 3-4, 272-77.

The Slovak-conscious intelligentsia was not only small in numbers but was also isolated from Hungarian cosmopolitan centers and from Western influences. Educated in Hungarian schools, the intellectuals lived in small communities and formed a fanatic nationalistic sect guided by the Pan-Slav idea or by the idea of cooperation between the Czechs and Slovaks. Familial paternalism, political and spiritual romanticism, religious traditionalism, lack of rational empiricism and urban and cosmopolitan contacts determined their basic provincial and clannish outlook. However, it was this alienation from the Hungarian society which helped them to resist assimilation, culturally as well as linguistically.

The idea of Czecho-Slovak cooperation was promoted primarily by a small group of Slovak alumni of Prague's Charles University who called themselves "Hlasisti" after the literary review Hlas, founded in 1898. They were under Masaryk's influence and consequently were much more Westernized, progressive, positivistic and cosmopolitan than the majority of Slovak intellectuals. They particularly influenced the young Slovak generation and contributed most to Slovak cooperation with Czechs during World War I.

A majority of the nationally conscious intellectuals were Protestants, mostly clergymen, poets, journalists, teachers, lower civil servants, doctors and lawyers. Catholics were much more exposed to Magyarization, because a great majority of the Catholic clergy was oriented toward Hungary, and because the tightly organized hierarchy of the Catholic Church encouraged loyalty to the Hungarian state.¹⁰

Against this Slovak intelligentsia stood the active Magyar and Magyarized intelligentsia, backed by the Hungarian aristocracy and Hungarian high and low bureaucracy. Characteristically, the assimilated Slovak intellectuals engaged in Magyarization more intensively than the native Hungarians themselves. Apart from this group stood a middle-of-the-road intelligentsia, half-Slovak, half-Hungarian, whose loyalty to the Hungarian regime was unquestionable but who did not sympathize with forcible Magyarization of the Slovak population. All three groups shared the

¹⁰A. Štefánek, Základy sociografie Slovenska, op. cit.

aristocratic outlook, an elegant social life and a conscious feeling of superiority to the country people.¹¹

Since trade, industry, and banking were in Jewish hands, and the middle and lower bureaucracy was Hungarian, there was almost no Slovak middle class. Slovak society was conceived by both intellectuals and peasants as consisting of two groups: "the people," i. e., the peasants, peasant workers and small artisans, and "the intellectuals" (priests, teachers, lawyers, doctors, a few industrialists, bankers and dealers) whom the peasants considered to be natural, God-given overlords. The country people counted as members of the intelligentsia all those who graduated from a Hungarian high school or university, or those who acquired the Hungarian language and aristocratic manners without schooling. He who did not know Hungarian was not considered an intellectual. Thus, in popular thinking, and even among intellectuals, the hierarchy of society was viewed as a semi-feudal dualism expressed in terms of the dichotomies--"masters - non-masters," "educated - non-educated," "governing - governed," "superior - inferior."¹²

The masses of the agricultural population did not play any role in political life. They were used to obeying officials and priests, although they protested sometimes against Magyarization in schools and against taxes, they looked at everything "lordly" with a great deal of respect. Opposition to the Hungarian government, scattered and ineffective, was due to the activity of the Hungarian Peoples' Party (Neppart) which had some adherents among Slovaks, to the Slovak circle of Hlasisti and to Slovak emigrants in the United States, rather than to general political participation. While the national renaissance gained little ground, the assimilation of Slovaks by Hungarian society and culture continued at a rapid pace.¹³

Slovakia before 1918 was predominantly an agricultural country with few cities and towns. It was tradition-bound and conservative, giving great emphasis to the patriarchal family system and religious ritualism. The Hungarian aristocracy and gentry had great influence, especially on Slovak intellectuals who accepted their ideology, etiquette, and usually

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

their language. Socialist ideas were little known, and historical materialism and Communism evoked horror among the leading intellectuals. Anticlericalism never became fashionable; only among the Protestant intelligentsia did there exist a certain degree of apathy toward religious affairs.

Cooperation and Conflict between Czechs and Slovaks

Creation of the Czechoslovak Republic meant for the Slovaks a real revolution: it was a liberation from political, economic, social and national oppression, the beginning of a transformation which in Bohemia and Moravia had started more than a century earlier.¹⁴

Czechs and Slovaks were unequal partners in the new state.^{The} Czechs were stronger numerically, they were advanced economically and politically, they had many and various institutions of their own, they had a high degree of literacy (97.95 per cent in 1910), and they had an idealized picture of their past history to back their stand internally. The Slovaks lived in a semi-feudal world with their political and social elite identified with Hungary, still facing the problem of stopping the process of assimilation, with a low rate of literacy (in 1910 about 65.10 per cent; in 1928, 84.97 per cent), without industry, schools or a functional bureaucracy, and without a conception of themselves which would help them shape their society along modern lines.

¹⁴The following is a statistical illustration of social stratification in Slovakia, including all ethnic groups:

Of each 1,000 inhabitants of Slovakia, there were:

Year	Peasants, peasant workers, industrial workers, artisans	Owners & white collar group in industry, trade & transportation	Civil service, liberal professions, military	Other occupations & without occupation
1900	821	68	42	69
1910	810	80	44	66
1921	780	76	50	92

Státní statistická ročenka (Prague: Statistický úřad, 1934), p. 14; 1938, p. 15. Separate figures for the Slovak population would be even more concentrated in the first category. It is estimated that 90 to 95 per cent of Slovaks were engaged in agriculture in the period 1900-1917. See Štefánek, op. cit., p. 364.

Most Magyar civil servants, gymnasium and college professors, and judges living on Slovak territory refused to serve the Czechoslovak state. For example, of the 12, 447 Hungarian civil servants only 35 offered their services to the new Republic in 1918.¹⁵ It was natural that Slovak leaders were compelled to ask Czechs for help. The Czechs were eager to help their "weaker brother," all the more so because they had already done a great deal to free the Slovaks from cultural isolation under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After liberation, they helped the Slovaks build up national education, regional administration, industry, banks, railways and hospitals. But they were a new social element in Slovakia, and in due time

they committed a psychological error common to teachers in their attitude toward pupils: they expected gratitude and reverence to endure for all time. They did not see that the pupil had grown up, not quite to the standard of the master, but enough to grow tired of the tutelage.¹⁶

The relationship between Czechs and Slovaks, their cooperation and antagonism, developed along two lines: the relationship between the Czechs in Slovakia and the Slovaks, and between both and the Hungarian minority; secondly, the relationship of Czechs and Slovaks in the Czechoslovak parliament and government. Both of these aspects are crucial for understanding the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and the present latent antagonism.

The number of Czechs migrating to Slovakia increased rapidly during the first two decades of the Republic; in 1938-39 a majority of them were forced by the Slovak authorities to return to Bohemia and Moravia. In 1921 over one-half of those gainfully employed were in state services as higher and lesser civil servants, teachers in elementary schools and high schools, university professors, railroad employees, members of the police and gendarmerie, postal clerks and officers of the Czechoslovak Army. A majority of the other half of the gainfully employed were shopkeepers, bankers, factory managers, doctors, lawyers, agronomists, and skilled industrial workers. Only about 13 per cent of the whole Czech group

¹⁵ J. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York: Praeger, 1955).

¹⁶ Kolarz, op.cit., p. 145.

was counted as engaged in agriculture in 1921.¹⁷ While they were welcome in the beginning, because only with their help were the Slovaks able to stop the influence of the Hungarian elite and to get the Slovak national movement under way, they soon were viewed as competitors, even as intruders, especially by the younger generation. While there were only 150 Slovaks in the civil service engaged in white-collar work in 1910, their number increased to 9,135 in 1921, and to 11,363 in 1930. This was paralleled by the rapid increase of Slovak school teachers, members of the liberal professions, railway and postal employees, and of army officers. The statistical table on the following page illustrates the position of Slovak and Czech state employees and members of the liberal professions in Slovakia, particularly in relationship to the position of the Hungarian and German minority groups.

¹⁷ Antonín Boháč in his analysis "Češi na Slovensku," Statistický obzor, XVI, pp. 183-90., gives the following numbers of Czechs in Slovakia:

<u>1910</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1930</u>
7,947	71,733	120,926
	-18,364 soldiers	- 20,652 soldiers
	<u>53,369</u>	<u>100,274</u>

Reprinted in Ant. Štefánek, op. cit., pp. 383-98.. On p. 179 of the same publication, Štefánek gives the number of Czechs in 1940 as 2.89 per cent of 2,998,244 Slovaks and Czechs. Assuming that this number is correct, there were 10,374 Czechs there at that time.

The rapid increase between 1921-1930 is due primarily to the migration of Czech white-collar workers' and officers' families. Ibid., pp. 383-89.

Table 1
 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PROFESSIONS
 IN SLOVAKIA, 1921-1930*

	<u>Czechs</u>		<u>Slovaks</u>		<u>Hungarians</u>		<u>Germans</u>	
	1921	1930	1921	1930	1921	1930	1921	1930
Civil servants:	8,654	9,874	8,258	11,363	3,661	1,486	860	642
Teachers, educators:	1,423	(1,398)	4,283	8,152	2,290	(1,682)	508	(575)
Liberal professions, health service and other public services:	1,124	2,304	5,736	13,042	4,764	4,971	1,399	2,355
Postal employees:	1,788	1,980	2,623	4,321	686	295	148	108
Railway employees and employees of other means of transportation:	5,753	6,272	18,705	18,732	3,475	1,434	847	503
Total:	18,815	21,828	39,622	54,555	14,876	9,868	3,762	4,183

* Compiled from tables presented by Ant. Štefánek, op. cit., pp. 383-89.

Particularly important is the predominance of Czechs in the state and regional administration; two-thirds of them were employed as members of the police and gendarmerie, at railroads and post offices, where they dominated the white-collar group; their share in the Slovak educational system was also substantial.

On the Slovak side there is an over-all increase in the number of civil servants and a particularly significant increase in the members of the professions. But a closer inspection of the table will show that the share of Hungarians in the state, regional, and city administrations was significant and was bound to create tensions. It should also be mentioned that many Slovak civil servants were people who changed their nationality after 1918 and whose loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic was very questionable. Of the other minority groups, only the Jewish intelligentsia was important, numbering 1,290 in 1921 and 1,770 in 1930. The size of the Jewish group in positions of importance was actually much higher, since many of them listed themselves as Hungarians or Slovaks. Also noteworthy is the number of foreigners in the professions; in 1930 they comprised 1,431 individuals. Most of them were Hungarian nationals who refused Czechoslovak citizenship.

Czechs in Slovakia represented a group quite different from Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians, and Jews, as far as their way of life and their orientation were concerned. The Slovak sociologist Štefánek attributes to them the following characteristics:

Rationalism of a more or less positivist-progressive nature and unbound by metaphysics, a socially and politically democratic orientation, superficial urbanism, inhospitality, the habit of spending free time in the taverns, coffee houses, and clubs, anticlericalism, a tendency to self-isolation, atheism, and social awkwardness in comparison with the Slovak social elite of the intelligentsia, dogmatism, sophistication, partisanship, egotism at taking over offices, nepotism and lack of understanding of the conservative orientation and of the aristocratic ideology of the Slovak intelligentsia. On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasize their industriousness and the intelligence with which they organized and led

the state and other offices, their economic enterprises, their club activity, their artistic advancement, their scientific ability in every field, etc.¹⁸

It is natural that many of them, especially the teachers and clerks, judged everything in Slovakia by the "common sense," i. e., Czech or Austrian standards. For most of them it was very difficult to adjust themselves to the Slovak society and its way of life; it was impossible to change Liberals, Socialists, atheists, and urbanized intellectuals into Conservatives, aristocrats or religious enthusiasts overnight. On the other hand, it was unrealistic for the Czechs to expect the Slovaks to give up their traditions, however inappropriate they were for a democratic society, and to follow their Czech example. One negative characteristic of Czechs in Slovakia should be added: some of them, especially teachers, were people of second-rate ability who were unable to compete with Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia. They looked at Slovakia either as a place for an easy promotion or a place where Czechs are sent for punishment. The attitudes of these people only worsened their mutual relationships.

It would not be correct to assume that the growing antagonism was only due to the struggle for jobs. Neither were the differences between the Slovak and Czech languages of the utmost importance, since with the help of Czechs the Slovak language had been promoted from a rural vernacular to a state language, being used officially in schools and scientific institutes. But both of these phenomena were used as points of attack by the deposed elite of Slovakia under Hungary, with the Catholic clergy and the young generation feeling underprivileged and growing more conservative than their fathers under the influence of the Church.

Inter-War Slovak Society and the Growth of Slovak Nationalism

Slovak society between the wars, primarily the upper and middle classes, could be roughly divided into three groups from the point of view of their loyalty to the Slovak nation and to the Czechoslovak Republic: the

¹⁸A. Štefánek, "Syngenza a spoločenské 'já'," Sociologická revue, X (1939), No. 1, (special issue in honor of Arnošt Bláha), p. 295.

Old Slovaks and the Assimilated Czechs; the Neo-Slovaks; and the young generation educated in new Slovak schools.

The first group could be divided into two subgroups: the older romantic, Pan-Slavist, conservative generation, maintaining its local patriotism and distrusting Czech liberalism and reformism; and the younger, Westernized generation with a long tradition of contacts with Czech intellectuals (notably with Masaryk), and essentially of Czechoslovak orientation. The former group was composed of the almost entirely Protestant adherents of the Slovak National Party (the oldest political party in Slovakia), and of the nationally conscious Catholics led by Andrej Hlinka and supporting his People's (Catholic) Party. They were opposed to the idea of a Czechoslovak nation and to the centralized government. In the early twenties they gave impetus to the movement for Slovak autonomy. The pro-Czechoslovak group was dominated by the Hlasisti and their followers, mostly Protestants who in later years became leaders of the Slovak Agrarians and Socialists. They enjoyed a privileged position in both central Czechoslovak government and in Slovakia.

The position of the Czech-oriented Slovaks was difficult from the beginning, not only because they were in the minority and were able to stay in power only with Czech backing, but also because of their Protestant religion. In 1921 only 17.68 per cent of the population of Slovakia were Protestants of various denominations, whereas 70.92 per cent were Catholics. During the first decade of the Czechoslovak Republic the Catholic Church grew not only in numbers (in 1930 Catholics comprised 73.64 per cent and Protestants decreased to 15.13 per cent) but, after an initial loss, also in influence.¹⁹ The Catholic clergy, essentially pro-Magyar, had a very high status in Slovak society; it dominated the schools under the Hungarian rule and influenced local administration. The introduction of state elementary and secondary schools and the creation of a state university at Bratislava in the twenties lessened its influence for some time. But the

¹⁹Stefánek, Základy sociografie Slovenska, op. cit., pp. 179-80.

foundation of a Slovak theological seminary, strong financial support of the remaining religious schools by the Czechoslovak government, and participation of Slovak priests in the political life and state administration soon brought the Catholic clergy back into power.²⁰

The conflict between Slovak conservative Catholicism on the one hand and the Czechs and liberal Slovak Protestants of Czechoslovak orientation on the other, was a basic factor of Czecho-Slovak antagonism. Czech rationalism and positivism, backed by the Slovak Hlasists, tried to eradicate deeply-rooted Slovak views of the world, church, state and nation. Creating resentment at first, it changed into an open conflict rationalized by longing for autonomy. It was primarily because of this that the Slovak defenders of Czechoslovak ideology were in the late thirties looked upon by some Slovaks as renegades.

The Neo-Slovaks, among whom a majority of the Catholic and a minority of the Protestant clergy also could be counted, represented the strongest group in the Slovak elite and middle class. Most of them were "Third and Half-Slovaks" who changed their Hungarian nationality to Slovak after 1918 for practical reasons. Aside from the clergy they were recruited from the ranks of white-collar workers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, technicians, shopkeepers and industrialists.

Only a small proportion of pure Mágyars and Magyarized Slovaks, especially the aristocracy and socially well-situated families, looked upon giving up of Hungarianism²² as something morally inadmissible. But the Magyar aristocracy was destroyed by the land reform to a great extent, and the Magyar merchants, bankers and industrialists were pushed into a difficult situation by the Czech competition.

²⁰Heinz O. Ziegler in Berufliche und soziale Gliederung der Bevölkerung in der Tschechoslowakei (Brünn: Rohrer, 1936), notes that the Slovak clergy of all denominations increased from 12,044 in 1921 to 14,172 in 1930. The size of the clergy in Bohemia and Moravia in 1930 was 15,673 and 11,190 respectively. This shows a disproportionate ratio for Slovakia.

²¹Stefánek, op. cit.

²²Hungarianism is a centuries-old concept implying the indivisibility of Hungarian lands-Hungary proper, Slovakia, parts of Romania and Croatia.

Consequently, the Magyars and pro-Magyar elite in Slovakia merged with the new Slovak elite, especially in the regions ethnically Slovak, where it gained a numerical and in many branches of public life also material superiority.²³

Most of the Neo-Slovaks did not go far beyond linguistic reorientation. Even the conservative ideology of the old Slovaks was alien to them. They considered Czechoslovak patriotism as a front for a policy of "Czechization" and proclaimed so-called "integral Slovakism." The latter concept meant for some of them political and administrative autonomy for Slovakia and for others, --the radicals--, most of whom were before 1918 enthusiastically pro-Magyar--separation from Czechs and an attempt to join the Hungarian state. The radical group, strongly represented in Father Hlinka's People's Party, became in 1938 and continued to be during the existence of the Slovak State, a tool in the hands of Nazi Germany. The moderate Neo-Slovaks joined the Czechoslovak rather than the regional Slovak parties, since this overt conformity entailed many privileges. But for a majority of both radicals and moderates the issue of Slovak sovereignty was not the only one. They looked askance at ideas of social equality, democracy, and concern for the welfare and education of the lower classes. It would be incorrect to place them in the same category with Slovak decentralists of democratic orientation (some Protestants and moderate Catholics in the Agrarian and Socialist parties).²⁴

The young Slovak generation, which did not grow up in Hungarian schools, was naturally influenced by the current political movements in Slovakia. Those accepting Czech ideals or the orientation of Slovak realists were definitely in the minority. Most of the youth were under the influence of the autonomists, conservatives, and Slovak nationalists. Ardent Catholicism became an inseparable component of their radical nationalism.

²³V. Stefánek; "Novoslováci," op. cit., p. 273

²⁴V. Stefánek, Základy sociografie Slovenska, op. cit.

For them the struggle for jobs was most meaningfully interpreted as the struggle against Czech bureaucracy, teachers, merchants, bankers and industrialists. For similar reasons anti-Semitism gained ground among them. Knowing little or nothing about the previous Hungarian domination of Slovakia, most of them denied altogether the usefulness of Czech help to the Slovaks. Most leaders of the young generation advocated the separation of Slovakia from the Czech regions. Together with the radical Neo-Slovaks and with the help of Nazi Germany they succeeded in establishing Slovak autonomy in 1938 and the Free Slovak State in 1939. Under their influence the Slovak People's Party, converted into a party modelled on the Fascist and Nazi example, suppressed all other political groups in Slovakia.²⁵

The majority of the Slovak peasants looked at the newly-created state with distrust, afraid of the new liberties and expecting that sooner or later their Hungarian ex-masters would regain power over them. Only slowly did they realize that the change was permanent. Unaccustomed to judging matters of more than regional importance, and with no experience in political participation, they became an easy prey for demagogues. Resenting and distrusting all city dwellers, they considered Czechs, as represented by the teacher, gendarme and tax collector, to be foreigners. Most of all they were deeply offended by Czech anticlerical and non-religious attitudes.

Role of the Czechoslovak Political Elite

Of special significance for the relationship of Czechs and Slovaks was the fact that some of the Czech political leaders were admired by many Slovaks and that some of the leading Slovak politicians exerted a good deal of influence on Czech political life. Most prominent among them was President Masaryk, who owed his influence in both sections of the Republic not only to his office but also to his background and orientation. Slovak by

²⁵Ibid.; also J. Lettrich, op. cit.

birth (Masaryk was born in Moravian Slovakia close to the present Slovak border) and Czech by choice and philosophy of life, he was regarded as a legitimate national leader by a great majority of Slovaks as well as Czechs. His intimate knowledge of Slovak leaders and understanding of Slovak problems won him respect and admiration. His Czech successor Beneš was considerably less successful; he was regarded by many Slovak Catholics as an exponent of the Czech centralistic tendencies. However, he was still able to command the cooperation and respect of Slovak Agrarians and Socialists.

Slovak representatives in the central government were, for a short period in the twenties, candidates of the Slovak branches of the Czechoslovak parties which always carried a majority of Slovak votes. Well educated and cosmopolitan, they were able to offer to the Slovaks an intellectual leadership far surpassing that of the leaders of the regional Slovak parties. Most prominent among Slovak governmental leaders was Prime Minister Hodža, liberal advocate of land reform, who was influential in the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party in the Czech regions as well as Slovakia. His ability and political realism contributed greatly to the stability of the Czechoslovak government in the inter-war period.

This overlapping of Czech and Slovak elites contributed to the fact that the Slovak autonomist leaders never obtained more than one-third of all Slovak votes in free elections. Slovak political allegiance was almost evenly divided between the left (Social Democrats, Czechoslovak Socialists and Communists), the center (Agrarians) and the right (Slovak People's Party and Slovak National Party). Slovak separatism remained dormant until the Austrian Anschluss and the consequent open attacks of German and Hungarian minority parties against the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic. This anti-Czech movement had Slovak public opinion in its favor for only a few years.²⁶

²⁶ Samuel Sharp, "The Czechs and Slovaks: New Aspects of the Old Problem," American Perspective, I, Oct. 1947, 311-22. Also J. Lettrich, op. cit.

Free Slovak State

The present relationship between Czechs and Slovaks is determined primarily by three factors: their different wartime experiences, the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the decrease in numbers and influence of other minorities, and the gradual incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet empire.

The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Nazi Germany and the five-year existence of the Free Slovak State as Hitler's model satellite left deep traces in the lives of both nations. It had more effect on their mutual relationship in the postwar period than did the First Republic. Oppressed, humiliated and pauperized, many Czechs looked at Slovaks (or to be more specific, Slovak Catholics) with a great deal of bitterness, regarding them as traitors. Life under German rule was for most of them a horrifying experience for which Populists, Slovaks and Sudeten Germans were held responsible. Nevertheless, the deep rift between both groups helped many Czechs to realize that the Slovaks were not only linguistically, but were also socially and culturally a different ethnic group.

To many Slovaks their semi-independent Fascist state meant definite progress in national development. For the first time in their modern history Slovak officials had the responsibility of running Slovakia within loosely defined limits. There were plenty of jobs after the expulsion of Czechs and the liquidation of the Jewish minority. Thanks to extensive trade with Sweden and Switzerland, mediated by Germans, Slovakia enjoyed a greater prosperity than she had ever known before. The turning point came only in 1944 with the uprising of Slovak anti-Fascists and with the approach of Soviet armies.

The groups which benefited from independence were the civil servants, priests, merchants, teachers and a number of peasants. The merchant group was no longer endangered by Czech competition, and it was enriched by confiscated Jewish and Czech property.²⁷

²⁷The value of Jewish property was estimated at four billion crowns. Only a small part of it was returned to the Jewish owners who happened to survive the concentration camps. (See Samuel Sharp, op. cit.).

Although it is claimed that only ten to fifteen percent of the Catholic priests supported the Tiso regime enthusiastically,²⁸ there can be little doubt that the majority of them regarded the Slovak regime with sympathy, since all schools became Church schools during that period. The teachers lent their support for reasons similar to those of government officials: they were running Slovak schools without Czech help. A majority of the peasantry supported the Tiso regime because of the general prosperity and for religious reasons; they profited from the sales of food products to Germans and Austrians, and they regarded Tiso's regime as a desirable form of theocracy.²⁹

The Free Slovak State was opposed from the beginning by most Protestants, irrespective of their political leanings. Political opposition was led by leaders of the dissolved Agrarian, Socialist and Communist parties, but it gained in importance when Slovak officers and soldiers were faced with the prospect of being sent to the eastern front to fight the Red Army. The rebels were recruited not only from the ranks of Protestants and anti-Fascists but also from the ranks of previous followers of the Tiso regime. Although the uprising was not successful and was limited to a rather small region, it cleared the Slovak people of the stigma of collaboration with Nazi Germany in the eyes of the Czechs and the Allies. It also strengthened the Slovak claim to autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic. During the revolt a Slovak National Council emerged as the embodiment of "state power" and of Slovak opposition to the pre-1938 conditions. If before the war only one-third of the electorate openly declared for political and administrative autonomy of Slovakia, such sentiment was now universal.³⁰ The existence of the Slovak State gave Slovaks a feeling of confidence in their own abilities, irrespective of their

²⁸ Maurice Hindus, The Bright Passage (New York: Doubleday, 1947).

²⁹ Ibid.; also Sharp, op. cit.

³⁰ Paul Zinner, Communist Tactics and Strategy in Czechoslovakia (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1953).

political persuasion or religious affiliation.

The wartime ideology of many Slovaks, especially the young generation, can be summarised by these four phrases: anti-Czechism, anti-Semitism, Fascism, and ultra-nationalism.³¹ Although postwar leadership passed into the hands of the Slovak Democrats--mostly Protestants and prewar Agrarians--and Communists, with the majority of the population the change was only overt; the old isms survived, particularly among the young people and Catholic peasants. The sudden reversal of the economic situation in 1944, the heavy destruction of eastern Slovakia, and the behavior of the Soviet soldiers were shocking and agonizing. "That it was the price Slovakia was paying for its own Fascism and its political and military alliance with Nazi Germany only a small part of the population recognized."³² Thus, the end of war meant quite different things to Czechs and Slovaks: while the former regarded it as a resurrection of liberty, many Slovaks took it as a national defeat. In Bohemia and Moravia the wartime experience gave rise to a strong leftward trend; Czech attempts to preserve a semblance of national unity, in addition to the unity of the state, were only partially lessened. In Slovakia a polarization of political sentiments took place. With a majority radical conservatism was entrenched more than ever before. On the other hand, the number of devoted and enthusiastic Communists increased substantially and Communism became a socially acceptable ideology even in the middle class and among Catholics (two-thirds of the Slovak Communists were members of the Roman Catholic Church). Only the Protestant minority within the Democratic Party continued to pursue the middle-of-the-road course. However, with all three factions the idea of a Czechoslovak nation was dead.³³

³¹ Maurice Hindus, op. cit.

³² Ibid., p. 354.

³³ Ibid.

Czecho-Slovak Relations After World War II

Postwar Czechoslovakia was designed by its leaders as a national state. This meant the end of the pluralism of the First Republic and expulsion and subordination of the revisionistic minority groups. This fact contributed to the stronger position of Slovaks, enabling them to claim the right to partnership with the Czechs. On the other hand, it took away from Slovak separatists the opportunity to look for the support of other ethnic groups on the Czechoslovak territory and forced the Slovak leaders to look for allies among Czechs. Of significance for mutual relations might be also the fact that about 200,000 Slovak peasants migrated to Czech parts of the country in the years 1945-48. It is possible that their contact with the Czech agricultural population and urban lower strata will bring about more understanding of Slovak problems on the part of the "little Czech man."

The effort at national reconciliation or readjustment was intertwined with the conflict of Communists and non-Communists. Both Slovak Democrats and Communists supported the idea of autonomy. The latter reversed their stand after their defeat in the elections and called for a clean-up of Slovak "reactionaries and Fascists" in public administration, in agreement with the strategy of the Czech Communist Party. The turbulent events of the fall of 1947 pushed the Democratic Party led by Protestants from middle-of-the-road liberalism into the more conservative Catholic camp. The introduction of an era of "good feeling" between Czechs and Slovaks was also prevented by complaints of Czech politicians about the disproportionate influence of the Slovaks in state affairs and the consequent attempt of the former to curb the latter.³⁴

The anti-Czech undercurrent among Slovak leaders remained latent only because of Slovak administrative and cultural autonomy, formation

³⁴Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 115. While in the First Republic Slovak representatives on the Czechoslovak Parliament comprised no more than one-tenth of all the deputies, in the years 1945-46 they were given one-third of all seats in the Parliament. See Gustav Beuer, New Czechoslovakia and Her Historical Background (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1947).

of separate Slovak army units, aggressive Slovak nationalism against Hungarians in the reincorporated southern Slovakia, absence of Czech competition in Slovak administration, trade, transportation and schools, and the realization by both Czech and Slovak leaders that the only alternative to Slovak autonomy was the creation of a Slovak Soviet Republic.³⁵ This also mitigated the ever-increasing animosity of Slovak Catholics, who opposed the transformation of all Slovak schools into state schools, and who resented the execution of Msgr. Tiso, President of the Free Slovak State.

The first stage of the transformation of Czechoslovakia from Soviet ally into Soviet satellite only increased the turbulence of the situation. In the course of two years, from 1948 to 1950, Slovakia was deprived of its indigenous postwar leadership; after the liquidation and escape of the liberal Democratic leaders came the purge of the dynamic Communist intelligentsia accused of "bourgeois nationalist deviation." Gradually the center of power was shifted to Prague, first in the subordination of the Slovak Communist Party to the Czech Communist Party and later in the increasing power of the central government over Slovakia. At the present time, autonomous Slovak governmental and executive bodies are not considered desirable in the fields of foreign affairs, foreign trade, external and internal security, justice, state control, bulk purchases, heavy industry and railroads. In other spheres the Slovak commissioners have to submit their decisions for approval to the central government, or rather to the Politburo of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In the central government, of the forty-five posts which represent ministerial or quasi-ministerial posts only nine or one-fifth are held by Slovaks.³⁶ Even though many of these are police-state measures, they also reflect the heritage of prewar centralism and represent a vote of non-confidence

³⁵ Sharp, op. cit.

³⁶ Pavel Korbela, The Development of Slovakia's Constitutional Position (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, July 1953), pp. 38-40.

to Slovak Communists.

The wave of anti-Czech sentiment reached an all-time high after the arrest and liquidation of Slovak bishops, priests and members of religious orders, and after the dispossession of the Slovak bourgeoisie. Although these measures were carried out by Slovak Communists themselves, most Slovaks blamed the Czechs for their misfortune. A gradual change in the attitudes of the non-Communist Slovak masses was brought about with the increasing persecution of the Czech Catholic clergy and bourgeoisie, and especially with the mass demonstrations of Czech industrial workers during the currency reform. These events led most Slovaks to realize the existence of a common goal transcending national cleavages.

An important factor determining the relationship of Czechs and Slovaks under Communism has been a rather rapid industrialization of Slovakia. On one hand, it meant at least a partial abolition of poverty in the Slovak countryside and a Slovak social structure approximating that of Czech regions. On the other hand, it has brought to Slovakia and increasing number of Czech engineers, technicians, and skilled workers and thus has created an occupational and national conflict similar to that before World War II.³⁷ Also noteworthy is the increasing reciprocity of cultural relations between Czechs and Slovaks. Slovak artistic production is receiving more attention in the Czech regions than ever before.

Although Czecho-Slovak relations are far from harmonious, open antagonism between Czechs and Slovaks has been relegated to the Party sphere where it is expressed in the struggle for power between Czech and Slovak Communists. The fate of "Czech supremacy" or of equality between Czechs and Slovaks on the political level is a matter of Moscow's confidence in the greater "partisan vigilance" of one or the other national group.

³⁷Most of the Czechs working in Slovakia build new factories and power plants. See for example Rudé Právo, August 17 and August 26, 1954. Czech tractor drivers are reported working on Slovak state and collective farms; Czech professors are again teaching at Slovak colleges and universities (Rudé Právo, July 1, 1953).

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SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Occupational Structure

The changes in the social structure of Czechoslovakia over the last fifty years are partially indicated by shifts in the occupational classes. The most important are the decline of the agricultural population (from 44.41 per cent of the total population in 1900 to 27.91 per cent in 1947), the absolute growth of the industrial population, the expansion of the civil service (from 3.82 per cent in 1900 to 8.30 per cent in 1947) and of transportation (3.05 per cent and 6.13 per cent respectively). Less significant, although not without importance, is the growth of banks, insurance companies, and commerce (3.77 per cent and 5.77 per cent respectively).

Czechoslovak society between the wars could be characterized as industrial-agricultural. In the present society industry has a definite predominance, particularly in the Czech-speaking regions. In 1947, the respective figures for the western and Slovak regions were as follows:

Table 1
AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL POPULATION OF
CZECH AND SLOVAK REGIONS: 1947*

	Czech Regions		Slovak Regions	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per cent
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	1,784,797	20.37	1,600,124	48.09
Mining, metallurgy, manufacturing, crafts trades.	3,460,601	39.50	914,095	27.47

*Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia (Prague: State Statistical Office, 1948), III, p. 180.

Nevertheless, these differences have tended to disappear with the increase in industrialization of Slovakia.

Occupational classes	Pop. by occ. classes in 1947	Percentage of population in various occupational classes in each year				
		1947	1930 ^f	1921 ^f	1910 ^f	1900 ^f
Agriculture, fishing, forestry	3,395,562	27.91	33.08	38.24	40.42	44.41
Mineral production	353,556	2.91	3.67	3.70	3.52	3.59
Crafts and trades	4,028,268	33.12	33.52	31.75	32.03	31.32
Commerce, banking, insurance	702,295	5.77	6.19	4.63	4.11	3.77
Transport	745,124	6.13	5.74	4.95	4.48	3.05
Civil service and administration	1,010,199	8.30	5.68	5.03	4.46	3.82
Liberal professions	76,922	0.63	0.78	0.65	0.53	0.56
Personal and domestic services	257,650	2.12	2.53	2.38	3.03	2.93
Persons without gainful occupation [#]	1,369,358	11.26	8.80	8.04	6.96	4.65
Persons without specified occupation	225,161	1.85	0.01	0.63	0.46	1.90
Total	12,164,095	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

* Source: Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia, op. cit., p. 100.

^f The retrospective data refer to the territory of the Republic as of December 31, 1947. The classification of occupation referring to 1900-1930 has been conformed to that in use at the census of May 22, 1947.

[#] Persons living on private means, old age pensions, and relief (and their employees), children and students living outside their homes and boarders of different establishments.

Main Characteristics

Social antagonism, social status and social distance have been frequently intertwined with ethnic antagonisms and ^{are} inseparable from them. Therefore, the analytical separation of the two aspects--social and ethnic--

is somewhat artificial and of necessity simplifies the reality of social relations. The following description refers primarily to the Czechs and Slovaks. It leaves out the peculiar aspects of the social stratification of the Sudeten German and Hungarian minorities and the overlapping of their elites with the Czech and Slovak elites.

Czechs and Slovaks have one main characteristic in common: their respective modern societies developed by a gradual differentiation from one social class, the peasantry. Their indigenous bourgeoisie is of recent origin. The Czech middle class started to develop at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Slovak middle class only after World War I. Their upper class has been always rather small and composed of "newly arrived" individuals.

Among Czechs, excessive wealth and excessive poverty have been very rare and differences in social status have been rather small. Class distinctions were frequently obliterated by united antagonism toward Sudeten Germans. Similarly, the rural-urban differences relegated some of the class antagonism into the background. Czechoslovakia--and this is primarily true for Bohemia and Moravia--has been frequently described as the classic country of the "little man," i. e., a country of hardworking, labor-loving, thrifty individuals who love their families and privacy and take pride in craftsmanship. At the time of the coup d'état in 1948, a majority of Czechs were eminently middle-class in their style of life, aspirations and expectations. The transition between the upper, middle and lower classes was very gradual; the borderline between the latter two was especially fluctuating and relatively arbitrary.

The middle-class orientation of the Czechs contributed to the increasing vagueness of the popular classification of the population into two social categories: "the people" (lid) and "the masters" (páni), the former including the majority of the agricultural population, industrial workers, artisans and low-skilled white-collar workers, the latter comprising the propertied strata (including average farmers, tradespeople and dealers), most white-collar workers, members of the liberal professions, the army and the police. During the First Republic the distinction between "masters" and "people" began to lose its feudal aftertaste. After World War II it was for the most part no longer acknowledged.

Two types of attitudes characterize the way Czechs have looked at their social structure: an egalitarian attitude and consciousness of rank. The former is expressed in the frequently-quoted Czech proverb "Já pán, ty pán" (I am a master, you are a master) and in the universal criticism of people who acquired prominence or leadership. It was most prevalent in the lower class, but it was also quite strong among members of the middle class. The consciousness of rank has been most characteristic of the upper class, while the bourgeoisie cultivated a mixture of rank consciousness and egalitarian attitude. The expression of inequality or "more than equality" has been manifested primarily in the use of titles: Mr. Doctor, Mr. Manager, Mr. Councillor, Mr. Drugstore Owner, Mr. Teacher, Mr. Tailor, etc. More obnoxious has been use of titles in designation of the wives: Mrs. University Professor, Mrs. Minister, Mrs. Mayor, Mrs. Flour Miller, Mrs. Chimney Sweep, etc. Only members of the lower class have been called by their last names. Rank consciousness has survived up to present; new titles have emerged and "Mr." is replaced by "comrade."

The distinctions between social classes among Slovaks were much more clearly delineated than among Czechs. This was due to the poverty and relatively low education of the rural population and to the persistence of feudal traditions introduced by Hungarians. The Slovak bourgeoisie was much smaller and more exclusive than the Czech. It looked down on peasants, industrial workers and artisans as backward people. The egalitarian attitude was on the whole much less pronounced and confined almost entirely to the lower class. The middle and upper classes were even more rank-conscious and displayed their status more openly than their Czech counterparts. Nevertheless, glamorization of the peasants and farmers was part of the literary and sometimes even scientific tradition of both Czechs and Slovaks. Up to 1945 the "rural people" were pictured as the backbone of the nation, the safeguard of its stability and its ethnic identity.

The change from the inter-war to the present system can be characterized as a transition from a pluralistic society to one stressing homogeneity, aimed at leveling off the upper strata. The dispossession of the old upper class and pauperization of the propertied middle class has meant a change in the standards used for the evaluation of status.

Up to the end of World War II class status was based upon a combination of the following criteria: possession of wealth (income), level of education, degree of superordination and subordination in the economic system, degree of influence in community and state affairs, and family tradition and style of life. Of these, wealth and education were the best indices of social recognition. Today they are replaced by power, income and type of occupation. Possession of wealth in particular is no longer an adequate index, with the possible exception of some rural areas.

The groups of the extremely wealthy and extremely poor people almost disappeared. There are no longer any professional mendicants and "professionally unemployed." Most striking is the change in the composition of the social elite: in contrast to the past, the present upper stratum is a caste-like group with uniform ideological orientation, relatively isolated from the masses of the population. Significant also is the nebulosity of the boundary between the lower-middle and the lower classes. It witnesses the relative rise in the status of workers, an increase in the size of the white-collar group, and pauperization of the merchants, tradesmen and artisans.

Social Structure of Prewar Czechoslovakia¹

The Upper Class

The prewar Czechoslovak upper class was a relatively small group. According to our estimate it numbered no more than 120,000 individuals, or less than one per cent of the total population. In common parlance it was the "upper ten thousand." It was composed of three main strata: the plutocracy (dominant capitalist group); the intellectual stratum (leading members of the liberal professions); and the top bureaucratic stratum. Although these groups varied in possession of wealth, influence and style of life, they tended to be composed of people with university education and to lay greater emphasis on family tradition than the members of the lower classes. They were recruited mainly from the upper-middle class,

¹ See Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3
 QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN 1930*

	Upper	Upper- middle	Lower- middle	Upper- lower	Lower- lower	TOTAL
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	16,700	70,300	1,924,000	1,434,000	1,395,000	4,840,000
Manufacturing, handicraft, construction, mining and metallurgy	15,200	220,700	932,100	1,117,000	2,605,000	4,890,000
Commerce, banking and insurance	10,100	185,800	298,100	163,000	349,000	1,006,000
Transportation	7,600	45,300	308,100	80,000	356,000	797,000
Public administration and state plants	17,000	133,000	268,000	207,000	150,000	775,000
Liberal professions and health service	29,300	70,700	60,000	16,000	16,000	192,000
Retirees, pensioners, and others	24,100	85,100	352,800	475,000	563,000	1,500,000
TOTAL	120,000	810,900	4,143,100	3,492,000	5,434,000	14,000,000
IN PER CENT	.85	5.79	29.61	24.94	38.81	100.00
			35.40%		63.75%	

*See note following Table 4.

Table 4		
COMPOSITION OF SOCIAL CLASSES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1930*		
Social class	Percent of total population	Social Categories included in the class
Upper	.85%	<p>A. The Plutocracy: farmers with 100 hectares and more; entrepreneurs; owners of banks and insurance companies; wholesale dealers; owners of private transportation, publishing houses, hotels, hospitals, clinics, spas, restaurants, theaters and similar establishments all with 51 employees and more;</p> <p>B. The Intellectual Stratum (members of liberal professions): leading politicians, university professors, physicians, clergymen, lawyers, artists, writers, journalists, composers, musicians, architects;</p> <p>C. The Bureaucratic Stratum: higher governmental officials and administrators; top group of army and police officers; directors of state plants with 51 employees or more; general managers of private enterprises with 250 employees or more.</p>
Upper-middle	5.79%	<p>A. The Propertied upper-middle Class: farmers with 30 but less than 100 hectares; entrepreneurs and owners of establishments as above with 11 to 50 employees;</p> <p>B. The Intellectual Stratum (members of liberal professions): less prominent members of the same categories mentioned above; <u>gymnasium</u> and special school professors;</p> <p>C. The Bureaucratic Stratum: less prominent governmental officials and administrators, Army and police officers; managers of state plants with 11 to 50 employees; head engineers; white-collar workers with high qualification working in private enterprises.</p>

Table 4 (cont.)

Lower- middle	29.6%	<p>A. Propertied Lower-middle Class: farmers with 2 but less than 30 ha.; entrepreneurs and owners as above with 1 to 10 employees; retail dealers and tradesmen with 1 or more employees;</p> <p>B. The Intellectual Stratum: the grammar school and high school (equivalent to Bürgerschule) teachers;</p> <p>C. The "New Middle Class :" managers of state and community enterprises with less than 11 employees; governmental officials and administrators with low qualification; managers of private enterprises with less than 50 employees; white-collar workers with medium qualification; technical personnel with medium qualification.</p>
<hr/>		
Upper- lower	24.94%	<p>A. The Propertied Upper-lower Class: peasants with less than 2 hectares; retail dealers and tradesmen with no employees (except for family members); artisans; homeworkers;</p> <p>B. The "New Lower-middle Class:" white-collar workers with low qualification; foremen and attendants; skilled industrial workers;</p>
<hr/>		
Lower- lower	38.8%	Semi-skilled and unskilled industrial workers; agricultural workers; workers in all other occupations; soldiers; unemployed; mendicants; etc.

*

* This is a very approximate estimate of the social structure based on objective criteria like degree of superordination and subordination in the economic system, possession of wealth, income, type of occupation and education. For method used see T. Geiger, Die soziale Schichtung des Deutschen Volkes (Stuttgart: Enke, 1932). Some of the premises were modified to suit our theoretical scheme and the Czechoslovak situation. This estimate is based on 1930 census data, primarily as presented by H. O. Ziegler in Die berufliche und soziale Gliederung der Bevölkerung in der Tschechoslowakei (Brünn: Rohrer, 1936). The data refer to the territory of the Republic as of December 31, 1947.

although the careers of some of the most prominent members of the social elite contributed to the belief in the universal possibility of achieving the highest positions in the society, a Czechoslovak version of the Horatio Alger story. Among the most successful were President Masaryk, son of a coachman who started his career as an apprentice village cobbler; President Beneš, son of a poor peasant; Baťa, shoe magnate who began as a village shoemaker; and Rolný, a tailor who became the most noted clothes manufacturer.

The members of the upper class tended to share a conservative orientation in economic matters. Most of them were members of the National Democratic Party, which was instrumental in the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic and which staunchly defended the interests of industrialists and the presidents of leading banks. A minority, almost all of them owners of large estates (velkostatkáři), belonged to the Agrarian Party, a middle-of-the-road but still quite conservative group. The weight of the upper class was in the highest financial circles. Živnobanka, the leading bank in the country, and six other banks practically controlled Czechoslovak industry. Thus in the middle thirties only fifty-six independent entrepreneurs in the mining industry, ten per cent of those in the building industry, and, on the average, twenty-eight per cent of those in other industrial branches were independent. Only the textile industry remained largely a family enterprise.² As a result there was a certain degree of antagonism between the independent entrepreneurs and the financial magnates. Except for its nationalism, and this was defined for this group primarily in terms of Czech-German competition, the capitalists of Czechoslovakia resembled those of Western Europe: their main goal was accumulation of private property and expansion. With the exception of the financial circles and estate owners the propertied upper class was fairly socially conscious; it was characterized by a conciliatory attitude in labor-management relations.

While the status of the plutocracy was based primarily on wealth, power and achievement, the prestige of the leading members of the liberal professions could be ascribed to the high valuation of university

2 - Kurt Witt, Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftspolitik der Tschechoslowakei (Leipzig: Weiner, 1936).

education, to the traditional engagement of its members in the defense of national interests and to their very extensive autonomy. The intellectual stratum was composed of the leading university professors, physicians, clergymen, lawyers, artists, writers, journalists, composers, musicians, architects and politicians. The higher ranks of the Catholic clergy enjoyed a high status, especially in religion-bound Slovakia.

The leading politicians and the top bureaucratic stratum (high government officials, leading army and police officers and top managers of the large enterprises with absentee ownership) formed a group which was a predecessor of the postwar and the present elite. Although heterogeneous in their political orientation and in their relationship to the lower strata of the population, they shared a common basis of social status, power, loyalty to their organization or enterprise, eventually skill and income. Not accumulation of property, but accumulation of prestige and power was their primary goal, the desire to lead and to extend opportunities for manipulating other individuals through various organizations.

While the group of capitalists started to decrease during the depression years, the increase in the other two strata continued, due to the expansion of the state apparatus, cartelization, concentration of property and the rapid growth of the Slovak intelligentsia. With the exception of some estate owners, the members of the upper class lived in the larger cities, primarily in Prague, Brno and Bratislava.

The Bourgeoisie

The Czechoslovak bourgeoisie was a fast-growing, dynamic and self-confident class exercising influence on the national, regional and local levels. In 1930 it comprised about five million people, or about 35 per cent of the total population of Czechoslovakia. The bourgeoisie was composed of all those who for one reason or another could conceive of themselves and were by others recognized as páni ("masters") and did not qualify for admission in the upper class. Consequently it was very heterogeneous. This was manifested, for example, in the fact that members of the middle class belonged to various political parties: the Agrarian, Tradesmen's, Czech Socialists, Czech People's and Slovak People's parties.

The main distinction among the members of the bourgeoisie could

be illustrated by the use of three indices: the possession of wealth (income), the level of education and the degree of power over others; these rather vaguely separated the middle-class population into the upper-middle and lower-middle classes. This distinction also held true for the most part in terms of mutual association.

The upper-middle class (sometimes called honorace or lepší lidé, i. e. , people who are better off) was composed of three social strata parallel with those of the upper class. However, there was a difference between the former and the latter in the degree of prominence, influence, power, wealth, and sometimes of education and style of life. It was customary among the members of the upper-middle class to play down one's wealth and to emphasize one's education, prominence and influence. The majority of this class was composed of well-educated people. Most members of the intellectual and bureaucratic strata attended or graduated from the universities. A fair percentage of the propertied members graduated from the gymnasiums, reálkas, or special technical, commercial and agricultural schools. Some of them also had university education. Another obvious factor which divided the members of the urban upper- and lower-middle classes was the ownership of a house: among the former, it was a rule; among the latter, only the propertied stratum usually possessed houses of their own.

The urban upper-middle class was dominated by the entrepreneurial group. The latter comprised the owners of the textile, shoe, furniture, glass, ceramics, light machinery factories, breweries, distilleries, brickyards, sugar refineries, dairies, mills, printing houses, and similar enterprises. With them can be ranked owners of hotels, restaurants, coffeehouses, theaters, movie theaters, hospitals, clinics, private schools, and similar establishments, and wholesale dealers and owners of smaller banks. They shared many of the characteristics of the upper-class entrepreneurs, but were much more antagonistic toward the group of financial captains and big wholesale dealers than were their upper-class counterparts, more nationalistic and less conservative. They also felt personally responsible for their own property.

The members of the intellectual and bureaucratic strata were

usually outstanding civic leaders. The members of the liberal professions and gymnasium and special school professors were especially concerned with the welfare of the lower strata and thus balanced the less social-minded ideology of the propertied group. They sometimes ranked higher in prestige than the propertied stratum because of the cultural emphasis on education as a goal in itself.

The bureaucratic stratum actually represented the second-rank managerial group and important regional and local civil servants. In addition, it included highly skilled technicians. Although striving for power and influence, this stratum laid great emphasis on the security of their jobs and a retirement pension.

The rural middle class was differentiated primarily according to the size of the farm, number of people employed and orientation of production to the market or to home consumption. The upper-middle class composed of smaller estate owners (statkáři) and big farmers (sedláci⁵) was an entrepreneurial stratum sometimes urbane in manners, consumption habits, dress and interest. But in contrast to the richest landlords, they seldom practiced absentee ownership and seldom owned sugar refineries, dairies or mills. Many of them attended agricultural high schools and colleges, were well versed in scientific farming and specialized their crops according to the demands of the city market. Like the urban propertied stratum, they were economically and socially conservative, self-confident and tradition-oriented. From among them the political leaders of the agricultural population were recruited. As a rule they were very antagonistic toward the Czechoslovak plutocracy, primarily toward the financial group.

The upper-middle class constituted about six per cent of the total population, or slightly over 800,000 individuals.

The lower-middle-class intellectual stratum, the teachers in national schools, actually formed a transition group between the two sections of the middle class, both in the cities and in the countryside.

³ This group of sedláci was sometimes called lánici, owners of a lán (or more), a measure which is not everywhere of the same size but which can be roughly fixed at 30 hectares (74 acres).

The teacher performed the role of civic leader on the community level, especially in towns and villages.

The propertied lower-middle class (with the exception of farmers) gained recognition as a separate group only with increasing industrialization and commercialization. It was composed of the merchants, tradespeople, owners of larger repair shops, lesser white-collar workers, skilled technicians and skilled attendants. In general, this group ranked itself and was ranked by others among the "masters," but this agreement was not overwhelming.⁴ This indecision indicated the relatively recent origin and the relative instability of the social position of this group. On the other hand, it was indicative of the democratic character of Czechoslovak society and it reflected the trend toward "bourgeoisification" of the mass of the population carried to the utmost in the present-day United States. The gradualness of social differences between classes had a definite influence on the attitudes and aspirations of industrial workers and proved to be in later periods an effective balancing factor in Czech society.

The propertied lower-middle class was composed mainly of the newly arrived "little people" who had risen by their own efforts and hard work during the three preceding decades. There were few among them who had inherited their own shops or establishments. It was an extremely mobile and consequently not too solidary stratum aspiring to a good standard of living and good education, and imitating in style of life and political orientation the members of the upper and middle class, although putting the emphasis on small entrepreneurs' interests. Very few of them had more than měšťanka (Bürgerschule) education.

As elsewhere in Europe, the period between the wars was the time of the rise of the "new middle class," composed of lower white-collar workers and technical personnel in the state administration, at railways and post-offices, in banks, insurance companies, and factories; of sales

⁴L. Boček, "Jsou obchodníci, živnostníci, řemeslníci, nižší úředníci pany'ci lidem?" Sociologická revue, XI (1940), No. 1 - 2, 73-82.

employees in commercial enterprises; and of skilled attendants and foremen. The majority of them were employed in retail and wholesale shops, in transportation, and in banks. It was a consequence of the rationalization of production and of the increasing expansion of the distributive and state functions. Most of them were of lower or lower-middle class origin who benefited from the opportunity for universal education and preferred the clean and light "brainwork" to tiresome jobs in a factory or shop. Although they usually were not much better off than industrial workers in terms of income, they developed a style of life akin to that of the middle class. They identified their own interests with those of the employer although they had not much in common with him socially. They tended to spend much less money for food than an average worker, but much more for the so-called cultural needs, primarily for health, transportation, cigarettes, meals in restaurants, entertainment, and travel. They did not aspire to self-education or accumulation of wealth, sometimes not even to a higher social position, but to a safe, comfortable life, full of few events and little glamour. The exceptions were those who lived on the peripheries of cities or in rural areas who owned a piece of land, a garden, or a house. The latter group usually had much in common with the propertied lower-middle class. Ideologically, this group stood slightly to the left of center; most of its members belonged to the Czech Socialist Party, others to the Tradesmen's Czech and Slovak Catholic Parties, sometimes to the Social Democrats. Characteristically they were the backbone of the Sokols, together with grammar school and high school teachers.

The major difference between the "new middle class" and the old one was the new group's lack of interest in the accumulation of private property, its great mobility, its dependence on the fortunes of the labor market, and also its attempt to form unions of its own. Nevertheless, in terms of social status it can be ranked with the propertied lower-middle class because of its education and its style of life. Many of this white-collar group graduated from the gymnasium, commercial or other special schools.

The rural lower-middle class consisted of the middle and small

farmers (sedláci)⁵ and those peasants (rolníci) who were able to support their families by farming on their own land. They were generally very concerned with their own land and bound by sentiments and interests to their own communities and neighborhoods, much more so than the estate owners and big farmers. They valued their property more than their own health and comfort or the happiness of their families. In their dress, manners, speech and use of leisure time, they were much closer to the peasants and agricultural workers than to the rural upper strata.

The central value of the middle and small farmer was, and still is, the idea that he has an inalienable right to the land. The land was his love, his pride and his fate. As one of the leading Czech sociologists put it, the farmer's hunger is not a hunger after money but a hunger after the land.⁶ With this went related characteristics: emphasis on family tradition and continuity, pride, self-sufficiency, lack of confidence in the city people, conservatism marked by caution in accepting innovations, an extremely utilitarian attitude toward life, thrift, orderliness, and egocentrism. The desire of the farmer was to be his own boss, to do the work his own way, and to be the master on his own land. This attitude led to lack of cooperativeness, but also to placing a high value on personal freedom and independence.

The farmer's world view--and for that matter, that of all people engaged in agriculture--was rather limited and simple. His interest in national and foreign affairs increased only with increasing urbanization of the countryside in the late thirties. His adherence to the church was, with the exception of some districts in Slovakia and Moravia, a social convention rather than an expression of deep religious feeling. The Agrarian Party got the support of farmers because of their dominant economic interest; the Czech and Slovak Catholic Parties found support

⁵This group of sedláci consisted of the so-called půllánici, owners of half a lán (about 37 acres), and čtvrtlánici, owners of a quarter of a lán (about 18 acres).

⁶A. Bláha, Sociologie sedláka a dělníka (Prague: Orbis, 1925).

in the countryside as a result of the farmers' conventional attitude in church matters. In education, the middle and small farmers did not surpass their urban counterparts; most of them went only to the national schools.

The Lower Class

The lower class was commonly referred to as "people," "rural people" and "urban people;" "working people;" or simply as peasants and workers. It was differentiated from other classes by lack of property, low income, performance of manual work, a lower educational level, lack of direct influence on community and national affairs, economic dependence and subordination, lack of emphasis on family tradition, an unrefined style of life, and locally oriented interests.⁷

In 1930 the lower class constituted slightly over two-thirds of the total population, but its size diminished steadily before the Communist coup d'etat. The distinction between the upper-lower and lower-lower classes used further in the chapter, is an analytical distinction rather than the reflection of a social reality meaningfully conceived and acknowledged by the participants. It is introduced here to point out the gradualness of the social differences and of the social distance which sometimes existed between the "have littles" and "have nots" and between the skilled and unskilled workers.

The upper-lower class could be conceived of as a transition category between the middle class and the Czechoslovak proletarian population. The main stratum was composed of cottagers (chalupníci), peasants owning a small piece of land (the upper limit in our scheme is fixed at two hectares, i. e., about five acres; actually, the upper limit fluctuated between two and five hectares according to the quality of land, etc.) insufficient to support their families; consequently they were forced to earn a living as farm laborers or by handicraft. During the late twenties when agricultural work started to be less valued as a way of life and the economic situation in the countryside worsened considerably, many of these cottagers left for the city or took a full-time job in industry while

⁷A. Blaha, "Problem lidu," Sociologicka revue, XI (1940), No. 1-2.

their wives managed their small property. The cottagers' style of life was not very different from that of the industrial workers but their mentality was much closer to that of the farmers and peasants. Like the latter, the cottager was striving for land and was bound to his own village. In some instances he shared the farmers' political orientation, but in general he was fertile soil for both the extreme left and the conservative parties. Nevertheless, his involvement was motivated by local economic advantages and personal relationships, not by an ideology.

The second stratum in this category were homeworkers specializing in home production of textiles, costume jewelry, musical instruments, leather goods, clothes, and similar items. Ranked with them were artisans and the smallest retail dealers. This petty producer class lived mainly in villages or the smallest towns, carrying on a long family tradition. Their numbers were rapidly diminishing with increasing industrialization and urbanization. Often poorer than the urban industrial worker, they were nevertheless much more property-oriented and independent in attitude. Typically their beliefs were a mixture of radicalism and conservatism.

The last stratum was a rising group, the only one to stay during the coming decades: the technical personnel with low qualification, foremen, attendants, highly skilled industrial workers, and the white-collar workers with low qualification. The non-clerical group was distinguished from the rest of the industrial workers by three main factors: higher income, skill, and aspirations. In its style of life it was usually little distinguishable from the lower white-collar workers. The same was true of its political orientation: the great majority of them voted for the Social Democrats or Czech Socialists. The upper-lower class constituted almost one-fourth of the total population.

A special group of the lower-lower class was composed of agricultural workers and domestic servants. In both cases there was little social distance between them and the employers; quite frequently, the agricultural workers and domestic servants shared their master's beliefs and conservatism, but opposite cases were not exceptional. Thus a number of Slovak agricultural workers belonged to the Communist Party. Their standard of living and education was very low. In contrast to the

industrial workers, they were bound to their own communities (with the exception of seasonal workers); not only their economic but also their personal liberty was rather limited.

A transition group between the agricultural workers and the industrial workers provided a special category, the so-called "metal-agriculturalists" (kovozezedelci) owning some land, although very little, or not owning any land but residing in the village. In style of life and standard of living they were very similar to the agricultural workers. In regard to ideological orientation they usually leaned toward the socialist or communist parties, but did not share the collectivist ideology of the urban workers. . . Belonging to the Party was a matter of social convention and was important only as far as their local economic interests were concerned, i. e. , usually as a way of opposing the dominance of the farmers and peasants in the community.⁸

The industrial workers of Czechoslovakia between the wars could be divided into two major categories: those working in large and middle-sized factories and mines (over twenty employees) and those working in smaller establishments. The former group could be defined as proletarian while the latter would usually tend to comprise many workers with artisan-like mentality and skill. That this distinction was significant is shown in Table 5.

⁸J. Obrdlík, "Social Distance in a Village," Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Congress of Sociology (Rome: International Institute of Sociology, 1950).

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION IN THE CATEGORY
"MANUFACTURING, HANDICRAFT, CONSTRUCTION, MINING, AND
METALLURGY"
ACCORDING TO THE SIZE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT. 1930.*

Population of the Industrial Society		Population of the Small Industrial Society	
Establishments with More than 50 // 11 to 50 Employees		Establishments with 6 to 10 // 1 to 5 Employees	Out of Those Are Homeworkers
Bohemia	1,342,752 (287,516) 426,624 7,737	144,129 (82,829) 620,037 20,812	66,796
Total	2,064,629	867,807	
in %	70%	30%	
with correction	67%	33%	
Moravia	727,534 (110,282) 172,539 2,753	71,010 (46,121) 302,716 1,340	25,868
Total	1,013,108	421,187	
in %	71%	29%	
with correction	68%	32%	
Slovakia	208,505 (64,622) 71,696 1,722	40,915 (28,329) 206,240 445	2,927
Total	346,545	275,959	
in %	55%	45%	
with correction	51%	49%	

* H. O. Ziegler, Die berufliche und soziale Gliederung der Bevölkerung in der Tschechoslowakei (Brünn, Rohrer, 1936), Appendices 21 a, 22 a.

The differences in the size of groups of workers accounted for some of their differences in orientation toward their employers, as well as in their aspirations. The smaller establishments and quite frequently those of middle size were run in a more or less paternalistic way, and mutual obligations between the owner and the workers, relative intimacy, and sometimes even friendship were not exceptional. In such instances, the workers tended to be rather conservative, admiring the "classic" social system with a fixed division of labor and of responsibility between the employer and employee and taking it for granted that they should be satisfied with their poor social and economic situation. It was basically an expression of the Catholic doctrine and an ideology of social fatalism.⁹ This situation was prevalent in the clothing, food processing, and leather industries (excluding Bata shoe factories) and in the metalworking and finishing industries.

The working class, a solidary and class-conscious group of workers, was composed primarily of miners, textile workers, and workers in the iron, glass, paper, building, printing, and chemical industries. There the ties between employer and employee changed to depersonalized relations characterized by feelings of deprivation, injustice, and social exclusion on the part of the workers. The majority of these workers were semi-skilled or skilled. Nevertheless, their class-consciousness took different forms; the prevalent orientation was reformist and conciliatory, seeking adjustment through bargaining and parliamentary pressure by the socialist parties (Social Democrats and Czechoslovak Socialists) and their labor unions. Only a minority stood for a revolutionary program of the Communist Party. The latter group was composed of semi-skilled and unskilled laborers mainly; this was demonstrated in the membership of the Communist Labor Union, where the majority was constituted textile workers, miners, and bricklayers.¹⁰

⁹Bláha, Sociologie sedláka a dělníka, op. cit.

¹⁰V. Walzel, History of Czechoslovak Trade Unionism (New York: Mid-European Study Center, 1952).

The differentiation in skill and income of workers was also reflected in their style of life. The majority lived in poor houses and dressed poorly; many did not finish the national school program. Their family life was frequently disorderly; heavy drinking was quite common. The working-class aristocracy, on the other hand, could afford to dress well, and generally took good care of their families, primarily because of the fact that their wives could afford to stay at home.¹¹

The lower-lower class in 1930 constituted slightly less than forty per cent of the total population. Very few among its members lived below the level of subsistence, by mendicancy, prostitution, or as "unemployed by profession." The wave of unemployment which hit Czechoslovakia in the early thirties reversed the trend toward general betterment, but in the late thirties the rise of the prestige of the working class continued even faster than before.

Class Conflict

The relative stability of the Czechoslovak social structure is best revealed in the lack of warlike antagonism between workers and employers. As elsewhere in European industrial countries, the main pressure groups were the unions of the industrialists (especially the Central Association of Czechoslovak Industrialists) and the labor unions. (The most powerful among the latter was the Czechoslovak Labor Association, which was connected with the Social Democratic Party.) The labor unions, among the best ones in the world, comprised 2.2 million members, about 45 per cent of all persons economically active in industry, trades, crafts, transportation, and state administration.¹²

In spite of the good organizational setup of workers, there were few strikes throughout the whole period. In Vítkovické železářny, the largest steel mill in the country, there was no major strike after 1923. In the

¹¹Blaňa, op. cit.

¹²Witt, op. cit.

second largest steel mill, at Trinec, there was no strike after 1919.¹³ Usually the strikers would not stay out for longer than one day. The only major strike worth mentioning was that of 100,000 miners who were on strike for two months in 1926.¹⁴ This fact illustrates the general tendency to compromise characteristic of both labor and management. It also shows the effects of state sponsorship of a highly progressive labor code and a highly ramified system of social and individual benefactions.

The third largest pressure group consisted of the farmers' organizations headed by the powerful Society of Czechoslovak Sugar Refineries. In general, these organizations were designed to protect the farmers' interests against big city industrial and financial corporations.

In many instances the overall tension between the owners and the "have nots" was overshadowed by occupational antagonism and particularism. It took the form of an excessive pride in one's occupation and underestimation of the value of other people's work. It was most pronounced among farmers.¹⁵

The economic and occupational competition operated also on the level of political parties. With the exception of the Catholic and Nationalist Parties, each party represented a major occupational category. In general, the farmers and peasants were represented by Agrarians; the skilled workers by Social Democrats; the salaried lower-middle class and intellectuals by Czech Socialists; small retailers and tradesmen by the Tradesmen's Party; the capitalists, leading members of liberal professions and high bureaucracy by the National Democrats; the unskilled and unemployed workers by the Communists. In spite of its organizational atomization and diversity, many professional organizations, labor unions, and political parties, Czechoslovak society was developing without any social disruption.

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M. Hindus, The Bright Passage (New York: Doubleday, 1947).

¹⁴V. Walzel, op. cit. This author gives also the total number of strikes for 1922 as 194, for 1928 as 192.

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A. Obrdlík, Povolání a veřejné blaho (Prague: Orbis, 1937).

Stability was destroyed by outside interference augmented by internal ethnic cleavages. The resulting partition of the Republic and German domination in Bohemia and Moravia proved to be an important factor not only in the ethnic relations but also in the development of the social composition of Czechoslovak society.

Transformation of Czech Society under German Occupation

Structural changes which occurred in German-occupied Bohemia and Moravia resulted in a shift in the industrial setup of the country; in the rearrangement of the decision-making, controlling groups in the economic system; increasing control of private enterprise by the government; changes in the institution of property; and increasing bureaucratization.¹⁶ Together with political persecution and a shift in popular attitudes towards the system of private enterprise, these changes had a lasting effect on the social structure of Czech society. They meant a rapid shift from an industrial-agrarian society to a society dominated by industry, and within the industrial branch itself a further shift from small and middle-size enterprises to huge combines. This was accompanied by a shift of agrarian population and the forcible transfer of about 100,000 tradesmen and craftsmen, several more thousand state officials, and students to industrial establishments.¹⁷

The change in the social structure was further characterized by an increasing bureaucratization, a rapid growth of the white-collar group. In prewar Czechoslovakia there were seven to eight persons in production for each one in administration; in 1946 the ratio changed to three to four in production to one in administration.¹⁸ Supremacy of the political cliques over entrepreneurs and businessmen was instituted. Business became a political privilege handed down by the functionary of the N. S. D. A. P.

¹⁶ Frank Munk, The Legacy of Nazism (New York: Macmillan, 1944).

¹⁷ Leopold Chmela, Hospodářská okupace Československa, její metody a důsledky (Prague: Orbis, 1946).

¹⁸ Ibid.

It became as bureaucratic as the other government bureaus.¹⁹

The German project of liquidating and assimilating Czech society resulted finally in the pauperization of the propertied upper class and much of the propertied middle class. Banks, private insurance companies, and large industrial establishments were taken over by the German ruling group either through semi-legal action or by direct expropriation. Over three thousand plants, eleven to twelve thousand tradeshops, and thirty five hundred to four thousand commercial establishments were forcibly closed down, and many others closed voluntarily because of lack of material.²⁰ The net result was the institution of a class of hired managers, German almost without exception, which has been described as persons who have their tasks cut out for them by others and have been set to perform them. The entrepreneurial character of Czech society started to disappear rapidly.

A further consequence of the German policy of domination was a partial physical liquidation of the Czech social elite. About 200,000 Czechs died in concentration camps,²¹ most of them members of liberal professions, high government officials, leaders of political parties, military organizations, labor unions, and gymnastic associations, clergymen, entrepreneurs, businessmen, and wealthy farmers. Not only the wealth and power, but also the number of members of the upper class declined considerably. The prewar social elite was at the end of the war too weak to make its way back to power, either politically or economically. The rule of the political bosses, this time Czech and Slovak and later Russian instead of German, was to continue.

The large-scale expropriation of property had another consequence apart from being instrumental in the dispossession of the upper class.

¹⁹Munk, op. cit.

²⁰Chmela, op. cit.

²¹Ibid.

The Nazis dissociated ownership of property from control--from making decisions about uses, consumption, and appropriation. They created extreme uncertainty about property tenure.²² This uncertainty, together with extreme political pressure, contributed a great deal to the passivity of the propertied groups in the first stage of nationalization in 1945, and strengthened the attitude of the Czech and Slovak doctrinaire Marxists, populists, and egalitarians about the expropriation of large fortunes. At the end of the war the egalitarians won an overwhelming following among the Czech and Slovak population. This was accentuated by the transfer of Germans and Hungarians and the expropriation of their property.

Final Dispossession of the Old Upper Class

The process of liquidation of the prewar upper class started during the German occupation. After the war, it was extended first to the remnants of the German and Hungarian gentry and landowners, entrepreneurs, and bankers, and then to Czech and Slovak collaborators. At the beginning of October 1945, one month before the nationalization decree was issued, there were already about 9,600 enterprises with one million employees which had been placed under national management.²³ The presidential decrees themselves provided for the nationalization of (1) mines and large industrial enterprises; (2) enterprises of the food industry; (3) all joint stock companies engaged in banking and financial transactions (banks); and (4) private insurance companies.²⁴ The nationalization involved 1,327 industrial plants and mines with 570,000 employees, and all types of banks and insurance companies with an additional 90,000 employees. The extent of nationalized industry is very clearly shown by the following estimate made by the Central Union of Czechoslovak industry.

²²Munk, op. cit.

²³Gustav Beuer, New Czechoslovakia and Her Historical Background (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947).

²⁴Ibid.

TABLE 6
THE EXTENT OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
IN 1945.*

Economic Group	Nationalized Enterprises		
	Number of Enterprises	Number of Employees	% of All Employees
Mining industry	125	104,000	100.0
Sugar industry	35	32,000	80
Alcohol industry	23	1,600	31.5
Brewing and malt industry	6	3,500	27
Milling industry	7	700	14
Food industry	111	4,400	9
Iron production	22	36,000	100
Iron and other metals	150	190,000	68.5
Electric power plants	471	20,500	73
Sawmills and woodworking industry	22	4,700	8
Paper industry	18	10,000	45.5
Chemical industry	94	37,600	72
Stone, clay and ceramic industry	97	20,400	46.4
Glass industry	84	15,000	65
Textile industry	60	63,000	47
Clothing industry	15	8,000	25
Leather industry	6	15,000	53.5
Gasworks and waterworks	31	3,500	50
		570,000	37.0%

*Gustav Beyer, *op. cit.*, p. 136. Figures given in the percentage column indicate the number of persons employed in nationalized enterprises as the percentage of the total employed in the respective economic groups. In addition to this, all property of Germans and collaborators which has not been nationalized because of its size has been confiscated and put under national management.

Only a few of the expropriated owners got any compensation. No plants with more than five hundred employees remained in private hands. In addition, the land of a few hundred landowners was confiscated during the new land reform. The remainder of the propertied upper class was disowned three years later in a sweeping nationalization of all the industrial enterprises and expropriation of all landholdings over 50 hectares. "Bourgeoisification" of the Industrial Workers.

Class consciousness among Czechoslovak workers before World War I was characteristic only of skilled workers. In fighting for universal suffrage, the feeling of class solidarity was extended to all city workers. The agricultural laborers took part in this movement much later, with the increasing industrialization of the country and urbanization of rural areas. In the course of the First Republic the city workers became conscious of their importance and of the strength of their organizations. This realization helped them to overcome their feelings of social exclusion and induced many to exchange class conflict for cooperation with members of other social classes. This was true primarily of the skilled workers with higher incomes.²⁵

This process was intensified during the war. Under the pressure of German occupation many prewar social cleavages disappeared or were lessened by the feeling of national humiliation. Intense nationalism became a universal ideology. The forced induction of many middle-class members into industry helped to narrow the social distance between the industrial worker and the wealthy or the educated. Of some importance also was the fact that the industrial workers were the only Czech social stratum which the German regime felt it necessary to win over to insure smooth war production. Although most rights were taken away from the workers (including the right to strike, to choose one's job, to associate freely, to keep to a forty-hour work week, etc.) they benefited by high wages in all branches of heavy industry (especially in war production), special rations, introduction of factory kitchens, health service, paid vacations in spas and summer resorts, etc.²⁶ Even though these measures

²⁵ Jaroslav Hanáček, "Kotázce dělníkova sociálního sebevědomí," Sociologická revue, XII (1946), No. 1, 41-46; No. 2, 24-35.

²⁶ Walzel, op. cit.

did not win over the Czech workers, they raised their level of aspirations.

The postwar shift of power to the left created a new type of relationship between employer and employee. In large and medium-sized plants Works Councils were created, giving the workers the right to participate in the management of the factory and to protect their own interests. The Unified Trade Unions (ROH) came to be a powerful organization, equal in importance to political parties.

This change in the balance of forces and in the workers' prestige resulted in a change in the workers' style of life and mentality. Before the war, the workers were eager to buy and to distribute socialist and Communist literature. After the war they took interest primarily in the publications and activities of Trade Unions, cooperatives, and sporting organizations. Play and leisure became as important as ideological education or political meetings. The gain of the Communist Party in 1946 was looked upon by them as recognition of the value of their own class and work for the welfare of the whole society. Typically, the workers tried to recruit for their clubs and associations white-collar workers from banks and retail stores, tradespeople, and intellectuals, not as prospective functionaries but as simple members. Absence of class consciousness was exemplified also by the vocabulary used in public and by disapproval of those who acted as "oppressed proletarians."²⁷ The American writer Maurice Hindus properly called Czechoslovak workers of that time "middle-class proletarians," people with a relatively low standard of living, but with a non-Marxian and non-proletarian mentality.²⁸

The changes in the style of life brought the worker much closer to the white-collar employee than in prewar times. It was exemplified in the worker's desire to own or to rent a house; to furnish his apartment according to middle-class standards; to dress as well as the people from higher strata (in this respect, the change was most radical); to abstain from excessive drinking; to be polite in dealing with others; to take proper care of one's family; to send his children to higher schools and thus

²⁷ Hanáček, op. cit.

²⁸ Hindus, op. cit.

enable them to raise their status; to save more; to enjoy and utilize modern mass communications media for self-education, i. e., radio, newspapers, movies, books, libraries; to spend much free time dancing, at concerts, at sporting events; to travel on weekends and during the vacation; to participate in a great variety of clubs and associations, apart from the trade unions and the political party.²⁹ The tavern and the secretariat of the political party were no longer the most usual meeting places of workers. Quite frequently this new way of life brought with it indifference toward religion, especially in the case of Catholics. On the whole, this change in the status and aspirations of the workers started to obliterate the boundary between the lower-middle and lower classes, a process which has continued to the present.

This tendency toward greater cooperation with other social strata described above was not equally true of all workers. There were many among them who capitalized on the strength of the workers' organizations, the working-class bureaucrats, the secretaries and functionaries of the trade unions, Communist Party, and of the Workers' Militia, a semi-military organization created right after the end of the war to safeguard the factories against possible sabotage. The second group, frequently overlapping the former one, comprised the convinced revolutionaries, a number of them people who had spent some time in the underground during the war or who had suffered a great deal from the prewar depression. The third and most numerous group was composed of the industrial workers living in agricultural communities, and of the agricultural workers. All of them shared--for various reasons, to be sure --excessive pride in their class background and were extremely eager to keep their newly acquired power.

Radicalization of the Landless Peasant.

The urbanization of the countryside had a manifold effect on the Czechoslovak villagers. It brought an enterprising spirit to the farmers, who started to place the monetary value of the results of their work above traditional sentiments about farm work and the village way of life. In

²⁹Hanáček, op. cit.

some instances this change resulted in absentee landownership. The small peasants, cottagers, and agricultural workers either began to look down on agricultural work and to leave it for employment in industry, or they tried to acquire new land which would make their situation more bearable. While the flight to the cities was a continuous process which had gone on since the twenties, an opportunity which would satisfy land hunger arose only after the end of the war with the expropriation of all land owned by Germans, Hungarians, and Czech and Slovak collaborators, and with the Communist proposal to reduce all landed property to the upper limit of 50 hectares per farmer. Both events were of special importance for structural changes of the village. After the postwar land reform the poorest elements in the interior villages left to settle in the frontier country, and many cottagers became small holders expecting to get more land from the estates of big farmers. The lack of farmhands became universal on the larger holdings; cottagers disappeared as a dependent category. At the same time the material conditions of the "metal agriculturalists" (kovozemědělci, industrial workers living in the village and usually owning a piece of land) improved to a degree previously unknown, and their self-confidence and class consciousness rose accordingly.³⁰

The main source of status in the village was amount of property and degree of personal independence. The postwar changes brought economic self-sufficiency to practically all village strata, and antagonism was accentuated because social distance ceased to be acknowledged. The farmer was no longer regarded as superior, a fact which he resented. The strong antagonism between farmers, on the one hand, and cottagers, craftsmen, and industrial workers on the other, had originated during the war. Controls had been imposed only on farmers, while the cottagers freely engaged in the black market. Craftsmen and workers resented the fact that the farmers were willing to sell food at reasonable prices only to those who would work on their fields. (This was also the cause of antagonism between the urban population and the farmers.)

³⁰J. Obrdlik, op. cit.

This strained relationship was intensified after the war. The industrial workers as a rule refused to help out on the farms, both because of their better economic situation and as a reaction to their previous dependence on the farmers. On the other hand, the farmers blamed the workers for the unpleasant changes which resulted in the loss of prestige of the former, and for the rising antagonism between the farmers and their servants. Sometimes the enmity between farmers and workers was due to the latter's flight from the land, religious difference, or political antagonism.³¹

The antagonism between farmers and cottagers was only slightly different. Farmers blamed cottagers for refusal to help at a time when farmhands were lacking; on the other hand, the cottagers felt exploited in the exchange of mutual services with the farmers. But the main source of discord was the conflicting attitude about property. The farmers feared to lose it; the cottagers were hoping to acquire it.³²

This antagonism between the farmers and other groups in the village broke down the traditional solidarity even in purely agricultural communities. It was demonstrated in the elections of 1946 when more than 50 per cent of all the Communist votes came from rural areas. They were the votes of the agricultural laborers, servants, cottagers, village craftsmen, and the small farmers, as well as the "metal agriculturists."

The Creation of a New Elite

Non-partisan groups and associations were severely disrupted during the German occupation; therefore, political parties performed many communal functions in the postwar period of reconstruction. The parties which formed the National Front were operating partially in the underground, and were therefore legitimized and in a position to take control of the state. Consequently they grew in power at the expense

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

of other social organizations. The Party functionaries influenced the appointments of civil servants, managers of nationalized and expropriated plants, leaders of trade and farmers' unions, youth organizations, and to a growing extent, army and police officers. They were actually in charge of the distribution of land and other property expropriated from Germans and Hungarians. Their influence in political trials were unprecedented. This concentration of power in the hands of Party bosses took place both on the national and local level. With the Communist coup d'etat this power was taken over by the leaders of the Communist Party, and in the following years the process of concentration and centralization was carried to an extreme.

The first step in this process was the elimination of all competitors and the destruction of organizations which supported them. The elimination centered first around the non-Communist political leaders, high government officials, Army and police officers, managers of nationalized factories, judges, university professors and students, all ranks of the civil service, leaders of the Sokol organization, trade union functionaries, journalists, radio and movie employees, etc. Hand in hand with the liquidation of their political opponents, the Party leadership decreed nationalization of all industrial plants and started on the program of nationalization and collectivization of commerce, trades, crafts, private transportation, and farms. The third step involved dissolution of voluntary organizations or their fusion with Communist-dominated mass organizations.³³ The final blow was directed against the clergy, particularly the Catholic and Greek Orthodox.

An overall reorganization of all major institutions and organizations which were preserved was conducted at the same time, with the aim of securing for the Party leadership firm control of the society. Three

³³ Gadourek, ^vPolitical Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953), p. 147, notes that up to July, 1951 about 13,000 organizations were abolished in Bohemia and Moravia. In Slovakia they were reduced to 8,000 by that time.

major hierarchies were created, each with an army of functionaries of its own, but without a clearly delimited competence: the policymaking, executive, and mass organizing ones. The first group comprised the Party leadership, including the regional and district secretaries. In the course of time an autonomous Soviet hierarchy emerged at the top of the Czechoslovak policymaking body.

The executive hierarchy consisted of the government bureaucracy, the police, the army; the managerial group in industry, commerce, trades, crafts, and transportation; and the trade union functionaries. The mass organizing hierarchy was composed of the functionaries of the major mass organizations: the trade unions (the role of trade union secretary is both organizational and executive), the Czechoslovak Youth League, the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League, the Union for Cooperation with the Army, and Voluntary Association Sokol (the remnants of the once-famous gymnastic association, now in existence in some villages only). Until the abolition of the Unified Farmers' Union in 1952, its functionaries could be counted among the army of "mass organizers." Schoolteachers and the employees of the media of mass communication should also be subsumed under this category.

The transformation of society resulted in a state of social relationships which has been described as "organized inequality." It abolished some social distinctions based on property, education, and family tradition, but it introduced a much harsher principle of superordination and subordination based on position within or in regard to the powerful hierarchies. The prewar pluralistic system changed into a dichotomy consisting of the ruling elite with its subsidiaries, and the ruled strata. By atomizing and pauperizing the subdued strata and by depriving them of their autonomous organizations, the ruling group did not eliminate, but strengthened class differences; social distance and the antagonism between the powerful and the powerless was greater than ever before.

The Composition and Cohesiveness of the New Elite

The ethnic distinctions separating the representatives of the Soviet Union and the group of native rulers constitute the major dividing line

among the members of the new elite. The former perform their tasks either from a distance through the Party and the administrative and business personnel of the Soviet Union, or by appointees on Czechoslovak territory.

Soviet Elite. The Soviet control of Czechoslovak society can be roughly divided into two periods, coinciding with the prevalent agency of control: the period of the Cominform, ending approximately at the end of 1950; and the period of dominance through the newly created Council of Mutual Economic Aid.³⁴ The policy of the Cominform emphasized control of the country through control of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The reliable apparatus of the latter was supposed to be granted an unlimited competence and complete autonomy from any other social group in the country. With Tito's break with the Soviet leaders, the exercise of Soviet control through the organization of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was gradually replaced by a direct control of Czechoslovak society through Soviet representatives, specialists, and counselors on Czechoslovak territory, and through control of Czechoslovak production and foreign trade.³⁵

The Soviet elite in Czechoslovakia is a well-knit caste with an autonomous hierarchy in each branch of public life. It consists of the Soviet Ambassador and his staff;³⁶ Soviet representatives in the Czechoslovak Communist Party; counselors and supervisors in the army, Ministry of National Security, Office of State Planning, in railroads, coal mines, foundries, factories in the Ostrava region, the Jachymov uranium mines, and newly built Slovak factories;³⁷ geologists, agronomists and university professors. Most of them come into contact with Czechs and Slovaks only in performing their official functions. In spite of the fact that they work

³⁴Paul Barton, Prague a l'heure de Moscou (Paris:Horay, 1954).

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 12 (Dec. 1952).

³⁷Barton, op. cit.

primarily "behind the scenes" and that little is known about their actual mission, their presence is resented by many of those who come into contact with them. Dolanský, chairman of the State Planning Office, complained about the Czech-Soviet antagonism in industry; the nationalistic Czech managers are convinced that "Czechoslovakia does not need to, or even cannot, learn anything from the Soviet Union or from the People's Democratic countries because it has an advanced industry and old traditions."³³ Nevertheless, it is probable that the excessive authority granted to the Soviet representatives is effective enough to bring about the satisfactory cooperation of Czechs or Slovaks who happen to be working with them.

The primary role of the Soviet elite is the execution and elaboration of policies created by groups of leaders in the Soviet Union. Most conspicuous in this regard is the role of the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Zorin's stay coincided with the transformation of the National Front Government into a Communist dictatorship. Lavrentiev's eight-month stay was marked by the purge of high Party and government officials and reorganization of Czech industry. (His consequent appointment to Rumania coincided with the arrest of Anna Pauker), Lavrentiev's successor, Bogomolov, came at the time of the ending of immunities for industrial workers, marked by show trials of technical personnel, extension of the eight-hour day, a cut in labor's wages, and currency reform.³⁹

The Czechoslovak Ruling Elite. The institution of Communist dictatorship brought about a new Czechoslovak elite, significantly different from any of its predecessors. Today, the elite is much smaller, relatively more integrated, and much more powerful. We can estimate its strength at about thirty thousand persons, including family members. It is composed almost exclusively of the members of the Communist Party--the Party leadership group, the top government bureaucracy, the general managers of the largest industrial enterprises, mines, wholesale organizations, and banks, the leaders of the trade unions, and the top police and army officers.

³³Rudé Právo, February 27, 1952.

³⁹News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 12 (Dec. 1952).

It would be erroneous to assume that this elite is very homogeneous and solidary. Nothing holds it together but the fear of the Soviet masters and of the oppressed masses. Although all of its members adhere to the same political doctrine and observe very similar rules of governing the society, there are as many power cliques as there are interests. These cliques have little in common with factions of political parties in the West. They are to be viewed rather as a desperate attempt of the participants "to gain some security in an insecure society and to share power often for power's sake. Carried to its extreme form, this system of sharing power results in a primitive sort of nepotism and accumulation of political offices and functions."⁴⁰ These cliques, or clans, composed of family members, friends, and acquaintances, constitute relatively stable larger groupings leaning on one or another army of functionaries.

Each clan is headed by a prominent Communist leader bidding for supreme rule in the country. The clan's existence is not determined by ideological differences, but by the giving of priority to the ongoing institutions and their personnel, i. e., the Party organizational apparatus, the governmental and managerial bureaucracy, and the trade union's organizational hierarchy. After the coup d'etat, the first clan was headed by Slansky, the second one by Gottwold, and the third by Zapotocky. The police and army personnel were controlled alternatively by the first and second groups. Each clan was played off against the others by the Soviet superiors, resulting in some loss of independence for all of them.⁴¹

The fate of every clan is determined by the logic of the situation above all. The relationship between the the different clans changes with the changes in the situation. Each given situation poses a certain number of problems of particular importance and thus imposes upon the regime the methods which it has to use in order to

⁴⁰ Gadourek, op. cit. p. 68.

⁴¹ Barton, op. cit.

keep pace with the events. Every existing clan has a greater ability to use a certain method rather than another depending on the forces on which it leans.

Thus the development of the satellite regime in Czechoslovakia could be described in terms of the struggle of these clans, their changing roles and power.

After the coup d'etat, the Party machine (Slánský's clan) had the upper hand. Its rule was based on its role in the coup, the Cominform policy, the relative reliability of Party secretaries, agents, and informers, and the undisputed support of the police. It had a definite advantage in the fact that it constituted a rigid hierarchy controllable from the top and thus also from Moscow--an advantage which the other two clans did not possess at that time. It was most orthodox in reshaping the society into a model dictatorship of the proletariat even at the expense of expediency and sound administration.

Under the pretext of reorganizing the society along ideological lines, the clan started a fight for supremacy in the government, the economy, and the army. It tried to transform the government into its auxiliary organ by placing its confidants in the positions of vice ministers and chargés d'affaires, and by creating the Ministry of National Security. It gained ground in the army by "domesticating" the pliable officers' corps and making the acceptance of new candidates largely dependent on the benevolence of Party secretaries.⁴³

The fiercest struggle, and the decisive one, was waged in industry. Czechoslovakia, as an industrial country, was bound to play an important role in Soviet planning. On the other hand, the wealth and importance of industry was bound to cause it to exercise a certain pressure upon the Czechoslovak Communist leaders and to find its champions among them. It was Gottwald and the Party economists who chose to defend the interests

⁴²Ibid., p. 195.

⁴³Ibid.

of Czechoslovak industry, to fight against its disintegration, its ruthless exploitation by the Soviets, and the competition of other satellite regimes in the fields in which Czechoslovakia had a quasi-monopoly in the orbit of the People's Democracies. The struggle was waged between the "specialists" and the Party functionaries and agents (as in the government, where the opposing groups could be labeled as "career bureaucrats"--government Communists-- and "career Party functionaries"). The Party economists were placed in a paradoxical situation: their success depended above all on the good will and effective cooperation of the managers who had been trained and had made their careers under the pre-Communist regime. The former tried to solve the problem by giving enormous power to the managers and by conceding to them even the opportunity to influence Party policy considerably. On the other hand, the Party secretaries pushed forward a policy of strict Party control over the managers, even at the expense of slowing down production and endangering the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan. The result was the increasing disorientation of production and growing dissatisfaction on the part of the Soviet leaders with the rule of Czechoslovak Party secretaries.⁴⁴

The change in the power position of the two clans (Slánský and Gottwald) occurred in the fall of 1951 with the downfall of Slánský's clan, and it ended in November 1952 with its trial. This managerial revolution had far-reaching consequences, not only because it eliminated one of the competing clans, but also because it considerably reduced the independence of the Czechoslovak elite from the Soviet leadership. It brought about a victory of the "captains of industry" but it also created a more intensive Soviet domination.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 155.

⁴⁵Ibid.

The "managerial revolution" restored a conservative spirit to the administration of the country. The autonomy of Party secretaries and their dominance over Communists in the government, the central management of the economy, and the army were destroyed. The new Politburo of the Party was formed of government Communists only; the prestige and autonomy of the army from the police were restored; the newly created Ministry of State Control limited the interference of the police and Party secretaries in the factories; the emphasis on industrial production strengthened the power of the State Planning Office and brought reorganization of most Ministries under heads of economic branches. A new government hierarchy was created, headed by the State Planning Office, Ministry of State Control, and Ministry of National Defense. Dolanský, the head of the first of these, became a virtual dictator in the economic field.⁴⁶

Even more striking were the changes in the role of the industrial managers or, as the regime prefers to call them, the specialists. They were granted more power in the factories and took over the "economic" Ministries. In this way they won greater autonomy from the trade union organization, as well as from the typical government and Party bureaucrats. The victory of the government Communists over Party secretaries secured for the managers a stronger position in regard to the police also. This fourfold victory (over the Party apparatus, the government bureaucracy, the police, and the trade unions) was caused by the desolate state of the Czechoslovak economy and the rising inflation, and in the final instance by non-fulfillment of Russian orders.⁴⁷

The deteriorating economic situation was one of the factors which contributed to a temporary rise in the importance of Zápotocky and his clan, which was much weaker than the former two. The power of this group was due to the role of trade union functionaries and the Workers' Militia in the coup d'etat. It was trying to maintain a certain degree of

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

autonomy from the Party organization as well as from the government, and to conduct a semi-popular (not strictly partisan) policy in regard to workers.

This clan's opportunity came at the time when a lowering of the standard of living aroused the indignation of workers and led to increasing absenteeism. The task given the clan was difficult; it was supposed to persuade workers that the fulfillment of production plans was more important than the workers' well-being. Barton poses the problem very clearly in the following remark: "In the last analysis, the difference between the syndicalist and the police method is that between the prevention of a coup and repression after the coup, as far as the elimination of resistance goes."⁴⁸ The trade unions were the only organs that could use the preventive method. Their attempt ended in defeat. They did not succeed in suppressing workers' resistance; on the contrary, the local trade union functionaries were contaminated by the spirit of revolt. This fact signified a retreat of Zápotocký's clan. Not even the death of Gottwald substantially changed the balance of power between the two remaining rival groups.⁴⁹

It is probable that sooner or later there will come a decisive showdown between the two clans and that elimination of one of them will result. But even then it seems improbable that power would be held by one relatively unified larger grouping. There is always a possibility of intensified rivalry between the army and the police or between the government bureaucracy and the restituted Party apparatus. Such conflict is not predetermined. It may arise from the changing role of the Czechoslovak People's Democracy within the Soviet sphere of influence; from drastic changes in the Czechoslovak economy; from a general dissatisfaction of the subordinated strata; or from an increasing unwillingness of Czech and Slovak Communists to continue Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation along the present lines.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

The Czechoslovak social elite enjoys privileges far surpassing those of the prewar upper class. It controls the means of production by holding in its hands the levers of political, social and economic power. In addition, it controls the means of coercion and persuasion. It runs the society as a vast business enterprise which can be manipulated according to given principles. Its style of life is enormously different from that of the strata which are prohibited from participating in decision-making: among other things, its members have special stores, exclusive luxury resorts, special night clubs, and special schools for their children.⁵⁰ These most conspicuous symbols of vast social differences are inadequate indicators of the actual power held by the "strong men" of Czechoslovakia.

Collectivization

In contrast to Russia in 1917, Czechoslovakia had a large middle class and a large and skilled industrial population at the time of the Communist coup d'etat. The enforced transformation of the society was therefore bound to produce different results in the Czechoslovak People's Democracy than in the Soviet Union. The "revolution" did not abolish the existing social classes, but rather changed their respective numerical strength, composition, and functions; it gave them different social justification; and it caused large-scale vertical social mobility. The expropriation of the propertied upper and middle classes and a decline in the prestige of intellectuals were accompanied by the growth of the bureaucratic and managerial strata and a gradual consolidation of the social position of the latter.

The expropriation of large industrial enterprises, mines, insurance companies, wholesale dealers, and landowners was followed in 1948 and 1949 by liquidation of the medium and small producers, shopkeepers, and artisans. The rapidity of this process is fairly well indicated by Table 7.

While the remaining industries were nationalized by decree, the merchants, tradesmen, and artisans were asked to join the cooperatives

⁵⁰News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 12 (Dec. 1952).

Table 7

EXTENT OF NATIONALIZATION AND COLLECTIVIZATION
OF INDUSTRY, COMMERCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 1947-1953*Percentage of Employees

	1947 ^f	1948 ^h	1949 ^f	1953 [#]
Industry:				
State-owned and cooperatives	31.6	96.4	about 98.0	99.6
Large and medium producers	18.0	3.5	--	--
Small producers	0.4	0.1	about 2.0	0.4
Building industry only:				
State-owned and cooperatives	(6.5) [§]	--	92.7 [§]	99.8
Large and medium producers	(91.0)	--	6.9	--
Small producers	(2.5)	--	0.4	0.2
Commerce:				
State-owned and cooperatives	15.0	43.8	--	99.7
Large and medium dealers	48.3	24.8	---	--
Retail dealers	36.7	31.4	--	0.3
Transportation:				
State-owned	--	--	--	100.0

^fUnless indicated otherwise, the data for these years are taken from V. F. Kotok, "O klassovoi structure narodno-demokraticheskoi Chekhoslovakii," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1952, No. 5, pp. 39-50.

[#]Zdeněk Fierlinger in Rudé Právo, Oct. 28, 1954.

[§]All data for 1947 and 1949 are taken from Statistický věstník, XII, No. 11 (Nov. 1949), 391-92. 2. Data for 1947 refer to the Czech regions only.

*Except for the data on building industry, all data refer to December 31 of the given year. The data on building industry are given for June 30 of the given year. It was verified that these numbers are not accurate. The reader should take them as only an indication of the trend.

voluntarily. Those who refused were usually arrested on a petty pretext; some of them were sent to forced labor camps for "re-education," others to mines, foundries, and other industrial plants. The more cooperative individuals were usually appointed managers of their own stores and shops or of the new cooperatives created by fusion of several establishments.⁵¹

But the full expropriation of these strata was accomplished only by the currency reform of June 1953. Typically, Rudé Právo commented: "The currency reform is a mighty blow to the remnants of the bourgeoisie, rich farmers, and black marketeers."⁵² And fourteen days later the ideological justification followed: "In the future human work can be the only source of human well-being (in our country)."⁵³ In this way private property was almost liquidated as a basis for social status in urban areas. The category of economically independent individuals was reduced to a minimum.

Nevertheless, the spirit of private enterprise is still very much alive. During their leisure hours,

the former artisans and many more less qualified workers in factories as well as the members of the compulsory trade cooperatives accept private orders for repairs or they manufacture nails, screws, cigarette lighters, small tools, and so on for the black market. By this type of work they often earn within a few hours several times a day's wages as paid in the nationalized industries.⁵⁴

Conditions are similar in the retail trade, where the black market fills up the deficiencies of the cumbersome state distributive organization. The authorities often turn a blind eye to the existence of the black market and "black labor," because it is too universal to be cleaned up. Since spring 1954 some of the artisans have been allowed to re-open their shops officially.⁵⁵ But their further independent existence remains bound to

⁵¹Gadourek, op. cit., p. 102. See also F.X. Havlíček, Die rote goldene Stadt (Frankfurt-am-Main: Rudl, 1952).

⁵²Rudé Právo, May 31, 1953.

⁵³A. Zapotocký at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia. Rudé Právo, June 16, 1953.

⁵⁴Ernest Halperin, "Artisans and Trades in the Soviet Satellite States," Swiss Review of World Affairs, IV, No. 1 (April 1954), 5.

⁵⁵Ibid.

Soviet policy and the general state of the economy in the Soviet sphere.

The collectivization of the peasants proved to be a much more difficult and complicated task. The land reform of July 1947 broke up the remaining large estates, and that of March 1948 made 50 hectares the maximum amount of land any individual might legally possess. This program satisfied the land hunger of small and medium farmers, former farm laborers, cottagers, factory workers, and others. Since the end of the war about one million persons have received allocations of land. They constitute a new peasant group, "far less conservative, more malleable and more dependent on the state than the old peasant families who had in many cases occupied the same farmsteads for generations."⁵⁶ This group, together with small peasants (who constituted about 70 per cent of the total number of peasants in 1949), was looked upon by the Communists as the springboard of collectivization.⁵⁷

First, "class war" was introduced in the villages by singling out the group of farmers owning more than 20 hectares and by designating them as "village rich," equivalent to the Russian kulaks. Secondly, the Communist peasants were asked to form a nucleus of cooperatives and to persuade the small and medium farmers to join them. At the same time machine tractor stations were set up to introduce rationalization of agricultural work.

The collectivization of agriculture proceeded swiftly up to the summer of 1953. Since then a considerable decline can be noticed in the number of cooperatives (see Tables 9 and 10). It seems that the present social structure of the countryside is being consolidated and that further abolition of private property is being delayed until a more opportune period.

Czech and Slovak villages underwent a radical transformation during the last decade. Their social structure is dominated by collective and state farms. The Unified Agricultural Cooperatives exist in 47 per cent of all communities, i. e., in about 7,500 villages, and own 33 per cent of

⁵⁶D. A. Schmidt, Anatomy of a Satellite (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1952), p. 408.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 415.

all arable land. An additional 10 per cent of the arable land is the property of the state farms.⁵⁸ A new agricultural middle class has developed, consisting of the chairmen of the cooperatives and their administrative personnel. Many members of the cooperatives lost their former social status. They do not look on themselves as co-owners but as employees who are supervised and controlled by their superiors. This transformation of reciprocal social relations into a factory-like social setup has created a new type of agricultural proletariat, working under inefficient leadership, bad living conditions, and for low wages.⁵⁹

Of the independent farmers and peasants, only the "village rich" are singled out for extinction. They are not allowed to join the cooperatives, to sell their land, or to give it away. Their machinery is confiscated. They pay higher taxes and have higher delivery quotas. They cannot buy fodder enough to feed their cattle. The discrimination imposed on them by the Communist officials is almost endless. Many of the wealthier farmers were tried for alleged sabotage and sent to prison or to forced labor camps. "The more fortunate of the 'village rich,' who do not end up behind barbed wire, are driven from the land and must go to work in the factories."⁶⁰

Nevertheless, the Party leadership has not been too successful in breaking down the solidarity of small and medium farmers with the so-called "village rich." They are bound together by everyday contacts, family bonds, and frequently by common economic interests. The pauperized big farmers are no longer competitors or dominant figures in the villages. As such, they are not identified as "class enemies" even by the radicals and Communists. On the contrary, they frequently win sympathy, support, and cooperation.⁶¹ It seems that as long as the

⁵³ A. Novotny, Rude Právo, July 12, 1954.

⁵⁹ F. X. Havlicek, Die rote goldene Stadt (Frankfurt am Main: Rudl, 1952).

⁶⁰ Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 416-41..

⁶¹ F. Hon, "O třídním boji na vesnici," Rude Právo, June 8, 1954, p. 4.

Table 8
STRUCTURE OF CZECHOSLOVAK AGRICULTURE IN 1949*

Size of enterprise	Number of enterprises	Per cent of the total number of enterprises	Per cent of the total arable land
Less than 5 hectares	1,046,282	69.4	15.2
5 to less than 20 ha.	414,167	27.4	34.9
20 to less than 50 ha.†	33,159	2.4	8.8
Over 50 ha.	11,489	0.8	41.1
	1,507,097	100.0	100.0

(11,792,411 hectares)

* D. A. Schmidt, Anatomy of a Satellite (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1952), pp. 415-16.

† Unified Agricultural Cooperatives, state farms, experimental stations, etc.

Table 9
GROWTH OF THE UNIFIED AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
OF ALL TYPES, 1949-1952*

	Spring 1949	End of 1949	Spring 1950	End of 1950	Spring 1951	End of 1951	July 1952
Number of cooperatives	20	700	3,000	5,500	6,000	6,500	7,669

* D. A. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 420. All data in the table are approximate.

Table 10
GROWTH OF THE UNIFIED AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
OF TYPES III AND IV, 1949-1952*

	December 31, 1949	December 31, 1952	June 30, 1953	December 31, 1953	October 31, 1954
Number of cooperatives	28	5,784	7,038	6,782	6,530
Per cent of the total arable land	--	36.7	40.0	--	28.0

* For 1949 see Zd. Fierlinger, *Rudé Právo*, Oct. 28, 1954. All other data are from *Československý přehled*, II, No. 2 (Feb. 1955), 10.

medium and small farmers are recognized as a legitimate social stratum, the Communist agricultural policy will not make much headway either in collectivization or in liquidation of the wealthier farmers.

The propertied agricultural lower-middle class has become a permanent feature of the present society. But it should be clear that it does not constitute an independent pressure group. It lost its last organization with the abolition of the United Peasant Unions in March 1952.⁶² The power is now concentrated in the hands of the rural bureaucracy organized in the Unified Agricultural Cooperatives.

Bureaucratization

An increasing bureaucratization accompanied the destruction of the competing elites, autonomous associations, and propertied strata. The consequences of this process could be adequately described by the following quotation from a treatise on Nazi Germany:

[Bureaucratization] means that human relations lose their directness and become mediated relations in which third

⁶²News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 5 (May 1952).

parties, public or private functionaries seated more or less securely in power, authoritatively prescribe the behaviour of men . . . There is, in short, a huge network of organizations covering almost every aspect of human life, each run by a president and a vice-president and secretaries and treasurers, each employing advertising agencies and publicity men each out to interfere with, and to act as the mediator in, the relations between man and man.⁶³

These autocratic hierarchies are only partially the creation of the totalitarian state. Many of them owe their existence to the necessary division of labor characterizing an industrial society. Their members do not form a homogeneous group in regard to income, education, and exercise of power; but they tend to associate together and to form protective cliques. They are identified by others and identify themselves with the ruling strata. They tend to have a similar style of life as well.

At the present time there are three major categories of Czechoslovak bureaucrats: (1) The civil servants, comprising the traditional governmental bureaucracy; the employees of the State Planning Office, Ministry of State Control and the "economic" ministries; functionaries of the regional, district and local National Committees; army officers and professional soldiers; members of the police force. (2) The Party bureaucracy and the officials and functionaries of the Trade Unions, Czechoslovak Youth League, the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League, and other mass organizations. (3) The factory managers, technicians, and administrative personnel of the Unified Agricultural Cooperatives, consumers' cooperatives, repair shops, etc. Each of these three strata has a tendency toward a certain degree of autonomy. Each has some interests of its own conflicting with those of the others. Within each category, the antagonism between subgroups is a rule of the game. The Communists have a majority in all three strata, but their loyalty to Party policies is not equally manifested. Loyalty to the regime and the power derived from it is the major basis of the status of the officials and functionaries of the Party and of mass organizations, as well as of members of the police. With the others, skill, education, and income

⁶³F. Neumann, Behemoth, The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, (London: Gollanz, 1942), pp. 299-300.

are of equal or almost equal importance. At the present time, the members of the bureaucratic stratum constitute the backbone of the Communist Party and probably also form the largest occupational group within it.⁶⁴

As within the ruling cliques, there is a lasting antagonism between the old career bureaucrats and managers on the one hand and the "new intelligentsia," selected from inadequately trained workers and careerists, on the other. This conflict is especially sharp in industry, where the old managerial and technical group is in an overwhelming majority and is indispensable for smooth fulfillment of production plans. Since 1949 the so-called "worker-managers" have been instituted in a number of factories. Their function has been primarily administrative, representative, and political. Their existence is supposed to prove that the working class is the ruling class.⁶⁵ Their promotion was clearly political, unlike the promotion of the older group, which had depended on skill and knowledge. The former group frequently proved to be incompetent, inefficient, and irresponsible; consequently, it started to lose its influence after about 1953 and has been exposed to strong public criticism ever since. This is an illustrative quotation from Rudé Právo: "Instead of making decisions about what should be done (the worker-managers) mutter about 'political tasks,' or take no action at all."⁶⁶ The return of the conservative spirit announced the victory of the pre-Communist management. A similar trend, although much less distinct, can be observed in the ministries, local administrations, and the army.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Luděk, David, "Strana vyzdviženců," Československý přehled, I, No. 7 (Sept. 1954), 5-6.

⁶⁵ Paul Barton, "Nomination des ouvriers aux postes directoriaux," Masses-Information, I, No. 7-8 (July-August 1951), 20-30. In 1951 the "worker managers" constituted 18 per cent of all managers in the heavy mechanical construction industry.

⁶⁶ Rudé Právo, January 29, 1953.

⁶⁷ For example, in 1952, 10,000 permanent secretaries of the National Committees were appointed; see Gadourek, op. cit. p. 248. Barton, Prague à l'heure de Moscou, points out the emphasis on good qualifications for government employees. See also, Rudé Právo, July 3, 1953.

The second area of antagonism among bureaucrats is between factory managers and the government planners. The former are sometimes local patriots with sentimental attachment to their factory or just conscientious people who are unable to cope with the opposition of workers. The latter group is primarily concerned with the fulfillment of planned quotas and Soviet orders. The issue at stake is the realization of the plan. The opposition of the factory managers is usually overt, even in regard to the heads of ministries and their Soviet advisors.⁶⁸

Finally, a number of disagreements arise between those concerned with partisan purity and those emphasizing efficiency of administration and production. This antagonism seems to be unavoidable and is a permanent characteristic of a country which is run by two parallel channels of authority.

There are no statistics from which one could estimate the strength of all bureaucratic hierarchies, but their size may be illustrated by the following figures: In 1947 there were 7,452 trade union officials⁶⁹ and about 250,000 functionaries.⁷⁰ In the spring of 1954 the functionaries of the National Committees numbered 100,000.⁷¹ In 1954 there were about 260,000 members of the police and 130,000 to 190,000 army officers and professional soldiers.⁷² If we assume that the ratio of Party employees to Party members is the same in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as in that of Italy, that is, one to six, then there were 248,205 Party employees in August 1954.

⁶⁸R. Loukota, "Les managers aux prises avec le plan," Masses-Information, II, No. 4 (April, 1952), 12-14.

⁶⁹Statistical Digest of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1948 (Prague: State Statistical Office, 1948).

⁷⁰Gadourek, op. cit., p. 91.

⁷¹Rudé Právo, July 12, 1954. As with the trade unions, a sizable number of these functionaries do not perform their function as full-time employment.

⁷²Ceskoslovenský přehled, II, No. 1 (January 1955), 21.

The relationship between the administrative personnel and the number of workers in heavy industry was typical. There was one white-collar worker for 4.1 workers in production in January 1950, for 3.9 in December 1950, for 3.7 in May 1951.⁷³ This trend was stopped or reversed in 1952, thanks to the policy of reduction of the administrative personnel. Thus in 1951 the plan "77,000 administrative workers into industry" was announced; it was fulfilled by 1953. Similarly, the personnel of the ministries was to be reduced by 12 per cent starting in summer 1953.⁷⁴ In spite of these changes, the bureaucratic stratum remains numerically much stronger than at any previous time and proves by its omnipresence the self-contradiction of a classless society.

Since the currency reform, members of the bureaucratic strata have been increasingly ostracized from the ruled masses of the population. This pressure from below proved to be equally effective in demoralizing the esprit de corps of the Czechoslovak bureaucrats as the danger of a permanent purge, both resulting in avoidance of responsibility, lack of initiative, and compromising attitudes in regard to the Party policy.⁷⁵

Status of the Workers.

The transition from the dictatorship of the proletariat to the dictatorship of the bureaucrats is well illustrated by the following official statement published in 1953:

It is true that the working class is the ruling class and the decisive factor in the new society. But this does not mean that every worker and every so-called "workers" cadre" is able to govern, to decide, and to direct justly; that the responsible functions can be entrusted to anybody just because he is a worker or a member of a Youth Organization. If the worker wants to become a responsible and decisive element he must prepare himself for it carefully. He must become familiar with the necessary knowledge and improve it continually; he must prove in practice that he will be able to carry out his function organizationally and politically with expertness.⁷⁶

Thus the working-class background officially stopped being the basis

⁷³"Soumrak funkcionářů," Československý přehled, II, No. 3 (March 1955), 1-2.

⁷⁴Rudé Právo, Dec. 12, 1951.

⁷⁵Rudé Právo, July 13, 1953.

⁷⁶Rudé Právo, July 3, 1953.

for one's undeniable right to rule the society.

A majority of the workers viewed the coup d'etat either with sympathy or with indifference. The Communist Party was promising them a better standard of living and a greater influence in the affairs of the country. The workers' attitude toward the regime started to change only in summer 1951.⁷⁷ Their gradual alienation and finally open antagonism resulted from a number of factors. First among them was the introduction of the sweatshop system, with its "shock work," socialist competition, overtime, night work, and "voluntary" brigades.⁷⁸ Later came the decline in political influence of the trade unions, their subordination to the factory management, and their reorganization into organs of state control. With the loss of their organization the workers lost the right to quit their jobs and to take others, to voice complaints, to elect their own representatives, to spend their leisure as they pleased, and their most important weapon--the right to strike.⁷⁹ With the increasing difficulties of the Czechoslovak economy the grievances of the workers grew: the currency reform deprived them of their savings, the buildup of heavy industries brought a forced dislocation of thousands into mines and foundries and after the fall of 1953, unemployment made its way into the "country of socialism." The young people were especially hard hit, faced with the choice of becoming miners, workers in the foundries, or agricultural laborers.

The falsity of the cult of the working man is evident not only from the limitations imposed upon his freedom; his income reflects his status as well. In the years 1948-1950 his monthly wage was one-third below the monthly earnings of the white-collar workers and three to ten times less than the earnings of the managers and technicians. The only exceptions to this rule have been Stakhanovites and innovators.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Masses-Information, I, No. 7-8 (July-August 1951), 1.

⁷⁸ Schmidt, op. cit.

⁷⁹ Ibid. See also P. Barton, "Mesures anti-ouvrières en Tchécoslovaquie de 1951," Masses-Information, II, No. 1 (Jan. 1952), 6-13.

⁸⁰ Gadourek, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

The working class does not constitute a homogeneous and solidary class any more than the destroyed bourgeoisie. Its solidarity was broken down in three ways: (1) by the cleavage between the Communists and non-Communists; (2) by special privileges for Stakhanovites and innovators; and (3) by the fact that in many plants the "regular" workers do not constitute an overwhelming majority. Thus in the Kladno coal mines the "regular" miners constituted only 50 to 60 per cent of all employees in 1950; the rest were relocated workers, members of brigades, soldiers, and inmates of forced labor camps.⁸¹

But in spite of their heterogeneity, the workers started to express their dissatisfaction in a massive way: by unorganized slowdowns, absenteeism, and during the currency reform by stormy demonstrations in Pilsen, Ostrava, and other cities. This spirit of revolt converted many of the local trade union functionaries to their side and strengthened to some extent the independence of the workers.⁸²

According to the refugee reports, workers are materially better off than they were during the last war. They are conscious of and proud of the fact that their work is appreciated. But at the same time they feel themselves to be nothing but tools of production, with fewer rights than before the coup d'etat.

The Communist policy of "buying off" the ambitious and cooperative workers (for example, by promotion to white-collar or better-paid jobs, free vacations in luxurious resorts, better opportunities for higher education) deprives the working class of its indigenous leaders. Similarly the "rebels" among workers are seldom able to exercise their leadership role; they can be "legally" arrested and sent to concentration camps under the pretext that they are agents interested in disturbing the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan.

The Present Social Structure

As in the Soviet Union, the members of the Communist Party are not placed exclusively at the head of the social hierarchies, although the

³¹ P. Barton and A. Weil, "Travail forcé en Tchécoslovaquie," Masses-Information, I, No. 11-12 (Nov.-Dec., 1951).

³² Growth of "Egalitarian" Trends in Czechoslovak Trade Union Movement (New York: Free Europe Press, Research and Analysis Department, July 20, 1954).

Czechoslovak Communist Party tends to become an interest group of the bureaucratic strata, i. e., of those who rule the country.⁸³ It is more accurate to say that within each occupational group the Party members are usually better off than the non-Communists and that the former have far better opportunities for upward mobility than the latter. The ideological considerations were emphasized most, sometimes to the exclusion of all other criteria, in the first two years after the coup d'etat. Their importance diminished considerably with the increased emphasis on national economy in 1951.

Membership in the present social classes depends only partially on inherited status. It is determined primarily by possession of power (command over other persons), income, type of occupation, and skill. This has been particularly true since the currency reform of 1953, which liquidated most savings and made almost all Czechs and Slovaks dependent on their earnings. Since then one's status has been based on the function which he performs in the production process, the administration, school system, or in the bureaucratic hierarchies of the Party and the mass organizations. In this respect Czechoslovak society is fast approaching the Soviet one.

The new social elite (it is difficult to designate it as the upper class) and the upper-middle class are much less numerous than before the war. In spite of this fact they exercise a stricter and more direct control over the members of other classes, because of the concentration and centralization of power. On the other hand, they lack the independence and self-reliance of the prewar upper strata--they are dependent on their Soviet masters, their status is unstable, and they feel personally insecure. This is true to some extent even of those strata which did not lose their social status, i. e., factory managers, technicians, and the secondary and special school teachers.

In contrast to the pre-Communist period, the social distance between the members of the upper strata and the lower classes has increased. On

⁸³L. David, op. cit.

the other hand, the differences between members of the lower-middle and the lower classes diminished considerably. In these two categories vertical social mobility was most significant. Most present-day skilled workers, foremen, and less qualified technicians could be counted as members of the lower-middle class. On the other hand, a number of former merchants, tradesmen, farmers and owners of small enterprises lost their status by expropriation and by relocation in semi-skilled work in factories or mines. Differences in income and skill were narrowed down with the general increase in educational opportunities and the level of technical abilities of the workers.

While many old social strata disappeared, one new social category was created in the fall of 1948: the inmates of forced labor camps.

During 1949 and 1950 well over seventy forced labor camps were established in Czechoslovakia and their number is still increasing. They are either attached to mines (especially uranium and black coal mines), to large factories or constructions, or to independent institutions. The number of detainees in each of these camps varies from a few hundred to 10,000 and a very conservative estimate puts the total number of persons deported and interned in such camps at 200,000. Probably the figure is now nearer to 300,000.⁸⁴

Since 1951 the number of inmates has increased. They are mostly politically unreliable persons; former owners of factories, banks, estates, etc., clergy, and members of religious orders.⁸⁵ The concentration camps are a permanent feature of Czechoslovak society. They are one of the main channels through which the existing antagonisms are lowered to the level of non-violence.

Social Mobility

Vertical mobility was especially high in the first years after the coup d'etat. The reliable Communist workers were given white-collar jobs in all branches of public life and through speeded-up courses many of them were trained for higher-level positions. In addition, a number of skilled

⁸⁴P. Korbel and V. Vagašský, Population Transfers, Deportations, and Forced Labour Camps in Czechoslovakia (New York: Free Europe Committee, Research and Information Center, August 1951), p. 5.

⁸⁵Ibid.

workers were transferred to the group of technicians. The downward mobility characterized the politically unreliable persons, the propertied upper and middle class members, most members of the liberal professions, white-collar workers with lower qualifications, and various skilled employees who were replaced by women and relocated in industrial plants (for example, train conductors, sales clerks, and waiters).⁸⁶

The changing system of social relationships resulted in the decline of some standards of social evaluation and in the emergence of new ones. The following standards are disappearing from the Czechoslovak prestige system:

1. The ideal of economic independence: people are not esteemed because of the number of persons which they employ or the numbers of acres they possess.
2. The ideal of the superiority of mental work over manual work: although the Communist elite abstains from manual work and deals with organizational activities, the prestige of manual work is reinforced by the work of the whole propaganda machine.
3. The esteem for non-technical education: people are not esteemed any longer because of their literary taste, number of languages they speak, or because of books they read; educational prestige is centered rather on acquired technical skills and insight.
4. The superiority of property in general over political and social position or over the position which one occupies in the production: money can be blocked by currency reform, houses nationalized, furniture confiscated.⁸⁷

Recruitment of the new elite is determined by the new power, occupational, and economic structure. The most important criteria are membership in the Communist Party and the level of technical and organizational skills. The Party controls all new openings in the civil service, army, police, factories, and frequently also in cooperatives of all kinds.

⁸⁶ Gadourek, op. cit.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

It is customary to hand out the best positions to the reliable and able Party members. Of considerable importance, particularly for the younger generation, is the social origin of the candidates and membership in mass organizations. Workers' and peasants' children have precedence in admission to the universities over the sons and daughters of members of other occupational groups. Participation in the Czechoslovak Youth League is a vital necessity for any future university student. Finally, the recruitment of the elite is influenced by the contacts and "pull" one has with the people in power.⁸⁸

Czechoslovak society is an open society with a strong egalitarian spirit which helps to prevent the stabilization of existing social differences. Nevertheless, the newly constituted social classes proceed toward consolidation under the severe economic and political pressure. The existing instability of individual members or groups will hardly bring about a reconstitution of the social structure. The law of permanent purge helps to mitigate some of the existing antagonisms, but does not reverse the newly established status system.

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 210-11.

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INTELLECTUALS, ARTS AND SCIENCES

The Present Role of the Intellectuals¹

Sovietization of Czechoslovak culture on all levels means not only domination of the Communist ideology but also--if not primarily--redefinition of the role and function of the intellectuals in the society. As elsewhere in the People's Democracies the Soviet example is followed: the concept of genius is denied, the doctrinaire, partisan and utilitarian orientation is introduced and any kind of alienation of attitude is viewed with suspicion and distrust. The status of the intellectual is redefined in terms of the Marxian heritage and the Soviet experience. The opportunity for creative activity is reserved to a rather small group which has to pay a high price for its privileges.

The status of the intellectual in Czechoslovakia is partially revealed by the following statement of the Minister of Information and Enlightenment, Vaclav Kopecky:

According to the Marxist-Leninist theory, the intelligentsia is a so-called inter-class which exercises an important directory function, and is not a class which would be able to support itself; . . . it is called upon to serve these classes which are in possession of the means of production. . . Not infrequently we find in the ranks of our comrades the tendencies to consider the teachers, clerks, physicians, engineers, etc. as bourgeoisie. This is very incorrect. . . It is true that some individuals from the ranks of the intelligentsia can be misled to sabotage and evil-doing because of their relationship to the past when they had certain privileges. But it does not follow from this fact that we should take an anti-intellectual standpoint, much as an anti-peasant standpoint does not follow from the resistance of a part of the peasants to the Unified Agrarian Cooperatives.²

¹The terms "intellectuals" and "intelligentsia" are here used interchangeably, although their meaning is not identical. As a guiding criterion Prof. Shils' definition is applied: "The intellectuals are people oriented toward general or concrete, depictive symbols which are not of instrumental value." The reader should therefore bear in mind that the concept of intellectuals does not refer to the Soviet conception of defining the intelligentsia in terms of occupational categories and including on one hand university professors and writers, and on the other bookkeepers and "Stakhanovites "

²Rede Pravo, July 12, 1953.

This extensive definition shows the difficulties the Communists face when explaining social phenomena in terms of their classical terminology. But what is more important, it reflects the two major trends of Soviet development: the anti-intellectualism of the early period, linking intellectual products with the Tsarist regime and bourgeois culture and considering the knowledge based on past experiences as worthless; and the anti-intellectualism of the second period starting in the thirties, which restituted the intellectuals to positions of prestige, making them at the same time subservient to the Party organization. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that it would be incorrect to assume that the present situation of Czechoslovak intellectuals is the same as in the Soviet Union. The Czechoslovak social structure of 1948 was substantially different from the Russian one of 1917. The development must of necessity take a somewhat different course and meaning. Also the fact that the Sovietization of Czechoslovakia proceeds altogether with a thorough Russification adds a new factor, quite similar to but still not the same as in the Ukraine. Although the country is becoming a Russian cultural colony with very little contribution of its own, it has an independent tradition to which even many Party members are attached. The process of "rebirth" of Czechoslovak culture is not a mere echo of Soviet development and policy. Although the main currents are the same, they have their own peculiarities and their particular dynamism.

The Role of Czech and Slovak Intellectuals
Before 1948

Traditionally, Czech and Slovak intellectuals enjoyed a very high prestige. They originated and shaped the course of the national revival and were the undisputed leaders of both ethnic groups up to the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Artists, journalists, teachers, humanists, and among Czechs natural scientists also, all lived under a moral obligation to their people which was formulated later on by Masaryk in the following way: To live for science is to live a little; to live for religion only, for art only, for politics only, for profession only is to live a little. The intellectuals were obliged to take the place of the nonexistent aristocracy

and to become the bards and teachers of their nation.

Intellectual tradition runs all through the Czechoslovak history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was especially the historian Palacký who gave the Czechs the sense of mission, a raison d'être, through his interpretation of the Czech past, and laid the foundations of Czech policy to the Austrian monarchy. The philosopher Masaryk formulated the idea of Czech democratic humanism based on Czech religious traditions of the Middle Ages. His disciple, sociologist Beneš, reformulated the concept of Czechoslovak democracy according to the changed economic and social conditions of the twentieth century. Both Masaryk and Beneš, together with the Slovak astronomer Štefánik, became the exile leaders of the fight for independence during World War I, supported by Czech artists and journalists at home. The foundations of Czechoslovak democracy were of intellectual origin, and consequently the intelligentsia was expected to play an important role in the life of the new republic.

But the first postwar years showed a partial decline in the social prestige and influence of the intellectuals. On the one hand, it was due to the rapid increase in the number of intellectuals and to the consequent loss of the barriers of exclusiveness, particularly in Bohemia and Moravia. On the other hand, the intelligentsia lost its undisputed leadership of political parties to the peasants' and workers' leaders whose methods of competition did not suit the intellectuals' etiquette. It "lost faith in the effectiveness of its own work and closed itself into a resigned, aristocratic solitude, bitter, perplexed and sarcastic, but still worried by the uneasy feeling of being unfaithful to its social and cultural function."³

The lack of political activity on the part of many intellectuals soon changed into a conscious social isolation aided by increasing specialization, professional antagonism and loss of much of the audience to political demagogues, a sensational press and the movies. Increasing numbers

³Inocenc Arnošt Bláha: Sociologie inteligenc (Prague: Orbis, 1937), p. 352.

of intellectuals were unwilling to participate actively in the political life of the country, some of them because of their unwillingness to subordinate scientific endeavor or philosophy to the partisan ideology, others for opportunistic reasons or for their own convenience. On the other hand, those who did take an active part in the political parties did not always measure up to the statesmanship of the intellectual leaders of the republic, T.G. Masaryk and E. Beneš. Many of them, especially the free-lance intellectuals and elementary school teachers, merged with the radical movements emphasizing social antagonisms and defending particularistic interests. This change in the role and orientation of the intelligentsia led, in the late twenties, to a fashionable cry about the "crisis" of the intelligentsia and to the emergence of ideological anti-intellectualism in the ranks of the Communists and extreme conservatives, especially in Slovakia.

The economic crisis of the thirties and the danger of the unemployment of intellectuals in Bohemia and Moravia roused many of them from indifference and brought about more intense political participation. But only the imminent danger of Nazism mobilized a large majority of Czech intellectuals, determined to preserve an independent and democratic state, for the service of the nation. This mobilization for a cause, expressed in different ways, became their fate for the next decade.

In the course of a century and a half, the Czech intelligentsia changed considerably in size and function, due to the rapid industrialization of Bohemia and Moravia, the development of a strong middle class, the almost complete disappearance of illiteracy, an intensive political life and increasing contacts with foreign countries. From a rather small, well-defined and extremely self-conscious group whose main goal was to revive the Czech language and historical traditions, it developed into a differentiated, amorphous stratum having no particular common creed except in times of national crisis. In the realms of literature, painting, sculpture and music, it was striving persistently away from an ideologically colored art toward pure art. In social science, this phenomenon found expression in the stress on objectivity and empiricism as against ethically or philosophically oriented inquiries about social phenomena.

The emphasis on the study of and concern with natural science and technical subjects had become intense by the turn of the century, unlike the situation among the Sudeten Germans and Slovaks. This trend may be credited to the independent development of the country and to the free and wide borrowing of foreign models and ideas. The complete eradication of illiteracy brought about a high valuation of education as an end in itself and a popular pride in the existing freedom of arts, sciences, education, religion, discussion and criticism. Most of these trends were arrested, retarded or even reversed during the Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and during the time of postwar reconstruction troubled by a new, serious political struggle, they never again reached the peak of the period before World War II.

Czech intellectuals were the most persecuted group during the war years. Since the Germans were determined to Germanize Bohemia and Moravia, they started by eliminating the intelligentsia and curtailing intellectual life in general. The universities and higher technical institutes were closed during the entire war; artistic and scientific activities were strictly censored and limited to a bare minimum. There was little opportunity for young intellectuals to advance, especially for the young scientific generation which did not have an opportunity for the exchange of ideas regularly offered in universities and scientific institutes. The result was that in the postwar years the country suffered from lack of competent leadership in public life, universities, newspapers, broadcasting stations, churches and in a variety of free associations which had formerly helped to safeguard the democratic way of life in the Czech society.⁴

⁴Yearbook of the State Statistical Institute of Czechoslovakia (Prague: Statistical Institute, 1948) gives the following figures for "liberal professions:" 1930, 0.78 per cent of the total population; 1947, 0.63 per cent of the total population, i. e., a loss of almost one-tenth. On the other hand, in the period between 1900 and 1930 the rate of increase of the members of the liberal professions was approximately 0.07 per cent for a decade.

The development in Slovakia, although parallel in many instances, was different. During the First Czechoslovak Republic, Slovaks had an indigenous intelligentsia for the first time. Still small in numbers, feeling and consciously cultivating the great disparity between themselves and the mass of the peasant population, the intellectuals continued to live as a rather homogeneous, isolated caste. With growing nationalism and anti-Czechism, many of them--especially the young conservative Catholic intellectuals who felt themselves to be underprivileged because of the Czechs--isolated themselves even from the Westernizing influences of the Czech regions. Neither religious differences between the Catholics and Protestants, political differences between ultra-rightists and leftist radicals, antagonism between the laymen and clerics nor between romantic humanists and sceptical and relativistic scientists could break down their professional solidarity. The Slovak intelligentsia remained up to 1950 "a self-centered caste nourished by pride and an incredible susceptibility, deprived of living bonds with its social environment and substituting the solidarity of an extraordinary sect in their place."⁵ Thus both Slovak Fascism and Communism were affected by this role and status of Slovak intellectuals, the former being supported and led by the conservative ultra-nationalists, mostly teachers, journalists and priests, the latter by dynamic young Marxists recruited from among writers and university students. The progress of Slovak literature, music and science slowed down only after the uprising of 1944 reaching its low ebb shortly after the end of the war.

⁵Paul Barton, "L'intelligentsia slovaque sur la sellette," Masses-Information (Paris) No. 3, March 1951, p. 14. The author of this article gives the following illustration: Sano Mach, Minister of the Interior of the Free Slovak State who exterminated almost all Slovak Jews, did not dare to censure openly the anti-Fascist literature or to forbid the publications of Communists because these writers belonged to the same social group as himself. Vice versa, Laco Novomesky, the Communist Commissioner of Education, did not hesitate to testify for Mach before the People's Court after World War II.

The post-liberation period was characterized by the intense involvement of intellectuals in partisan issues and by the large-scale promotion of Czech and Slovak artists and scientists to political and administrative positions. Many of them served as deputies in the Parliament, in the Ministries of Education and Information, on National Committees, etc., thus enlarging the group of political leaders and higher civil servants which had been severely decimated during the war. The majority of them were Communists, particularly in Slovakia where the leftist intelligentsia enjoyed an exclusive position after the real and assumed collaborators with the Tiso regime were punished or silenced or had escaped from the country. This institution of "cultural organizers" may be interpreted as the first attempt to reorient the intellectual life of the society through organized, official channels.

But in spite of their high prestige and seemingly important positions, the intellectuals, especially the Czechs, did not regain the leadership of the mass of the population. Most of them stood in the shadow of the political parties and their ideologies, discussing public issues in partisan language and with partisan weapons. The non-Communist intellectual camp soon became the most vocal and self-confident opponent of the Communist Party. It centered around university and gymnasium professors and students, mostly adherents of Czech reformist socialism, followers of Masaryk and Beneš and defenders of an independent development of Czechoslovakia. The Communists found their supporters mostly among newspapermen, broadcasting station employees, artists and elementary school teachers.

There was no intellectual controversy in terms of preservation of the capitalistic order as against its abolition. The points of disagreement were degree of collectivization, methods of political and legal procedure, the extent and intensity of the Western and Eastern cultural orientations and the relationship of the artist to his society. Even before the coup d'etat some of the leading Communists started campaigning for "Socialist Realism" and a strict cultural orientation toward the Soviet Union. But even the majority of the leftist radicals hoped for a semi-independent development and intellectual freedom, at least for themselves.

The traditionally high prestige of Czechoslovak intellectuals of all

political creeds was disadvantageous for the coming People's Democracy and its "avant-garde of the proletariat." One of the reasons why this was so was the popular belief--only slowly eradicated by political demagogues--that the intellectuals should properly be the leaders in all matters pertaining to arts, sciences and politics. As representatives of the people by virtue of their knowledge and their titles, they were looked upon by the Communist Party strategists as a potential threat to the Party's monopoly of power.

The second characteristic which disqualified the intellectuals for the "era of socialism" was their predominantly middle-class origin. Although social mobility was rather high in Czechoslovakia, the majority of gymnasium (high school) and university students were children of state and private employees, members of the liberal professions, shopkeepers and wealthier peasants. The proletarian stratum, especially the industrial workers' children, were least represented.⁶ It is natural that many of them reflected the ideologies of the social stratum from which they came and resented the radicalism and ruthless tactics of the Communist Party.

The intellectuals' predominantly Western orientation was a natural hindrance for the Communist policy of pro-Soviet and pro-Russian orientation. The admiration for Western culture was shared in prewar times by intellectuals of all ideological orientations, by the artists, scientists, journalists, and statesmen. The Communist artists were no exception to

⁶ Bláha, op. cit., pp. 159-64. There was the following proportion of Czech students graduated from the gymnasiums in the school year 1933-34 to the number of potential parents, i. e., the persons who according to their age and marital status could have been their parents: for 10,000 gainfully employed parents there were 128 graduates from officeholders' families, 25 from employees' families, 13 from self-employed and tenant families, 4 from workers' families. A. Štefanek, Základy sociografie Slovenska (Bratislava: Slovenská akadémia vied a umení, 1943), pp. 292-310, gives the following data for Slovakia: out of 20,682 gymnasium students in 1938-39 there were 4,339, and out of 19,533 gymnasium students in 1939-40 there were 4,472, students of peasant origin, while 7,678 and 6,982 children, respectively, came from white collar families, 1,316 and 1,063 respectively came from lawyers' and doctors' families and the like. According to Bláha, students of worker origin at Masaryk University at Brno in the years 1921-22 and 1922-23 comprised only 9.4 and 8.4 percent respectively.

this rule. Typically, they saw Communism through the eyes of the West, notably of France, and linked Communism with everything new and modern in art. While accepting political ideology from the Soviet Union, they were not looking to Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Gorky for creative inspiration, but to Freud, Bergson, Proust, Breton and Joyce. Their artistic credo was surrealism and cubism, and Czech variations of these. This might explain why most of them sided with Trotsky in 1926 and later with Bukharin and Radek. Their own work denied adherence to Socialist Realism and Party-controlled art, of which they knew very little.⁷ They associated themselves mainly with literary groups of "proletarian poets"--most of them of middle class origin--who, typically, addressed themselves to the intelligentsia and not to the workers. They did not create a "proletarian culture;" for most of them the literary radicalism of the twenties was nothing but a pose, a parlor Bolshevism. In 1929 this paradoxical situation led to a crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. After the Stalinist faction took over the Central Committee many intellectuals left the Party, accusing the new leadership of undemocratic despotism.

The influence of the West was on the whole stronger than domestic examples: the French determined the tendencies of Czech and Slovak art, Germans, Englishmen and Americans strongly influenced Czechoslovak natural and social sciences. Personal friendships between Czechoslovak artists and scientists and their Western colleagues were not exceptional. The year of 1945 brought significant changes. The German influence disappeared almost completely and its place was gradually taken by the Russian cultural "exports," which at first faced very difficult competition with the French, English and fast-growing American influence. The majority of the Communists became hostile to the continuation of the latter two and were more or less ambivalent toward France, while non-Communists opposed any break in cultural and political relations with the West.

Finally, intellectuals of socialist, democratic and liberal orientation became eminently dangerous for the Communist leadership because of the fact that they upheld the traditions of Masaryk and Beneš. Masaryk

⁷Egon Hostovský, The Communist Idol Julius Fučík and His Generation (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, April 1953).

particularly exercised considerable influence on the development of Czech philosophy and sociology, apart from orienting republican democracy toward humanistic ideals and pragmatic pluralism. As was proved repeatedly in the last few years, this heritage constitutes for many the only positive alternative to the Communist ideology.

The advent of the Communist dictatorship meant a definite break with the past for all Czech and Slovak intellectuals. It was the beginning of an era of transformation, of destroying the old institutions or adapting them to the new purposes, and changing the intelligentsia from an independent social stratum into a subordinated group at the mercy of the all-powerful political secretaries. It meant emergence of the "intellectual bureaucracy," approximating more and more its Soviet counterpart.

Redefinition of Culture

As a closed system of Weltanschauung, Marxism-Leninism pretends to have an answer to any cultural or social issue. The Communist Party, as a pre-destined group, is authorized to become the agent which carries out control of the social change in accordance with this Weltanschauung. Viewing society and its products primarily in terms of conflicts, it considers culture in the narrow sense--i.e., philosophy, science, arts, education and religion--as an ideological weapon which must be used both for destruction of the old society and for building a new one. To achieve this goal the Party strives, first, to put under its direct supervision all institutions and organizations which distribute information and reinforce cultural values, through nationalization, standardization and centralization. In Czechoslovakia some of these institutions, such as the radio stations, movie industry and schools, were run by the government even before the Communist coup d'etat. In 1949 the publishing business was reorganized into thirty-one publishing houses with thirteen branches, each controlled by a state or "collective" organization such as the Trade Unions, Unified Agrarian Cooperatives, Communist Party, Czechoslovak Youth Union, Army, etc.⁸ Private book stores and libraries were liquidated and theater com-

⁸See Publishing Act of April 1949. Previously there were 335 private book publishers, 56 music publishers and 130 firms publishing books at the expense of the author.

panies, newspapers, museum exhibit and lecture halls and scientific institutes were put under control in the same way.⁹

The second step calls for barring all undesirable intellectuals from participation in public intellectual activities and for abolishing institutions and associations which are not suited for reinforcing the goals of the Communist Party. In this way a number of university professors and students, artists, and journalists were purged, and in due course most of them were transferred to lesser bureaucratic posts, industrial plants, mines, or forced labor camps. Old artistic and scientific circles and institutions were dissolved.

Parallel with this purification of the ranks of the intelligentsia is the effort of the Communist Party to organize intellectuals in its own way. As the 21,000 voluntary associations were abolished, and in their place eight mass organizations were established, the intellectuals were forced to form specialized organizations subsumed under the Revolutionary Trade Unions. They are, for example, the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, Union of Czechoslovak Newspapermen, etc. To these organizations only those "experts" are admitted who are recognized as such by Party authorities. All members have to pay regular contributions; all of them have to participate in the activities of their organizations and follow the instructions of the organization's leadership. Those who fail to do so--that is, those who do not adjust properly their ideological orientation or fail to create the promised intellectual products in a certain period of time--are excluded and lose all their privileges. Such exclusion means, in effect, the end of one's artistic or scientific career. The main task of these organizations is not so much to protect and support the social and economic claims of their members but rather to exert pressure toward uniformity and to exclude from public life all intellectuals who are not loyal to the regime.¹⁰

⁹Books are distributed by 555 shops supervised by a section of the Ministry of Education and Enlightenment, called "Books for the People," and by a network of lending libraries centrally controlled by the Ministry of Education and Enlightenment.

¹⁰I. Gadourek, Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953). The strictness of selection is exemplified by the Union of Czechoslovak Writers: only 220 Czech and 60 Slovak writers were admitted, along with 100 young candidates, at the time the Union was established in 1949.

The ideological control of intellectual creativity is enforced in different spheres under various headings and in various forms. In the realm of arts it is known as "Socialist Realism" or the "Zhdanov line." In the field of science it is disguised in the effort to introduce a "socialist science" by applying historical and dialectic materialism to all phenomena under investigation. In schools, newspapers and broadcasts, the Party line calls for the mass production of a "new man" and especially of a "new intelligentsia."

This process of the reorganization of intellectual activity and of "reevaluation" of culture went through three distinct phases which in many cases coincided with the development of the political and economic situation: the initial appeal for a common progressive front (February-October, 1948); a period of increasing doctrinaire rigidity with the emergence of a young generation hostile to the left-wing avant-garde of the 1930's; the return to a relative freedom of discussion within Marxist limits and the condemnation of the previous dogmatism as leftist deviation.¹¹

The first phase started on the day of the coup d'etat, February 25, 1948, with a manifesto of the progressive intelligentsia:

The People's Democracy desires well being and happiness for all the people . . . and therefore wishes it to be on the closest terms with its intellectuals.

The formation of this progressive front, including left-wing intellectuals of different artistic and scientific orientation and both Communist and non-Communists, was supposed to win over or to neutralize the major part of the old intelligentsia for the period of transition. The subsequent appeals were formulated in terms of "cooperate or quit." The ideological offensive was opened by Premier Gottwald's attack on highbrow exclusiveness:

I really cannot see why a culture catering to a dictatorship of some kind or hundreds of chosen individuals should be superior

¹¹ This classification and part of the material presented in this section are taken from D. E. Viney, "Czech Culture and the New Spirit, 1948-52," Slavonic and East European Review, June 1953, pp. 466-94.

to one that heartens and illuminates tens of thousand and millions on their march toward the ideals of humanity.¹²

This was the first foreshadowing of a people's culture inspired by the people, especially the workers and their work, or by the material things with which the people work. Nevertheless, the major attack was concentrated on the unconvincible "class enemies." They were purged from broadcasting stations, newspapers, the film industry, schools, universities, theaters and political bodies. The anti-Communist press was suppressed, and Marxism-Leninism was introduced in schools as a compulsory subject.

In the fall of 1948 the second phase was launched by strict enforcement of the Zhdanov line. It was exemplified at first by rude attacks on formalism, petty bourgeois cosmopolitanism, objectivism and all other attributes of "decadent" Western art and science. Rigorous censorship of the publication and circulation of books and artistic objects was introduced, along with the removal of large collections of proscribed books from public libraries and bookstores. In January 1950 a ban was placed on all books published by non-Communist authors before May 1945, except for specified scientific textbooks and reviews. The "reevaluation of Czechoslovakia's intellectual past" started simultaneously with the campaign for the glorification of the Soviet Union, Russification and the emergence of the young generation of Communist intellectuals hostile to the old ultra-leftist avant-garde.

Whereas the first phase primarily hit the outspoken anti-Communists, in the following years many prominent Party intellectuals were purged or silenced along with second-rank members of the old intelligentsia. Among the former were notably poets, writers and painters defending pure art or artistic freedom against Socialist Realism and Party control. Some of them were silenced, some were imprisoned and some committed suicide following (consciously!) the examples of Mayakovski and Yesenin. In Slovakia the purge, proclaimed as a fight against bourgeois nationalism, was disastrous for Slovak intellectual life. Practically the whole intellec-

¹² Svobodne noviny, April 13, 1948, quoted in Ibid., p. 468.

tual elite forming the Communist literary group DAV was imprisoned; consequently, Slovakia was left without any outstanding intellectuals and able political leaders.

While the Communists had identified their efforts with the heritage of Masaryk and Benes in 1948, their new policy reversed the trend. At present the "official hatred" of these two men and their work is reaching its peak. Nevertheless, their ideals are still the most reliable bases of resistance to the Communist experiment, both for the intellectuals and the masses.

During the third phase the death of Zhdanov growing economic difficulties and the demoralization of the Communist Party brought the end of the uncompromising rigidity and the resurrection of some of the old Communist intellectuals who had been steadily on the defensive since 1949. The opening for their resurrection was provided by a debate on Marxist linguistics, ending with Stalin's statement that language is not part of the superstructure, but belongs to the whole culture of the society. There followed a series of public controversies between the "neo-liberals" and "vulgarizers" in art as well as in science, culminating in an appeal to the old intelligentsia delivered by Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Information. In a lecture at the Central Political School of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, he said:

It is our duty to win over the intelligentsia, even the old one, for building socialism, and not to force it to oppose us. . . it is decisive for us to educate a new, socialist intelligentsia. . . We are changing the social composition of the student body and of the schools of all kinds; we reserve high schools and the universities for the students from the families of working people. . . We are in such a situation, namely, that we do not have enough graduates from the universities, especially technical branches which were newly established. . . I am mentioning all this to prove how much we must cherish our intelligentsia, and how firmly we must eradicate those harmful tendencies in regard to our intelligentsia that were cultivated by the people of Slansky's gang. . .¹³

¹³Rude Pravo, August 22, 1953.

This situation was precipitated by two unforeseeable events: the deaths of Stalin and Gottwald, and an economic crisis culminating in a currency reform which started off mass demonstrations by workers in June 1953. The regime had to acknowledge that it had failed to carry out its economic policy and that it was unable to win the unconditional cooperation of the masses. The revised program of the National Front was thus a suitable tool of the new Malenkov policy of "bread and butter" announced in the fall of 1953.

The Soviet tactics in Czechoslovakia were not aimed at gradual reformation and re-education but rather at the radical breakdown of the spirit of the country, to be followed by re-education of the favored or useful groups. The traditional division of professions has been weakened; technology and natural sciences are given prominence over humanistic fields. This fact, along with the liquidation of the democratic intelligentsia, enables the regime to create masses of workers of low specialization, without a worldly universalistic orientation and without a humanistic historical education. This makes it possible for the leading political group to indoctrinate the population with Marxist-Leninist doctrine without the danger of criticism or effective resistance.

Communist intellectuals, on the other hand, are enjoying a very dubious freedom: it is freedom within newly established, centralized and controlled institutions, within the limits of dogma. They are unable to resist the forced reorganization of their traditional patterns of creative activity after the Soviet model. The result is amorphous or rather anemic culture, artificiality and mediocrity. There is nothing in Czechoslovakia resembling the atmosphere of the early Bolshevik art. The Party intelligentsia is the intelligentsia of a conquered and colonized country.

Association of Artists

The planning of cultural life in Czechoslovakia imposes new responsibilities on four categories of persons: the creative artists and writers themselves, the cultural organizers, the critics and the public. Marxist comment continually stresses the interplay of these elements; culture is a product of social cooperation, a superstructure whose soundness depends on a healthy economic, political and social foundation, i. e., a society in which the eco-

nomically progressive class is also the political master.

The role of the creative artist in this symbiosis is to express his personality as freely and pregnantly as he can within the framework of certain demands, "pozadavky," imposed by the society which his art is designed to serve. These demands can be made clear only by the "science of sciences," Marxism-leninism. The art form which is thus shown to be suited to the present phase of society in the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies is Socialist Realism.¹⁴

In brief, Socialist Realism demands that art must be realistic, optimistic, partisan, effective, intelligible, imbued with popular feelings, generally significant, heroic, and created and judged with a view to contemporary needs. The demand for this form of art follows from the assumption that the Communist revolution is the final one. Basically, Socialist Realism is

prohibition of a new creativeness, prohibition of a new reality different from Communism. . . . It is an organized mass aversion to anything new and still unknown. . . the production technique and technocratic conception of the world though out completely to the end.¹⁵

The only choice left to the recognized artist is to reflect and to photograph this reality. New revolutionaries are not admissible.

To enforce the prescribed themes and artistic method of work, the Party uses the following means of pressure:¹⁶

(1) Meetings, lectures and courses are organized by the Unions and designed to mold the character of any creative effort in the country.

(2) The system of collective obligations is a sort of yearly work plan which each artist announces on special occasions.

(3) There is a system of socialist competition on subjects announced by the government or the Party (for example: peace campaign, beginning of the Five-Year Plan); financial rewards, and eventually the title of People's Artist are granted for the best products.

¹⁴Viney, op. cit., pp. 486-87.

¹⁵V. Deyl, "Socialisticky realismus v.kommusticke soustave," Skutecnost, III, No. 2 (Feb. 1951), 37.

¹⁶I. Gadourek, op. cit.

(4) Property control: the members of the artistic organizations have the exclusive right to use the buildings (music halls, exhibition halls, theaters, lecture halls, etc.) and material goods related to their work. It is very difficult for an artist who is not a member of the Union to get paints, brushes or rock for carving, or to have his book published. Neither is he allowed to advertise in the papers to find a buyer for his product.

(5) Legal control is maintained by restrictive legislation (prohibition of the public intellectual activities outside the organized bodies) and censorship. The latter point is well illustrated by D. A. Schmidt:

A member of the union writes a book and persuades the editor of one of the thirty-one publishing houses that it should be published. The editor, then, in the words of the law, submits it to "the appropriate sector of the publishing section in the Publications Department of the Ministry of Information and Public Culture." This office passes it on to the Publishing Council or one of the Council's Commissions of experts. On the basis of Publishing Council recommendations the Ministry decides whether or not the book should be published.¹⁷

It is natural that there are few non-Communist books to survive this process.

Censorship in other branches of intellectual activities is done on a similar basis. Apart from the central censorship boards, special functionaries for cultural matters are appointed by the Party in each National Committee. They have to be notified a few weeks in advance of any concert, theater performance or lecture in the district of their competence, and they have the right to prohibit these activities. Similar rules apply to the sale and circulation of printed matter.

The restrictions in regard to themes and methods of work are most severe in visual arts, while, because of the inadequacy of Marxist theory in the field, music is least affected.

The absence of a real basis for artistic creativity is also illustrated by the absence of genuine criticism. While the official criticism is

¹⁷D. A. Schmidt, Anatomy of a Satellite (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1952, pp. 281-82.

presented in the form of partisan invective, the public--unable to manifest its taste--either applauds everything or is too apathetic to look or to listen. The result is a new type of mediocrity. The planners of the new culture are aware of this, and they try to conceal the true situation by two arguments. Some assert that the new culture is still in a state of reorganization, so the new art will develop only in the course of years. Others, especially Zdenek Nejedly, contend "the overwhelming majority of our writers have become Socialist only recently;" it follows therefore that they cannot master socialist culture, and must look even more consciously to Soviet writers for inspiration.¹⁸

But no argument can deny the lack of original artistic masterpieces in Czechoslovakia today. The core of the matter is expressed concisely in the statement of an exiled journalist:

The man who wrote a dadaist play and because of it was sentenced to two years of forced labor, is a better and more typical representative of Czeck hoslovak culture than the Communist toreadors appearing at public manifestations.

Association of Scientists

The organization of scientific work, the goals followed, and the means of control used are almost identical with those in the field of art. Every scientist is required to understand historic and dialectic materialism and to apply the dialectic method to his research. This stand is characterized by a well-known Czech biologist, Dr. F. Hercik:

In the first place, we shall require from our scientists that they would and could deduce their specific science from the social economic basis. They must realize that every scientific fact which they ascertain and to which they ascribe a place in their theory and hypothesis, has in the long run its social and class consequence. . . . We want to have class-conscious scientists, partial scientists who know what is their part in the struggle and who will play their part with all skill and enthusiasm.¹⁹

¹⁸D. E. Viney, op. cit.

¹⁹Lidove noviny, August 24, 1949, quoted by Gadourek, op. cit., p. 139.

Czech scientists have three main goals today: (1) to link up science with practice; (2) to follow domestic scientific tradition; (3) to base Czechoslovak science on the experiences of the Soviet science.²⁰

While the latter two requirements are aimed at isolating the scientist from the Western tradition, the first goal means reorganization of all research in accordance with the planned economy and the political situation. The practical, specific tasks are : (a) to invent substitute raw materials for industry, especially for heavy industry; (b) to help in the scientific reorganization of agriculture; (c) to spread scientific knowledge among the population (for this purpose a Czechoslovak society for spreading political and scientific knowledge was established in February 1952); (d) to raise the health standard of the population; (e) to strengthen the defense capacity.²¹

As in the Soviet Union, pure science is officially discarded, and applied science is elevated in its place. The prerequisites of this orientation--centralization and planning of all research--were introduced in December 1949. The Center of Scientific Research was established in the Central Planning Board, whose duty it is to select problems for investigation, to work out the plan of scientific projects and to control the research work done. A further tightening of control was introduced in the fall of 1952 through the establishment of the Soviet-modelled Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, which is the official guardian of ideological purity and activity in science. Its purpose is to suppress scientific objectivity and scepticism through ideological criticism, self-criticism, discussions and counseling, and to eliminate the possibility of the transmission of Western scientific standards to the younger generation.

In spite of these changes, the highly skilled natural scientists and technical experts enjoy relative freedom in performing their function. Unlike the realm of art, there are few doctrinaire Communists in Czechoslovak science; even among the new students, able non-Communists are

²⁰ Antonin Zapotocky in Rude Pravo, November 18, 1952.

²¹ Ibid.

in the majority (for example, in statistics, mathematics, geology). On one hand, the non-Communists are protected by their indispensability; on the other, by the complexity of their work which makes them dependent only on the busy Party experts. As in the case of music, no adequate Marxist interpretation of some branches were developed. For this reason, we may believe that even for the coming generation of natural scientists dialectic and historical materialism will remain little more than a working hypothesis. At present the Party seeks remedy in inviting soviet experts to hold courses and give lectures to their politically less developed Czechoslovak colleagues, and in isolating scientific research from university teaching positions, to prevent the less doctrinaire research attitude from being passed on in teaching.

The new problem the Communists are confronted with in science is the intrusion and dominance of the careerists. Zapotocky describes them as follows:

In some scientific branches groups of scientists were formed, establishing factions which tried to proclaim their own research method as the only scientific and official one, refused any other critical opinion and tried to refute it not scientifically, but by making its defender impossible administratively, socially and economically.²²

Using the careerists first as fronts in the fight against "bourgeois" scientists, the Communists are now (probably temporarily) turning against them because the inflation of careerists endangers the progress of science even within Marxist limits.

A much more radical and definite stand is held by the Communists in regard to social sciences, since these fields are in direct contradiction to Marxism-Leninism. In 1950 sociology and social psychology were eliminated as university subjects; the sociological and psychological journals were suppressed in 1949. The teaching of economics and political science is limited to Marxism-Leninism. History interpreted in the light of historic materialism became a valuable instrument of public re-education. In the words of Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Information and Enlightenment

²²Ibid.

History belongs to those to whom the future belongs. It is true that history has been written in the past by the bourgeoisie and its historians. That is over now. Now, we begin to write the history of our Republic, and we do so from the point of view of the working class truth.²³

The Old and New Intellectuals

The present solution of intellectual affairs is a vicious circle, endangering the smooth functioning of the society. The old intellectuals were either silenced or barred from their solitude and intimate circles; by persuasion or under pressure they were forced to submit themselves to rigid discipline in organizations which have no domestic tradition whatsoever and which impose an anti-intellectual code of ethics on their members. By requiring them to conform to Communist ideology and to the rules set by the interpreters of Party policy, the political leaders deprive the intellectuals of the conditio sine qua non of the creative activity, that is, of the freedom to disagree and to express themselves. In this way they necessarily deprive their own society of useful and indispensable contributions. On the other hand, they realize that free development in science, arts and education means an automatic obstacle to their monopoly of ideological leadership, possibly creating a serious ideological conflict which could eventually incite a popular chain reaction and revolt. At this time the only solution to this insoluble problem is the accelerated production of a "new intelligentsia" little aware of the duality of its values and of the self-destructiveness of its ideological orientation. However, it is doubtful whether or not this effort will ever be totally successful.

Only exceptionally is it possible for the old intellectuals to retreat into "inner exile," into privacy where creativity is stimulated by correspondence or occasional discussions with a group of intimate friends who are intellectual equals. Most frequently such retreat, following after the purge from public participation, ends with the imprisonment of the

²³Rude Pravo, October 29, 1948.

intellectual or with his utter isolation. Fatigue, depression, resignation, fear of police examinations and of farced labor camps, absolute loneliness, hopelessness, nihilism, fear of sterility--this is the fate of those who have tried to live in an ivory tower.²⁴ Deprived of their audience--however small it may have been--many of them give up their creative activity. A small number of them find a solution by committing suicide.²⁵ Still others, steadily decreasing in numbers, try to survive as part-time intellectuals, burying themselves in their private libraries and their family circle and secretly hoping that after the "relaxation of proletarian vigilance" their work will find merit in the eyes of the Party censor. But there are also many of those who find seclusion unbearable; who cannot cope for long with their suppressed ambition and the fear of sterility; who gradually give up their fight with the Communist phraseology and axioms they read, hear and have to repeat publicly everywhere, against which they sometimes have no adequate arguments. Concluding that there is no way out for them, they overcome their convictions and their guilt feelings and "follow the rat-catcher, fascinated, stupefied, unable to resist, unable to get out of the vicious circle although they know they are going into ruin."²⁶

Fanaticism, disillusionment, cynicism and hypocrisy are the main dispositions of those who accepted the "Party leadership" immediately after the coup d'etat or after a period of abstention and self-purification. A large majority of them are Communists or fellow-travelers having in common a conscious or unconscious attempt at "self-realization against something."²⁷ Basically it means performing whatever service the

²⁴ Aqua, "Intelligence doma," Skutecnost, III, No. 1 (Jan. 1951).

²⁵ Among those who took this step in Czechoslovakia was Karel Teige, leader of the Czechoslovak surrealists, who committed suicide in 1951 as he was about to be arrested. It is worth noting that he joined the Communist Party in the early twenties and that he supported the Stalinist Party line in 1929 during the conflict between the "organizers" and intellectuals in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

²⁶ Aqua, op. cit., p. 22.

²⁷ Czeslaw Milos, The Captive Mind; translated from Polish by Jane Zielonko (New York: Knopf, 1953).

Communist Party strategists ask from them while deriving satisfaction from side tasks or from their unofficial activity in "splendid isolation" at home. It means to live constantly in two worlds with diametrically opposed sets of values, to be optimistic and useful in one and alienated and utterly discouraged in the other.

There is little solidarity among the old guard of the "official intelligentsia." Apart from surviving professional antagonism and open conflict with the younger generation, personal rivalry and strong competition between careerists persist, cloaked by a struggle for ideological purity. At the present time there seem to be two major groups fighting each other behind the scenes as well as in newspapers and periodicals, the "neo-liberals" and the "Party intellectuals." The object of their conflict is the interpretation of dialectical and historical materialism in arts and sciences, which in practice means an attempt to preserve the continuity of modern art in one way or another and to uphold acceptable scientific standards in research against those who call for utilitarian production and for dogmatic imitation of everything coming from the Soviet Union.

In spite of the hidden conflicts, many of the "neo-liberals"--practically all of them people with an outstanding record of intellectual activity in the pre-Communist era--are old-time Communists who can afford to disagree with the official policy because many of the leading Party politicians are, or once used to be, their close personal friends. They belong to the group of disillusioned intellectuals who once joined the Party out of hatred of the bourgeoisie and the capitalistic order, considering the Party as their ally in the fight against old conventions and ideas. Only after the coup d'etat did they discover that the Party politicians, by embracing the artist and scientist as agents of the class struggle, did not accept the new art or the new philosophy of science. After a period of retreat they reappeared in public, partially accepting the official platform. Others, probably the majority, are university professors and scientists who entered the Party out of necessity and are kept in their positions because they are indispensable. The position of neo-liberals and their good standing in the Party are usually precarious. They are looked upon by others, as a potential threat to Party discipline and as allies of

the dispossessed democratic intellectuals.

The Party intellectuals, i. e., the supporters, organizers and defenders of Party policies in the realm of intellectual activities, are the most important agents in shaping the intellectual life of Czechoslovakia today. It is characteristic that the main figures among them are ambitious politicians who gave up or limited their intellectual activities in order to devote all their time to political careers. Most of them are old-time Communists, but only a few of them accepted and defended Socialist Realism and socialist science before the coup d'etat.

The material and social position of these intellectuals is excellent. They are granted titles and privileges; they are given constant publicity, leading positions in government, Party, universities, unions of artists, academies of science, and scientific institutes; they perform the roles of competent critics, organizers and popularizers of the new culture. Their loyalty to Party leadership and their willingness to advance Party interpretations of history, politics, economy, natural science, arts and human behavior in general make them virtually immune to the ongoing struggle for power in the Party and to the political criticism of their comrades.²⁸

Apart from sheer opportunism and ambition, they are motivated by a sense of mission, an enthusiastic messianism which entrusts them with the task of reshaping the culture of the society and re-educating the masses; by their feeling of usefulness and intense participation; by their hatred of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, which they feel used to humiliate them, and of everything Western; and by the appeal of the quasi-rational Communist credo. They feel that they have to conform to the new conventions even to an extent which is unpleasant to them, if they are to be useful.²⁹ But even this group seems to hold its positions more or less temporarily. The Party leaders are aware of the fact that even the trusted old intellectuals are conscious of the duality of intellectual and

²⁸ Viney, op. cit.

²⁹ Milosz, op. cit.

Party values and therefore are easily prone to disaffection from the present system. The future belongs to the young generation, the "new intelligentsia."

The young generation of intellectuals, graduating from Communist schools and universities or "discovered" during the Festivals of Creativity organized by the Czechoslovak Youth Movement, is growing up in an atmosphere where the shadow of ideology falls on any factual knowledge. This applies not only to scientific and artistic theories but also to common experience. The channeling of creative activity, criticism and public opinion destroys the processes of spontaneous interaction and the cultivation of critical thought.³⁰ In schools, nineteenth-century vulgar materialism was extended to every subject; history and every branch of human creativity are presented as governed by unshakeable and already known laws. This vulgarized knowledge seems to give rise to the feeling that everything is understandable and easily explained.³¹

The "new intellectual" is supposed to be a man who thinks and acts in terms of the assumed working-class psychology: he must be solidary, cooperative, conformist, loyal and obedient. His highest social norm is the preservation and support of the Communist system; his goals and tasks must be identical with the Party policy and must change as Party strategy does.

Apart from ability and intelligence, the criteria for selecting the new intellectual elite are strictly political: affiliation with the Party, social class origin, intensity of political participation, and contacts with and the favor of those who are in a position to make political decisions and give promotions. Most of the "new intellectuals" are children of workers and of Party and state employees, while the peasants' children constitute only a slightly higher percentage than in the prewar schools.

A majority of the young generation is composed of zealous doctrinaires, still aware of the dual set of values they cherish but resisting Com-

³⁰Gadourek, op. cit.

³¹Milosz, op. cit.

munist dogma emotionally rather than rationally.³² The concept of liberal professionalism and awareness of alternatives to Socialist Realism, socialist science and historical materialism are foreign to them. They act and feel primarily like employees and only secondarily like specialists or intellectuals. After they master the present institutional pattern of intellectual activity, they might be able to follow objective scientific or artistic standards under the guise of verbal acceptance of Marxist-Leninist interpretation and analysis, as seems to be done in the Soviet Union today. But even then the opportunity of becoming true intellectuals ultimately depends on Party strategy, because in a Communist state no human judgment is valid except in terms of power. The fluidity of social positions makes any effective social and intellectual resistance impossible. The survival, composition and function of the Czechoslovak intelligentsia is linked to the power and policy of the Communist Party. By selecting useful and loyal individuals and assigning them roles in its system, the Party maintains its monopoly of ideological leadership and establishes one of its basic conditions of "planned culture."

³²Ibid.

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MASS COMMUNICATION MEDIA, MASS ORGANIZATIONS
AND POPULAR CULTURE

Folklore

With the exception of folk songs, the traditional patterns of popular culture survive only in a few remote mountain villages in northern and eastern Slovakia. Being bound to a stable and coherent peasant style of life, folklore gave way before imported urban culture, or a modification of it, after the disruption of the traditional village organization. In the past, village festivals, local costumes, folk plays, stories and songs had a utilitarian function, in defining the rites de passage of the individual; reaffirming the solidarity of the group at various times such as the beginning of the spring, the end of harvest, and during religious festivals; explaining the universe, human existence, change and the unknown; reaffirming the approved social norms and giving an opportunity to the participants to fulfill their desire for creativity.

The breakup of the traditional style of life came with the industrial revolution, with its urbanization, growth of railways, compulsory school attendance, compulsory military training, introduction of newspapers, radio, movies, sports, and, not least, by the introduction of farm machinery. This century-long change resulted in the dominance of urban culture and in a gradual recession of folklore. Most of the folklore which has been handed down to the present urbanized generation has preserved its original form, but old functions are replaced by new ones, and the original social context is gone. This process started in Bohemia and Moravia in the thirties of the last century; in Slovakia, it began only after World War I.

The stable style of life of the villagers was particularly shaken during the war; since 1949 a persistent process of collectivization and the changing role of the churches have further altered it. With collectivization most villages lost their traditional opinion leaders, non-urbanized wealthier farmers who used to be carriers of the folkloristic

tradition. The new village leaders are chairmen of the Unified Agrarian Cooperatives who in most cases are Communists, sometimes individuals alien to the peasant traditions (for example, industrial workers). Gradual abolition of private property and introduction of new farming practices resulted in a change of patterns of social relationships as well as in the changing value orientation of the villagers. The effect of the hostile policy of the regime toward the churches was similar. Religious festivals have been suppressed and the influence of priests has been severely limited. Thus folklore as a utilitarian or a semi-utilitarian expression of a traditional style of life lost its social context and consequently its original meaning. The village population, particularly the young generation, participates fully in the industrial popular culture, selecting the suitable patterns and modifying them according to its needs. The range and intensity of this participation usually varies with proximity to the city and with the readiness of the farmers and peasants to accept the change.

Under the Communist regime a movement to revive folklore was started. It is essentially an urban affair. It selects from the now antiquarian material suitable folk songs and dances and puts them on the urban or village stage as an example of popular creativity. It aims at mitigating the influence of "bourgeois" popular music--particularly jazz--and at establishing greater understanding between city people and the countryside. The revivalist movement has the official endorsement of the government, and consequently it has strong political undertones: it is supposed to propagate the idea of cooperative farming and to create bonds of solidarity between peasants and industrial workers.

In 1954 there were about 15,000 folkloristic ensembles with an estimated membership of 300,000.¹ These groups--choruses, folk dance and recital ensembles--are organized by the schools, the army,

¹Rude Právo, July 13, 1954.

factories, offices and cooperative farms. Members of the ensembles and their audiences are overwhelmingly urban. Thus revived folklore is being built up as an intrinsic part of industrial popular culture carried on by its typical representatives, presented to audiences which seldom share any of the peasant traditions of the past.²

Industrial Popular Culture Before 1948

Czechoslovak industrial popular culture is of relatively recent origin. It started to develop on a large scale only in the nineties of the last century. It was manifested in the growth of gymnastic organizations, sports clubs, athletics, amateur theatrical groups, popular music, popular literature, tourism, spread of Western urban dances, frequenting of coffee houses, development of slang, etc. In the twentieth century the trend was reinforced by the impact of radio, movies, jazz and weekend outdoor recreation. Many patterns of this popular culture were imported to Czechoslovakia from the West. However, their acceptance was so rapid that they soon lost their foreign character and became part of everyday life.³

Some aspects of the popular culture traditionally had educational, national, political or religious overtones. This was particularly true of the gymnastic organizations, amateur theatrical and other social clubs, newspapers and radio programs. The popular gymnastic organization Sokol, established in 1862, was one of the strongholds of Czech national and democratic ideology before the Communist coup d'etat. The Catholic

²The political function of the revivalist movement is indicated by the fact that members of the ensembles are encouraged to create "Socialist" folk songs and that they are forbidden to propagate certain traditional folk songs and dances associated with the prestige of wealthier farmers.

³Soccer and ice-hockey, for instance, have been regarded as "national" games for decades, and their popularity in Czechoslovakia equals that of baseball. During 1946, 33 per cent of the population attended several soccer matches, 9 per cent saw one match and 58 per cent did not attend any matches. The participation of workers was strongest: 41 per cent of them saw several matches during 1946. Adamec and Others: What's Your Opinion? (Prague: Orbis, 1947).

gymnastic organization Orel promoted ideas of Catholic modernism; Social Democratic and Communist gymnasts cultivated their partisan ideologies. Various clubs and newspapers were sponsored or backed by political parties; they tried to educate as well as entertain their audiences and to win them to their point of view. "Yellow journalism" never circulated widely and since 1939 it has been suppressed. Directors of radio programs were guided by the idea that the listeners were not the best judges of what they wanted.⁴ Similarly, it was believed by the educated strata that theatrical plays, movies and popular literature should not be seen or read only for entertainment or relaxation, but that they should provide the audience with a set of new values or broaden their knowledge. After the end of World War II, few thrillers and books playing up sex have been published and circulation of the prewar publications was severely limited. Comic books have never appealed to the adult Czechoslovak reader.

That part of popular culture which was defined as entertainment for entertainment's sake was substantially smaller than in the United States. It was limited primarily to sports, outdoor activities, dances, parties, popular music, hobbies and to the "tramp" and zoot-suiters' movements. Other leisure activities, although spontaneous, were generally thought of as a part of democratic education, a voluntary training in citizenship defined by the Sokol slogan, "a sound mind in a sound body." They promoted ideas of democratic leadership, social equality, team spirit, abstinence, fair play, and the emancipation of women. The great variety of organizations and associations gave the participants a good opportunity to choose activities which suited their taste and style of life and to introduce innovations which would make their participation more congenial.

⁴For example, in 1946 Czechoslovak broadcasting stations featured 297 full-length operas and special symphonic programs and a great number of educational programs. (Research in Contemporary Cultures files, Czechoslovakia, section 15.) In 1945, only 40 per cent of the listeners were satisfied with the overall programs, but in spite of that the people in charge of broadcasting did not make a great effort to cater to the public and continued their policy of "raising the educational level" of the audience. RCC files, Czechoslovakia, section 29.

The Role of Organizers and Opinion Leaders in the Communist State

Under the impact of German occupation and the postwar spirit of reconstruction there emerged a strong trend toward the greater uniformity of voluntary organizations and mass communication media. With the emergence of the Communist dictatorship this trend assumed unprecedented proportions. At present all mass communication media are owned or controlled by the leadership group of the Communist Party which dictates their purpose, selects and dismisses their personnel and determines their content in great detail. Similarly, voluntary organizations were dissolved or fused with existing or newly created mass organizations which are controlled by members of the Communist Party at all levels. This fact is justified by the Leninist theory of leadership, which assigns to the Party the role of teacher, guide and leader and makes it responsible for the transformation of society and of the social attitudes of its members.⁵

This centralization of mass communication media and fusion of voluntary organizations was accompanied by a rapid growth of full-time opinion leaders and full-time organizers, who were assured of a lifetime career. These professionals are almost without exception members of the Communist Party or fellow-travellers employed by the Party itself, by the government or by various branches of the mass communication media and mass organizations. They form an elite of strategists and propagandists, seated in the Agitprop (agitation and propaganda section of the Central Committee of the Party), Orgbyro (organizational section of the CP), Ministry of Culture (formerly Ministry of Information), Ministry of Education, regional and local Party offices, program sections of the broadcasting stations, movie industry and newspapers, in the central and regional committees of the mass organizations

⁵A. Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).

and at various civil service posts. They decide the general policies of the mass communication media and mass organizations and are instrumental in elaborating the policy laid down by Moscow.

Apart from the professionals there are thousands of semi-professional and amateur opinion leaders and organizers; most of them are rank-and-file members of the Communist Party. Frequently they play a leadership role by virtue of their position in office, school, plant, or farm (for example, managers, foremen, shock-workers, innovators, chairmen of collective farms, school principals, chairmen of National Committees, etc.), or by virtue of their skills (writers, artists, scientists, professional sportsmen). Most of the semi-professionals and amateurs are engaged in verbal agitation and in organizational activities on a local scale.

The most important task of both categories of organizers and opinion leaders is the "mobilization of the masses" for the attainment of the goals toward which the Party is striving. This is carried out through meetings, parades, lectures, demonstrations, collection of signatures and contributions, organization of work brigades, permanent campaigns carried on by newspapers and radio stations, production of ideologically slanted movies, stage plays, books and art exhibits, and to an increasing extent also in the realm of sports, gymnastics and any other kind of organized leisure activities.

The consequence of the professionalization and centralization of the propagandists, agitators and organizers is that public opinion is constantly being shaped, molded or held in check. In many areas of life the competition of spontaneous opinion leaders and organizers opposing Party policies has been eliminated or reduced to small groups of intimate friends. The existence of organized or semi-organized association outside the mass organizations has become increasingly difficult. Just as art for art's sake is almost non-existent in Czechoslovakia, leisure, amusement, and opinions for their own sake have become much less frequent. Since the coup d'etat much of the popular culture has been deprived of its spontaneity and private character. The effort to create a

so-called "proletarian culture" meant not only elimination of non-partisan literature and art but also an attempt at suppressing many types of leisure activities, remolding popular tastes and fusing "highbrow" and "lowbrow" cultures into one. The Party leadership took upon itself the task of planning popular preferences and the use of leisure time.

The Mass Communication Media

Newspapers, periodicals, books, broadcasts, stage plays, movies and exhibits are looked upon by the Party leadership group as instruments of Party strategy and tactics. It follows that all mass communication media are put under strict, centralized control and that they are owned exclusively by the Party, government, mass organizations or various institutions which constitute a link between the Party and the masses of the non-Communist population.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Establishment of the Communist state resulted in suppression of the democratic press and in a constant decrease of the number of dailies and periodicals. The total number of dailies in 1950 is given as fifteen by one source (estimated circulation 2, 250, 000),⁶ and twenty-three by another source (estimated circulation 2, 500, 000).⁷ In the following years the number of dailies was further reduced. The development in the field of periodicals was similar.⁸

⁶D. A. Schmidt, Anatomy of a Satellite (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1952).

⁷Situation in the Czechoslovak Periodical Press (Chicago: Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, 1955).

⁸Even the Party press was not spared. In 1952 the popular Party weekly Tvorba and several regional dailies were abolished. In August 1954 three internal Party publications -- Funkcionář, Propagandista and Slovo agitatora -- were fused into one new bi-weekly Život strany. (See Rudé Právo, August 12, 1954.) The extent of the changes in the daily press is clearly indicated by the following fact: in 1938 there were thirty-five dailies published in Prague; in 1950, only nine.

The surviving newspapers are not differentiated according to political point of view, as is customary in Western democracies, but according to the audiences to which they address themselves. Thus the members of the Communist Party have their Rudé Právo, Rovnost, Pravda, etc., with a total daily circulation of 1,350,000 copies.⁹ Other newspapers are addressed to various special groups: Práce to the workers, Mladá Fronta to the youth, Zemědělské noviny to the farmers, etc. In 1950 their daily circulation was about 900,000 copies.¹⁰ Only the daily press of the puppet parties lacks a well-defined audience; however, its importance has been steadily declining. In 1950 it had a daily circulation of 320,000 copies;¹¹ in 1952, this circulation was reportedly reduced by sixty per cent and the papers were forbidden to accept new subscriptions.¹²

The content of newspapers varies only slightly; the main difference is in the style of writing up the news and in the amount of detail devoted to particular topics. All of them have the same main sources of information, i. e., the Czechoslovak Press Agency (CTK.), the Soviet Press Agency (TASS) Soviet newspapers and Soviet broadcasts. They receive daily instructions about what news to print and frequently even where to print it. The job of the editors consists mainly of translating, rewriting, editing and planning the content of the papers for several days ahead.¹³

The main part of every paper consists of editorials, speeches of leading Communists, announcements of Party and government decisions

⁹Situation in the Czechoslovak Periodical Press, op. cit. The leading Communist daily, Rudé Právo, had a daily circulation of about 300,000 copies in September 1950 and 750,000 copies in September 1951. See D. A. Schmidt, op. cit.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Radio Free Europe interviews with refugees.

¹³Inkeles, op. cit., points out that such planning is possible only because of the fact that newspapers in the Soviet orbit redefined the concept of news. News is not comprised of events but of social processes, as, for example, industrialization.

and of official interpretations of these items. There are almost no human interest stories, very few pictures, no sensational news about murders, divorces and scandals, almost no humor and advertisements. The sports news and "cultural" items are very limited. The language of the newspapers is dull, pathetic and amateurish.

The result is that some people simply stopped reading newspapers, a situation sharply in contrast to the pre-Communist period when many people read two or even three papers every day. However, the buying of newspapers is obligatory for many individuals by virtue of their membership in the Party, Trade Unions, Czechoslovak Youth Union, etc.

With the exception of the Soviet and satellite press, foreign publications are banned in Czechoslovakia. However, a black market for Swiss and Austrian papers has been doing a good business.¹⁴ The circulation of the Soviet press in Czechoslovak territory has been reported to be increasing steadily.¹⁵

Books

It is books to which the tormented reader turns in the absence of good newspapers and periodicals. A love of books is traditional in Czechoslovakia, and it probably has increased rather than diminished under the present regime. According to the public opinion poll of October 1946, 19 per cent of the interviewees stated that they had over a hundred books in their family library; 38 per cent had ten to a hundred volumes;

¹⁴News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952).

¹⁵According to Práce, May 13, 1952, there were about 240 Soviet periodicals and newspapers circulating in Czechoslovakia in the beginning of 1952. Of those, the most important were Czech and Slovak translations of Novoye Vremya, the Russian edition of Pravda (with 18,000 subscribers in Prague alone), Ogonek, Pionierskaya Pravda and Sovetskaya Zhenschina.

26 per cent had one to ten volumes; and only 17 per cent stated that they did not own any books. Fifty per cent of those interviewed stated that they bought one or more books during the first nine months of 1946.¹⁶ Public libraries were established during the First Republic in all communities of more than fifty families, and they were always extremely popular.

The interest of the readers varied with their social background and education. After World War II the books on popular science enjoyed the greatest popularity.¹⁷ Also widely read were books on history, geography, sentimental love stories and adventure novels.

Communist propagandists are trying to change the reading habits of the public in several ways: by rigorous and partisan selection and censorship of works published and distributed to bookstores and public libraries; by making the buying of Marxist-Leninist classics obligatory for members of the Party or other organizations; and by giving priority to domestic political or semi-political works and translations of Soviet literature. While Communist or Communist-stamped literature is published in many thousand copies, approved but not privileged authors' works have very small circulation and are sold out the moment the books are on the market.¹⁸ The "pre-fabrication" of a susceptible audience through school education is particularly emphasized.

¹⁶ Adamec and Others, op. cit.

¹⁷ RCC files, Czechoslovakia, section 16.

¹⁸ During the period from 1950 to 1953, Lenin's writings were published in almost three million copies and Stalin's works in over four million copies (Rudé Právo, March 27, 1954). The invasion of Soviet literature is indicated by the following data: out of a total of 5,974 volumes published in 1947 there were 102 translations of Soviet literature (Statistický věstník, XII, No. 1 Jan. 1947); of the 19,635 volumes published during the period from 1950 to 1953, there were 5,069 translations of Soviet literature, i. e., over one-fourth of the total (Rudé Právo, March 27, 1954).

However, there are few ardent readers of the new official literature. This is partially indicated by the fact that the newly created and Communist-sponsored book club, Klub Čtenářů, had only 27,000 members in 1954. The clubs dissolved after the coup d'etat totaled about 260,000 members.¹⁹ Thus the reader who looks down at the new literary production usually turns to the private libraries of his friends and acquaintances. Inaccessible and forbidden books are rented and sold for exorbitant prices.²⁰ The most sought-after books still remain light novels, sentimental and detective stories, thrillers, travelogs, forbidden political writings and works of Western authors.

Radio

As in the Soviet Union, broadcasting stations are owned by the government. Their program is not regarded as entertainment and amusement, but a means of education and persuasion. In comparison with the pre-Communist period, broadcasts are monotonous, repetitive and partisan. However, the competition of foreign radio stations for the attention of the Czechoslovak audience forces Communist program directors to comply at least partially with the tastes of the listeners. This fact was underlined by radical changes in programs at the end of 1953 indicated in the table on the following page.

The new program resembles that of the first postwar years. It stresses its intention to lead and educate the masses, but it introduces more popular music and programs designed to entertain and relinquishes the doctrinaire attitude of interpreting any item broadcasted in partisan terms. On the other hand, it puts more emphasis on informing the listeners about Soviet affairs. A new program, "Moscow Calling," was introduced (this program is responsible for the increase in the category "news,

¹⁹ Literární Noviny, May 22, 1954. Quoted in Československý přehled, I, No. 5 (July 1954).

²⁰ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952). A refugee reported that Jan Masaryk's collection of wartime speeches was selling for \$100.

Table 1
PROGRAMS OF THE MAIN BROADCASTING STATIONS
"ČESKOSLOVENSKO" AND "PRAHA" *

	September 14-20, 1953	February 15-21, 1954
Light music	39.5 %	43.9 %
Classical music	16.6	14.2
(Total music)	(56.1)	(58.1)
News, Commentaries, surveys of the Czechoslovak and Soviet press, etc.	10.5	18.6
"Cultural" programs	13.5	6.9
Special programs -- for women, soldiers, farmers, etc.	14.5	11.6
Children and school programs	6.4	4.8
TOTAL	100.0 %	100.0 %

* F. X. Havlíček, "Československý rozhlas mění linii,"
Ceskoslovenský přehled, I, No. 2 (April 1954), 27.

etc."), and greater stress is put on surveys of the Soviet press and reviews of Soviet literary and artistic production.

The radio audience proved to be much more steady than the newspaper audience, as is documented by the I.P.O.R. interviews with 110 Czechoslovak refugees during the period from July 1951 to March 1952. Of the interviewees only 36 per cent read domestic newspapers regularly and 36 per cent occasionally, while three out of four interviewees listened to the domestic radio either regularly or occasionally. Only a few indicated that their exposure to these mass communication media was compulsory.²¹

²¹ Media of Communication and the Free World as seen by Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish Refugees. Comparative Report. (New York: International Public Opinion Research, Inc., April 1, 1953), p. 2.

However, in no other country behind the Iron Curtain is the competition of foreign broadcasting so strongly felt as in Czechoslovakia. This is due to the fact that almost every family owns a radio set and that during World War II the habit of listening to foreign broadcasts was strongly ingrained.²² In contrast to the U.S.S.R., so-called wired radios²³ constitute only a small fraction of the total number of sets; consequently, a choice of program is still available to the listeners.

Preferred foreign stations are the Voice of American, Radio Free Europe and the British Broadcasting Corporation. The general motivation for listening to foreign broadcasts springs from the listeners' bitterness and antipathy toward the regime, their desire for liberation, and a wish to hear objective news. The frequency of listening is very high. Of the above-mentioned sample of Czechoslovak refugees, 32 per cent stated that they listened to foreign broadcasts daily, 25 per cent more than three times a week, and 33 per cent one to three times a week. It is said that this habit is frequently practiced by the Communists as well. However, listening remains a private affair since listening in "public" places and the dissemination of foreign news are illegal.²⁴

²²In 1953 there was one radio set for every six inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, and the number of private owners has been steadily increasing. Rudé Právo, Jan. 1, 1953.

²³"The wired radio refers to a system of radio broadcasting where the broadcasts are transmitted by means of a wire to all receivers. It consists of one centrally directed program which is the only one that can be heard by the listeners. The loudspeaker does not pick up the radio waves from the air but only the program transmitted by the wire. In this way it resembles a large telephone network where one person speaks to many." News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 40. At the end of 1954 there were about 200,000 wired radios in Czechoslovakia (Rudé Právo, Jan. 7, 1954), while the total number of radio subscribers (presumably owning regular sets) was 2,676,000 in June 1954 (Rudé Právo, June 12, 1954).

²⁴Media of Communication and the Free World as Seen by Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish Refugees, op. cit. D. A. Schmidt, op. cit., complains that he had a hard time during his stay in Czechoslovakia in finding out what people thought of certain political events because he was repeatedly told opinions people heard from Sir Bruce Lockhart, the star commentator on the BBC Czechoslovak program.

Movies

Movie production and movie theaters are also state-owned. Production schedules, scripts and distribution of films are controlled and censored by the Ministry of Culture (formerly Ministry of Information). In contrast to the pre-Communist period, the movie audience is heavily exposed to domestic and Soviet production.²⁵ However, the overall attendance, as reported by the Communist press, rose from 127, 220, 000 in 1946²⁶ to 140, 000, 000 in 1953.²⁷ It seems probable that frequency of movie-going also remained similar to 1946 when 8 per cent of the population went to the movies more than once a week, 25 generally once a week, 16 per cent generally once in a fortnight, 44 per cent occasionally, and only 7 per cent never attended movie shows.²⁸

However, there seems to be a great degree of selectivity practiced by moviegoers. The few pictures from western Europe and the United States, and Czech productions with little ideological content, enjoy a great popularity. On the other hand, attendance at politically-oriented movies frequently has to be "encouraged" or even made compulsory for

²⁵ Thus in the week from October 5 to 12, 1952, in Prague movie theaters thirty-two Czech, twelve Soviet, two French, three East German, three Hungarian, one Korean, one Chinese, one Bulgarian and one Polish movie was shown. (News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 11 Nov. 1955). During the Christmas week of 1952, the following movies were shown in Prague: thirty-two Czech films, twenty-three Russian, six East German, two American, one Polish and one French. (News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 2 Feb. 1953). Compare this with the 1946 releases on Czechoslovak territory: out of the total of 150 released films eleven were Czech, thirty-two Soviet, twenty-three American, fifty British and thirty-one French. Similarly, in 1947 there were released nineteen Czech, thirty-seven Soviet, eighty American, twenty-three British and twenty-three French movies out of the total of 187 released pictures. (Statistický věstník, XII, No. 1 Jan 1949), p. 21.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ V. Kopecký, Rudé Právo, June, 14, 1954.

²⁸ Adamec and Others, op. cit.

certain groups (students, soldiers, members of the Communist Party, etc.). The tickets for such pictures are distributed by the secretaries of the Party, Party plant officials, functionaries of the Trade Unions, Czechoslovak Youth Union and so on.²⁹ In spite of these measures, such pictures are frequently boycotted or laughed at.³⁰

Movie themes are designed for education of the masses, and they conform to the general pattern of Socialist Realism. They deal mainly with historical topics, socialist competition, collectivization, "struggle" against capitalism and for peace, cooperation of the Communist states, etc. Pictures which are purely for entertainment are very rare. Musicals and westerns, which enjoyed a great popularity before the war, are not released at all.

Theaters, Operas, Concerts.

Theater traditionally has great appeal for the Czechoslovak audience, particularly in cities and towns. The number of professional theaters and the frequency of theater-going testify to this. In 1954 there were fifty-five professional theaters in Czechoslovakia, with ninety-seven stage, opera, operetta and puppet ensembles.³¹ In addition, there were several hundred amateur theatrical groups. The frequency of theater-going may be illustrated by the data for 1946: 52 per cent of the population saw several plays, 23 per cent saw one, and only 25 per cent saw none.³²

Although theaters are also under strict control (most of them are owned by the community, a few by the state), they proved to be much less

²⁹News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 11 (Nov. 1953).

³⁰For example, the Czech movie "The Green Book;" inciting the children to spy on their parents, was withdrawn shortly after the premiere because of the public boycott. The comment of the Práce reviewer reveals the reaction of the audience to an anti-Western Czech picture, "Express Train from Nürnberg:" "It is an espionage film which the spectator should see breathlessly. However, the spectator behaves during the show as if he were seeing an entertaining comedy. It is exactly the most serious scenes which evoke laughter." (Práce, May 14, 1955, quoted in Československý přehled, I, No. 4 [June 1954], p. 31).

³¹V. Kopecký, Rudé Právo, June 14, 1954. Included in this total are one Polish, one Ukrainian and two Hungarian stage ensembles. In 1954 a plan was announced to establish a German stage ensemble.

³²Adamec and Others, op. cit.

amenable to ideological invasion than other mass communication media. Czech, Western and Russian classics still constitute the major part of the programs. The situation is similar with operas and concerts of classical music. Only operatta programs underwent a radical change after the coup d'etat. Consequently, stage plays, operas and concerts proved to be an area of refuge for many of those who look for "highbrow" entertainment

Popular Music.

The Communist attempt to change the taste of the masses was least successful in this area of popular culture. Most people in Czechoslovakia like very sentimental and sweet music dealing with nostalgic themes, romantic foreign places, and courtship. There are a great number of popular songs about cowboys, ranches, deserts, backwoodsmen, señoritas, etc., composed by people who have never been outside Czechoslovakia. Communist propagandists tried to popularize the "official-made" songs of shock-workers, choral songs in the Soviet style and cheerful marches for brass bands. In 1952 a list of forbidden dance pieces was issued and distributed to all orchestra leaders. However, all these measures had little effect on the popular tastes and a number of the old-style condemned songs were again allowed in 1954, even being played on the radio.

Jazz music merits special consideration. Although there exists a general ban on jazz in the whole Soviet orbit, a quasi-compromise has been worked out in Czechoslovakia. This is due to the influence of Ježek, a Czech jazz composer and a disciple of Gershwin, who was extremely popular among young Socialist and Communist workers and students before World War II. Although Ježek died in the United States, his music has not been banned; on the contrary, an orchestra bearing his name was created after 1948. Of American jazz music only Negro spirituals and I. W. W. songs are approved of at present.³³

The audience for jazz has always been relatively small in Czechoslovakia, constituted mainly of younger people from larger cities. "Sweet"

³³ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 1 (Jan. 1953) and II, No. 5 (May 1953).

popular music, folk songs and classical music had much larger audiences. However, jazz fans composed a group of enthusiasts similar to a religious sect, and thus gained considerable attention from the public. Since the coup d'etat, "jazz addicts"--as they are called in the Communist press--have been classified together with admirers of Western capitalism and are exposed to discrimination in the dance halls and night clubs.

Mass Organizations

The attempt of Communist organizers to control all formal secondary groups and to determine the purpose and nature of their activities is exemplified by the dissolution of voluntary organizations or their fusion with Communist-controlled mass organizations. The law on voluntary organizations, passed in July 1951, states: "The State guides the development of all organizations . . . and sees to it that their work is in harmony with the Constitution and the principles of the People's Democratic Order."³⁴

The mass organizations serve as a link between the Party and the non-Communist masses. Their aim is to win the support of the population for Party policies and to change the attitudes and opinions of non-Communists by persuading them to participate in small Communist-dominated discussion groups, lectures, demonstrations, work brigades, etc. The most important mass organizations are the Trade Unions(R.C.F.), Czechoslovak Youth Union(C.S.M.), Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League, Voluntary Organization Sokol(D.O.S), League for Cooperation with the Army (Svazarm), and Women's Committees.³⁵ Some of them existed before the coup d'etat and were skillfully used by the Party as front organizations; others, like the League for Cooperation with the Army or Women's Committees, are of recent origin.

³⁴Quoted by News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 1 (Jan. 1952), 35.

³⁵Rudé Pravo, June 19, 1953. National Committees and Consumers' Cooperatives are also looked upon as mass organizations, although their respective functions are mainly administrative and distributive.

Membership figures are very imposing, but they are frequently meaningless as an indication of the activity of members. For certain categories of people membership in the mass organizations is semi-voluntary (for example, Trade Union membership for workers, Czechoslovak Youth Union membership for youth) and consequently does not indicate the value orientation of the members. The Trade Unions reached 3,647,000 members in June 1954;³⁶ the Czechoslovak Youth Union had about two million members in 1953;³⁷ the membership of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League was also estimated at two million in 1953.³⁸ Membership in other organizations is substantially smaller. Each mass organization is dominated by the professional and semi-professional organizers who have emerged as a new branch of the Communist bureaucracy.

Apart from semi-administrative work (supervision of work conditions in plants, schools, etc., help in recruiting the labor force for various branches of the economy), political and technical schooling, and organization of work brigades and various campaigns, the leaders of the mass organizations are charged with the organization and supervision of leisure activities such as sports contests, gymnastics, excursions, vacations, dances, concerts, amateur theatrical productions, lectures, etc. However, leisure activities, particularly those designed for young people, are looked upon as instruments by which the Party wins over new converts, trains a susceptible audience, and controls citizens' leisure time.

Collectivized Sport

The omnipresence of political ideology in the life of the Czechoslovak people is best illustrated by the organization and purpose of sports, the domain traditionally excluded from association with politics. In the fall

³⁶ Odborové rozhledy, No. 6 (June 1955).

³⁷ Estimate based on the census figures for 1947. Almost all young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five are organized.

³⁸ Radio Free Europe interviews with refugees.

of 1948, all existing sports and gymnastic organizations were united in a single organization under the control of the Ministry of Information. Since 1950 all sport activities have been directed by the new State Committee for Sports under the Ministry of National Defense. The main goal of sports was proclaimed to be pre-military training of youth and glorification of the achievements of the "new socialist man." Statewide defense competitions were decreed by law with the expectation that both youth and adults, men and women would take part in them.³⁹

The new organization of sports brought not only increasing regimentation but also a growth of professionalism almost unknown in Czechoslovakia before 1948. Teams are no longer organized by voluntary clubs but are subsumed under the Trade Union organization and represent a particular factory, army unit, school or collective farm. Star players and athletes receive greatest attention; it is their task to win international contests with Western athletes and thus prove the superiority of physical education under the People's Democratic regime. Some of the leading athletes are then used as agitators and opinion leaders in peace campaigns, campaigns for socialist competition, etc.

The goals of the Sokol movement, emphasizing amateurism and mass participation were abolished. Sokol itself was practically dissolved; it remains in existence only in small communities where there are no Trade Union organizations. In the cities, gymnastics and athletics are practiced in schools, factory, army and police organizations. The famous Sokol slet (the Czech style of gymnastic Olympics) was replaced by the Soviet-modeled Spartakiáda, the essence of which is a show of military preparedness.

For the spectators, sport events became a matter of political importance as well. This is best manifested by the attitude of the audience at international contests with Western and Soviet teams, when many spectators take the opportunity to demonstrate their pro-Western, anti-Soviet attitudes.

³⁹F. Sacks, "Collectivized Sport," Esquire, March 1954.

Mass Communication, Mass Organization and Social Control

The dominant characteristic of Communist mass communication is its one-directional character. Although both mass communication media and small "discussion" groups are exploited extensively, the flow of messages from the leadership group to the masses is uniform and institutionalized, the response of the masses is unspontaneous and formally prescribed. Thus the leadership group of official opinion leaders and organizers can be considered relatively isolated from its audience. However, the Communists have the advantage of employing various methods of persuasion, the possibility of some channeling of public opinion and of using the threat of sanctions which may be put into effect unless the messages are favorably accepted. They may, and this is what in fact happens, change or completely reverse their policies in order to get better results.⁴⁰

Further, Communist communication is characterized by monotony and by a one-sided representation of the world.

The Communist leadership is mostly concentrated upon one theme when attempting to induce people to accept some new changes. Once a theme is given by the top leadership group all other agencies take it and hurl it upon the people. It is obvious that this is what makes the Communist leadership effective as well as ineffective. There is probably a certain degree of repetition which cannot be overstepped if the messages are supposed to meet with positive reactions. On the other hand, the potential threat backing communication frequently induces a certain degree of conformity on the part of the non-Communist population.⁴¹

The tendency toward conformity in well-structured "public" situations has been aided also by the leveling and standardization of organized activities and the difficulty of maintaining spontaneous secondary groups. Non-conformist attitudes are usually expressed in primary groups only, i. e., the family circle or a clique of intimate friends, or at non-political mass gatherings (for example, at sports events), which assure the

⁴⁰Jiri Kolaja and Jan Hajda, "The Cold War Viewed As a Sociological Problem"(unpublished paper).

⁴¹Ibid, p. 5.

individual a great degree of anonymity. Consequently, the majority of the population does not behave spontaneously in "public" life. A dual pattern of values--those one has to conform to overtly and those one professes in private--thus becomes an inseparable part of Czechoslovak culture. Communist strategists, being aware of this tendency, seek to keep the citizen busy by manifested and group activity to such a degree that there is little room left for privacy and informal group behaviour. Consequently, the privately professed values gradually become more diffuse, colored by too extensive individual differences. Only when social approval is provided for (for example, through foreign broadcasts, reading of forbidden literature, nonconformist behavior of deviant groups, etc.) do these values tend to persist as widely shared social standards.⁴²

The Deviant Patterns of Popular Culture

"Theoretically, a society lacking the dimension of individual, more or less deviational and somewhat unmeasurable processes of valuations, tends to be an uncreative and in certain respects 'arrested' society."⁴³ Fear, lack of privacy, lack of opportunity for self-expression, apathy, and boredom dominate the lives of those who are reluctant to become Communist activists or fellow travelers. Consequently, deviant patterns of popular culture emerge (usually modifications of the traditional deviant patterns) through which existing frustrations are channelled. Three types of such social phenomena should be mentioned: the Schweik-type activity in existing organizations, "gallows humor" and the zoot-suiters' movement.

The first pattern is widely practiced in all mass organizations and reveals itself in the tendency of local groups toward autonomy from central committees, in the tendency of members to pay lip service to regulations coming "from the top" while exploiting the privileges of the organization for their own purposes ("pure" entertainment, recreation, protest,

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., p. 6.

self-assertion). Instances of such behavior can be found among members of the Youth Union who turn into "tramps" or organize jazz session, in the Trade Union locals which turn the principle of socialist competition into a farce by drawing the name of the "best" worker in a lottery or which "mobilize the masses" by working out the system of "black" wages in their factory, among soldiers who sham illness, among printers who misprint a title and thus give it a sarcastic meaning, etc. These patterns tend to be short-lived in a particular group. However, their recurrence and frequency magnifies the effect.

"Gallows humor" is a type of humor which arises in connection with a precarious or dangerous situation. In a totalitarian state it is an expression of hope and wishful thinking rather than of cynicism. It is a manifestation of the morale of those who oppose the regime and is a factor in social control over those who rule the society.

The specificity of the gallows-humor type lies in that it is always intentional in the very real sense the very definition of this word. Not humor-for-humor, but humor with a definite purpose--that is, to ridicule with irony, invectives, and sarcasm in order to become a means of social control.⁴⁴

The effectiveness of gallows humor, which usually takes the form of anecdotes, proved to be as strong under the Communist as under the Nazi regime, particularly because of the fact that "official" humor of today is usually dry and inoffensive.

To illustrate the type of popular humor, we quote a few current anecdotes. The first one illustrates attitudes toward participation in the mass organizations:

A burglar had broken into a home of a Prague family. The police had no difficulty in reconstructing the case. Members of the family had a habit of writing notes to each other and pinning them to the door. On this occasion the first note was from the head of the family: "Returned from work at 6:30 and am leaving for preparatory class of Marx-Lenin studies. Will return about 10 o'clock. Long live Stalin! Father."

⁴⁴Antonín J. Obrdlík, "'Gallows Humor'-- a Sociological Phenomenon," American Journal of Sociology, XLVII, No. 5 (March 1942), 716.

The next note came from the mother: "Returned from the office at 6:45. Must leave to attend the Peace Committee meeting of the Women's League. Long live Stalin!. Mother."

The third note was from the daughter: "Have to attend the youth brigade rally on behalf of the People's Democratic Fighters in Korea. Will be back at 11:00. Long live Stalin! Lida."

The son had written: "Returned from work at 7:40. Have to attend the Youth League meeting. Will be home about midnight. Long live Stalin! Miloš."

The fifth note was the shortest: "Arrived at 8:00. Will not be back. May Stalin live forever! (signed) Thief."⁴⁵

The frequency of listening to foreign broadcasts is documented by the following anecdote:

"Did you hear that the radio fee will be increased next month to 251 crowns?"

"Why exactly 251 crowns?"

"Well, just count them up. Fifty crowns for Radio Free Europe, fifty crowns for Voice of America, fifty crowns for British Broadcasting Corporation, fifty crowns for Radio Canada, fifty crowns for Radio Paris and one crown for Radio Prague."⁴⁶

That boycotting propaganda films is not a rare phenomena can be seen from the following:

An old lady went to the movies. When she turned in the ticket, the usher handed her a gun.

"What is the gun for?" asked the lady.

"I would not like to see you getting scared in the dark. You will be there all by yourself."

Most anecdotes are directed against members of the government, leaders of the Communist Party and against unpopular measures. They are invented and spread with great rapidity. Sometimes gallows humor takes a different form. For example, a salesgirl working for a Bratislava bookstore used current book titles in a window display. These titles were

⁴⁵News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 3 (March 1952), 40.

⁴⁶Ibid., III, No. 8 (Aug. 1955), 59.

arranged one below the other:

We Want to Live
Far from Moscow
In the Shadow of Skyscrapers
Under a Foreign Flag

The salesgirl was arrested.⁴⁷

Both gallows humor and Schweik-type activity are popular with a great majority of the population. They are not characteristic of any particular social group and are spread by spontaneous opinion leaders whose leadership role is usually limited to a very small informal circle and is exercised for only a short period of time.

Quite distinct from these activities is the subculture of the Czechoslovak zoot-suiters' movement, the most conspicuous example of existing patterns of non-conformity and of the lack of opportunity for creating spontaneous formal groups for innovation and new experience. The zoot-suiters' movement began shortly after the coup d'etat and has been growing ever since. The majority of its members are young workers, boys and girls between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five, living in larger cities. In Prague, for example, they are recruited from youth of the most typical and traditionally "proletarian" city quarters.⁴⁸ The movement had two generations of predecessors: the "tramp" movement of the thirties and the zoot-suiters' movement of the war period.

The "tramps," similar in social composition to the present zoot-suiters, started a "back-to-nature" movement in protest against parental authority, too great stress on politicking in youth organizations and against the dull life most of them led. They established settlements in the woods where they spent their weekends dressed in exaggerated cowboy and cowgirl costumes imitating what they thought to be the tough life of the American backwoodsmen, cowboys and prospectors. They developed their own slang and composed songs expressing the longing for adventure.

⁴⁷Ibid., I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 40.

⁴⁸Karel Vavra, "Pasek contra svazák," Československý přehled, I, No. 1 (March 1954).

the unusual and bizzare. Western novels and movies were extremely popular with them, as can be seen from the names of the "tramp" settlements: Dead-Eye Gulch, Bar-B Ranch, Klondyke, Last Hope, etc. The "tramps" almost disappeared during the German occupation.⁴⁹

The wartime zoot-suiters' movement had no direct connection with the "tramps," but it expressed similar tendencies. Unlike the "tramps," it had a clearly middle-class character and was striving to refine urban subculture rather than to deny it. Its members were mostly students, blasé and sophisticated "lounge lizard" types affecting an eccentric dress and hair style, having a lingo of their own, and admiring jazz and jitterbugging. Unlike the "tramps," the wartime zoot-suiters' movement had distinct political overtones: it was openly pro-Western, specifically pro-American, and anti-German. With the end of the war the zoot-suiters disappeared.

The new generation inherited many of its preferences from its predecessors of the war. It differs mainly in social composition, a new dress and hair style, new slang and in a great demand for chewing gum. With the "tramps," the present zoot-suiters share an interest in thrillers and Western novels. However, the liking for "hot" jazz and jitterbugging is their most outstanding characteristic.⁵⁰

The movement is spontaneous and without any formal structure. The small groupings are unstable and have a fluctuating membership. Usually they do not have a strong leader. The hierarchy of prestige in the group seems rather to be based on the degree of knowledge and refinement of the zoot-suiters' style of life one possesses, one's inventiveness, ability to amuse others, courage in behaving boldly in public places and ability to organize group undertakings. The group meets several times a week to chat in its own slang, play the guitar, sing bop, cowboy and tramp songs,

⁴⁹RCC files, Czechoslovakia, sections 38 and 67.

⁵⁰Vávra, op. cit.

listen to jazz programs of foreign broadcasting stations and to compose new songs. Frequently they visit dance halls and engage in "provocative" jitterbugging.⁵¹

A small number of zoot-suiters profess a primitive, emotional anti-Communism and openly ridicule the representatives of the regime. Another minority is organized in gangs which engage in vandalism, street fighting and vagrancy. The majority are just young people who detest the uniformity of organized participation in the Czechoslovak Youth Union and like to enjoy themselves in their own way.

In spite of a strong campaign and police actions against the movement, zoot-suiters continue to flourish in Czechoslovakia. Their existence-- although hardly approved by most non-Communists--is the strongest assertion of popular culture independent of the Czechoslovak mass communication media, mass organizations and the pre-fabricated "proletarian culture." It proves the difficulty of eradicating the continuity of youth culture patterns transmitted from generation to generation in an informal way outside of institutionalized areas of human behavior.

⁵¹ Ibid.

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FAMILY AND THE INDIVIDUAL¹General Characteristics

The emphasis on family life in Czechoslovak society is augmented by the cultural stress on privacy, which is interpreted as an area of intimate relations with others to be guarded from invasions by outsiders. This area of the private is usually limited to the relations between members of the immediate family. The code of behavior which marks family life sometimes contrasts strangely with the code dominating behavior in "public" small groups, organizations, and institutions. It is not an overstatement to say that it is the former which gives the men security in an insecure society. Consequently, many people--perhaps the majority--regard their family's welfare to be equally as important as their jobs or careers. This was demonstrated particularly after the Communist coup d'etat, when many hundreds sacrificed civic integrity for their family's sake.

The relative stability of Czechoslovak families is demonstrated by the following figures: in 1937 there were 72.1 divorces in Bohemia and Moravia and 23.2 divorces in Slovakia per 100,000 inhabitants.²

In 1947 the total number of persons in the divorced and legally separated category was 114,000, or about 1.2 per cent of all persons 15 years of age and over.³

This stability is only partially accounted for by the fact that three-fourths of the population were nominally Catholics in 1930. Of equal or even greater importance is the dominance of sober, non-sentimental and casual relations among members of the family.⁴

¹This chapter refers primarily to Czechs and to Slovak Protestants. The pattern of relationships among Slovak Catholics, particularly peasants, is probably significantly different. Unfortunately no adequate treatment of Slovak cultural and social variations is available.

²A. Štefánek, Základy sociografie Slovenska (Bratislava: Slovenska akadémia vied a umení, 1944).

³W. Wynne, Jr., The Population of Czechoslovakia (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 25.

⁴David and Elizabeth Rodnick, "Tentative Hypotheses About Czech Culture," Research on Contemporary Cultures (RCC) files, Czechoslovakia, Part II, section 90. See also A. Blaha, Sociologie sedláka a dělníka

This prevailing mode of family relations is manifested in the choice of a partner. Although romantic marriages are becoming more frequent, practical considerations are still more prevalent. A peasant does not look for a beautiful wife, but for one who is thrifty, domestic, and industrious, one who can manage the farm by herself in time of need. The same qualities usually determine the choice of a partner in the case of artisans, merchants and tradespeople. Material considerations are also of great importance among the more propertied urban strata. The emphasis on the groom's occupation and income and on the bride's dowry sometimes makes the marriage more like a business transaction than a union of two people seeking a fulfillment of spiritual, social and ethical needs.⁵

With other strata, and especially with the younger generation, the economic motive loses some of its importance, but the stress on the possession of practical qualities still prevails. This is exemplified by the hierarchy of praise for wives and husbands. An ideal wife is described as good, decent, and honest, one who keeps everything neat and has high morals. An ideal husband is a nice, decent man, who takes proper care of and is full of understanding for his wife.⁶ Czech women in all strata are extremely well trained in household duties. They are expert at sewing, embroidery and cooking.⁷ The husband is expected to be well prepared for his trade, profession or craft, but he is not simply a money-maker; he is looked upon as sharing familial duties with his wife.

Czechoslovak family life is in some respects like American family life. Members of a family are primarily concerned with making a living, maintaining a home and, on occasion, finding diversion through holiday excursions, vacations, theaters, operas and dancing.⁸

(Prague: Orbis, 1925) and Dnešní krise rodinného života (3d ed.; Prague: Fastr, 1947).

⁵A. Bláha, Sociologie sedláka a dělníka, op. cit.

⁶Czechoslovakian Group, Minutes of Seminar, 1947-48. RCC files, Czechoslovakia.

⁷J. C. Schultz, "Notes on the Czech Family," RCC files, Czechoslovakia, section 98.

⁸Ibid.

The casualness of family relations is exemplified by the effort of husbands and wives to solve conflicts by discussion and compromise, and to maintain tranquility in their relations even though it is sometimes artificial. An aggressive, pugnacious individual is disapproved of either privately or openly. Relatives and neighbors classify him automatically a surovec (brute, cruel individual).⁹ The often-quoted proverb, "the wiser person gives way," testifies to this effect. Differences in opinion among family members are frequently very striking. However, this does not imply personal hostility.¹⁰

The attitudes of parents toward their children have a similar coloring. Babies are the center of attention of both mothers and fathers, but only up to the age of two; then they begin to be treated firmly.¹¹ They are rarely punished, but physical punishment is looked upon as a necessary remedy for extreme misbehavior. They are given a great deal of freedom within the family and are taught to be self-reliant at a very early age. Even at the age of two they are taught to do things by themselves. For example, parents assume that it is good for children to burn themselves, since they will learn through experience to keep away from hot things.¹² In rural and lower-class families children are looked upon as co-workers, and they begin to help their parents at an early age.¹³

The young people, particularly adolescents, resent their helplessness and their dependence on their parents. They want to feel equal and independent and prefer not to be considered young, since youth is an age when one can be ordered around by others and when his behavior is not always taken seriously. "Mrs." is considered more important than "Miss;"

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Letters from D. and E. Rodnick to Ruth Benedict, RCC files, Czechoslovakia, section 154.

¹¹ Ibid.; also D. and E. Rodnick, op. cit.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Bláha, op. cit.

to be older means to be more important, more independent and responsible.¹⁴

The nonsentimental but affectionate attitude characterizes relationships among siblings and with grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins. There is a great deal of rivalry between brothers and sisters, yet they do not display feelings of hostility to one another.¹⁵ The relationship with members of the extended family is important only in those groups where family tradition is stressed, that is, in the upper strata and among some farmers and peasants. Close contacts are usually maintained only with fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, and first cousins;¹⁶ these nearest relatives get a good deal of attention. Grandparents, especially in rural areas, usually expect certain privileges and respect. On the other hand, they frequently look upon retirement as an unproductive time which should be as short as possible. The retired farmer may be heard to say, "I am good for nothing. May the Lord take me soon."¹⁷

The cohesiveness of the family has been changing with its changing functions, the changing roles of its members and increasing secularization of the culture. The number of women employed full-time outside their homes is increasing, and emancipation is starting to break down the traditional division of labor between wife and husband. There is more religious indifference, selfish individualism, and marital infidelity. Members of the family tend to spend less time together. This is especially true of urban families. In the countryside the family is still the core of one's life: the family members work together and have more interests, opinions and ideals in common than with outsiders. Also, fidelity is stressed more, not for religious reasons, but because it is related to the peasant's concern with such virtues as honesty, dignity and authority.¹⁸

¹⁴ Letters from D. and E. Rodnick to Ruth Benedict, op. cit.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Schultz, op. cit.

¹⁷ Bláha, op. cit.

¹⁸ Bláha, Dnešní krise rodinného života, op. cit.

In urban families the relationship between husband and wife tends to be that of companionship, where the wife plays the role of housewife and partner. This pattern is also becoming more frequent in the countryside.¹⁹ In general, we may say that family stability is persisting in spite of decreasing family cohesion and changing functions and roles of family members.

The Fundamental Family Pattern

The predominant relationship between parents and children is a kind of comradeship. It is not comradeship between equal partners, but a relationship which stresses the obligations of children, especially of sons, toward their parents. Love is interpreted not as demonstrative affection, but as mutual obligation. Parents frequently remind their children of the sacrifices which they theoretically make for them, and gratitude and obedience are expected in return. The children are made to feel that they owe an obligation to their parents in the form of consciously trying to live up to their parents' expectations.²⁰ These attitudes usually result in children's having feelings of guilt: they think of themselves as being irreparably ungrateful and as having no opportunity to remedy their mistakes.

On the other hand, parents--especially mothers--tend to feel that they have been neglecting their parental duties and fear rejection by their children.²¹ Conscious effort to be a good son or a good mother is a matter of pride and personal integrity. If such effort is unsuccessful, a sense of never being able to fulfill one's obligation may develop, accompanied by feelings of anxiety and depression. One is seldom sure that he has done the right thing, or has the proper motivations.²² This feeling of mutual obligations and parallel anxieties may be considered the fundamental pattern in Czechoslovak family relations.

¹⁹ Ibid. See also Otakar Machotka, "Sittliche Erscheinungen," in Zdeněk Ullrich, Soziologische Studien zur Verstädterung der Prager Umgebung (Prague: Revue Soziologie und soziale Probleme, 1938).

²⁰ D. and E. Rodnick, "Tentative Hyptheses About Czech Culture," op. cit.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

The Dominant Family Types

There are two basic types of families: the patriarchal and the matricentric. The first type is more prevalent in rural areas, particularly among Slovak Catholic peasants, and represents a minority of Czechoslovak families. The father is considered the undisputed head of the household, deciding all major issues that arise in the affairs of his family. His wife is subordinated to him, and his children are at his command. They have to follow his orders, conform to his opinions, follow the career he dictates.²³

In the dominant matricentric family the father is only nominally head of the household. He consults with his wife as with a business partner, while maintaining the appearance of being the most important member of the family to outsiders. Even an aggressive, dominant woman would not display her status publicly, and thus damage her husband's reputation. Cooperation and respect typify the relations between family members.²⁴

Roles of Family Members²⁵

The Role of the Mother

The role of the mother is far more important than that of the father. In most families she disciplines the children (with the father usually playing the role of the "final authority"); teaches them the criteria which traditionally distinguish the sexes; teaches them the difference between right and wrong; and determines their attitude towards the father and authority in general. She handles the finances and decides about her childrens' occupations. She initiates or approves the plans for the family. She does not like to delegate her responsibilities within the family and does not like to rely on outside assistance.²⁶ She is independent, self-reliant and self-assertive; in urbanized families she is also quite rebellious about

²³ Schultz, op. cit.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The following section on family roles applies more to the matricentric than the patriarchal family type.

²⁶ D. and E. Rodnick, op. cit.

her position as a woman in society.²⁷

Mother's role has been glorified in folk songs, literature, popular music, schools and official propaganda. It is characteristic that only Mothers' Day, but no Fathers' Day, is celebrated. The former is even more exaggerated than in the United States.

The mother tends to undermine the authority of her husband in the eyes of her children. By criticizing him and poking fun at him she conveys to the children the notion that the father is not really head of the family. She will tell her children they must obey their father, but at the same time she will indicate to them either directly by words or indirectly by other means that his judgments are not reasonable and that his way of exercising authority leaves much to be desired.²⁸ Consequently, the mother is usually the authority within the family which is respected by the children. This pattern seems to hold even in paternalistic families where the father is feared rather than respected.²⁹

The mother punishes and criticizes the children far more often than the father. The child usually feels completely dependent upon her good will and learns early in life that he can do nothing without his mother's approval. Although the mother is closer to her children than the father, she does not exaggerate her intimacy or affection for them. She shares their ambitions and does things for them, but she has little time to talk to them and almost no time for play.³⁰

However, the mother's authority tends to last only until the child recognizes that the father's authority is but a part of folklore and consequently concludes that the mother's previously unquestioned position may also be questioned. The child learns through experience that the authority of both parents is neither fixed nor enduring, that harmonious family relations are not dependent on his conformity. Bit by bit he learns to force

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.; see also RCC files, Czechoslovakia, section 76.

²⁹ J. Uher ("Student a rodina," Sociologická revue, V 193, No. 1-3) points out that both boys and girls feel closer to their mother and respect her more than the father.

³⁰ D. and E. Rodnick, op. cit.

his parents to give up their authoritarian demands upon him.³¹ This is an important part of the anti-authoritarian pattern so prevalent in Czech culture.

Role of the Father

There is more variation in the role of the father than in that of the mother within different social strata. Although the father is almost never close to his children, he tends to be especially distant in lower-class families. On the average, the father spends about half an hour a day talking to his children; among workers and peasants it is even less.

Every father is proud of his children and will talk a great deal about them. But when he is with them he usually does not know what to say to them, unless he is called upon to reprimand them.³² The middle-class father's attitude towards his children is very critical, varying chiefly with his humor. As long as he is in a good mood and the children behave well, he will be rather benign and distant.³³ He makes his presence felt much more strongly when children misbehave. Consequently, children try to win his praise and good humor at all costs.

The father usually becomes interested in his children after they reach the age of ten. Unlike the mother, he is interested in seeing them grow up as quickly as possible. He is most pleased when they are able to compete with him intellectually and when they behave like adults. He tends to be impatient with small children and to under-rate their abilities. Under such circumstances, the children learn quickly that they can win his approval only if they give up their childish habits and if they can prove to him that they are much better than he thinks.³⁴

In the lower class, the image of the father is that of a hard-working bread-winner who prefers not to have children around too much. Although he is interested in his children in terms of ambition, he is yet not an authoritative kind of individual.³⁵ No Czech or Slovak father goes much out

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

of his way to make certain that the children think the way he does. He seldom acts as advisor to his children.

The ideal image of the father is not that of a strong, all-knowing and omnipotent man. The child does not win his favor by being submissive but by attempting to be his equal. This striving for independence rather than for submission is another clue to the anti-authoritarian tradition of the Czechoslovak people. To act wisely and properly means to act as a mature, responsible person conforming to the commonly accepted standards of conduct.³⁶

The Role of the Daughter

Girls get more affection from parents than boys do and have a greater feeling of being wanted and belonging. Both men and women show subconscious preference for girl babies since girls remain closer to the family, are more conscientious and make the parents less self-conscious than do the boys. With the boys the parents feel slightly inhibited. They are afraid that it would make them soft if they were shown too much love.³⁷

On the other hand, the transition into adolescence is made far more difficult for the girls. They are expected to become mature, responsible, and self-sacrificing during puberty; to take the place of the mother if she is absent; to help out a great deal in the household. The frustration and revolt of girls during adolescence is more common than among boys. The girl competes with her brothers for the attention of her father and is frequently in conflict with her mother, since it is the mother who imposes restrictions.

During adolescence, girls like to compete with boys intellectually and to prove to themselves that their intellectual potentialities give them the right to be looked upon as equal.³⁸

The Role of the Son

Boys are less attached to, and are less controlled by, their parents. The restrictions imposed upon them are greatest in middle-class families: they are told what friends to choose, what games to play and the

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

hours when they must be at home. In lower-class families the boys are usually at home only for meals and when they have to help their parents. Their friends and their leisure time are their own affair.³⁹

Boys are generally considered to be less responsible than girls. In contrast to his sister, a boy receives little attention from his parents, and he is not required to assume as many responsibilities of family life. Parents do not expect much of boys, and they do not get much. In spite of the freedom they have, the boys tend to view their position in the family as one of great inferiority to the adults. The freedom of boys has still another important aspect: it teaches them independence and caution in testing new behavior.⁴⁰

Competition for status is rather strong among boys, particularly after the age of thirteen. Each boy wants to know more than any other boy, to be outstanding in a particular sport or in mastery of a musical instrument. He is strongly opposed to organization and resents attempts at leadership on the part of other boys. For example, it is very difficult to find officials for student and youth organizations, since none of the boys want to be leaders for fear of being disliked by others. The informal groups of boys that arise tend to be temporary and are formed for special purposes--hikes, trips, games, singing or merely chatting together. They are seldom run by a boy who is stronger, more aggressive or more verbal. Conflicts which arise are usually solved by quarrels rather than by fighting.⁴¹

Intimacy among boys occurs less frequently than among girls and develops rather slowly. The period of adolescence is an "uncommunicative age" when one behaves like a "lone wolf," living with his great dreams, writing poetry and trying to solve his emotional problems all by himself.⁴²

The Family under Communist Rule

The function, stability and cohesiveness of the family are under-

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

going a slow change under the pressure of new legislation, recruiting of women for full-time employment and increasing emancipation of women in rural areas.

The new legislation secularized marriage: it is prohibited to marry in church without being previously married by the official of the local National Committee. The law does not hand authority to the husband, but gives both partners equal privileges and imposes equal obligations. The wife is allowed to use either her husband's or her maiden name. Divorce is much easier than before; the partners may divorce each other without going through the courts. Special privileges were granted to unmarried mothers; no legal distinction is now made between married and unmarried mothers.⁴³

Although it is improbable that the basic pattern of family life has changed significantly in the last five years, it may be expected that the official authority of the husband is declining. The wife tends to be more openly independent and self-reliant. Consequently, there are more conflicts between the partners over authority in family matters than before.

The family is affected even more fundamentally by the fact that it no longer has an exclusive monopoly in rearing children. The drive for female labor was accompanied by a fast growth of nursery schools. In 1949 every 104th child could be placed in a nursery, in 1950 every 34th. It was expected that in 1953 there would be a bed for every 23rd child.⁴⁴ The number of full-time employed married women has increased very fast; in 1952 women constituted 34 per cent of the total labor force.⁴⁵ These data indicate that an increasing proportion of mothers spend the day outside their homes and away from their children. The result is a change in the division of labor in the household and competition of nursery school employees for authority over the child.

Kindergartens, and later on regular schools, tend to undermine the authority of non-Communist parents. Children are frequently taught by their nurses and teachers to despise their old-fashioned and "reactionary"

⁴³I. Gadourek, Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953).

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

fathers and mothers, to exercise pressure on them in political matters, and even to inform on them. Several cases have been reported of children denouncing their parents to the police or to Party control organs.

The regime tries to win over the young children by attaching more prestige to youth than has been done traditionally. It is difficult to estimate the success of this campaign and to see what consequences it may bring about in relationships of children to their parents.

In spite of all innovations, the family persists as the ultimate group forming and conditioning the child's personality and imbuing him with the values shared by Czechoslovaks for generations. As long as the fundamental pattern of family relations holds, there is little chance for the present regime to convert the majority of the population to a totalitarian orientation. It is not an overstatement to say that the family is one of the main causes of the instability of the present regime.

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EDUCATION

Goals of Education

Schools have been traditionally among the most esteemed Czech and Slovak institutions. Through them, the national revival was made possible; they were justly considered the main defenders of the independent development of both nations. It was customary to point out that while a country as small as Czechoslovakia could not compete with greater ones on the battlefield, it could do so successfully in the field of knowledge and skill. The emphasis on education as a goal in itself was reflected in good schools, concern with self-education, high prestige of university and gymnasium professors and teachers, and an extremely low percentage of illiteracy.

Up to 1948, Czechoslovak schools cultivated ideas of independence, freedom, equality, tolerance and democracy. "Democracy has, from the first, been the keynote of Czechoslovak education, just as education has been always the keynote of Czechoslovak democracy."¹ Education was traditionally secular and non-sectarian. Educated and cultured citizens rather than specialists, cooperativeness rather than acquisition of knowledge --these were the ends desired. The opportunity for education was available to every citizen regardless of his nationality, religion or wealth. Pre-war treatment of minority groups was especially exemplary.

Under the Communist regime, the role and function of education are strikingly different from previous periods. The schools have been transformed into institutions of political indoctrination, civic conformity, and professional specialization. The government--in practice the leadership group of the Communist Party--has a virtual monopoly of education; it determines who will teach what, whom and how.² The Party bosses decide what should be the structure of the school system and its goals; what courses should be given; what should be the content of the textbooks; who is and who is not to be allowed to teach. They select the candidates for

¹E. P. Young, Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy (London: St. Botolph, 1946), p. 103.

²I. Gadourek, Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953).

teachers' colleges, for secondary and special schools, and for universities.³

At present the Communist Party relies more and more on the educational system to implement its policies among young people. This is so probably because of the fact that the Pioneer Movement and the Union of Czechoslovak Youth proved to be failures in many respects. Although most of the children from nine to fifteen, and boys and girls from fifteen to twenty-six, are forced to belong to the former and latter organizations respectively, an overwhelming majority define them as organizations one has to belong to and not as those one wants to belong to. It is estimated that only 15 per cent of the members of the Youth Union are interested in its activities, while about 25 per cent are young careerists making their way ahead by prescribed channels. The rest, 60 per cent of the members, are defined by the Communists as "plain reactionaries."⁴ The situation is similar in the Pioneer Movement. The repeated public cries for recruitment of young people for the Communist Party seem to confirm these reports.

It is natural that the leaders of the regime turn their attention to the adapted school system and lay the responsibility for proper political education of the young generation primarily on the teachers and university professors. "The school in the hands of our People's Democratic State," says the Secretary of the Communist Party, "is the basic and the most important tool for the Socialist education and apprenticeship of all youth, and for the training of the 'cadres' for the development of our economy and culture."⁵ After a relative lapse following the coup d'etat, the school is again taking a very prominent place in the Czechoslovak society, although with a different emphasis and for different reasons than previously.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Radio Free Europe interviews with refugees.

⁵ A. Novotny, Rude Pravo, December 6, 1953.

By 1954 Czech and Slovak schools became fairly good copies of their Soviet model both in organization and orientation. Political education --entirely absent from the previous system--was given the most prominent place in schools of all types, including theological seminaries. The traditional democratic beliefs, Western orientation and religious feelings are slowly being eradicated and the new official ideology is being substituted. Opportunity for advanced studies is usually granted to those who prove their reliability as functionaries of the Pioneer Movement and Youth Union and who are well versed in Marxism-Leninism, dialectical materialism, and the history of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia.

A principle of class favoritism was instituted: after the children of Communist functionaries, students from workers' and small peasants' families have been given preference in admission to secondary and special schools and universities. This principle of partisan justice is illustrated by the following:

Although we very much appreciate the fact that children of most class conscious workers and farmers wish to emulate their parents by building socialism with their hands, we must induce them to study. . . On the other hand, children of bourgeois origin whose physical ability makes it possible, must choose manual labor and finally do work which their class has been too willing to leave to the proletariat. They must become miners and foundry workers.⁶

Only recently did the regime show more leniency toward the children from middle-class families in consequence of the fact that the present-day "proletarians" do not show sufficient interest in higher education.⁷

The second and equally important keynote of the Communist educational system is the emphasis on occupational specialization. The schools

⁶ A. Jungwirthová, Lidové Noviny, April 27, 1951. Quoted in P. Korbel, Some Basic Information on the Czechoslovak School System (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, Sept. 1952).

⁷ Korbel, op. cit.

are designed to meet the current needs of industry, agriculture, state administration, commerce, transportation and crafts. The growth of engineering, agricultural and forestry colleges is the most obvious indication of the increasing professional specialization. More striking is the uniform, technologically oriented, curriculum in primary and secondary schools.⁸

Finally, the aim of the present school system is to implement a universal knowledge of the Russian language. Russian is an obligatory subject even in the elementary schools. The circulation of Russian newspapers, reviews, and textbooks both in the original and in translation has been steadily increasing. Russian is becoming the second language in Czechoslovakia, slowly replacing German, English and French. This development fulfills two tasks: it destroys the means of communication with Western society, and it creates a common language bond with the Soviet bloc. The latter aim was explicitly stated in Lidové Noviny, where it was claimed that knowledge of Russian is necessary for every citizen "because it is a highly important means of ideological partisan education, the medium of all progressive peoples all over the world and a powerful instrument of socialism."⁹ Russification does not imply knowledge of the Russian language only. It includes glorification of Soviet achievements (i. e. Russian achievements) and a gradual acceptance of Russian, i. e., supposedly superior culture.

Organization of the Primary and Secondary Schools

Before the coup d'etat the Czechoslovak educational system was essentially modeled on the Austrian system.

It provided for an eight year compulsory school attendance, i. e. five years of lower elementary and three years of upper elementary school. Higher degrees of education were achieved at the so-called secondary schools (střední-školy - Mittelschulen), by which the students were either trained for

⁸ Gadourek, op. cit. See also D. A. Schmidt, Anatomy of a Satellite (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1952), pp. 264-78; Korbelt, op. cit.; and Korbelt, Czechoslovak Universities (New York: Free Europe Press, Nov. 1952), I.

⁹ Lidové Noviny, Oct. 1949.

special professions or prepared for study in the universities. There were various types of these secondary schools. The gymnasium (classical-humanistic) was basically the stepping stone for studies of medicine, law, philosophy and theology. On the other hand, graduates from the reálka (Realschule) usually went to the Vysoké technické školy (Technische Hochschulen), i. e., technical universities . . . The gymnasia had eight grades while the reálkas had only seven . . . In addition to these seven and eight grade secondary schools there existed various types of one to four grade higher professional schools for technical, commercial, agricultural, pedagogical and other special studies.¹⁰

Not even the period of the German occupation of Czech provinces brought any substantial change, although during the war the number of Czech schools above the elementary level was reduced to some 65 per cent.¹¹

Supreme authority and control over all instruction has been traditionally in the hands of the state and local communities. Slovak schools constituted an exception during the existence of the Free Slovak State when the Church exercised supervision over education. The number of private schools which were mostly denominational has always been insignificant. However, a great variety of schools and the liberal spirit of the government assured students a great degree of choice and freedom of learning. The Communist era brought with it unprecedented rigid control and standardization.

In the course of the two consecutive reforms of 1948 and 1953, the primary and secondary schools were reorganized according to the Soviet system. Primary schools are divided into the National Schools of the First Degree, including pupils from six to eleven, and National Schools of the Second Degree, including all pupils from eleven to fourteen. After completing this eight-year compulsory curriculum, some students are given the chance to enter the three-year National Schools of the Third Degree.¹² The number of those who are allowed to do so is fairly restricted. In 1951, for example, 78 per cent of all pupils leaving the National Schools of the

¹⁰ Korbek, Some Basic Information on the Czechoslovak School System, op. cit., p. 1.

¹¹ Young, op. cit.

¹² P. Korbek, Czechoslovak Universities (New York: Free Europe Committee, Aug. 1954), II.

Second Degree started to work in industry, agriculture, etc. Not all of the remaining 22 per cent enrolled in higher schools; some of them were small farmers' children who were permitted to stay at home and help their parents.¹³ Many of those leaving the schools of Second Degree are persuaded to sign contracts with the Labor Reserve Schools--a new type of apprentice school--attached to mines, foundries, and other industrial plants. There they are trained for skilled jobs under very strict discipline, on condition that they will work for eight years at a job assigned to them by the appropriate Labor Office. Since 1954 a greater emphasis has been laid on recruitment of graduates for Farmers' Cooperatives, building, food and other light industry, communal enterprises and craft cooperatives.¹⁴

The most striking feature of the school reform was abolition of the gymnasia and reálkas and lowering of the age limit for enrollment in the universities from nineteen to seventeen. This innovation, imported from the Soviet Union, resulted in the lowering of educational standards and in the transformation of the middle-class character of the seven- and eight-year secondary schools into the mass character of the unified school system.¹⁵

The National Schools of the Third Degree remain the stepping stone to lower white-collar jobs and to college and university education. However, their function has changed: they are no longer transmitters of the cultural heritage, either Czechoslovak or Western. Instead they orient the student toward his future profession. In spite of this fact they assure him a social distinction: to study at the National School of the Third Degree is usually a privilege and a public reward for loyalty (even false loyalty) to the regime.

¹³Gadourek, op. cit.

¹⁴A. Novotný, Rudé Právo, June 12, 1954.

¹⁵L. Koubek (Sociologický výzkum zactva městanských škol ve školním roce 1929-30, Prague, 1932.) points out that the strongest social group at gymnasia and reálkas were children of white-collar workers, teachers and professors, comprising 34.17 per cent of all students, although this occupational stratum constituted only 7 per cent of all inhabitants of Czechoslovakia in the given years. In the upper primary schools (měšťanka--Bürgerschule) the children of this group constituted only 8 per cent of all pupils. (See A. Bláha's review in Sociologická revue, III, No. 3-4, 359-60.) According to

The Pupils

Besides a great many obvious distortions presented as truth, young people learn in school the basic rules of behavior in a totalitarian state: suspicion of the opponent, opportunism and Schweik-type conformism--overt conformity accompanied by covert rebellion, sometimes expressed in jokes, nicknames, ridicule, etc., against what is taught and against the authority of the teacher. Although most pupils are organized in the Pioneer Movement starting at the age of nine (later in the Youth Union), each class is usually divided into the "Communists" (i. e., children of Communists) and "non-Communists." Within each section the boys and girls form small cliques with their most intimate and trusted friends, with whom they share their secrets and on whose help they rely in case they get into trouble.¹⁶

The basic reciprocal attitude of pupils and teachers usually runs along partisan lines. The children of Communist functionaries are feared and disliked by pupils and teachers alike. Nevertheless, they enjoy a number of special privileges, particularly in that nobody dares to fail them or to reprimand them for their misbehavior. The "regular Communist" pupils have a number of advantages over others; only they are selected for the pupils' committees and pupils' self-government activities. Their better opportunities for informal contact with the teachers assure them an easier time in the classroom.

The "non-Communists" hate and ridicule the "fanatic Communists" particularly. The latter spy and inform on their fellow pupils, secretly search their belongings and sometimes even go so far as to "grade" their behavior. Since the traditional school code censures both "favored" students and informers, the "fanatics" soon find themselves isolated and ostracized.¹⁷ Thus the classroom becomes the first scene of pitched battles between oppressors and defenders of the rudimentary civil liberties. The

A. Novotný, children of workers constituted only 4 per cent of all students attending gymnasia, reálkas, special schools and universities during 1937. (See Rudé Právo, June 12, 1954.)

¹⁶ "Na návštěvě v lidovodemokratickej škole," Československý přehled, I, No. 1 (March 1954).

¹⁷ Ibid.

situation is probably different in the National Schools of the Third Degree where the "Communists" are frequently in the majority and where overt conformity is enforced much more rigidly.

In the elementary schools pupils are also introduced to the principle of "socialist competition."

Every child receives a special "Pupil's Booklet" in which his tasks, scores, and Socialist pledges are registered. These booklets resemble in many respects the personal documents of the Stakhanovites, and their purpose is the same: to stimulate their holders and all those to whom they are shown to self-sacrificing work for the regime; to teach them how to surpass the tasks imposed on every inhabitant by the claims of the Communist economy.¹⁸

However, the most important instrument in molding children's political orientations are the textbooks, including those on mathematics, grammar and geography. Quite frequently the parents are unable to mitigate the half-truths and obvious lies instilled in the children through school education.

The Teachers

The teaching profession still carries on its traditions in spite of regimentation, controls and purges. A majority of the teachers belong to the older, pre-Communist generation. Most of them conform out of opportunism, in contrast to the newly recruited group. This is particularly true of the professors at former gymnasia and reálkas--all of them with university training--who lost most of their privileges by the school reform and whose status was gradually lowered to that of the teachers.¹⁹ However, there are still some teachers who are unwilling to commit themselves to political work either in school or in the community.

Czech and Slovak primary school teachers belonged usually to the progressive and leftist groups. Their orientation could be defined by the following isms: reformism, social radicalism, anticlericalism (particularly in Bohemia and Moravia) and nationalism. The ideal of most teachers

¹⁸Gadourek, op. cit., pp. 112-13.

¹⁹See for example the report in Rudé Právo (July 3, 1953) on the gymnasium in Louny.

was to be "progressive," welcoming all innovations as better by definition than anything old and traditional. The limited education of teachers frequently led them to make uncritical judgments of political matters and to accept ideological orthodoxy. Although most teachers belonged to the Czechoslovak Socialists, Social Democrats and middle-of-the-road parties, there had been a very active Communist group in their ranks since the middle twenties. After World War II this Communist minority succeeded in taking over the teachers' organizations.

Teachers were recruited largely from peasants', artisans' and low-paid white collar workers' families. Their status was fairly high, usually higher than that of priests. This fact is well illustrated by the frequently repeated statement of Jan Masaryk, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Czechoslovak teacher should be better paid than any army general.

The importance of teachers in the present system has been underlined by the institution of Teachers' Day, celebrated for the first time in March 1955. Prague News Letter commented upon this occasion:

Good teachers are generally admitted to be the first requirement for a good school system. The teaching profession therefore receives great attention in Czechoslovakia and Teachers' Day is to be an occasion on which this important work is publicly honored and rewarded.²⁰

The emphasis on the teaching profession has also been increased by careful selection of new candidates and by repeated attempts to raise their educational level.²¹ The teacher is expected not only to offer basic knowledge to the children but also (or probably primarily) to instill in them loyalty to the People's Democracy and the Soviet Union and hatred of the West. He (or she) is supposed to be not only a guide but is expected to mold the child's personality, reprimanding him for "improper" opinions. In this way the teacher frequently competes with parents for authority over the child.

²⁰ "Teachers' Day Observed," Prague News Letter, March 19, 1955, p. 4.

²¹ Gadourek, op. cit.

A teachers' "correct" political performance is assured in many ways. Apart from the overall control by the Ministry of Education (in Slovakia, Commissariat of Education) he is supervised by the school inspectors and principals, most of whom are members of the Party, by his Communist colleagues and the functionaries of the teachers' branch of the Trade Unions.²²

Twice a week the principal holds a "work-meeting" with teachers and outlines instructions to them. These are then incorporated by the teacher into a highly detailed daily "plan of operation" which is submitted for the principal's signature at the following meeting.²³

Another common (and reportedly most distasteful) device of regimentation is the so-called "observation visit." Each teacher is required by the principal to enter a colleague's classroom at least once and to listen for his "mistakes." It is his duty to report his findings "critically" at the next work-meeting. This system of control works as long as there is one Communist teacher on the staff.²⁴

The teacher's role is not confined to the classroom. He is expected to engage in the anti-religious and collectivization campaigns, to give assistance to the administrative personnel of the Farmers' Cooperatives, teach Russian courses to adults, supervise the Pioneer Movement, etc.

Through all these measures the teacher's individuality is constantly suppressed. However, the tradition of non-violent resistance is strong enough to mitigate the bureaucratization of schools to some extent.

Organization of the Universities

Until the coup d'etat, the organization of universities and the training offered by them were the same as in other central European countries. The classical (humanistic) universities consisted of the departments (faculties)²⁵ of theology, law, medicine, philosophy and natural sciences. The technical

²² "From Discipline to Diversion," News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 3 (March 1953), 47. Also Gadourek, op. cit., p. 115.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Each faculty consists of several departments, in the American sense. The reader should keep this in mind during the further discussion where only the designation of department (instead of "faculty") is going to be used.

universities and colleges included departments of agriculture, business and various types of engineering. In addition there were several art and musical academies enjoying university status, and a university for political and social sciences with departments of political science, journalism and social service administration. During the war all Czech universities were closed down by German occupation authorities, while in Slovakia university education continued without any interruption. In the short period of political freedom (1945-48) the universities were the point d'appui of all anti-Communist intellectuals and were quite immune to the Communist attacks because of the excellent anti-Nazi record of university professors and students.

The universities were traditionally the main recruiting centers of the national and regional elites and thus vitally important in shaping the development of the Czechoslovak state. Although state-supported, they enjoyed a far greater degree of autonomy than any state university in the United States because of special constitutional guarantees and quasi-sacred traditions. Every university was governed by an Academic Senate elected by the faculty members for the period of one year and presided over by the rector (*magnificus*). The latter was selected each year from each of the departments in rotation by vote of the regular professors. The departments elected their deans in a similar fashion.²⁶ The Academic Senate had the final vote in the nomination of new professors also. The nomination was for life. This self-government and many additional privileges made universities virtually a state within a state. Of particular importance was also the fact that the main center of higher learning, the Charles University at Prague, was the oldest university in Central Europe (founded in 1348). It was looked upon as the symbol of national continuity and prestige.

The transformation of the universities was therefore a much more difficult task for the Communist rulers than the changes in the elementary school system. The structural changes which have occurred during the last seven years are numerous and cannot be described here in detail.

²⁶Korbel, Czechoslovak Universities, op. cit., I.

Gradually all traditional privileges were abolished and control over universities was transferred entirely to governmental organs, particularly to the Ministry of Education, Arts and Sciences, later to the newly created Ministry of Universities. Immediately after the coup d'etat control was exercised by the so-called Action Committees, composed of reliable Communist professors, students, and representatives of the administrative personnel. In 1950 the Academic Senates were abolished and replaced by Faculty Councils stripped of all the power and autonomy of the Senate.²⁷

Members of the Councils, rectors, deans, and new professors are appointed directly by the Ministry of Universities. The rector became a mere figurehead; the decisions are actually made by his secretary, who as a rule is a reliable Communist.²⁸ Faculty members lost the privilege of unlimited tenure; they may be removed and transferred at will. The Ministry also has the right

to determine and eventually to change the field of activity of the professors and lecturers and their educational work within the sphere of science for which they have been appointed or with the teaching of which they have been charged.²⁹

The professors are controlled not only by their superiors but also by appropriate functionaries of the Communist Party and reliable student-informers.³⁰ These measures reduced the status of the university professors to that of well-paid state employees.

The second major goal of Communist policy was the reorganization, decentralization and expansion of the universities. A number of departments and colleges were abolished and new ones were created. The administrative authority over some departments frequently changed hands. The theological seminaries were separated from their traditional universities. There has been an overall increase in the number of colleges, universities, and other

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., II

²⁹ Higher Education Act, May 1950. Quoted by Gadourek, op. cit., p. 121.

³⁰ Schmidt, op. cit.

schools of higher learning. In the school year 1933-34 there were nine universities and eighteen colleges, academies, etc., with a total enrollment of 35,523 students.³¹ During 1953-54 there were three classical (humanistic) universities, three general technical universities, two economic universities and thirty-one other institutions, mostly specialized schools hardly surpassing the level of colleges. The total number of enrolled regular students was about 47,000; the students taking evening and correspondence courses numbered about 19,000.³² Most remarkable was the trend in Slovakia, where there was just one university with three departments before the war, and eleven universities and colleges with a total of twenty-seven departments and three branches in 1953-54. In 1937-38 the university students studying in Slovakia numbered 2,471; in 1953-54 enrollment rose to 13,252 regular and 4,200 extraordinary students.³³ However, the real meaning of this expansion is doubtful in view of the fact that most of the new colleges and departments were established without an adequate faculty or adequate facilities. The lowering of the age of enrollment to seventeen means of necessity the lowering of standards and transformation of most universities and colleges into colleges of the Soviet type.

This large-scale reorganization was accompanied by a strong emphasis on specialization, particularly in the technical fields. The increase in the number of schools of higher learning was due to the increase of technical, agricultural and teachers' colleges. Some specialized technical colleges (for example, the colleges of mining and metallurgy, chemistry, textiles, and of railroads) are in reality training schools for mines, industrial plants, and similar establishments which are located in the given community or region. The agricultural colleges train the personnel for state farms and Unified Agricultural Cooperatives. Similarly, other

³¹S. Turossi, Education in Czechoslovakia (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 12.

³²Korbel, Czechoslovak Universities, op. cit., appendix and pp. 18-22.

³³Ibid.

colleges and departments in the general universities are oriented primarily to the needs of the state economy and administration; they train suitable leaders, managers, technicians, administrators, teachers of the future "socialist" generations, organizers, propagandists, physicians, judges with proper ideological background, etc. The dream of the Communist technocrats is slowly being accomplished.³⁴

This stress on specialization and "practical" training is exemplified also by the establishment of the so-called Party University in September 1953. This school is designed to train reliable and well-educated Party leaders and secretaries. To illustrate this function we quote from the opening speech:

We need Party workers who see further than their desk at the office, who are capable of correctly and independently solving urgent problems and of guiding others, who do not rely on some instinct and their own limited experiences but are supported in their decisions and acts by profound knowledge of the social laws (laws of society), by the knowledge of the great experiences of our teacher, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the entire international workers movement.³⁵

The school offers three-year courses and enjoys university standing. However, it has an altogether peculiar status: it is not under the control of the government authorities but is attached to and financed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.³⁶ The existence of this school is not only witness to the occupational specialization of university students, but also to the increasing professionalism of the Party employees.

Of the other main innovations, three are parallel with the program of secondary schools: great emphasis on political education, knowledge of

³⁴Ibid. See also "The Big Red Schoolhouse," News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 10 (Oct. 1953), 34-45.

³⁵F. Nečásek, Rudé Právo, Sept. 2, 1953. Quoted by Korbél in How a Communist "University" is Created (New York: Free Europe Press, April 1954), pp. 15-16.

³⁶Korbél, op. cit.

Russian and on pre-military training. Universities are supposed to educate professionally and politically highly qualified intellectual workers faithful to the People's Democratic Republic and loyal to the idea of Socialism.³⁷

Political indoctrination is most stressed in department of law, history, philosophy, economics and education. Class-consciousness and a good knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and the Russian language are supposed to be characteristic of every university student. The importance of Russian was stressed by the establishment of the University of Russian Language and Culture at Prague in the fall of 1952.³⁸ Pre-military training was made compulsory.

A further novelty worth mentioning was the introduction of evening and correspondence courses, and of so-called workers' preparatory courses. All of them, particularly the latter, are designed to assure to the more ambitious and politically reliable workers an opportunity for rapid social mobility.

Adaptation of universities to the Soviet model was not restricted to the above-mentioned changes. It also meant introduction of Soviet textbooks, teaching methods, degrees, and in the final instance, appointment of Soviet professors at Czech and Slovak universities. Since 1951 an increasing number of Czechoslovak students and professors have been studying in or visiting the Soviet Union.³⁹

The University Students⁴⁰

University students traditionally formed not only an intellectual but also a political avant-garde. They organized the first anti-Nazi demonstration after the Germans occupied Bohemia and Moravia. This event was commemorated in many Western countries during and after World War II,

³⁷Dolanský, Rudé Právo, May 14, 1950.

³⁸Korbel, Czechoslovak Universities, op. cit., I.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰The role of university professors is adequately described in the chapter on intellectuals, arts and sciences. Therefore, we are going to discuss some features of students' life only.

and left a lasting imprint on Czech university student traditions. After the war, students of Prague, Brno and Bratislava had a great deal of influence on the postwar political climate by their open anti-Communist stand.⁴¹ During the coup d'etat the Prague university students staged the only anti-Communist demonstrations. The tradition of revolt against oppression is an undisputed part of Czechoslovak university life.

To subdue the universities, it was necessary for the new rulers not only to change the system and curriculum of the universities, but also to change the composition of the student body and faculty. Immediately after the coup about five hundred student leaders and about fifty professors were expelled from the universities; some of them were arrested. In 1949 all 47,000 students enrolled at that time were "examined" and by March 1949, 6,370 were expelled. Eventually some of them were readmitted; but in the fall of 1950 an additional 2,400 were deprived of the opportunity to continue their university education. Most of them were simply not admitted for registration.⁴² The most severe purges took place in the Prague Department of Agriculture and in the Law School. In the former, 65 per cent, and in the latter, 60 per cent of all enrolled students were expelled.⁴³ A sizable group of students left the universities voluntarily and managed to escape from Czechoslovakia. In 1954, the number of escaped students was estimated at 4,500, i. e., about 7.5 per cent of all Czech and Slovak refugees.⁴⁴ The number of purged university professors is not known, but it is probable that it is proportionately higher than among students. These purges sizably reduced the number of anti-Communists among students and professors and intimidated the remainder.

In the course of time student associations were abolished and were replaced by Party cells and student branches of the Union of Czechoslovak Youth. For several years after the coup d'etat, students were forced to

⁴¹In the elections for National Union of Students, the democratic students got 90 per cent of votes.

⁴²"The Big Red Schoolhouse," op. cit.

⁴³Czechoslovak Students Bulletin (New York: National Union of Czechoslovak Students in Exile, May 1954).

⁴⁴Ibid.

study collectively in so-called study circles. Their leisure time is supervised, being occupied usually by forced participation in brigades, demonstrations, political meetings, etc. Class attendance is compulsory, in contrast to previous tradition. The curriculum is planned and strictly enforced. Reading habits of the students are supervised by making prohibited books inaccessible except on Party recommendation. Privacy is a rare thing at the universities.⁴⁵

Along with these changes came the regulation of admission of new students, of the number of students in various fields and of employment of university graduates.

Up to 1949, any graduate from gymnasium or reálka could automatically register at the university. Since then, strict selection procedures and a numerus clausus have been put into effect. The selection of new students is determined by their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, their record of activities in the Party, Union of Czechoslovak Youth and other mass organizations, their social origin, and their intellectual qualifications. Applications for admission are checked by the Ministry (Commissariat) of Education which eliminates politically and socially unsuitable candidates on the basis of reports received from the local youth or Party organizations, local National Committees, the Party cell in the secondary school, etc. Those who pass this pre-selection test are allowed to apply for the entrance examination, which is a sort of ideological screening.⁴⁶

The favoritism extended to "proletarians" is particularly demonstrated by the establishment of workers' preparatory courses, special one- and later two-year acceleration schools for selected shock-workers, innovators, etc., recommended by the Trade and Youth Unions. Completion of these courses--which are supposed to offer a condensed version of the secondary school program--qualifies the graduate for admission to the university. It is probable that the preparatory courses will fall into disrepute with the carrying out of the 1953 secondary school reform and ex-

⁴⁵ Schmidt, op. cit.; also Gadourek, op. cit.

⁴⁶ "The Big Red Schoolhouse," op. cit.

pansion of evening and correspondence courses.

The percentage of university students from workers' and small peasants' families showed a substantial increase: it rose from 7 per cent in 1948-49 to 27.6 per cent in 1949-50, 41 per cent in 1950-51⁴⁷ and 43 per cent in 1953-54.⁴⁸ Of those enrolled in 1953-54 about 10 per cent were from peasants' and 33 per cent from workers' families. These statistics demonstrate not only a sharp reduction of students with "bourgeois" background, but also the fact that the bulk of university students is composed of children of the "new middle class" parents --functionaries, managers, technicians, etc.

The planned economy requires a planned university program--so runs the Communist slogan justifying the regulation of the number of students in different departments. The restrictions apply primarily to the departments of medicine, veterinary and pharmaceutic studies, law and philosophy. They are intended to compel more students to enter the fields of engineering, economics, agronomy, geology and natural sciences. The newly created specialized colleges are particularly in need of students.⁴⁹

Only a few students pursue graduate studies. They are selected individually and are usually guided by one professor only. The others, an overwhelming majority, are subject to further regimentation when they start looking for employment. This applies especially to the students of engineering, economics, agriculture, forestry and education, who are assigned to particular plants, mines, schools and other establishments by the appropriate ministries. For a period of three years after graduation students may be transferred from one factory or institution to another and may be forced to accept employment different from that for which they have been trained. So far, this regimentation has not worked to the rulers' satisfaction.⁵⁰

⁴⁷Gadóurek, op. cit.

⁴⁸A. Novotný, Rudé Právo, June 12, 1954.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

In contrast to 1948, the number of non-Communists in the universities at present is very small. The overall control and planning of university life makes intellectual servility and political loyalty necessary. The elite of the young generation is expected to live up to its Soviet example. It is supposed to learn to accept Czechoslovak society as it exists today; to be devoted and loyal to the Communist cause and the People's Democracy; to be anti-liberalistic, anti-individualistic and anti-Western; to be realistic, enthusiastic and self-sacrificing; to live in the belief that one may find satisfaction and full enjoyment of life in collective living only; to believe in the undisputed superiority of the Soviet Union over any country in the world and of the Czechoslovak People's Democracy over the Western countries. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the present students do share these attitudes, whether out of conviction or out of opportunism. But it is fair to say that "socialist students" are more prevalent in present Czechoslovakia than are "socialist workers" or peasants.

The school system is a master plan for the re-education of the young generation and for the "buying off" of potential leaders of various social strata and groups. The "weeding" process, starting with the secondary schools, separates reliable from unreliable students and compels the former to be increasingly conformist. An ambitious young man learns to live according to an old Czech proverb: "He who wants to live with the wolves, must howl with them." However, university studies in themselves do not assure any student that he will become a member of the social elite, in contrast to the prewar situation. The lowering of standards means loss of the prestige of the university diploma. Narrow specialization confines the performance of graduates to their own fields. But even with a well-rounded education and an excellent university record one cannot "arrive" at the top; the main stepping stone to power remains membership and activity in the Communist Party.

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RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Religious Affiliation

The last data on religious preferences in Czechoslovakia were recorded in the 1930 census. Some of them, in view of the large-scale population changes and increasing secularization, do not accurately represent the religious composition of the present society. They are reproduced here for reference, not as indications of the actual strength of various churches or of the emphases laid on certain types of creed.

Table 1

POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 1930 *

Religious Affiliation				<u>Percentage Distribution</u>		
	<u>Czech Regions</u>	<u>Slovak Regions</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Czech Regions</u>	<u>Slovak Regions</u>	<u>Total</u>
	(in thousands)					
Roman Catholic	8, 378	2, 384	10, 762	78.5	71.6	76.9
Greek Catholic	12	214	226	0.1	6.4	1.6
Evangelical	500	556	1, 056	4.7	16.7	7.5
Czech. Church	780	11	791	7.3	0.3	5.6
Jewish	118	137	254	1.1	4.1	1.8
Unaffiliated	833	17	850	7.8	0.5	6.1
Other & unknown * /	54	11	65	0.5	0.3	0.5
Total	10, 674	3, 330	14, 004	100.0	100.0	100.0

*W. Wynne, The Population of Czechoslovakia. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 65.

/ Includes Old Catholics, Orthodox, "other Christian Churches" and "other non - Christian confessions."

It should be pointed out that membership in the Catholic Church was considerably reduced by the transfer of the German minority and by increasing secularization. The Greek Catholic Church ceased to exist in 1950 when it merged with the Orthodox Church. The Jewish group, comprising 254,000 in 1930, was reduced to 55,000 during the war and then was halved by the postwar emigration.¹ Mormons, Quakers, Jehovah's Witnesses and other smaller sects were outlawed.²

¹Wynne, op. cit., Of Germans living in Czechoslovakia in 1930, 90 per cent were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church.

²I. Gadourek, Political Control of Czechoslovakia. (Løiden: Stenfort-Kroese, 1953.)

Religion in Czech Culture

In spite of the fact that Czechoslovakia is predominantly Catholic in church affiliation, it could be ranked with Protestant societies because of its peculiar religious development and the predominant religious attitudes. This is particularly true of Bohemia and Moravia, which emerged from World War II with a strongly secularized culture but also without many of the religious cleavages characteristic of the first two decades of the Czechoslovak Republic. It is not an overstatement to describe the Czech regions of 1945-48 in these words characterizing contemporary Protestant England:

Both faith and infidelity tend to be mild and inoffensive; as the culture has become secularized, the cultural differences between faithful and infidel are minimal; the boundary between belief and unbelief is vague; the Christianity is more pliant, the atheism more negative; and all parties live in amity, as long as they continue to accept some common moral conventions.³

The German occupation had two major consequences for religious attitudes of Czechs: it contributed to the alienation of the young people from the Church, and it reduced the traditional antagonism between Catholics and non-Catholics to the minimum. For the first time in several centuries the Catholic Church as an organized body had to fight for Czech national interests. Both Catholic and Protestant clergymen were among the most persecuted people under the German occupation, by virtue of the fact that they belonged to the Czech social elite singled out for physical liquidation.⁴ The national solidarity of the Catholics and their defense of democracy practically eliminated the militant anti-Catholicism which had prevailed in Bohemia in the twenties.

How strong this spirit of religious toleration was is demonstrated by the public opinion poll taken in July 1 in Bohemia and Moravia. To the question "Do you feel an antipathy towards members of other churches and creeds?" 67.2 per cent of those interviewed replied that they were entirely tolerant in matters of religion. Of the remaining 32.8 per cent, 7.4 per cent felt antipathy toward the Catholics, 1.3 per cent toward Protestants,

³T. S. Eliot, Notes Toward the Definition of Culture (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), p. 72.

⁴T. Frejka, "The Fate of Czechoslovakia," in G. N. Shuster, Religion behind the Iron Curtain. (New York: Macmillan, 1954.)

8.2 percent toward atheists and 15.9 per cent toward Jews.⁵ There is no doubt that these prevailing attitudes cannot be entirely explained by the war experiences; rather they should be traced in the nature of Czech Catholicism and anti-Catholicism as they were defined at various periods and by various social groups.

Among Czechs, religious passion and struggle for religious rights and freedom have been traditionally associated with nationalism and political and social ideologies. From the beginning of the fifteenth century up to the 1920's, the fate of Bohemia and Moravia was inseparably bound up with the development of the religious situation in these two provinces. For Czechs the periods of Reformation and Counter-Reformation remain the most glorious and the most humiliating phases of national history, respectively. Under the influence of Jan Hus, a priest, reformer and Czech patriot, Bohemia became a "heretic" country a full century before Luther, with reformed churches of its own and a variety of religious sects, defying foreign Catholic crusaders and German political influence.⁶ Two hundred years later, Czech Protestantism, and with it Czech independence, was crushed by the Austrian emperor in the battle at Bílá Hora (the battle of White Mountain). The Thirty Years' War which followed and the exile of the leading Czech noblemen and burghers reduced the population of Bohemia from 3,000,000 to 800,000.⁷ In the course of the Catholic Counter-Reformation Czechs became a rural folk without a history of their own.

Consequently, Catholicism was frequently regarded as a foreign and imposed religion which was accepted only as a social convention. It is noteworthy that there have been no significant Czech contributions to the development of Catholicism such as can be found in Italy, France, Spain, Germany or Ireland. The Roman Catholic religion was looked upon by nationally conscious people as an expression of Austrian and German cultural and political domination and as a safeguard of an ultraconservative spirit

5

Adamec and Others, What's Your Opinion? (Prague: Orbis, 1947.)

6

Jan Hus is regarded even by many Catholics as the greatest Czech religious figure. The date of his martyrdom, July 6, was recognized by the first Czechoslovak government as a national holiday. This fact created a strained relationship between the Vatican and the Czechoslovak Republic after 1918.

7 M. Liscova, Religious Situation in Czechoslovakia. (Prague: Orbis, 1925), p. 26.

in the government. With the growing liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there re-emerged the pattern of religious nonconformity and of militant anti-Catholicism. After 1918 this developed into a national movement "away from Rome" and resulted in the establishment of the national Czechoslovak Church and in a rapid growth of Protestantism and atheism.⁸ Between 1918 and 1930 about one and a half million Czechs left the Roman Catholic Church.⁹

Resurrected Czech Protestantism played a role in the Czech national renaissance far surpassing the small number of its adherents. Many of the foremost Czech leaders were Protestants: the greatest Czech historian and political figure of the nineteenth century, Palacký; first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Thomas G. Masaryk; his son and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Masaryk; and many outstanding ministers, members of the parliament, university professors, writers, journalists, etc. The contribution of Protestants to Czech culture and to the democratization of Czech life was enormous.¹⁰

These conflicting roles of Czech Catholicism and Protestantism tended to persist up to the late twenties, when the Roman Catholic Church succeeded in making an adjustment to the new political and national situation in Bohemia and Moravia, primarily through the efforts of the religious orders, lay intellectuals and lay organizations of the Church.¹¹

For many Czechs, including a number of nominal Catholics, religious beliefs are not bound by church membership or by performance of religious rites. Religion is regarded as a set of individually interpreted norms entailing moral obligations, rather than as a dogma or a mystical experience. One does not look to religion for consolation except in times of unhappiness, sickness or crisis. This religious individualism could

8

Ibid.

9

E. P. Young, Czechoslovakia, Keystone of Peace and Democracy (London: Gollanz, 1938), p. 106.

10

M. Spinka, "Religious Situation in Czechoslovakia," in R. J. Kerner, Czechoslovakia, Twenty Years of Independence. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940.)

11

Ibid.

frequently be found among even the most strongly Catholic group, the farmers, who chose from Catholicism only those elements which they found convenient. An average farmer went to church three or four times, and to communion once a year; he did not care about sermons, religious mysticism or theological doctrines. In his daily life, he was sober and utilitarian.¹² The emphasis on individual definitions of religion was much stronger and more explicit among intellectuals, the majority of whom, before the war, were militant anti-clericals. Among workers various degrees of indifference, sometimes verging on hostility, toward church and religion prevailed.

How vague was the boundary between the believers and non-believers (and how little meaning can be attributed to the census data on religious affiliation) can be seen from the replies to a public opinion poll taken in Bohemia and Moravia in July, 1946.¹³

Question: Do you go to church?

Replies: Regularly (20.0); occasionally (42.8); on major occasions (13.3); never (23.6).

Question: Do you believe in the existence of God?

Replies: Believe firmly (63.8); admit His existence (16.0); do not believe (11.8); no opinion (8.4).

Question: Do you believe in an after-life?

Replies: Yes (38.4); admit its existence (20.7); no (28.4); no opinion (12.5).

Question: Do you believe that Christ was the incarnation of God?

Replies: Yes (32.8); admit the possibility (18.0); Christ was a normal human being (37.8); no opinion (11.4).

Question: Do you believe that religious people are on the average

Replies: Yes (33.2); no (30.2); prefer not to generalize (36.6).

The percentage of those who voiced opinions and who behaved according to the dogmas of the Catholic Church was much lower than the 78.6 per cent of the population of Bohemia and Moravia who registered as Roman Catholics in the 1930 census.¹⁴ On the other hand, the secularization of

¹²E. Chalupny, "Nazory Otākara Breziny o nabozenstvi, "Sociologicka revue, I, No. 1-2.

¹³Adamec and Others, op. cit.

¹⁴W. Wynne, op. cit., p. 65.

religious beliefs was much stronger after the war than in 1930, when only 7.8 per cent of Czechs registered as agnostics and atheists. However, this does not mean that the membership in the Roman Catholic Church declined with equal speed. It rather seems to indicate how moderate and uninfluential Czech Catholicism was after its successful adaptation to the Czechoslovak democracy.

Agnosticism and Atheism

Religious mildness and indifference in the Czech regions was accompanied by the growth of professed agnosticism and atheism. Its roots were religious, national and social. While nationalism played a leading role under Austrian rule and in the twenties, Socialist and Communist ideologies with their strongly rooted anti-clericalism won many converts to the new "faith" in the later period. However, the main reason for leaving the Church was usually religious: the desire to profess one's faith or convictions according to one's reason and without prescribed doctrines and rituals. The best Czech literary critic of this century remarked on this point:

Indeed, if you still want to realize what is religious feeling and religious passion, you have to look for such atheists. Today, the believers will no longer tell you anything about the genesis of the religious feeling; atheists will tell you almost everything!¹⁵

The Czech anti religious movement had noticeable puritan tendencies. It started around 1900 in the larger central Bohemian cities. Before 1918 only 13,000 persons registered as free-thinkers;¹⁶ in 1921 the number of persons without any church affiliation increased to 724,000¹⁷ and in 1930 to 850,000, i. e., 6.1 per cent of the total population of Czechoslovakia.¹⁸ Of those, 728,000 were in Bohemia and 105,000 in Moravia, comprising 10.24 per cent and 2.94 per cent of the Bohemian and Moravian populations respectively.¹⁹ That this movement was not only a national but also an urban affair can be seen from the following data:

¹⁵F. X. Salda, Boje o zítrek (6th edition; Prague: Melantrich, 1948), pp. 187-88.

¹⁶Young, op. cit., p. 106.

¹⁷Liscova, op. cit., p. 36.

¹⁸Wynne, op. cit., p. 65

¹⁹Young, op. cit., p. 367.

Table 2

PERSONS WITHOUT CHURCH AFFILIATION IN BOHEMIA
BY THE SIZE OF THE COMMUNITY: 1921 *

<u>No. of Inhabitants</u>	<u>% of Unaffiliated</u>
under 500	3.9
500-999	7.1
1,000-1,999	9.0
2,000-4,999	12.6
5,000-9,999	14.6
10,000-19,999	13.7
20,000-49,999	6.7
over 50,000	19.6

*Zd. Ullrich and O. Machotka, "Konfession und Religiositat, " in Zd. Ullrich, Soziologische Studien zur Verstadterung der Prager Umgebung (Prague: Reue Soziologie und soziale Problems, 1938), p. 207.

In Prague, which was the center of the movement against organized religion, 18.8 per cent of the population in 1921 and 14.9 per cent in 1930 did not register any church affiliation. The relative decline was due to the emigration of rural population to Prague.²⁰

Unlike the newly established Czechoslovak Church, the anti-religious movement did not appeal to the farmers, peasants and the propertied middle class. It was comprised mainly of industrial workers intellectuals and city white-collar workers. It had no organization of its own. Only the Communists, a majority of whom were atheists, established so-called Proletarian Clubs of People without Church Affiliation.²¹ These clubs were not, for the most part, re-established after the end of German occupation.

Czech agnosticism and atheism of the pre-Communist period was primarily anti-Catholic and anti-clerical. Its militancy was at its height in the early twenties. Its fervor decreased steadily with increasing moderation of Catholicism as well as with the increasing realization that opportunities for social mobility were not bound by any religious faith. However, the movement did not lose its social undertones: many of its "members" were convinced egalitarians and populists looking for a faith which would equalize the rich and the poor in this world and which would enable them to

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

live in a communistic community not unlike that of the Taborites in the Middle Ages.²² This is true primarily for the agnostics and atheists among workers. With the intellectuals, rationalism, sophistication and a desire for moral integrity were of much greater importance.

Religion in Slovak Culture

Differences between the role of religion and church form an important dividing line between the prevailing Czech and Slovak culture patterns. Statistically, both sections of the Republic are very similar: in Slovakia as well as in the Czech regions, the Catholics are in a great majority. They constituted 71.6 and 78.5 per cent of the population of the respective regions in 1930, while the Protestant minorities comprised 16.7 and 4.7 per cent respectively.²³ However, much of the similarity ends there.

The movement "away from Rome" in the twenties had little influence in Slovakia. Similarly, atheism and agnosticism gained little ground; persons without church affiliation comprised only 0.51 per cent of Slovak population in 1940.²⁴ While in the Czech regions Protestantism was growing and Catholicism was steadily losing adherents, in Slovakia the situation was almost reversed: between 1921 and 1940 the Roman Catholic Church grew stronger.²⁵

	<u>1921</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>1940</u>
Roman Catholics	70.92	71.61	73.64
Protestants	17.63	16.69	15.13

The causes of this development lie, probably, in the nature of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Slovakia. The Reformation reached its height only at the end of the seventeenth century. It was not a native movement as in Bohemia and Moravia, but was introduced under

²²Taborites formed the more militant of the parties during the Hussite period in Bohemia.

²³Wynne, op. cit., p. 65.

²⁴A. Štefánek, Základy sociografie Slovenska (Bratislava: Slovenska akadémia vied a umení, 1944), p. 180.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 179-80.

Czech, German and Hungarian influence usually without its militant character. Typically, the majority of the reformed Slovaks became Lutherans (an almost non-existent group among Czechs). Similarly, the Counter-Reformation was moderate and did not succeed in stamping out Protestantism altogether. The reconversion to Catholicism was more successful, however, since it was aided by the Hungarian St. Stephen tradition and by the so-called Cyrillo-Methodian idea. The latter appealed to the national sentiment of Slovak Catholics and of Czech Catholics in Moravia.²⁶

Before the Communist period, an overwhelming majority of Slovaks were deeply devoted to the Church, detesting laxness in matters of religion. The Catholics in particular were intolerant of the secularistic and liberal leanings of Czech non-Catholics. The consequences of the integration of Roman Catholicism into Czech and Slovak culture after World War I were divergent: while "Czechization" of Czech Catholicism led to its enlightenment and moderation, closely akin to French Catholic modernism, the "Slovakization" of Slovak Catholicism was associated with growing social conservatism, aggressiveness and totalitarian tendencies similar to Spanish Fascism. In addition, Catholicism was identified with the political opposition to the Czechs which culminated in the establishment of the Free Slovak State in 1939. During the war the Catholic Church became the state church.

How strong the dependence of Slovak Roman Catholics on their Church was can be seen in the fact that during the first land reform after World War I, the Agrarian Party did not succeed in winning the approval of the small peasants, cottagers and agricultural laborers for the expropriation and division of the vast Church estates.²⁷ This was at a time when thousands of landless Slovak peasants were migrating because they could not find work at home.

²⁶ Cyrillus and Methodius were two Greek missionaries who introduced Christianity to Moravia and Slovakia early in the ninth century. They preached and conducted services in Old Slavonic and thus mitigated the influence of the German Catholic missionaries who were active in Bohemia at that time.

²⁷ Stéfánek, op. cit.

Protestantism played a role in Slovakia similar to the one it played in the Czech regions. It had distinctly national and democratic overtones and was a rallying point of Slovak cultural identity under the Magyar rule. Štefánik, the leader of the Slovaks during World War I, and 90 per cent of his collaborators, were Lutherans.²⁸ The Slovak politicians who cooperated closely with the Czechs after the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic were mostly Protestants. Most prominent among them was Prime Minister Hodza. Again, the Protestants played a prominent role in the insurrection of 1944. However, it was Hlinka and later Tiso, both Roman Catholic priests, who won eminence among Slovaks as national figures in the thirties and forties.

As in Bohemia and Moravia, Catholicism and Protestantism were two of the main conflicting forces in Slovakia. Under the pressure of the political situation, their open antagonism and mutual hostility persisted even in the post-war period. The majority of Protestants identified themselves traditionally with the Czechoslovak cause and democracy. Most Catholics passed from pro-Magyar leanings to ardent Slovak nationalism and anti-Czechism. In 1945 Slovakia was as much divided religiously as it was politically.

The Roman Catholic Church

Role of the Roman Catholic Clergy.

The differences between Czech and Slovak Catholicism were reflected in the role of the clergy as well. In Bohemia and Moravia the status of priests was relatively low. In Slovakia the priests were highly esteemed and very influential people. This could be accounted for not only by the differences in religious attitudes but also (or maybe primarily) by the fact that up to the thirties there were few educated Slovak laymen and consequently the priests (Protestant as well as Catholic) were compelled by circumstances to act as political and cultural leaders.²⁹ In the Czech regions, the growth of education led to strong competition between

²⁸F. Ruppeltdt, "The Lutheran Church in Slovakia," in R. W. Seton-Watson, Slovakia Then and Now (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931).

²⁹P. Yurchak, The Slovaks, Their History and Traditions (Whiting, Indiana: Lach, 1946).

teachers and priests; the former were steadily gaining prestige even in the remote villages. In the towns and cities, the priests were exposed not only to the competition and criticism of the educated, but also of the propertied members of the middle class. With the exception of some rural areas in Moravia, the priesthood was not considered an attractive occupation. Esteem was reserved for religious thinkers rather than for the members of the clergy, particularly in Bohemia.³⁰

The Slovak pattern developed under Magyar rule when the Church was the only institution in which poor peasants' sons might rise in status. The nationally conscious clergymen were the only Slovaks who were exempt from outright persecution. Consequently, some priests became the embodiment of the indigenous Slovak intelligentsia, and they persisted in this role long after the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic. In Slovak villages before the Communist period, the priests represented the highest authority. They could not be criticized except for breach of Church rules. Their counsels and orders were followed in economic, political and personal as well as religious matters.³¹ The competition of the intellectuals and of the rising middle class made itself felt only in the post war period when Church schools were taken over by the government and the political participation of the rural population became more intense.

Up to the twenties, the higher clergy, particularly bishops and archbishops, were recruited from the ranks of the nobility, which meant that they were Germans and Hungarians almost without exception. In the course of the First Republic, the Catholic elite became a national elite which was socially much more akin to the expectations and aspirations of the Czechs and Slovaks. A majority of the higher clergymen came from the middle class, although several among them were of peasant origin. Among Czechs they were almost without exception men of great erudition and of intense interest in social problems.³² The result was that in Moravia the archbishops, bishops and prelates soon won high esteem and

³⁰ Chalupny, op. cit.

³¹ Stefanek, op. cit.

³² Spinka, op. cit.

influence, while the equivalent Bohemian hierarchy gained in status only after World War II, when it had proved the sincerity of its patriotism.

Magyar influence in Slovakia persisted much longer than the German influence in Czech regions. Although Slovak bishops were nominated in 1921, Slovakia remained under the administration of the Hungarian archbishop until 1937.³³ Many, if not most, of the higher dignitaries were Magyars or strongly pro-Hungarian, even in the late twenties.³⁴ Most Magyarized were the religious orders who had their headquarters in Vienna and Budapest. A reversal came only with the rise of the new popularity of the higher clergy in the eyes of the Slovak population. In the thirties and forties the Slovak episcopate became one of the most powerful pressure groups, exerting a good deal of influence on the national, political and economic development of Slovakia.

Power of the Roman Catholic Church

In spite of loss of membership, secularization and loss of state endorsement, the Roman Catholic organization remained the most powerful, the most influential and the most efficient of all churches. The strained relationships between the Catholic Church and the Czechoslovak government and between the latter and the Vatican ended in the late twenties when a modus vivendi between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Holy See was established, and the Roman Catholic Church started to receive regular state support.³⁵ Due to the influence of the Roman Catholic Church the intended separation of church and state was never carried out.

The power of the Church was based not only on its clerical organization but also on its wealth and the influence of Catholic political parties and lay organizations. Before the war the Church owned 787,930 acres of land,³⁶ and in 1947 it still possessed somewhat over 400,000 acres.³⁷

³³Ibid.

³⁴K. Medvecký, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia," in R. W. Seton-Watson, op. cit.

³⁵Spinka, op. cit.

³⁶"The Red and the Black, the Church in the Communist State," News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 2 (February 1953).

³⁷Frejka, op. cit., p. 77.

Most of these holdings were located in Slovakia. The political interests of the Church were defended by three Catholic parties: the Czech People's Party, the Slovak People's Party and the German Christian Socialists (Christliche Sozialen). While the latter two almost always stood in opposition to the Czechoslovak government, the Czech People's Party soon became a regular member of the governmental coalition and exercised considerable influence. It was the only one of the three pre war Catholic parties to emerge after the German occupation. The power of the Slovak People's Party was greatest during the period between 1939 and 1945, when it succeeded in establishing a separate Slovak state, suppressing all other Slovak political parties. In addition to the newspapers of the Catholic parties, the Catholic cause was defended in three weeklies with a total circulation of 600,000 copies.³⁸

Of the lay Catholic organizations the most important was the gymnastic organization Orel (founded in opposition to Sokol) with a membership of 130,000, the welfare organization Charitas, Catholic Trade Unions, the Boy Scouts, and the Academic League (association of Catholic college and university students). With the exception of the Trade Unions and Orel all of these organizations resumed their activity after war time suppression.

The influence of the Church was strongest in education. Due to the pressure exerted by the Roman Catholics, religious instruction was made compulsory in primary schools.³⁹

On the whole, the power of the Roman Catholic Church decreased only slightly in the first years after the war, and then primarily because of the changing balance of political forces and the increasing influence of the non-religious bodies like Trade Unions. In Slovakia the conversion of the denominational schools to state schools meant a definite loss for the Church. The power and influence of both Czech and Slovak Catholics was traditionally strongest in the rural areas.

The Czechoslovak Church

The Czechoslovak Church was established and led by the modern-

³⁸ "The Red and the Black," op. cit.

³⁹ Ibid.

istic, patriotic Catholic clergy which seceded from the Church in 1920. It was almost entirely a Czech affair. Of the 791,385 members in 1930, there were 618,305 adherents in Bohemia, 161,367 in Moravia and only 11,495 in Slovakia.⁴⁰ The church grew very fast. From the time of its foundation until 1938, it gained 850,000 members.⁴¹

In the course of time, the church became an episcopally organized body with Unitarian theology. It introduced the Czech language into church services instead of Latin; abolished the compulsory celibacy of the clergy; introduced presbyterial ordination of the bishops and lay representation in the governing bodies; modified the training of theological students; democratized the organization of the parish, etc. Although the church joined the ranks of the Protestant denominations, it is in no sense a Protestant body.⁴²

The great majority of its members are dissenters from the Roman Catholic Church who joined the movement "away from Rome" under the spell of the nationalism, reformism and anti-Catholicism of the twenties. Glorification of the cult of Jan Hus and Hussitism became their major religious theme. In the thirties a number of agnostics and atheists joined the Czechoslovak Church. A majority of the adherents of the church came from lower social strata, both urban and rural.

The creation of the Czechoslovak Church was not only an expression of nationalism and anti-clericalism, but it also expressed the cultural emphasis on religion defined as rules of moral behavior and interpreted as an individual affair. It was a revolt against dogmatism, supported by ideas of pacifism and the equality of men.⁴³ The Czechoslovak Church enjoyed state support similar to that given to the Roman Catholic Church. During the German occupation, the members of the former were particularly exposed to persecution, and the Church was forced to change its name from Czechoslovak to Czechomoravian.

⁴⁰ Young, op. cit., p. 366.

⁴¹ Spinka, op. cit., p. 305.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ J. Síma's review of "Duchovní ideály Československé církve," by Fr. Hník. Sociologická revue, VI. NÖ. 3-4.

The Protestant (Evangelical) Churches

The largest Czech Protestant denomination was the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren revived in 1918 after a lapse of three centuries. It was formed by the union of the Czech Reformed and Lutheran Churches, the basis of the union being the Confessio Bohemica of 1575 and the Confession of Czech Brethren of 1662. Its membership doubled between 1918 and 1930, reaching 320,000 members in the late thirties.⁴⁴ Most of the new members were dissenters from the Roman Catholic Church.

In Slovakia, where Protestantism was numerically much greater, the largest denomination was the Evangelical Church of Augsburg Confession (Lutheran), having 301,600 members in 1930. It was composed almost entirely of Slovaks.⁴⁵ The second largest denomination, the Calvinist Church (219,000 members in 1930) was almost entirely Magyar in membership and was strongly oriented toward Hungary.⁴⁶

Other smaller Protestant denominations and sects numbered over 31,000 members in 1930. They comprised the Moravian Brethren, Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists and a few others. The Methodists constituted the largest group, with about 10,000 members.⁴⁷ The Lutheran denominations in the Czech regions almost disappeared after the war with the transfer of the Sudeten Germans.

In contrast to the Roman Catholics, the Protestants did not attempt to create political parties of their own. Their relative abstention from political life is indicated by the fact that no Protestant minister ever accepted a post in the government (unlike Catholic priests). Their lay organizations were few and relatively weak, the largest of them being the YMCA. However, their religious fervor, cultural contributions, and the support of many leading Czechs and Slovaks assured them a position of high prestige. The Protestant ministers, unlike Czech Catholic priests, enjoyed high esteem in their parishes.

⁴⁴Spinka, op. cit.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

Churches under the Communist Regime

The Causes of the Conflict between the Churches and the State

The causes of the conflict between the churches and Communist leaders in Czechoslovakia are similar to those which resulted in persecution and subordination of the church in the Soviet Union. Churches and the Communist Party have competing doctrines: each strives for the conversion of man and each perpetuates an image of the ideal society. Each of them is trying to implement standards of morality: the Communist morality is partisan, class-bound, secular, materialist and determinist; the religious morality is universal, eternal, transcendental and volitional. From the Communist point of view the function of religion in a "People's Democracy" is essentially negative, because it siphons off enthusiasm which should be directed to the class struggle and serves as a refuge for those who oppose the regime.⁴⁸

The second area of conflict can be defined as a conflict of elites. After eliminating their economic and political competitors and converting the remaining major institutions to their own use, the power-seeking Communist leaders logically have to attack the autonomy of the churches if they want to become the exclusive controllers of the means of persuasion. The strategy varies with the situation: the clergy of some churches is simply liquidated; the clerical hierarchy of other churches is decimated and then forced to cooperate; still others are intimidated; ideological affinities are sufficient in converting some churches into state-controlled organizations. The autonomy of the churches, however relative it may be, is a permanent danger to a Communist-dominated society, since religious leadership could, in the course of time, become a rallying point of the popular opposition. It is primarily the education and recruitment of the younger generation which is at stake in this struggle.

Communist Policy Toward Churches and religion

At the present time, the dominant pattern of the Communist policy toward the churches is modeled on the relationship of the Soviet government (and Communist Party) to the Russian Orthodox Church. All churches

⁴⁸A. Heidler, "Režim proti církví, " (I), Československý přehled, I, No. 2 (April 1954).

have been converted into pliable, state-controlled and state-supervised organizations, economically and politically dependent on the state, almost deprived of new recruits, and governed by a newly established hierarchy loyal to the Communist regime. The domesticated churches are forced to propagate and support various policies like collectivization, the Five-Year Plan or peace campaigns, but may neither propagate nor defend religion outside of the churches, nor contest the anti-religious propaganda and activities of the Communist Party.⁴⁹

The first indication of this policy was the suppression of the Catholic press in 1948. The establishment of the State Office for Religious Affairs in October 1949 sanctioned the state's exclusive jurisdiction in religious matters.⁵⁰ From the end of the war until the coup d'etat, the Communist Party pursued a policy of reconciliation; it neither spread nor endorsed anti-religious propaganda. Membership in the Party was not looked upon as conflicting with church membership or religious beliefs. A majority of the members of the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties were Roman Catholics, even though many of them were only so nominally. None of the churches officially endorsed the anti-Communist campaign of the democratic parties.

A few months after the coup d'etat, freedom of worship was guaranteed by the new constitution:

Everyone shall be entitled to profess privately and publicly any religious creed or to be without denomination. . . . Everyone shall be at liberty to carry out the acts connected with any religious denomination or the absence thereof. The exercising of this right shall not, however, be inconsistent with public order and morality. This right shall not be misused for non-religious ends.⁵¹

In the following months Communist leaders tried to win clergymen to their side by intimidation and persuasion. They relied on the Hussite, rationalist, and nationalist traditions of the Czech (and with some modification, of the Slovak) Catholic and Protestant clergy, on the war experiences of the latter, and on the relatively good relations between the

⁴⁹"The Red and the Black . . . ," op. cit.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Constitution of June 9th, 1948.

munication with the lower clergy, became impossible in the course of time.⁵⁹ From 1950 to 1954 the clerical elite was liquidated, the Church organization was broken, and a state of anarchy in the exercising of authority developed. The archbishop of Prague, who became a martyr and a quasi-saint in the eyes of many non-Communists, was deported to an unknown place; the Moravian archbishop was placed under house arrest. (The Slovak archbishop died in 1945 and was not replaced.) Of the ten bishops, six were arrested, tried, and sentenced to long-term imprisonment.⁶⁰ The fate of all the abbots and several of the prelates was similar.

At the same time began the gradual transfer of authority over Church matters to the State Office for Church Affairs and to the few members of the higher clergy who decided to cooperate with the regime. Some of them were promoted to high positions only by the Communists. The new laws reduced all clergymen to the status of civil servants receiving a regular salary from the state and bound to take the loyalty oath to the People's Democracy. The State Office for Church Affairs acquired the authority to appoint, transfer or remove priests as well as higher clergymen. It makes decisions in many administrative and financial matters of the Church, takes care of Church publications, controls religious ceremonies and supervises the education of new priests.⁶¹ It is the embodiment of the rule of the state over the church.

The remaining clerical elite cooperates half-heartedly with the regime; it is composed of people who succumbed to blandishment, fear and to despair resulting from the feeling that things will never change anyway. They have very little power and still less prestige, despised by Communists, priests and parishioners, and excommunicated from the Church by the Vatican. Their main function is to keep the clergy in line with the policy of the regime and to keep up the pretense that the whole clerical hierarchy came to terms with Communism and is willing to cooperate loyally with the organs of the state.⁶²

⁵⁹Heidler, op. cit.

⁶⁰"The Red and the Black. . . .," op. cit.

⁶¹Frejka, op. cit.; also Heidler, op. cit.

⁶²Ibid.

The New Role of the Lower Roman Catholic Clergy

Although the number of Communist sympathizers among priests is virtually meaningless, there are very few among them who still refuse to compromise with the Communists.⁶³ This willingness was brought about by a number of very severe measures. While the liquidation of the elite was under way, the Communist leaders tried to win the support of the lower clergy, which the press and radio depicted as faithful to the people, poor and sceptical about the Vatican policy.⁶⁴ However, only twenty Czech and twenty Slovak priests joined the Communist-sponsored Catholic Action in 1949.⁶⁵ Similarly, the Movement of the Patriotic Priests, established after the failure of Catholic Action won very meager support. Up to 1952 only a few priests took the requested loyalty oath to the People's Republic.⁶⁶ It was primarily the full-scale terror which forced the clergymen to submit. It is reported that by January 1951 more than three thousand of the 6,600 Catholic priests living in Czechoslovakia in 1949 were arrested. Of those, two thousand were held in so-called concentration monasteries, i. e., monasteries converted into concentration camps.⁶⁷

The role of priests who are still at liberty is limited to saying mass and administering sacraments. They can seldom exercise any extensive influence on their community or its schools. Their sermons are heavily censored: it is dangerous not only to preach Christian morality but even to use such words as the devil, sin, Antichrist, Herod or Pilate, since they are frequently disguised references to the Communists and their actions.⁶⁸ Every sermon and mass is attended by secret agents of the State Office for Church Affairs.⁶⁹ If the priest succeeds in influencing his parishioners

⁶³ Frejka, op. cit.

⁶⁴ Gadourek, op. cit.

⁶⁵ Heidler, op. cit.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Frejka, op. cit.

⁶⁸ M. M-Ý, "Boj slovenského evanjelíctva proti režimu," Československý přehled, I, No. 7 (Sept. 1954).

⁶⁹ Gadourek, op. cit.

either by his exemplary way of life or by sermons, he is transferred to another church.⁷⁰ Sometimes his salary is withheld or other measures are taken against him.⁷¹ The priests usually have little opportunity to communicate with one another. Their isolation sometimes drives them as much into despair as their persecution by the exponents of Communism.

The attitudes of the parishioners toward the priests varies with the type of community and with the degree of compromise the priest has made. In the villages, particularly in Slovakia, the priests enjoy traditionally high prestige. In many rural communities the peasants stood guard in front of the parsonage, attempting to prevent the deportation of their priest. In other places the parishioners collected money in order to pay heavy fines imposed on the priest because he had broken some of the new laws.⁷² On the other hand, the increasing willingness of the clergy to engage in Communist political campaigns necessarily lessens its status.

The sharp decline in the number of priests is due in part to the increasing difficulty of training new recruits for the priesthood. The number of Catholic seminaries was greatly reduced (there were fourteen before the war) and one of the three theological schools was abolished. Most of the professors were dismissed and a new curriculum was introduced which emphasized political education and included pre-military training. The candidates are few, usually people with low qualification and pro-Communist leanings. Consequently, there are almost no successors to vacated church posts. In 1951 there were only twenty-five graduates from the two Roman Catholic theological schools.⁷³

Still harsher was the fate of the members of religious orders. By 1954 all monasteries were abolished, and only those convents which were attached to hospitals remained. Monks and nuns are mostly held as inmates in the "concentration monasteries" established in 1950. They are assigned to work in factories and agriculture and are exposed to continuous attempts at political re-education.⁷⁴

⁷⁰Heidler, op. cit.

⁷¹Gadourek, op. cit.

⁷²Radio Free Europe interviews with refugees.

⁷³Gadourek, op. cit.; also Heidler, op. cit.

⁷⁴Ibid.; also Frejka, op. cit.

Protestant Churches under Communism

The initial position of the Protestant churches toward the Communist regime lay somewhere between the explicit opposition of the Roman Catholics and the complete subordination and subservience characteristic of the Russian Orthodox Church. Consequently, they received more favorable treatment and were spared some of the harsh measures directed against the Roman Catholic clergy. This is particularly true of the Czech Protestants. Nevertheless, since 1949 the State Office for Church Affairs has been taking over control of the Protestant churches in the same way as it did the Roman Catholic Church. Most of what has been said about the role of Catholic priests applies to Protestant ministers as well; however, persuasion and intimidation were used on the Protestant churches rather than outright persecution.⁷⁵

The outcome was distinctly different in the Czech regions and in Slovakia. The Slovak Lutheran elite was deposed; the bishops and several other of the higher clergy were replaced by pliable men, little known or esteemed in the Lutheran community. Out of the four hundred clergymen only eight are said to have offered their services to the regime. The others adopted the Catholic priests' pattern of half-hearted cooperation.⁷⁶

On the other hand, the Czech Protestant elite passed into the pro-Communist camp with few exceptions. This can be accounted for to some extent by the influence of the well-known theologian and dean of the Comenius Theological School in Prague, Hromadka, and by the precedent of the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren. Although not a Communist himself, Hromadka has become during the last few years the most prominent Protestant protagonist of Communism, not only in eastern Europe but the world over. His attitude stems from his anti-liberal, Biblical views, and from his application of Barthian dialectical theology. In the words of a prominent American theologian, Hromadka

has convinced himself by a process extending over his entire adult life, that liberal democracy is a lost cause, that communism is the divinely-ordained "wave of the future," and that the Christian churches must accept the new order if they are to survive. He furthermore believes that the churches must

⁷⁵Ibid.; also Frejka, op. cit.

⁷⁶M. M-Y, op. cit.

voluntarily undertake a radical reconstruction "from the ground up" for they must ultimately serve as the moral and religious foundations of the "classless society."⁷⁷

The cultural traditions which enabled this church to reconcile itself with Communism are rooted in the belief that it is possible to convert the anti-religious Communism of the twentieth century into the Christian Communism of the Middle Ages professed and practiced by the founders of the Czech brethren. Parts of Chelcicky's teachings embodied in the original creed of the church lent justification to the behavior and orientation of the present members of the church. Chelcicky's social doctrine could be stated briefly as follows:

Social inequalities such as wealth, standing and rank were created by the State, and can only disappear with it. The sole Christian method of destroying the State, however, is to ignore it; hence the true believer is forbidden not only to accept a government office, but also to invoke the power of the State. For him police and judges are nonexistent. The Christian strives after goodness of his own free will, and must not force others to be good, for God demands that goodness should be voluntary, and all compulsion is an outcome of evil.⁷⁸

However, it is probable that with the increasing ruthlessness of the class struggle in Czechoslovakia, and with the growing strength of the anti-religious campaign, both Hromadka's leadership and the modernized emphasis on the medieval theme lost their meaning in the eyes of the majority of Czech Protestants.

The fate of the smaller Protestant denominations was similar to that of the Roman Catholic Church, largely because of their connections with American Protestantism. Most notorious is the case of the Czech Baptists, whose leaders were all sentenced to long-term imprisonment.⁷⁹

The Fate of Other Churches

The policy of outright subservience to the Communists has been

⁷⁷ M. Spinka, Church in Communist Society, A Study in J. L. Hromadka's Theological Politics (Hartford, Mass.: The Hartford Seminary Press, June 1954).

⁷⁸ K. Kautsky, Communism in Central Europe in the Time of Reformation (London: Unwin, 1897), p. 79. Chelcický was born in 1390 in southern Bohemia. By the middle of the fifteenth century his religious writings aroused universal attention throughout central Europe.

⁷⁹ Spinka, op. cit.

practiced since the coup by two churches only, the Czechoslovak and the Orthodox. In exchange they receive favorable treatment, particularly in regard to the training of clergymen.

The case of the Orthodox Church merits special attention. Until the Communist coup d'etat it was insignificant; in 1930 the church had only 33,564 members, constituting 0.24 per cent of the total population.⁸⁰ In 1950 its membership increased to about one-quarter million. This increase came about after its fusion with the former Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Church, after Bishop Gojdič of the Greek Catholic Church was imprisoned and the intimidated council agreed to break the union with the Roman Catholic Church (going back to 1649) and to return to the Orthodox Church. It seems that the main function of the church is to increase Russian cultural influence in Czechoslovakia, especially among the Ukrainian minority living in the northeastern section of the Republic which borders on the Soviet Union. This is indicated by the nomination of Russian-trained metropolitan Jelevjerij for the office of exarch of the Moscow patriarchate at Prague.³¹

The New Religiosity

The final aim of the Communists is to achieve complete secularization of Czechoslovak society and culture. However, they realize that they cannot eradicate religious beliefs at once. Of the older generation, pressure has been exerted only on members of the Communist Party and state employees to leave their religion. The mass of believers is being diverted from religion and churches by participation in the mass organizations which are clearly anti-religious; by deprivation of close contacts with the priests and ministers; by dissolution of lay religious associations; and by anti-religious propaganda spread by newspapers, radio, lectures, etc. In the campaigns, the Society for Propagation of Scientific Knowledge takes the most prominent place. Church attendance has become increasingly difficult, especially in the countryside, where individual intimidation is easier and compulsory Sunday work is more frequent than in the larger urban communities. However, it is said that in the cities participation in religious services is

⁸⁰ Young, op. cit., p. 366.

⁸¹ Gadourek, op. cit.

very strong.⁸² This may be explained on both non-religious and religious grounds. For some people, church-going became a demonstration of opposition to the regime. On the other hand, a polarization of religious sentiments probably took place: some nominal Catholics became practicing members of the Church, others became more definitely secular.

The trend toward secularization affects the young generation much more strongly. Compulsory religious education was abolished. Optional courses in religion are offered to children between the ages of seven and thirteen (obligatory school attendance starts at the age of six and ends at fourteen). At the beginning of each school year parents must personally ask that their child be registered for religious education. Many of them get discouraged or are talked out of their attempt by the principal or his substitute. Religious instruction is heavily censored and closely supervised; its effect is probably neutralized by secular and often anti-religious instruction offered in regular courses. It is forbidden to offer religious instruction outside of schools. Opportunities for higher education and better careers are scarcer for those who keep their faith and observe religious rules.⁸³

It is difficult to estimate how successful this over-all drive against religious sentiments has been, but it seems probable that it made faster progress than in other People's Democracies. Religious indifference prevails, especially among workers and young people.⁸⁴ Wide-spread agnosticism and atheism are not Soviet-imported innovations, but have strong roots in the Czech culture. Only their official endorsement, the privileges they enjoy and the degree of intolerance they demonstrate are new. Religion became salvation primarily for those who have been exposed to political persecution, who were pauperized after the Communists took over, or whose traditional way of life was destroyed by the Communist revolution. Resignation, fatalism, mysticism and traditionalism are the main themes in the creed of the practicing believers.

However, it should be pointed out that religious indifference does

⁸²Heidler, op. cit.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Radio Free Europe interviews with refugees.

not imply agreement with the persecution of the churches. The spirit of toleration prevalent in the first postwar years indicates that the anti-church and anti-religious campaign has been led by a tiny minority only.

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LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Constitution and the Judiciary 1920 - 1948The Constitution of 1920

The Czechoslovak constitution of 1920 was brought into being without the benefit of elections to the National Assembly. This body had been established on the basis of political representation in the Austrian Reichsrat. Representatives from Slovakia were sent after the Declaration of Turčianský Sv. Martin (October 31, 1918).¹ The constitution itself was divided into six main headings. These were: (1) the general provisions of the basis of the state; (2) the section dealing with legislative powers, constitution and competency of both chambers of parliament; (3) governmental and executive powers; (4) judicial powers; (5) human rights and duties of citizens; (6) protection of national, religious and racial minorities.²

Citizenship and the State. The first section declared that all state power resided in the people of the state, who shall express their will in laws. The territory of the state was defined and a special semi-autonomous relationship established for "Carpathian Russia" (Ruthenia). Citizenship was declared uniform throughout the Republic.³

The Legislature. Section two defined the terms and number of the deputies to the Senate (upper house) and the Chamber of Deputies (lower house). In addition, it designated the electorate, the principles, and the day (Sunday) of elections. Parliamentary immunities were set forth for the members and the regular sessions, and provisions for emergency sessions were established. Governmental accountability was confirmed in the right of the representative organs to call to account any minister or committee, and provisions for impeachment of the President were also

¹Malbone W. Graham, "Constitutional Structure," in Robert J. Kerner, (ed.), Czechoslovakia, Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940), p. 109.

²"The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic," International Conciliation (Greenwich, Conn.: American Association for International Conciliation), No. 17 (Oct. 1922), pp. 35-73.

³Fuller details as to citizenship and nationality are found in the Treaty of St. Ermain and in the Human Rights section. Malbone W. Graham, New Governments of Central Europe (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924), p. 295.

outlined. Primacy of legislative power was vested in the lower house. Procedural methods in many instances were duplications of those of the French National Assembly. In addition, rules for the passage of acts and for constitutional revision were established. A strange provision for popular referendum in the case of a government-sponsored bill which was defeated in the legislature was stipulated, but under no conditions could constitutional amendments go to the country.⁴

"It is naturally of the greatest importance to our state that all parliamentary work should take an undisturbed and effective course. Much care has therefore been devoted to the elaboration of rules of procedure."⁵ Dr. Hoetzl in his commentary on the constitution emphasized the importance of stability in governmental processes as a goal. This has caused many to regard the Czech constitution as a conservative one. However, though the Czech government was one of the most stable in Europe, it was equally one of the most representative.⁶

Other unusual features of the document were the provision for a "main committee" to perform custodial functions when the Assembly was not in session,⁷ and the provisions for large quorums for the conduct of legislative affairs.⁸ Graham comments: "So normally did the Czechoslovak Constitution follow the principles of parliamentary procedure that little comment is necessary on the exact regime of legality with which it surrounded legislation."⁹

⁴Graham, op. cit., pp. 294-303; also "The Constitution . . .," op. cit., pp. 411-26.

⁵Jirí Hoetzl. "The Definitive Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic," introduction and commentary in "The Constitution . . .," op. cit., p. 303.

⁶Graham, "Parties and Politics," in Robert J. Kerner (ed.), Czechoslovakia, Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940), p. 137.

⁷Graham, New Governments . . ., "op. cit.", p. 304

⁸Graham, "Constitutional Structure," op. cit., p. 122.

⁹Ibid., p. 123.

Executive and Administrative Provisions. The third section on governmental and executive powers in its first portion dealt with the position of the President much as that post is handled in the French system.¹⁰ The term of President was for seven years, and provision was made for the Vice-President to assume the functions of the executive in case the latter was unable to continue his activities. The President represented the nation abroad, convoked, prorogued and dissolved the Assembly, reported on the state of the Republic to the Assembly, appointed a cabinet, university professors and higher-grade army officers, and signed or vetoed all laws of the central legislature and of the Diet of Ruthenia. He was not legally responsible for the conduct of his officers but was bound to adhere to the principles of his oath and might be impeached.¹¹

There were several broad provisions for local administration. These were, in general, more clearly defined by more detailed civil service codes. However, the assurance that the local administration would abide by the laws and the constitution, and that the people be protected by an independent judiciary, were part of the general provisions in the constitution.¹²

The office of President was held successively by two men of immense prestige, both founders of the Republic, both thoroughly imbued with the principles of democratic government. The office could hardly have given either Masaryk or Beneš^v more prestige than either already possessed, nor could the safeguard of the office be effectively tested. The result of the provisions for the presidency struck a chord somewhere between the ineffectual French office and the strong Weimar magistracy.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 125.

¹¹ "The Constitution . . . , op. cit., pp. 426-43, also Graham, "New Governments . . . , op. cit., pp. 305-307

¹² "The Constitution . . . , op. cit., pp. 434-36.

In effect, the position was one of considerable power but with sufficient provisions to forestall arbitrary abuse.¹³

The Judiciary. The fourth main section was that devoted to the judiciary. Jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters was reserved for civil and public criminal courts. It was provided that special courts could be set up in advance for criminal cases, but they could be only of limited duration. The jurisdiction of military courts could be extended to civilians in time of war only. The independence of the judiciary was emphatically announced and judges were independent and appointed for life.

A Supreme Court was established as the court of final appeal at Prague. Proceedings before law courts were to be public and verbal. Judges had the right to inquire into the validity of a government decree, but in the case of a law they could only inquire as to whether it was properly promulgated.¹⁴

A Constitutional Court was established to determine the agreement of acts with the constitution. This Court had seven members, two appointed by the Supreme Court, two by the Supreme Administrative Court, and three by the President. The Supreme Administrative Court was established to decide on administrative cases affecting the rights of individual citizens, to be sure these were arrived at with due process of law and were in accord with the legal order. A military supreme court was also established.¹⁵

The court system guaranteed the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizen. Cases of civil rights could be appealed before the courts as a last resort and a court could overrule an administrative action. The practice of stare decisis was introduced. The courts were known for their impartiality, which was appreciated both by laymen and lawyers.

¹³Graham, "Constitutional Structure," op. cit., p. 127.

¹⁴"The Constitution. . . .", op. cit., pp. 136-39.

¹⁵Ibid.; also Pavel Korbel, Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Judiciary (New York: Free Europe Press, Feb. 1953), pp. 1-2.

The quality of work was of high caliber, and their judgments were elaborate and exhaustive. Appeal to the courts was relatively inexpensive. The separation of the courts from the administration was effectively maintained, and it was intended that the courts be "the foundation stone of the whole life of the state, the fountain of rights of the citizen."¹⁶

Human Rights and Civil Liberties. The fifth section of the constitution dealt with civil liberties, which included the abolition of all privilege due to sex, birth, or occupation. Ownership of private property was assured and the freedom to dwell anywhere in the Republic guaranteed. A person could be deprived of property only by due process of law and with compensation. Freedom of the press, assembly and association were guaranteed with the proviso that such must not endanger the common good and that assemblages must not block public thoroughfares. The right of association to improve economic conditions of workers was established. Inviolability of conscience and the right to express opinion were set forth. The mails were declared inviolable.¹⁷

Section six dealt with protection of national, religious and racial minorities. It declared all citizens equal before the law. In addition, instruction in schools in the native language was guaranteed and budgetary apportionment was provided for suitable schooling for minorities.¹⁸

As far as civil liberties were concerned, the constitution of 1920 registered a revolution from the old system under Austria-Hungary. Liberty, equality, security and privacy were guaranteed throughout the Republic by a responsible government. In addition, the protection of minorities was assured by the equality registered in the "Language Decree of February 3, 1926".¹⁹

¹⁶ Eduard Táborský, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work (London: George Unwin and Allen, Ltd., 1945), pp. 133-34, 150.

¹⁷ "The Constitution. . . .", op. cit., pp. 439-44.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 445-47.

¹⁹ Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 119-20.

In keeping with the motto of Masaryk, "We must dare the competition of ideas," there was no restriction on publications of any type. Only at one point was there a restriction on educative practice; public education should not conflict with the results of scientific investigation. The new government took its stand on the principles of nineteenth century liberalism, and it was the first "Red-Green" coalition which, in response to its constituency, gave the state its mildly socialistic character in the form of extensive social benefits and guarantees.²⁰

The Transitional Period, September 1938 - May 7, 1948

After the Munich agreement in 1938, the area to which the constitution and the laws applied was considerably narrowed, and after March 1939, when the Protectorate was established, the entire system crumbled. However, an attempt was made to apply the constitution and laws in the embassies and by the government in exile, which was recognized by the major powers after the beginning of the general European war in 1940. Later, Czechoslovak law was recognized as pertaining to the entire pre-Munich area of the state.²¹

The Czechoslovak judiciary at home continued to operate but its competency was reduced. It applied Czech law between Czechs in the historic provinces, but in cases where Germans were involved special German courts were established for criminal and civil proceedings. These courts also handled all cases in which the interests of the Reich were affected.²² In addition, changes were made in the economic system by legislative measures intended to assist the German war effort, and such was the multiplicity of changes made by various authorities that the system of laws was difficult to reduce to order. This called for a great extension

²⁰Graham, "Constitutional Structure," op. cit., p. 132.

²¹Adolf Procházka, Changes in the Philosophy of Czechoslovak Law since the Prague Coup-d'état of February, 1948. (Unpublished Manuscript, Library of Congress microfilm), pp. 8-10.

²²Korbel, op. cit., p. 3.

of administrative rulings and many cases were decided quite arbitrarily.²³

Beneš and his London government assumed the status of the pre-Munich organ of legislative order. During the next few years the London government was concerned with maintaining the position of internal legal continuity. (So far as international law was concerned, the recognition of Czechoslovak statehood by a majority of allied nations was sufficient to sustain its identity within the community of nations.) However, this position was implicitly abandoned when Beneš issued his constitutional decree of December 4, 1944, which promised to create the Provisional National Assembly, thus denying the 1920 constitution. Thus, the so-called "revolutionary conception" of legality gained ascendance over the "conception of continuity." This change was insisted upon by the "Moscovite Czechs."²⁴

The change was formalized in Constitutional Act No. 65 of 1946 (C. L.), which was enacted by the Provisional National Assembly in April. This established the groundwork for the Constituent National Assembly to appoint a committee to draw up a new constitution. (Decree No. 57/1946 [C. L.] had already abandoned the 1920 constitution.)²⁵

The judicial system was re-established, with a notable addition. Special courts of laymen were organized locally under the "Retribution Decree" of June 1945 to punish Nazi sympathizers and traitors.²⁶ These courts were largely organized by local Communists and caused considerable disruption of the established legal norms. Many political adversaries suffered injustices at the hands of these courts, and severe punishments for a wide and ambiguous set of offenses were meted out with no chance of appeal.²⁷

²³J. W. Breugel, "Social Policy in Occupied Czechoslovakia," International Labor Review (Montreal: International Labor Office), LII, No. 2-3, 155.

²⁴Procházka, op. cit., pp. 11-12

²⁵Ibid., pp. 14-15.

²⁶Korbel, op. cit., p. 3.

²⁷Procházka, op. cit., p. 33.

During this period the government was radically altered by the announcement of the "Košice Plan." This official decree not only changed the existing relations and forms of the government, but in addition it re-oriented the entire position of the governing body to that of manager of the national economy. The conception of restoration of seized enemy property (in most cases national enterprise without a claimant) was supplanted by the importance of interim government management.²⁸

The New Constitution

The committee established by the Constituent National Assembly was given a deadline of two years to produce a fundamental document for the state. This committee was not able to resolve its differences until after the coup d'état. Dr. Vladimír Procházka, the Communist rapporteur of the committee, explained that "the problem of a new constitution is by far not limited to technical legislative issues; it is mostly and above all a political problem."²⁹ After the coup the National Front was replaced by the bogus coalition under Communist control and the committee met the deadline. The new constitution was passed by the Assembly May 9, 1948.³⁰

Citizenship and the State. The new constitution, of course, makes no provision for Ruthenia, since this is now part of the U.S.S.R. However, special provisions are suggested for Slovakia in that Czechoslovakia is described as a "unitary state of two slav nations possessing equal rights, the Czechs and Slovaks."³¹ Other than this qualification, the voting rights and the concept of popular sovereignty appear as in 1920.³²

The Legislature. The central representative body, the National Assembly, is modeled on the 1920 Czech parliament. It is even called by the same name. The upper house, however, has been eliminated. The

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 39-41.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁰ Samuel L. Sharp, New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere (Washington, D. C.: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1950), p. 4.

³¹ Ibid., p. 53.

³² Comparison has been made of the texts of the new constitution in Sharp, op. cit., and "The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic," op. cit., with the 1920 constitution.

powers delegated the Assembly, those of making war, electing a president, and so on, have been left almost intact. The important change is in the power of the Presidium, which is assumed to take the place of the former "main committee" (interim). Actually, it takes the place of the Assembly itself. Its powers are greatly extended and they include the new province of judicial review. The Presidium is quite obviously made in its Soviet image.³³

Executive and Administrative Provisions. The statement of the powers of the President has been virtually lifted from the 1920 constitution with very little change in wording. The oath is, of course, modified to include the "spirit of the People's Democratic Order." The government is still responsible to the legislature as in the 1920 instrument, and makes its decisions in council.

The major difference in this section is that local administration in the form of the National Committees is spelled out in some detail. This was left to subsequent acts by the 1920 constitution.

The Judiciary. Most of the provision follows the wording of 1920; however, there are several striking changes. The Constitutional Court has been dropped from the list of superior courts and lay judges were introduced which were to be appointed by the local administrative branch. Judges are ordered to interpret the law in the "light of the constitution and of the principles of the People's Democratic Order."

Human Rights and Civil Liberties. Human rights are set down in some detail. However, much of this was previously embodied in the legislation of the "First Republic." Many of the provisions deal with the right and duty to work, with some stipulations about fair remuneration. Certain limitations on assembly, domicile, and use of property are stipulated and the abuse of any rights is usually punishable by law. The device of using "public interest" as an escape clause is evident in this connection. In addition, citizens are required to carry out their civic functions "in the spirit of the People's Democratic order." The great

³³H. Gordon Skilling, "The Czech Constitutional System: The Soviet Impact," Political Science Quarterly, LXVII, No. 2 (June 1952), 210.

detail in these provisions and their economic implications are distinctive. The lack of judicial review in the protection of such guarantees and the open-endedness ("according to law," "as prescribed by act," etc.) of almost all have rendered all except the "duty to work" of little value.

Economic Provisions. These provisions are quite extensive (twenty-five in all) and pertain to virtually all types of property in the state. Property relationships are defined in three broad categories: (1) socialized industry, raw materials, and cooperatives in care of local property (presumably of minor value); (2) personal property; (3) agricultural property. Nothing like these economic provisions is found in the 1920 constitution.

Article XII, section two, states: "The entire national economy of the Czechoslovak Republic shall serve the People. In this public interest the State directs all economic activity by a Uniform Economic Plan." Thus the concept of "the Plan" is introduced in the constitution. It is quite obvious to what abuses this provision can lead in a one-party state. Section 153 declares that the sectors of the economy to be nationalized shall be "prescribed by Act;" part two of this section further asserts that the extent of nationalization carried out under Nationalization Acts cannot be restricted. The provisions on economic affairs clearly envision extensive nationalization of the economy.

The provisions concerning private property are very meager. Private enterprise is guaranteed if it employs less than fifty persons. This regulation has been rendered meaningless through systematic violation. Personal property, houses, household utensils and savings derived from labor are considered inviolable. The monetary reform nullified this guarantee. Other provisions state that private ownership may be restricted by law and that private monopoly organizations operating for profit are prohibited. These provisions are vague enough to be useful in stamping out private enterprise.

The limit of holdings in agricultural land is fifty hectares (123.5 acres). Article XII, section one, says that the ownership of the land shall be in accordance with the principle, "the land belongs to those who

till it."³⁴

Two Constitutions Compared

The preambles to the constitutions, when compared, bare the essential differences in the philosophy which inspired the documents. That of 1920 declares in favor of the general good, with no specific program except a faith that the individual in serving himself will in the end be of service to the state. The constitution of 1948 insists on a definite program of socialization, asserting that this is the "people's will" and that it shall be carried out. The 1920 declaration runs:

We, the Czechoslovak Nation, in order to form a more perfect union of the nation, establish justice and order in the Republic, insure tranquil development of the Czechoslovak homeland, promote the general welfare of all citizens of this state and secure the blessings of liberty to future generations have adopted in our National Assembly on the 29th day of February, 1920, a constitution . . . (etc.)³⁵

That of 1948 declares:

We have now decided that our liberated State shall be a national state rid of all hostile elements, living in neighborly fashion with the family of Slav States and in friendship with all peace-loving nations of the world. We wish it to be a Peoples Democratic State We wish it to be a State in which the entire economy shall serve the people and be so directed that the general prosperity shall grow, that there should be no economic crises and that the national income shall be justly distributed. By this path we wish to attain to a social order in which the exploitation of many by man shall be completely abolished to socialism.³⁶

Dr. Václav Beneš³⁷ declares that from the political point of view the most important provisions of the constitution are to be sought in this

³⁴Branko M. Pešelj, "Legal Trends in the People's Democracies" (New York: Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1954), p. 23; reprinted from 22 George Washington Law Review, 513.

³⁵Graham, New Governments. . . ., op. cit., pp. 292-93.

³⁶Skilling, op cit., p. 202.

³⁷Václav Beneš, "The New Legal System of Czechoslovakia," Journal of Central European Affairs, XII, No. 3 (Oct. 1952), 222.

introductory declaration which transforms the whole instrument. Communist constitutions are regarded as milestones on the road to socialism, but they may be documents presaging the absorption of the People's Democracies into the Soviet Union.³⁸ As early as April 1952, Oldřich John and Jan Bartuška criticized the constitution as obsolete and suggested that Gottwald initiate the work of drafting a new constitution as had Bierut in Poland. Their main argument was that the Soviet Union wanted the constitution of the People's Democracies to be uniform.³⁹

Ideological Foundations and Implications of the "People's Justice"

Perhaps the most fruitful method of investigation of the problem is the analysis of the principles of law as it pertained to the Soviet state in its period of advancement to socialism, i. e., in its period before the arrival at a classless society and complete socialization of the means of production (1936). The Soviet jurist would be quick to inform the unwary that the class struggle has not ended.⁴⁰ However, the Soviets felt safe enough in 1936 that they could guarantee equality of persons before the law. Prior to this time intentional inequality had prevailed. This period was the period of "dictatorship of the proletariat," the transitional stage to socialism which is necessary for all satellite countries, also.⁴¹

The state, according to the orthodox, arises from the productive relationships in society and in the mechanism used by the owners of production goods (capitalists) to exploit the workers. Law arises as an attempt to legitimize the property advantages of the few and translate them into a permanent power disposition. The major complaint of the Marxist against "bourgeois law" is that it does not represent the will of the workers and that there is no possibility of change since parliaments are

³⁸News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 5 (May 1952), 11-12.

³⁹Ibid., No. 4 (April 1952), p. 12

⁴⁰Stalin insists that the class struggle takes another form but intensity continues. See Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State. (New York: Macmillan 1948), p. 39.

⁴¹An excellent statement of the Soviet theory of the "People's Democracy" is H. Gordon Skilling, "The 'People's Democracy' in Soviet Theory," Soviet Studies, IV, No. 1 (July 1951) 16-33; No. 2 (Oct. 1951) 131-49.

invariably loyal to their own class.⁴²

When the workers seize power and smash the state machinery and the accompanying power relationships, they require a new law to define the new power distribution.⁴³ It must protect the gains in the revolution, the new social system, the rules of socialist life, and above all the new socialist property. In addition, it is to serve as a weapon to crush all elements still hostile to socialism.⁴⁴ Vyshinsky describes the "People's Law"⁴⁵ as the embodiment of the will of the proletariat established by state authority⁴⁶ and continues to assert that in the first phase of communism (dictatorship of the proletariat) there are no equal rights, no equality before the law; that it is unequal law.⁴⁷

The peculiarities of this legal system are (1) that it cannot be viewed outside its social context, which necessarily defines its function; and (2) that since by definition the period of application is a transitory one, the law is flexible and ambiguous.⁴⁸ The first of these peculiarities, the organic connection with the social milieu leads to the function of suppression of capitalists, kulaks, and other bourgeois elements, thus fulfilling its function in the establishment of the classless society. The second peculiarity leads to loosely worded, ambiguous statutes which leave much to interpretation and are designed to punish all actions inimical or persons unfriendly to the People's Democracy.⁴⁹ In addition, this feature also contributes to the vast number of regulations which seek to define a changing society and a rapidly expanding domain of public law. In Czechoslovakia in the period 1948-1952 over one thousand laws and decrees were

⁴²Vyshinsky, op. cit., pp. 1-86.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 38, 47.

⁴⁴Beneš, op. cit., p. 218.

⁴⁵This term is attributable to Branko M. Pešelj, op. cit., p. 7.

⁴⁶Vyshinsky, op. cit., p. 51.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 52.

⁴⁸Pešelj, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

⁴⁹Gadourek, Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden:Stenfert-Kroese, 1953), p. 61.

were promulgated.⁵⁰

Judicial Institutions

The Courts

The court system remained substantially the same after the coup until December, 1948. There was one significant addition, however, in March of that year. The "Retribution Decree," which had expired, and the corresponding measure of the Slovak National Council were revived, "people's courts" were established, and the Party systematically eliminated many of its bourgeois opponents.⁵¹

The economic and social plans of the Communist Party were extensive, and a change in the judiciary was necessary to implement such programs. In December 1948 an act was passed which reorganized the entire court system. District and regional courts were established and a Supreme Court was set up for the entire state. The district courts took their decisions in collegia with one professional judge and two lay judges with equal power, chosen from the people as assessors.

The regional courts, when acting as courts of the first instance, sit in three-man groups, two lay and one professional judge. When acting in an appellate capacity they sit in five-man senates, three lay and two professional judges presiding in a body.

Under the new act the Supreme Court is enabled to handle appeals from the regional courts only and is to supervise their work. The institutions of the superior courts was abolished. Only one appeal is allowed, thus restricting the case from going higher than the next highest level.

The jurisdiction of the administrative court which supplanted the Supreme Administrative Court of the Republic was undefined in the constitution. Its function became increasingly unnecessary and it was abolished.

⁵⁰Pešelj, op. cit., pp. 10-16. Pešelj characterizes the first peculiarity as "consistent inconsistency" and shows its use by Lenin during the NEP (p. 11). He indicates the stable factor in this to be the political factor; the unstable, the means through which the first is assured, i. e., tactics, of which means law certainly is a part and has its distinct function.

⁵¹Korbel, op. cit., p. 5.

in 1952. The Constitutional Court was, of course, never established. The extension of jurisdiction of military courts was almost guaranteed by its provisions in the constitution. Instead of being able to extend its activities to civilians only in time of war, it was permitted to deal with them in "time of increased danger to the state."⁵²

The changes introduced after the passage of three acts in October 1952 further altered the structure of the courts. The military courts were given the power to act in all cases which "endanger important interests of the defense of the motherland." The Court Organization Act No. 66/1952 (C. L.) defines the tasks of the courts as protecting

a) the social order and the state machinery of the Republic, her Socialist buildings and Socialist property, b) the personal, work and property rights and the interests of the citizens, which are safeguarded by law, c) the rights and the interests safeguarded by law of the Socialist corporate bodies and other social organizations.

In addition, the educative function of the courts is stressed.⁵³

The Supreme Court sits in three-man senates chosen from a collegium of jurists. It presides over civil and criminal offences and, in addition, has a military collegium. It is especially directed to watch over courts of the first instance and assure uniformity in their proceedings. A plenum of the court may issue directives to the lower courts on correct legal interpretation. A plenum is composed of two-thirds of the civilian and military collegia, and the attendance of the Procurator-General is compulsory.

Many former court activities have been annexed by the "peoples administration;" that is, local National Committees, which are the Communist-dominated organs of local administration, have been entrusted with

⁵²Korbel regards this as one of the major innovations in the court system. Korbel, op. cit., p. 5.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 13-14.

many of the cases which do not interest the state. These so-called "People's Committees," which are the agents of local administrative justice, are empowered to impose a penalty of correctional labor without confinement, public reprimand, and a fine not exceeding 3,000 crowns. Officers of People's Committees are competent to deal individually with cases of less importance. Cases too serious for the Committees are referred to the district procurator for further treatment.⁵⁴

State Procurator

The procurator's office is one of the most important controls of the courts that the state employs. The Procurator-General, according to the code of 1948, was to watch over the observance of law by civil courts. The office is organized into regional and district procurator's offices. The Procurator-General is appointed by the President of the Republic and is subject to recall. He is accountable to the cabinet. The procurator's office appoints the regional and district procurators and a military procurator in agreement with the Ministry of Defense.

This office is the instrument of public prosecution and is endowed with enormous powers. The Procurator-General

watches over, carries through and strengthens Socialist legality, and in doing so protects above all the social order and the State machinery of the Republic and its Socialist buildings, Socialist Property (ownership), as well as the interests of the working population against enemies and other wreckers of its up-building effort . . . [He] protects the fighting ability of the armed forces and the discipline and order stipulated for them, he strengthens the authority of the commanders and contributes toward the safeguarding of the defense of the motherland, . . . (he) educates the citizens in the observance of the laws, other legal regulations and rules of Socialist common life and in the fulfillment of civic obligations.⁵⁵

To implement these broad powers, the Procurator is entitled to intervene in any civil court proceeding if he holds that it is in the interests

⁵⁴Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe (New York: Mid-European Studies Center) II, No. 6 (June 1, 1954), 162-64.

⁵⁵Translation of Act No. 65/1952(C. L.) in Korbel, op. cit., p. 72.

of the state. He may step in at any point, remand any decisions, may appeal from any judgment or final decisions, and withdraw any case in any stage to the Supreme Court or in certain instances another court of a different level for a decision. The Procurator-General exercises supreme discipline over all procurators of lower levels. The strength of government control over the courts is dependent to a certain extent upon the power of this highly centralized office. Perhaps here more than anywhere else the structural unity of the "people's power" (as opposed to the western concept of separation of powers) is outlined.⁵⁶

Judges

The introduction of laymen as judges is one of the most startling changes in the constitution. These judges ("People's Judges") always outnumber the professional judges in the lower courts. The professional judges are appointed by the government and may be transferred. These People's Judges, who are presumably some day to be elected, are at the present time chosen by the regional or district National Committees. Since all judges are thus appointed by the government, they are under direct control of the Party.

The Party controls its judges in other ways. The judge, before rendering a verdict, must consult with the Minister of Justice, and the People's Judges are in close contact with Party headquarters, since in reality they are appointed by it. There were some 40,000 of these People's Judges recruited for service by 1951. Of this number, 54 per cent were workers and 15 per cent peasants. The percentage of women has risen from 9.7 per cent in 1949 to 26.0 per cent in 1951 in Slovakia from 5.4 per cent to 20.0 per cent.⁵⁷ The women judges were especially praised for their work by Minister of Justice Rais in 1952.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Korbel, op. cit.; also Beneš, op. cit., p. 226.

⁵⁷Gadourek, op. cit., p. 63.

⁵⁸Korbel, op. cit., p. 20.

The Party is able to control the courts further through forcing the judiciary to use Marxist-Leninist principles in the interpretation of legislation. This is facilitated through a reorganized law study program in the universities. Every candidate is examined on his political awareness, and those that are admitted are screened every few weeks by having to attend and participate in regular discussion groups in which their behavior can be checked.⁵⁹ Dr. Rais stated in 1951,

. . . . there is hardly a case, be it penal or civil, which does not require that the judge apply the political viewpoint in its solution. It is not sufficient for the judge to be familiar with the provisions of the law and its sanctions; it is necessary for him to be familiar with its substance and functions, particularly with its political meaning and significance. . . .⁶⁰

The most obvious control of the judiciary is that of dismissal and punishment. In the first days after the coup thousands of court personnel were dismissed. Many of these were directed to labor camps or factories. Political reliability, especially loyalty to the People's Democracy, has become the most important of desiderata in the appointment of all judges.⁶¹ In order to achieve this purpose the Party has made a painful effort to give some legal training to its reliables.⁶² The primacy of importance of political reliability over professional ability is patent.

Another minor change took place in 1950. The investigative magistrate who formerly conducted pre-trial interrogations was dropped and his function delegated to the organs of national security. In addition, the time limit for such pre-trial investigations was lifted and any limitation was made subject to the procurator. The results are shown in the maltreatment of prisoners during preliminary proceedings.⁶³

⁵⁹Gadourek, op. cit., p. 63.

⁶⁰News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Feb. 1-15, 1951, p. 11.

⁶¹Beneš, op. cit., p. 226.

⁶²Gadourek, op. cit., p. 63.

⁶³Ibid., p. 61.

Lawyers

At the National Conference of Czech attorneys held in Prague, Minister of Justice Rais made a speech on the tasks of lawyers. He contrasted administrative improvements with ideological shortcomings and called for a "spiritual reorganization" throughout the profession. He was quoted in Rudé Právo as follows:

The attorney must not always try to get his client acquitted. He must defend his client in accordance with the interests of society. (To do this) he must abandon all tricks, evasions and pretensions and try honestly to reveal the truth and see that justice is done He must protect the Socialist life instead of damaging it and not blindly defend the egotistic interests of his client It is essential that (lawyers) know Marxist-Leninist teachings. . . . and are firmly grounded in Soviet legal science, the only correct and true world science. It is essential that they systematically apply Soviet experience.⁶⁴

The lawyers were thoroughly "sifted" after the coup. About five-hundred were refused membership in the "National Association of Lawyers" (government sponsored professional organization), which is tantamount to being disbarred. In Prague alone two hundred fifty lawyers were "liquidated" within a single month.⁶⁵ "The practice of lawyers has ceased to be a liberal profession and is subject to strict control of the Ministry of Justice, and assimilated to an administrative branch of the government."⁶⁶

The state controls regional lawyers' associations, which are run on a cooperative basis with a central organ at the top. Lawyers are paid by the state and are forbidden to charge fees. Legal advisory offices are established which merged the private offices of from ten to two hundred advocates. According to an exiled Czech lawyer, it is difficult for the advocates to get used to the idea of not defending their clients.⁶⁷

The outstanding changes in the position of Czechoslovak lawyers

⁶⁴Rudé Právo, June 12, 1952. In News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 8 (Aug. 1952), 14.

⁶⁵Gadourek, op. cit., p. 62.

⁶⁶Beneš, op. cit., p. 227; and Jaroslav Mayda, "Lawyers Under Communism," American Bar Association Journal, XL (1954), January, p. 39.

⁶⁷News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 8 (Aug. 1952), 14-15.

are (1) that they are no longer free agents but government employees; (2) it is their duty to search for the "material truth" in cases and not defend their clients; (3) they are organized into collegia which are sponsored by the regime; (4) they are paid by the government, not by their clients.⁶⁸

Characteristics of Legislation

Function of Law

This topic has already been discussed briefly under another heading. Generally, legislation is designed to further the plans of the Party. Since the basis of law is the relationships of individuals in the production process (economic relations) but since this economic basis is not economics in general but in a particular stage of its development, the basis of law (described as a superstructure built over the material foundation of life) is continually shifting.⁶⁹ Thus, the Party has not attempted to formulate a "special, entirely independent, legal theory corresponding to the peculiar characteristics of their social development." However, it is apparent that with the increasing spheres of legislation of public law and the extension of the criminal code the government intended broadly to perform two tasks: (1) to express the changed circumstances of social and economic life, to facilitate further changes, and to create a favorable climate for the planned economy; and (2) to defend the regime against resistance, both violent and passive, from within.⁷⁰

To secure the first goal, laws concerning extensive social insurance, regulation of banks, the law on joint-stock companies, the law on the organization of housing ownership and on housing, the statute on national industrial enterprise and so, including laws regarding agricultural production such as the laws on the "Amelioration of Plant and Animal Production,"

⁶⁸ Pešelj, op. cit., p. 40

⁶⁹ Václav Vaněček, "Discussion sur l'Importance des Articles de Staline, Relatifs au Marxisme dans la Linguistique, pour la Science Tchécoslovaque du Droit," Bulletin de Droit Tchécoslovaque, No. 3-4 (Oct. 1, 1951), p. 289.

⁷⁰ Benes, op. cit., pp. 224-25

were passed.⁷¹ In addition, the first Five-Year Plan (adopted Oct. 23, 1948) was also passed as law. Thus, with much of life regulated by statute, most cases which in western countries would be regulated by civil law were now considered crimes against the public order or public (socialist) property. These were handled under the criminal code and are prosecuted by the state.

The second task, the defense of the regime, is largely carried out by the administration of the criminal code by the courts. The largest part of this code deals with the defense of the state and the economic order. Thus, the former Minister of Justice, Alexej Cepička, in a discussion on the mission of law emphasized especially the ruthless struggle against all disruptive and reactionary activities, and the necessity of suppressing all kinds of economic sabotage and attempts to disturb the socialist elements of the national economy, or damage of state property. In addition, he also discussed the struggle against the whispering campaign and efforts to fulfill "the Plan."⁷² Section one of the criminal code is striking in this respect, in that it stipulates that "The aim of Criminal Law is the protection of the People's Democratic Republic of its social development, of the working class, and of the individual, as well as education in keeping with the rules of Socialist cooperation."⁷³ The possibility of delicts being tried as endangering processes of sufficient importance to state security by the military courts is indicated by the following:

whether shortcomings appear; wherever spring field work is not finished on time, or delivery obligations are not met, wherever the Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives are not performing their tasks, there must certainly be someone still attempting sabotage.⁷⁴

⁷¹Valer Fábry, "Les lois sur l'amélioration de la production animale et végétale," Bulletin de droit tchécoslovaque, No. 3-4 (Oct. 1, 1951), pp. 262-70.

⁷²Beneš, op. cit., pp. 224-25.

⁷³Ibid., p. 230.

⁷⁴Rudé Právo, March 28, 1952.

Qualities of Legislation

Legislation in Czechoslovakia is unequal as to treatment of parties,⁷⁵ ambiguous, and flexible. These characteristics have already been mentioned. The law is partial law, and "socialist objectivity" is required in many instances to determine whether the punishment of a malefactor would be more harmful to society than his acquittal. Nationalized property receives more protection than private property. Political objectives are obvious in the wording of the Penal Code, which states that lawsuits may be withdrawn "if the accused person is leading further a good life, if he or she does an important economic job or if the interest of society bids that he should not be punished."⁷⁶ This leaves considerable room for exceptional treatment of Communist affiliates and Party members. In addition, Czechoslovak amnesty denies amnesty for political offenses (such as offenses against the Law of Peace, etc.).⁷⁷

The vagueness and flexibility are apparent in Section 3, Chapter 2 of the Penal Code. This section defines "culpability" in the following terms: (1) The result as specified in the law is caused intentionally if the offender (a) wished to cause it, or (b) knew that he could cause it, and in the event of causing it accepted the result. (2) The result as specified in the law is caused through negligence if the offender (a) knew that he could cause it, but without adequate reason depended on not causing it, or (b) did not know that he could cause it although, considering the circumstances and his personal situation, he could have known it.

⁷⁵Dr. Verich, on reporting the new Penal Code to the National Assembly, said: "We know from the words of Lenin that dictatorship of the proletariat means to go on with the class struggle in its new forms; in this struggle we shall be assisted by the new Penal Code which is actually a class-law." Gadourek, op. cit., p. 66.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 65-66

⁷⁷Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe, II, No. 2 (Jan. 1, 1954), 16.

Another primary example of ambiguity is the "Defense of the Peace Act" passed in December 1950. The Act declares:

1. Any person trying to disturb the peaceful life of nations by stirring up a sort of propaganda pertaining to war or by some means supporting such a propaganda is guilty of a crime against the peace.
2. The offender will be punished by imprisonment lasting one to ten years; the offender will be punished by imprisonment lasting ten to twenty years if he or she committed a crime described under (1): a. as a member of an association; b. in a greater extent; c. if there are some other aggravating circumstances.⁷⁸

Such ordinances leave considerable latitude for interpretation by the highly partial judiciary and for a wide range of punishments, which is just what is intended.

Other characteristics of legislation are the vast extension of public domain at the expense of the private sector, the draconic punishments permissible,⁷⁹ and the confusion of having several laws on the same issue in conflict, or in conflict with the constitution, without repealing a statute or amending the constitution.⁸⁰

The Trial

Function of the Trial

The objectives of the courts have been defined in many ways: to eliminate kulaks, to enforce labor discipline, to convict Western capitalist agents, to promote collectivization, and so on. Actually, these objectives correspond to the propaganda needs of the Party at the moment. Štefan Rais adjured judges to be constantly aware that they are under control of the people and that "he (the judge) must do his utmost that the trials have an overwhelming educational effect upon the participants as well as upon the public to educate citizens to preserve the laws, and fight against all

⁷⁸Rudé Právo, Dec. 21, 1950, p. 1.

⁷⁹Korbel, op. cit., p. 7.

⁸⁰The January 1953 issue of Zdravý Národ (Bratislava) demanded that the peoples judges must see to it that "harsh verdicts are imposed." Thus, the blame is not entirely legislative.

capitalist survivals in the minds of men"⁸¹

Often the actual guilt of accused people is not established, but the "objective circumstances" of his socio-economic status is sufficient for conviction. People found guilty of minor offenses are tried for other crimes. These trials follow political rather than judicial goals, and the Party calculates in advance the effect of their staging. The political aspects of these trials is apparent from the cycles which appear to control them. For months there are trials of kulaks publicized in the papers, then these cease altogether and their place is taken by "agents of the Vatican," "agents of the West in the coal mines, or some other publicity stunt."⁸²

Coinciding with the anti-United States campaign of late 1951 which occupied the satellite press, Rudé Právo reported on the trial of eight men for spying on industry, organizing terrorist activities and being agents of the C. I. C. Three received life sentences, five the death penalty.⁸³

In June 1952 several mass trials were staged concurrently with the drive for collectivization. The defendants in one were convicted for following a former gang of estate owners, supporting the International Peasant Union and the Central Europe Federation, and in conjunction with the "Green International" trying to sabotage agriculture by setting a bad example. The two leaders received death sentences, the rest, terms ranging from seven to twenty-five years.⁸⁴ On July 16 the Deputy General Procurator said that the struggle against the rich peasants was being intensified and that the major task of the law courts was to discover and expel rich peasants from their positions.

In November 1952 large trials were staged in Ostrava. Mining technicians and engineers charged with neglect of safety methods, en-

⁸¹Rudé Právo, Jan. 28, 1951.

⁸²Gadóurek, op. cit., p. 66.

⁸³News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 1.

⁸⁴Ibid., I, No. 9 (Sept. 1952), 3.

couraging inefficient work, and an irresponsible system of rewards, were tried. Almost simultaneously a group of Slovak miners were tried for passive resistance (imputed because they failed to meet their norms) and absenteeism. This was in connection with the coal shortage which was beginning to face the country with winter coming on.⁸⁵

Thus, the educative function of the trial appears to be not so much designed to inform as to influence by intimidation. In addition there are countless propaganda trials designed for external and internal consumption, such as the innumerable trials of "American agents," of "ex-Nazis" (in connection with West German rearmament) and of kulaks accused of belonging to the International Peasant Union (which was meeting in Washington simultaneously).

Significant Roles

In the more important trials the procedure and decisions have already been determined by the Party. The aim of the entire procedure is speed and precision. The important Slánský trial, for example, which sent eleven men to the gallows, took exactly a week. In this instance the trial was prepared by the police.⁸⁶ However, the majority of proceedings are prejudged in the office of the Procurator.

The Judge. The role of the bench is to conduct a speedy and consistent trial and to see to it that the proceedings provide educative material for the gallery and the press. It has been noted that harsh punishments are recommended as part of this function. The bench has been known to join the general censuring of the defendant. They must make sure that the law is pronounced with its proper ideological implication.

The Prosecution. The prosecution must, of course, defend the state's property and economic interests. He is expected to educate the toilers, protect their interests, and protect the security of the state. His job is to unify the charges against the defendant and level such charges as

⁸⁵ Ibid., I, No. 11 (Nov. 1952), 7.

⁸⁶ Korbelt, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

are required by the Party, with the proper ideological orientation. His conduct at trials often degenerates into a general political diatribe and he is permitted to shame and revile the defendant to any degree deemed profitable.

The Defense. The attorney for the defense is required to search out the truth and disregard the egotistic interests of his client. In the Slánský trials the counsels for the defense emphasized that the court had proved the guilt of the defendant beyond question and that the accused were guilty "in every respect." In many instances they will admit all charges and merely state extenuating circumstances such as the temptations of the capitalist camps or the insufficient political training of the client. The defense often joins the general vituperation against his own charge.

The Defendant. His procedure is usually to admit his guilt and plead his own shortcomings as defense. Currently he is prepared for this role by the pre-trial examination of the police. He is permitted a "final statement" in which he abjectly criticizes himself. In the Slánský trial the defendants pleaded guilty to such a preposterous list of indictments that the public thought they had been drugged and much of the domestic propaganda effect was lost.

The Gallery. Admission to trials is generally allowed to a special, reliable group. These are usually shockworkers and other Party reliables who participate in the proceedings by vociferously expressing outrage or indignation at the appointed moments. They represent full public support of the prosecution and general condemnation of the accused.

In addition to public trials, there are private police hearings which generally amount to attempts to extort information. Many of those who disappear are presumed to suffer the fate of such hearings and never come to trial at all, or are held for such times as their exhibition in a public spectacle will be of some benefit. It is presumed that many are dispatched in one way or another without even the formality of a private hearing.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1918 TO THE COUP D' ETAT

Political Forces in Independent Czechoslovakia, 1918-1939

The First Czechoslovak Republic was born out of the collapse of the double kingdom of Austria-Hungary in World War I. The dynamic Thomas G. Masaryk had managed to organize an army in the field against the Central Powers and inspired enthusiasm for Czech autonomy both in England and America. Thus Czechoslovakia was recognized as a co-belligerent by France, England, and the United States before the end of the war, and afterwards it won a place at the peace conferences. The leading figures in Czech society convened and selected Masaryk as the only possible president of the Republic.

Masaryk and the First Republic

Several elements combined to make Masaryk the political leader of his country. Son of a village coachman, he learned to understand the countryside in his youth. Later, during his school years, he became familiar with the Czech urban strata and their struggle for a national renaissance. Through studies and travel abroad, he acquired a detached and critical attitude toward narrow-minded provincialism. He understood the psychology of his people; he participated in their spiritual existence intensively and had saturated himself with Czech history and culture. His numerous works on Czech history and his awareness of the importance of great Czech literary, artistic and political leaders of the past, such as Havlíček and Palacký, made him a climax figure of the Czech national revival. In his prewar years as statesman and educator he had established himself as the leading Czech intellectual, but also as a man of independent thought attached permanently to no party. He continually inveighed against theories like Pan-Slavism which he considered romantic and unfounded. He intended to make Czechoslovakia conscious of her own national traditions, not in an archaistic or nationalistic way, but actively, with the intention of perpetuating and perfecting the national character and institutions.

Masaryk also was a cosmopolitan who was familiar with contemporary societies in Europe, Russia, and America. His activities in organizing

Czech resistance and speaking for the country in international circles made him the symbol of national leadership around whom public opinion gravitated. He thus succeeded in organizing and unifying Czech national consciousness and political activity during the war.

Masaryk described himself to Čapek as a politician who advocated Jesus, not Caesar.¹ His powers of sociological analysis enabled him to see what the people and society required for the permanent establishment of a democratic state. He thought initially that a firm hand would be necessary for the first few years of the Republic and was somewhat disappointed with his constitutional prerogatives, but his power extended far beyond his statutory confines. He was able to make his influence felt through the press, in which he had an interest, and by his policy notes to his ministers.

Masaryk's policies of moderation on racial and religious issues characterized the Republic. His entire attitude, which he labeled "realism", was based on a faith that man, given the proper education and incentives, will abandon political dishonesty and authoritarian policies and work for democracy. He was aware that some political corruption existed, but he was fully confident that the wicked politician was a short-sighted man and that the good man would eventually supervene.

Neither Russia nor Marxism attracted Masaryk. He was disenchanted with Bolshevism when he observed at first hand the senseless slaughtering of the Revolution. His feeling about Pan-Slavism was that it was regressive, that Russia's history showed a progressive gravitation toward the West and that to assert the contrary was historically unjustifiable. His contempt for Communism as a theory stemmed from the intellectual's indignation at any dogma which claimed the sole possession of truth. As a democrat he was aware that such assertions could only be uniformly accepted by the application of violence.

¹Karel Čapek, Masaryk on Thought and Life (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938).

Masaryk enjoyed tremendous prestige among his countrymen. As the son of a Slovak coachman, a serf, he embodied the Horatio Alger legend. The significance of his life and philosophy was so immense that the Gottwald government felt obliged to besmirch this memory and/or eradicate it.² The effort has not been very successful, however, and today his books, although no longer published in Czechoslovakia, enjoy a tremendous popularity.

Government and Opposition Parties

The first year of the new state was marked by a nationalist reaction to old political forms and to the now prostrate members of the Central Powers. The National Democrats of Kramář[✓] opposed Beneš[✓] and the League of Nations and fostered some Fascist circles in the army, but after the first surge of reaction this party became progressively weaker. In the postwar period there was no difficulty in forming a governing coalition, most of the parties were agreed on basic issues.

After the elections of 1920, which returned a Socialist plurality, the government carried out extensive programs of educational, health, fiscal, and land reforms. The governing coalition of five parties, called the "Pětka,"[✓] was formed of the Social Democrats, the National Socialists, the Agrarians, the Populists, and the National Democrats. The Social Democrats were Marxists but looked to the international Socialists at Amsterdam for guidance. The Agrarians, which became the largest single party after the Communist split from the Social Democrats in 1920, held the premiership from 1922 to 1938. It was composed of Czechs and Slovaks combined and held the real power in Slovakia under Hodža. It had no ideological basis but stood merely for the protection of agrarian

²Soviet Affairs, Notes (Washington, D. C.) June 11, 1953.

interests. The Czech National Socialists were the party of Benes and advocated a mild form of humanistic socialism. The Populist Party (Catholic), founded before the war, worked for closer Church and government cooperation. The Populists were the only one of the major parties unable to reconcile their Slovak equivalent. The National Democrats of Kramar were unimportant after the first few years of national reaction.

Table 1
REPRESENTATIVES OF CZECHOSLOVAK PARTIES
IN PARLIAMENT, 1919-1935*

	<u>April 1920</u>	<u>Nov. 1925</u>	<u>Oct. 1929</u>	<u>May 1935</u>
Agrarian	40	46	46	45
Social Democrat	74	29	39	38
Czech Socialist	24	28	32	28
Progressive Socialist	3	--	--	--
National Democrat	19	13	15	17
National Union	--	--	3	--
Tradesmen	6	13	12	17
Czechoslovak Catholic	21	31	25	22
Slovak Catholic	12	23	19	22
Fascist	--	--	--	6
Communist	--	41	30	30
	<u>199</u>	<u>224</u>	<u>221</u>	<u>225</u>

* Joseph S. Roucek (ed.), Slovanic Encyclopedia (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 1006.

The "Petka" was the ruling coalition of Czechs and Slovaks. These parties were satisfied generally with the state and preferred to operate within its constitutional limits. However, there were important obstructionist elements, based largely on ethnic groups within the territory of Czechoslovakia, and two extremist ideological parties. These extremist groups were not important. One, a small group of Fascists, emerged during the depression and in 1935 elected six representatives to the Assembly. The Communists were to a large extent a vehicle of ethnic minority discontent, but after 1935 the Party became one of the most aggressive proponents of Czech nationalism, temporarily forgetting about its ideology

and forming a united front with the Socialists.³

The Magyar parties were numerically inconsequential, and their programs became progressively milder as they compared life in the Republic with that in semi-feudal Hungary. The Slovak Populists (Catholic), under the leadership of Msgr. Hlinka, were in almost continual opposition to the government except for a short period from 1927 to 1929, when the party participated in the government under the leadership of Father Tiso. The conviction of Tuka, a Slovak deputy, of irridentist activities in favor of Hungary and the increasing demands for Slovak autonomy caused the party to lose favor with its own electorate.⁴

TABLE 2
REPRESENTATION OF NATIONAL GROUPS, 1920-1939*

	1920	1925	1929	1935	Proportions of Deputies	Population
Czechoslovaks	199	207	208	206	68.66	66.9
Germans	73	75	73	72	24.00	22.3
Hungarians	9	10	8	10	3.33	4.3
Ruthenians	--	6	6	8	2.67	3.8
Polish	--	2	3	2	0.67	0.6
Jews	--	--	2	2	0.67	1.3
	281	300	300	300	100.00	99.7

* Rouček, op. cit. p 100.

The German minority was the most troublesome. In the tradition of the Bohemian Germans, their Germanism was not of the Alpine Austrian variety but of the racist pan-German type. The party of Karl Herman Wolf and Georg von Schönerer, whom Hitler himself described as being the spiritual forbear of National Socialism, grew up in Bohemia. The Germans proved to be a large, intransigent, exasperated minority after the war,

³Eduard Taborský, Czech Democracy at Work (London: Unwin, 1945) p. 102.

⁴Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), p. 79.

piqued in many small ways by their loss of privilege. They believed that their minority problems were being ignored in the League of Nations through the influence of Dr. Beneš. However, after the middle twenties pan-Germanism subsided somewhat, and from 1927-29 onwards there were two and sometimes three Germans in the government. In 1926 thirty-four German deputies were bitterly antagonistic to the government, whereas in 1929 only fifteen were opposed.⁵

The German parties were grouped along lines rather similar to the Czech with the exception of the passionately irridentist National Socialist and Nationalist parties, which had to be suppressed for treasonous activities. In 1933, however, Hitler came to power, and under the influence of Konrad Henlein support was drawn away from those parties which had decided to participate in the government in the late twenties. Henlein's connections with secret Fascist organizations helped him absorb the two Nationalist parties into his Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront. In 1933 the name of the party was changed to the Sudetendeutsche Partei (S d. P.), after the arrest of several of its leaders, because Henlein wished to command a broader German following. Contrary to his customary vigorous racist stand, in 1935 Henlein suddenly took a position against pan-Germanism. He said that Fascism had lost its raison d'être at the Czechoslovak frontiers. "There was an uncomfortable discrepancy between these siren notes and the totalitarian methods of agitation developed during the elections of 1935. . . ."⁶

⁵Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans; A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 132.

⁶Robert W. Seton-Watson, A History of Czechs and Slovaks (London: Hutchinson, 1943), p. 352.

Table 3
GERMAN REPRESENTATION
IN THE FOUR PARLIAMENTS 1919 - 1935 * **

	April 1920	Nov. 1925	Oct. 1929	May 1935
Sudeten German	--	--	--	44
German Social Democratic	31	17	21	11
" Agrarian	13	24	16	5
" Christian Socialist	9	13	14	6
" Nationalist	12	10	7	--
" National Socialist	5	7	8	--
" Democratic	2	--	--	--
" Trades	--	--	3	--
	<u>72</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>66</u>

*Rouček, op. cit., p. 1006.

The S. d. P. proved itself an able vote-getter in 1935 and fell one representative short of being the largest party in the Czech Assembly. Henlein had managed to attract 62 per cent of the German electorate. In 1924 and 1929 the German nationalist parties had managed to poll only about 200,000 votes. In 1935 the S. d. P. received 1,249,530.⁷

General Characteristics of Political Parties

The political parties dominated the public life of Czechoslovakia.⁸ The party bosses were in positions of great influence and could impose a high degree of discipline on the members of their organizations. The strength of this discipline has been likened to a "rod of hard steel."⁹ The centralization of leadership was necessary in the days of opposition in the Austrian Reichsrat, and no doubt some of the centralism is due to that fact. However, the lack of a tradition of constructive politics among

⁷ Charles Hoch, Les parties politiques en Tchécoslovaquie, (Prague: Orbis, 1936).

⁸ Táborský, op. cit., p. 94.

⁹ Ibid, p. 97.

the minor political figures which Masaryk so feared led to a heavier reliance on the center of the parties. In addition, the election system, though it served to diminish the strength of splinter parties, contributed to the power of party leadership through the employment of the "list system." This in effect gave the voter an option on the party but left the selection of the actual representative in the hands of the party leaders. The parties also had the power to remove these representatives after they had been selected. In addition, although the minimal requirements insured a fairly high level of civil service personnel, the parties were able to influence the selection of civil servants, giving them an additional source of patronage.

The parties were remarkably stable through the years. This is probably due to the fact that they were "ideologically" oriented or were directed along the lines of special interests. Since a large proportion of people of voting age were registered with one or another of the parties, continuity was insured which could only be altered by a basic social change.

The press was largely controlled by the parties. Every party had one or more publications, and this contributed to both the intensity of political life in the state and the domination of this life by the party system.

The Czechoslovak parties were a great deal more volatile in their expression than are their Anglo-Saxon counterparts; however, there was such a broad area of agreement among the leading groups that the spirit of compromise generally prevailed, and a government coalition could always be formed. On only two occasions was Masaryk obliged to form an interim cabinet while the parties settled their differences. None of the major parties were at all radical, though most were progressive in the humanistic sense. Unquestionably this is attributable to the self-consciousness of the new state and the desire not to be considered backward. At any rate, a continuity of policy was maintained, and shifts either to the right (1925, "Green-Black" coalition without the Socialists) or to the left (1929, "Red-Green" coalition without the Catholics) brought only minor changes in the conduct of government. It is worth noting that in the crisis year

of 1938 the municipal returns in the spring showed the party blocs still firm with no major redistribution of strength.¹⁰

Foreign Affairs

Czechoslovakia was a member of the League of Nations from that institution's inception. Dr. Edward Beneš[✓] upheld Czechoslovak prestige in the League as Foreign Minister from 1918 to 1935. Upon the resignation of the presidency by Masaryk at the age of eighty-five, Beneš[✓] was elected to that office and was succeeded as Foreign Minister by the capable Czech historian Kamil Krofta. Thus Czech foreign policy showed a high degree of stability and continuity. This foreign policy was not aggressively directed at any one nation but aimed at preserving Czechoslovakia's physical integrity from Hungarian and German revisionism.

In 1920-1921 treaties of mutual assistance were signed with Yugoslavia and Rumania. This was the basis of the "Little Entente," and it effectively neutralized Hungary. The cornerstone of the Czech security system, the Treaty of Alliance with France, was signed in January 1924. At that time France was the most powerful European country, and it seemed that the German threat was effectively stayed. In 1935 a pact of mutual assistance was signed with Russia which was to become effective upon French fulfillment of its treaty obligations. This provided insurance against resurgent German militarism.

The years 1919-20 saw a Polish-Czech dispute over Teschen which was settled by a conference of ambassadors. In 1925 there was a rupture of relations with the Papacy. After the advent of the Pilsudski regime in Poland relations with that country worsened. During these years there was no threat to Czech security; even the Germans were cooperative at times.

¹⁰Robert J. Kerner (ed.), Czechoslovakia; Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1940), p. 167. This does not include the S. d. P., which gained 90 per cent of the German vote (Táborský, op. cit., p. 93).

The German Crisis

After the Nazi coup (January-March 1933) the Sudeten Germans became increasingly excited, but no outside threat can be said to have existed until after the Russo-Czech Treaty in 1935. In 1936 the Czechs embarked on a program of border fortifications and refurbishing their army. Goebbels accused the government of permitting Soviet military aerodromes and launched a violent attack at Czechoslovakia in the Nazi press. In April 1937 Henlein demanded Sudeten-German autonomy and in November the S.d.P. delegates left the Assembly.

On February 20, 1938, Hitler promised protection for all German minorities outside the Reich and the Austrian Anschluss took place on March 13. In April Henlein issued his Karlsbad Program, which demanded not only autonomy but reparations for German damages since 1918. These were rejected by the government, but Britain and France urged that the utmost in concessions be made. During the summer Henlein conducted negotiations with the Czechoslovaks and Hitler drew up his armies along the Czech frontier. The Czechs mobilized, and in September the French mobilized 1,000,000 men.

Henlein broke off negotiations on September 7 and fled across the frontier on September 15. Hitler demanded Sudeten German self-determination and Czechoslovakia declared martial law. At this juncture British Prime Minister Chamberlain asked to meet Hitler for a personal conference. The first conference was held in Berchtesgaden on September 15, and a subsequent conference between the French and British took place in London on September 18. Hitler demanded annexation of the Sudetenland, and Britain and France resolved to urge Czechoslovakia to accede. The Czechs were forced to accept these demands and the Hodža government resigned, giving way to the military leader General Jan Sirov^ý. Chamberlain visited Hitler at Godesberg September 22-23, at which time Hitler increased his demands. Chamberlain pronounced these unacceptable. Mussolini persuaded Hitler to meet once more the British, French and Italians at Munich. Meanwhile the Czechs had ordered full mobilization and awaited events. Chamberlain, however, went to Munich and on

September 29, with Czechoslovakia unrepresented, acceded to all of Hitler's demands.

The Second Republic and Protectorate

Within ten days Germany occupied the territory agreed upon at Munich, plus some additional territory in which an "international commission" was to hold plebescites. These never were held and the land in question was simply turned over to the Nazis. Poland seized 400 square miles around Teschen, the Hungarian Army occupied part of Slovakia and Ruthenia, as a consequence of the Vienna award in November. President Beneš resigned on October 5 and left the country. The Germans recognized Tiso's claims for Slovak autonomy on October 6, and Ruthenian autonomy two days later. Premier General Sirový resigned his post and Dr. Emil Hácha was elected President, a man of known integrity and a conservative legalist. The pressure of events dissolved the party system; a two-party system was set up in its place. The Party of National Unity, comprising all rightist groups, and the Party of Labor, comprising all socialist parties, were established. An emergency act of two-year duration was passed which permitted the President to change even the constitution by decree. The Communist Party was outlawed and elections were considered superfluous.

In March 1939 Hácha was called to Berlin and asked to place the fate of the Czech people in the hands of the Führer. Slovakia declared independence and Tiso was given Hitler's word of support. He immediately placed Slovakia under protection of the Reich. Ruthenia declared independence and appealed for assistance to Berlin, but was ignored. The Hungarian Army invaded this hapless province and annexed it to Hungary.

On March 15 Bohemia-Moravia became a German protectorate with Baron von Neurath as Protector, supported by Karl Hermann Frank, police chief and Gestapo representative, as actual administrator, and Konrad Henlein as Hitler's special deputy. Toward the end of March, Hácha was instructed to establish a "Committee of National Trusteeship." The Parliament was dissolved and the two-party system was suspended. The Czech government now worked by emergency decrees issued from

the office of the Reichsprotector through liaison men to the Czech "Committee" for rubber-stamping .

The Czech Army was dissolved and German S. S. and Gestapo units were substituted. Hitler's decree of May 7, 1942 for simplifying the administration of Bohemia-Moravia had the actual effect of delegating to police authorities the power to administer the Protectorate as the Reichsauftragsverwaltung (R.A.V., Reich Administration Commission).

Democrats and Communists: War Years Through the "Prague Coup"

During the occupation of Czechoslovakia political activity was carried on in three geographically discrete places. There was the London group, which functioned under Beneš as the reconstituted internationally recognized government. Secondly, there was an additional group of voluntary political exiles in Moscow which matured in stature as Russian victory in the east became increasingly evident. The third element were the people at home who were nearly leaderless and were forced to wait for liberation from without.¹¹ The Slovak rebellion on the approach of the Red Army and the smaller Prague uprising later were the two exceptions.

The Slovak rising had tragic effects for the people and leadership of that area and played a part in future Communist intra-Party struggles. This action was a joint Communist and Slovak Nationalist undertaking which was assisted by a brigade of Czech paratroops under Colonel Příkryl and some Slovak army units.

The Soviet main forces, which were at times close enough to establish contact with the insurgents, failed to give the necessary support and hindered assistance by Czech and Western army commands. The Nazis were able to crush the movement and to occupy key positions around

¹¹R. R. Betts (ed.), Central and South East Europe (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p. 166.

Zvolen and Banská Bystrica.¹² The uprising cost the Slovaks 30,000 lives¹³ and severely crippled the leadership of the country for resistance against Communist organization.

The political consequences of the Slovak revolt are important for the understanding of later events: (1) it gave substance to the Slovak bid for self-government; (2) it gave the Communists the assurance of 50 per cent of the governmental posts by agreement (the so-called "Christmas agreement") with the Slovak Democrats; (3) it unified the Marxist left as the Slovak Social Democrats merged with the Communist Party (K.S.S.); (4) it served as grounds for friction with the K.S.Č. between the organizers of the revolt and the Moscow leaders.¹⁴

Beneš and the London Government

Beneš resigned as President on October 5 and left for England October 22, 1938. His immediate tasks were to obtain recognition for legal continuity of a government in exile on the basis of the state as it stood in 1938, and to establish contact with his country and organize resistance. He expected a European war to break out not later than May or June of 1939 and needed to mobilize Czechoslovakia for a contribution to the war effort in order to participate in the peace discussions.¹⁵ This latter enterprise was an immediate success.

The initial attempts at recognition of his London group were frustrated by dilatory London legalists and the practical Gallic fear of Mussolini. The Chamberlain government of Britain was loath to recant

¹²Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee (eds.), Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946; Hitler's Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 603.

¹³Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, (Special Report No. 8 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Dec. 31, 1954 Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office)

¹⁴Paul Zinner, "Problems of Communist Rule in Czechoslovakia," World Politics, IV, No. 1 (Oct. 1951)

¹⁵R. H. Bruce Lockhart, "The Second Exile of Eduard Beneš," Slavonic and East European Review, XXV III, No. 70 (Nov. 1949), 39.

on its Munich agreement, but the advent of Churchill in May 1940 made the prospects much brighter.

Beneš formed the National Committee which was recognized by both Britain and France as a co-belligerent late in 1939. This group, composed of exiles in Paris and London, had an army in the field in France in June 1940 (most of the Czech forces were evacuated at Dunkirk). Beneš issued a decree in the name of the government which decree purported to be the basis of the postwar Czechoslovak legal order and to establish legislative continuity on the basis of temporary emergency decrees. Its validity was to be established in the future by the elected legislature. He had not enough members of the legislature with him to constitute a quorum and his own term expired in 1941. In July 1940 Britain and the other belligerents recognized the National Committee as the Provisional National Government. This, however, did not satisfy Beneš. His object was legal continuity from before Munich, and the Munich agreement had not yet been repudiated by its signatories.¹⁶

Beneš based his position on the argument that the Munich agreement had been dictated by violence and that the Germans had rendered the agreement void by seizing Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939.¹⁷ Finally, in the summer of 1942, the position of the legalists had been sufficiently eroded by waves of moral indignation to permit both Britain and the French government in exile to repudiate Munich.

The Soviets followed their own opportunistic course in all this. Before the Molotov-Litvinov pact of August 23, 1939, the Soviets were the champions of Czech independence and undertook to guide Beneš' protest telegram in the League in 1939. After August 23 the Soviets demanded that the Czechs close their legation and recall their minister in Moscow. They

¹⁶ Adolph Procházka, "Changes in the Philosophy of Czechoslovak Law since the Prague Coup d'Etat of February, 1948" (Mid-European Studies Center microfilm, 1951), pp. 9-12.

¹⁷ Lockhart, op. cit., p. 43.

recognized the Nazi seizure of Bohemia-Moravia and Slovak independence under Tiso. Also the Communist Czechs in London refused to cooperate with Beneš[✓], attacking him in the Daily Worker.

After Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 the Soviet government recognized the Provisional Government as the legally constituted government and officially rejected the Munich settlement, to which it had not been a party. The Kremlin exchanged ambassadors with the Beneš[✓] government and the London Communist Czechs eagerly assisted him in the affairs of state.

Negotiations Between London and Moscow

In Moscow the Communists who fled Czechoslovakia set up their own National Committee. Šverma had attempted to influence Beneš[✓] to establish his provisional government in Moscow in 1939, but to no avail. Almost all of the Czech Communist hierarchy were in Moscow with the exception of Nosek, Kreibich, and a few others in London, and the local leaders in Slovakia.

In 1943, after the Big Power conference in Moscow, Beneš[✓] too felt that political gravity had shifted since Stalingrad. He has been criticized for going to Moscow after the Moscow and Tehran conferences, in which it was agreed that Czechoslovakia would fall within the Soviet zone of influence, and it was obvious that he would have to negotiate with Stalin for his country's security.¹⁸ He felt that the Polish government was doomed and he did not want to be in the same position. Though Beneš[✓] was philosophically oriented toward the West, Moscow seemed to be the most reliable anti-German guarantee, so he resolved to bridge the East and West with a policy which included both.¹⁹ His objectives can be summed up as follows: (1) a treaty

¹⁸S. Harrison Thomson, "Eduard Beneš 1884-1948," Journal of Central European Affairs, VIII, No. 3 (Oct. 1948), 240.

¹⁹Lockhart, op. cit., p. 54.

of alliance to insure Czechoslovakia against German aggression; (2) a guarantee from Russia of non-interference in Czechoslovak internal affairs; (3) an agreement with the Soviet Union to return the Sudeten Germans to Germany.

The treaty which Beneš[✓] signed in Moscow embodied all these principles and was regarded by him as the assurance of Czech national security. Both Stalin and Molotov gave guarantees of treaty fulfillment, the sanctity of Ruthenia, and the pre-Munich boundary restoration. When Beneš[✓] discussed Soviet relations with Poland, Stalin even expressed some hope that a mutually agreeable solution would be reached. On his way back to London, Beneš[✓] reported his success to Churchill, who was at Marrakesh. Churchill was so impressed that he urged Beneš[✓] to discuss his accomplishment with Eden, so that the Poles might be influenced to accept the Soviet Union's offer.²⁰

Beneš[✓]' second week in Moscow was spent negotiating with the Moscow Czech Communist Party to reach some basis for its participation in the postwar government. It was decided at this meeting that National Committees should form the basis of local government reorganization, that the rightist parties be outlawed because of their cooperation with the Nazis, that the number of parties be limited, and that the National Front be organized for postwar cooperation. Beneš[✓] agreed in principle with these novelties.

Beneš[✓] was in an uncomfortable position. A large portion of political influence was outside the government and refused any responsibility for its actions. Yet it was clear that the Muscovites, who had the only virtually intact leadership and the obvious preference of Moscow, would have to be included in governmental decisions. The Muscovites were carrying on their own propaganda via radio and leaflets in Czechoslovakia and were

²⁰Eduard Táborský, "Beneš[✓] and Stalin--Moscow 1943 and 1945," Journal of Central European Affairs, XIII, No. 2 (July 1953), p. 162.

announcing outright their intended political program for the postwar period.²¹ Benes felt compelled to clear all government decrees with the Muscovites and when the K.S.C.[✓] induced him to issue a decree defining the competence of the National Committees (Dec. 1944) this decree was promulgated by Benes in its final form only with all the K.S.C.'s corrections.²²

After the Slovak uprising, the Soviet Army moved into Ruthenia and Slovakia late in 1944. Benes[✓] was suddenly alarmed by reports emanating from Russia (the government was permitted no contact with territories being liberated) that the population had spontaneously opted for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.. The entire operation, which took the form of a plebiscite, had been organized by a Czech officer of Ukrainian ethnic origin named Ivan Turjanica, who was assisted by the Red Army, the local Communist Party leaders and the political police. Benes[✓] was confronted with a fait accompli and both Molotov and Stalin, while expressing their reluctance to accept the decision, excused themselves and bowed to the will of the people. At this point, recalling the General Catlos affair,²³ Benes[✓] decided he had better return to Prague by way of Moscow, though he had originally intended to fly directly from London.

Benes[✓] arrived in Moscow on March 17 and spent the next two weeks working out the new governmental program with the Communists. In addition, he was forced to haggle with the Kremlin over the large-scale property confiscations in Czechoslovakia by the Red Army under the guise of German reparations. At Moscow during this two-week interval the cabinet posts were parcelled out. The Communists obtained eight out of twenty-five and established Svoboda and Fierlinger in the positions of Minister of Defense and Premier. All rightist parties were outlawed,

²¹Zinner, op. cit.

²²Ibid.

²³At the time the Soviet army was poised for the strike into Czechoslovakia the Commander-in-Chief of the Slovak puppet army, General Catlos, entered into negotiation with the Soviets with the aim of selling out Slovakia to the Soviets to save himself. Moscow never informed Benes of this; he learned of it through General Pika (executed by the Communists in 1949) in time to lodge a sharp protest which stopped negotiations. Taborský, op. cit., pp. 169-70.

including the strongest prewar party, the Agrarians. The new government then followed Nemeč, Benes' minister for liberated territories, to Kosice and established the Provisional Government on Czechoslovak soil on April 3.

On April 5 the Kosice program, compounded in Moscow, was announced as setting the tenor for the new regime. Slovakia was to be a self-determining state affiliated with Bohemia-Moravia only loosely; six parties were to organize the national front; the government was to operate on the local level through the National Committees; and governmental policy was to be a thoroughgoing nationalization of industry, business and agriculture.

Seizure of the Heights of Political and Economic Power

During the period from late 1944 to the first election in May 1946, the Communist party established itself in a position of political and economic dominance which it never lost.

Control of the National Committees.

Once the policy of permitting the local levels of government to organize spontaneously in the form of National Committees had been decided upon, the Communist Party, even before liberation, began to organize such centers. Organizers were parachuted in, in some cases, before the liberation,²⁴ but by and large they came in with the Red Army and were assisted by it in their activities. In many cases the National Committees were not voted on but were selected by an underground group. The Communists had planned to use the National Committees as the Soviets had been used previously; to eliminate the old bureaucracy and create new revolutionary units which could be controlled centrally by the Party.²⁵ In this they were not completely successful but sufficiently so that by autumn of 1945 most of the chairmanships of the National Committees were in their hands.²⁶

²⁴I. Duchacek, "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration," World Politics, II, No. 3 (April 1950), 351.

²⁵Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved (London: Gollanz 1950), p. 150.

²⁶Paul Zinner, Communist Politics and Strategy in Czechoslovakia (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1953), p. 53.

Political Control at the National Level

In the tradition of the Czechoslovak government, the ministers are all-powerful in their ministries and the Cabinet exercises a greater influence on policy than does the President.²⁷ Thus, control of certain strategic ministries was very important. Beneš^v was in a strong psychological position to be of great influence after the war, but he stood aloof from party affairs and controversial issues.²⁸ The Communists held the Ministries of Interior, Agriculture, Information, Commerce and Finance, and fellow travelers held the Premiership and the Ministry of Defense.

Minister of the Interior Nosek proceeded to reorganize the police and replenished its ranks with members of partisan units. The National Security Police (S.N.B) and its "Mobile Detachments"²⁹ were created as special organs and manned by hand-picked Communists. In addition, there was established a factory militia under the guidance of both the police and the Communist-dominated Central Labor Union (R.O.H.).

Control of National Economy: Industry and Commerce

The policy of nationalization was carried through immediately on the 60-70 percent of the productive resources which had been held by the Germans. Since these were under government management, the Ministries of Finance and Commerce had a predominant voice in the appointment of new managers for these industries. The courts were in some measure successful in returning part of the property to its rightful owners. These steps for the taking over of private enterprise by the government had been initiated as Constitutional Decree No. 10, August 3, 1944, as part of the decree establishing the temporary administration of liberated territories.³⁰ The provisions for interim management were reinforced by Decree No. 5/1945 which introduced the aspect of temporary management into professional

²⁷Táborský, Czech Democracy at Work, op. cit., p. 102.

²⁸Zinner, op. cit., p. 135.

²⁹These "Mobile Detachments" were composed almost exclusively of fanatical Communists. It was they whom the Communists relied upon in February 1948 to occupy Prague. Ripka, op. cit., p. 152.

³⁰Procházka, op. cit., p. 38.

organizations and cooperatives. These were limited to those properties which had been deserted or were in unreliable hands. These expedients bridged the gap for over a year until the courts could begin to work out the claims of the owners and in this period added greatly to the Communist power prior to the first election.

Control of National Economy: Agriculture

The Communists held the Ministry of Agriculture. The seizure of all German and some Hungarian land and its redistribution was entrusted to this agency under the direction of Communist [✓]Đuriš[✓]. The redistribution was done immediately after the expulsion of the Germans, but the legal limits of the individual holdings were not insisted upon until several years later. In addition, the final deeds were not issued until after the first election. All this proved to be lucrative party patronage and insurance against electoral backsliding.³¹

The Democrats during this period felt isolated, not only by the apparent relegation of Czechoslovakia to the political and military sphere of Soviet Russia, but by the seeming cooperation between East and West.³² The Communist Party was wealthy by comparison. It had offices in the best hotels with typewriters, supplies of paper and enough funds to pay full-time political organizers. It is not surprising that opportunists and intellectuals alike regarded Communism as the new order of things. Membership in the K.S.C. at liberation was 27,000, while in March 1946 it had risen to 1,081,544.

In addition, there was a definite reformist attitude in the electorate. This attitude was made to serve the Communist cause, as was the Communist-controlled National Government, under the guise of liberation and patriotism. The army was not controlled, but was effectively neutralized by Svoboda and Reicin, the latter as head of military counter-intelligence. The

³¹Zinner, op. cit., pp. 180-81.

³²Ducháček[✓], op. cit., pp. 345-49.

largest mass organization, the trade union, was taken over in a body, including the administrative personnel, by the Communists from the Nazis. Emotionally the workers were in a radical frame of mind,³³ and Zápotocký, who had been a popular prewar labor leader, had little difficulty in keeping the structure together as chairman of the Central Council of Unions (U.P.C.). A pro-Communist Social Democrat, Evžen Erban, was Secretary General of the group.

The First National Elections

In the elections of May 1946 the Communists won 38 per cent of the popular vote, almost double the strength of the nearest National Socialist Party. Together with the other Marxist party, the Social Democrats, which was led by Fierlinger, a Communist fellow-traveler if not a Party member, the K.S.C. was able to control a majority in the National Assembly and to nominate Klement Gottwald, the Party leader, as Premier.

It is apparent that the Communists needed their parliamentary majority merely to give the government the appearance of a democracy while relations between the Soviet and the West were still undecided. Benefits such as the \$261,000,000 received from U.N.R.R.A. Western trade, and the loan arranged by the Export-Import Bank assisted Czechoslovakia to manage during the transitional period. However, the Communists proved in 1948 that they were in a position to impose a "People's Democracy" when East-West relations deteriorated. Paul Zinner comments: "At no time were the Czechoslovak Communists confronted with a serious challenge."³⁴ He says further that the most serious problem was the necessity of handling Beneš^v delicately.³⁵

³³ Zinner, op. cit., p. 165

³⁴ Ibid., p. 131.

³⁵ Hugh Seton-Watson also comments that the Communists would have seized power easily in 1945 but that Gottwald chose not to as he wanted to exhibit himself as a "moderate and patriotic" Communist. East European Revolution (London: Methuen, 1950), p. 181.

The Coup

The Marshall Plan conference had been arranged for July 1947 in Paris, and the Czechs had voted unanimously to attend. However, Stalin summoned a Czech delegation of Gottwald, Drtina and Masaryk to Moscow, and after reaching a preliminary understanding with Gottwald³⁶ he announced to the delegation that Marshall Plan participation was in effect unfriendly to the U.S.S.R. At the same time the Marshall Plan was being rejected, the Soviet Union was also obstructing French-Czechoslovak negotiations for a new treaty of friendship and mutual alliance.³⁷

Until this moment the Czech Communists had behaved like parliamentarians. However, the failure to distinguish between tactics and objectives disarmed the democratic parties.³⁸ and deflected their attack to specific issues on which the Communists could suffer reversal without actually touching the bastions of their power.

When the Czechs voted unanimously to reject the Marshall Plan, after having voted unanimously to accept it a few days before, the Communists turned their propaganda machine into higher gear. A series of incidents accompanied the deteriorating international situation. The Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine expressed themselves in aid to Greece and Turkey, which had an electrifying effect on the Soviet Union's manipulation of the satellites. It is also possible to assume that, at least from January 1948 on, relations between Tito and the Kremlin were deteriorating, though the final break did not come until summer.³⁹

Since the Communists had to face an election in May 1948, they were

³⁶ Louise I. Chamberlain, "The Circumstances Surrounding the Coup d'État in Czechoslovakia in 1948" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1950), pp. 125-26.

³⁷ Ripka, op. cit., p. 72.

³⁸ I. Ducháček, "The February Coup in Czechoslovakia," World Politics, II, No. 4 (July 1950).

³⁹ Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 106.

naturally concerned with their legitimate claims to represent the nation. Both a student election, which was conducted on political issues in the fall of 1947, and a poll by the Institute of Public Opinion showed a significant decrease in support for the Communists.⁴⁰ In addition, the Social Democratic Congress in Brno in September indicated that the K.S.C.'s Marxist brothers were beginning to be restive. Fellow-traveler Fierlinger was fired as Premier and the more moderate Laušman was elected.

Several sensational plots were discovered or precipitated by the Communists, unsettling public opinion. The Communists had apparently determined to break the Slovak Democratic Party, which had received 61.4 per cent of the votes in Slovakia in 1946. The Communist police traced an espionage ring in the headquarters of Ján Ursíny, the Secretary General of the Party, and arrested several members of the Board of Governors, using this stratagem to achieve parity for the Slovak Communists on the Board.⁴¹ In addition, a crude attempt was made to assassinate the three most popular non-Communist minister (Zenkl, Masaryk, and Drtina). Despite police obstruction the Democratic parties managed to trace the effort to a Communist cell near Olomouc.⁴² In retaliation the Communists suddenly uncovered a spy ring in Most, which was clearly an invention of the police.⁴³

The K.S.C. made attempts to wipe out the middle class as a bloc of opposition. The proposed utilitarian levy and the pressure for the extension of socialization into small business were presented as Communist reforms. Actually they were initiated to serve as a diversion from the declining economic situation caused by the drought of 1947. The Communists had a choice of two sources of food to relieve the pressure: U. S. grain at

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 515.

⁴¹ Zinner, op. cit., p. 211.

⁴² Ripka, op. cit., p. 126.

⁴³ Zinner, op. cit., p. 217.

\$2.50 a bushel or high-priced Soviet grain at \$4.00 a bushel; they chose the latter.⁴⁴ Further nationalization, if achieved, would have the advantage of wiping out the economic base of the bourgeoisie, and if not achieved it would make good propaganda against bourgeois obstructionist politicians.

It has been asserted that the plan for the coup d'etat was formulated in the September-October meetings of the Cominform.⁴⁵ The Slánský group of radical internationalists assumed the direction of Party policy.⁴⁶ It was apparent that Gottwald, like Lenin after the election of the Constituent Assembly in 1918, was not going to surrender power because of lack of parliamentary majority. On the secondary level reports of distributions of arms were heard⁴⁷ and police packing was accelerated. It was this latter issue which eventually brought matters to a head in February 1948.

The Democrats demanded an explanation of the procedure and the reinstatement of eight Prague police officials on February 12. Nosek was ill, and Gottwald promised an explanation when he returned to the cabinet. On February 20 Zenkl inquired of Gottwald whether the police order had been rescinded; Gottwald was evasive, and the Democratic ministers resigned, with the notable exception of the Social Democrats.

At that moment the Communist machine went into action. Within the next few days the Communists had called their workers' militias into the streets of Prague and the armed "Action Committees" took over institutions from the inside. The first wave of arrests paralyzed resistance. The police had secured all the strategic points for the Communists and Radio Prague broadcasted reports of an attempted reactionary putsch. As an additional display of power the K.S.C. had called a nationwide

⁴⁴Ygael Gluckstein, Stalin's Satellites in Europe (London: Unwin, 1952), p. 67.

⁴⁵Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 148.

⁴⁶Ducháček, "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration," op. cit., p. 367.

⁴⁷Ducháček, "The February Coup in Czechoslovakia," op. cit., p. 520.

strike for one hour. Presses and democratic parties' headquarters were seized and looted. The fact that there was rarely any violence or bloodshed attests the power and preparedness of the Communists.

Gottwald prevailed upon Quislings from other parties to enter a new "Rejuvenated" National Front coalition, and pressure was put on Beneš to recognize the new cabinet. He resisted for five days but eventually recognized the new government. Both the army and the democratic parties refrained from any activity. A few months later a new constitution was issued by the National Assembly, and Beneš resigned on May 7 rather than sign it. Gottwald was then elected President by the Assembly.

The May 30 election confirmed the Communists' position through one of those majorities which have become notorious in the People's Democracies. The Communists had now legitimized their position and by June 9, 1948, the new constitution, signed by Gottwald, had legalized the condition of permanent revolution.

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
THE COMMUNIST PARTY

History

The formation of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia occurred through a split in the Social Democratic ranks in 1920 and a unification in 1921 of the Czech Marxists with Marxists of other national minorities. The Party was criticized repeatedly for not being sufficiently militant by the Comintern; however, with the ebb of Social Democratic influences and the ascendance to leadership of Klement Gottwald in 1929 the Moscow line was more closely followed. The Party was a significant vote-getter and in 1935 won the third highest number of votes. Since there were some twenty parties participating this amounted to only 9.7 per cent of the total vote cast. Its main strength was in national minority groups which had lost their vehicle for expression and preferred to register protest votes. The Party was never included in a government. Party policies were legislated by Moscow and during the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact it became exceedingly unpopular in Czechoslovakia.

During the war most of the leadership of the Party escaped to Moscow. With the increasing influence of Moscow in international politics that of the Muscovite Czechs rose correspondingly. Beneš' concessions are but recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union occupied the principal position in the European power panorama. The Muscovites reorganized Czech state policy and the bureaucracy according to their own necessities and succeeded in winning an electoral mandate. Armed with this and the organized violence to support anti-democratic abuses in democracy's name the Communists came into the open in 1948 and seized the entire state machinery.¹

¹ Paul Zinner, "Problems of Communist Rule in Czechoslovakia," World Politics, IV, No. 1 (Oct. 1951); and I. Gadourek, The Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953), pp. 9-15.



Source: Czechoslovakia in Maps & Statistics, "Czechoslovak," London, 1944 (?).

Ideology: Marxism-Leninism in Czechoslovakia

The official philosophical justification for the "People's Democracies" is Marxism-Leninism as propounded by its most notorious exponent, Joseph Stalin. The stage of historic development in which Czechoslovakia finds itself is the state of "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" which occurs just after the vanguard of the industrial proletariat seizes the state organs of suppression and in its turn exploits the exploiting minority. To put it briefly: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is the domination of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, untrammelled by law and based on violence and enjoying the sympathy and support of the toiling and exploited masses."²

Zdeněk Nejedlý, speaking on the education of youth in February 1951, said that the Czech state would not be satisfied with the innate gifts of man; that he should be changed to the utmost limits; that "everything will be explained scientifically and be firmly grounded in Marxism-Leninism . . ." ³ Propaganda centers were established for the dissemination of the official dogma, and in 1951 it was possible to have a "propaganda couple" visit people in their homes for question and instruction sessions. ⁴ In addition there are such instruction centers in factories and places of recreation, and there exist special refresher courses for Party line teachers in a "Summer Indoctrination School."⁵ According to the Party Regulations (Prague, 1949, Chapter 17) one of the functions of the basic organization is " . . . to arrange the courses in Marxism-

² Joseph V. Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (New York: International Book Publishing Co., 1932), p. 51.

³ Mladá Fronta (Prague), Feb. 13, 1951. Quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, May 1-15, 1951.

⁴ Rudé Právo (Prague), May 26, 1951. Quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, May 15-June 15, 1951.

⁵ Rudé Právo, June 12, 1951. Quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, June 15-Sept. 1, 1951.

Leninism and train candidates to become good Party members . . ."⁶
Thus it is seen that ostensibly Marxism-Leninism is the proper philosophical orientation and that measures have been adopted to insure its propagation.

Primacy of Moscow Interpretation of Marxism-Leninism

Marxism-Leninism, like mercury, can assume the shape of virtually any vessel. It is difficult to distinguish between what appears to be principles and what are merely tactics to gain a slight advantage in another area at the sacrifice of principle. "Tactics vary according as the movement is ebbing or flowing."⁷ ". . . in a given phase of the revolution, tactics can change repeatedly."⁸ The high command in the Party sets the immediate policy and once the policy is fixed no deviation is tolerated. Lower echelons must exhibit true "Bolshevik discipline" in their tasks.⁹ In Czechoslovakia, as in the other satellites, this primacy of theoretical interpretation lodges with the Kremlin. The "inclined plane" of deviation is doubt about the correctness of the Soviet Union.¹⁰ Hilary Minc of Poland stated that national deviation amounted to two crimes: (1) lack of faith in the Soviet Union; (2) lack of faith in the effectiveness of the teachings of the great Stalin.¹¹ A somewhat later reference to Muscovite theoretical leadership was made by Zdeněk Fierlinger, President of the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia who, after remarking that a dictatorship of the proletariat is

⁶Gadourek, op. cit., p. 25.

⁷Stalin, Leninism (New York: International Publishers, 1928), p. 148.

⁸Ibid, p. 149.

⁹Gadourek, op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁰"Love of the Soviet Union does not tolerate the slightest reservation. The road into the morass of treason indeed begins on the inclined plane of reservations and doubts regarding the correctness of the policy of the Soviet Union." Rudé Právo, May 25, 1952.

¹¹"Party Discipline in Eastern Europe," The World Today, VII, No. 10 (Oct. 1951), p. 430.

indispensable for the creation of democracy of a higher type says:

The Soviet Union remains an important source of information for all the peoples democratic countries. . . . The triumph of Soviet creative policy, which is becoming evident to the whole world, is a great source of strength for all of us who are drawing fresh vigour and enthusiasm from the successes of the Soviet people for further work in the strengthening of our People's Democratic Republic. ¹²

A somewhat stronger statement of Czech ideological obsequiousness was made by Klement Gottwald at the time of the Nineteenth Party Congress and quoted in the Czech Press Service on October 4, 1952:

. . . . when the heroic Red Army under the leadership of Stalin destroyed Hitler it was easier for us to settle accounts with our own capitalists, to crush their attempts to carry out a counter-revolutionary putsch and now we come to you to learn how to build socialism. The work of the nineteenth Congress and of Comrade Stalin will be an inexhaustible source of information for daily work and the daily struggle to consolidate socialist order in Czechoslovakia and for the fight to preserve peace. ¹³

In what has been considered the classical tactical-theoretical statement of the "People's Democracies" and the extent to which they are directed by the Soviet Union, Josef Revai comments on the mistakes of the Hungarian regime; point two of this disquisition emphasizes that one mistake was to stress the differences in the "development of the Soviet Union and our (Hungarian) development into a Peoples Democracy, instead of stressing the similarity; the substantial identity of the two developments." ¹⁴ In addition he makes clear that after the essential liquidation of the democratic parties and the seizure of power by the Communist Party; after the resignation of the Ferenc Nagy government (May 1947 to 1948), the Hungarian People's Democracy became a

¹² Zdeněk Fierlinger, "Le régime démocratique populaire en Tchécoslovaquie," Bulletin de droit tchécoslovaque (Prague: Jednota československých právníků), No. 1 (Oct. 1, 1953), p. 77.

¹³ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 11 (Nov. 1952), 2-3.

¹⁴ "The Character of a 'People's Democracy'," Foreign Affairs (New York), XXVIII, No. 1 (Oct. 1949), 148.

dictatorship of the proletariat. The state of "People's Democracy" is seen to be the initial formative stage of dictatorship of the proletariat.¹⁵

The Changing Party Line

The "Communist line" is not a static thing; it develops with the necessities of Russian state policies. From the period of liberation in 1945 to the establishment of the Cominform and its first meeting in September 1947, the Communists were content with their initial conquests. The Czech democratic parties were allowed to function and parliamentary majorities were observed. Klement Gottwald, who had said earlier that "dictatorship of the proletariat is not the only road to socialism,"¹⁶ restated this view in 1947: "Our experience has demonstrated it is possible to move in the direction of socialism in our own Czechoslovak way without dictatorship of the proletariat."¹⁷ This was in accord with Beneš' conception that in a mature society like Czechoslovakia socialism could come about by peaceful methods rather than by revolution.¹⁸

Thus for a short time after the war the "soft" element in the K. S. Č. was in the position of control; however, as the international situation became more tense and Communism more unpopular at home the international line and the national line were brought into accord.¹⁹ The Party press leveled attacks at warmongers abroad and at reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries at home. There was said to be but one path to socialism, the Leninist path, based on the idea of dictatorship of the proletariat. Gottwald, who had spoken earlier for the national

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 145-47.

¹⁶Samuel L. Sharp, New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere (Washington, D. C.: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1950), p. 10.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁹Ducháček, "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: Czechoslovakia, 1944-1948," World Politics, II, No. 3 (April 1950), 366-68.

path, made the transition gracefully.²⁰ He was able to justify the tactic of holding back in 1945 and emphasizing the national line. "Our party and our people inevitably had to go through this school of three years in order to make what happened in February possible. . . ." ²¹

During the year which followed the announcement of the Marshall Plan a shoring up of the international Communist front took place and the "national line" advocates were overturned all over eastern Europe. The cooperative elements of democratic parties continued to exist without any independent will and Socialist parties were swallowed up in party mergers. G. Dimitrov of Bulgaria and Gottwald both made important policy speeches at the end of 1948; in the spring of 1949 Josef Revai clearly stated that socialism would not be built without a dictatorship of the proletariat, and that it must move along the path to socialism blazed by the Soviet Union.²² Thus according to Soviet academicians I. P. Trainin and E. Varga, there are three types of democracy: the bourgeois type; the "People's Democracy," which is a transitional phase and is moving toward the third and final form--the perfect democracy of the Soviet Union.²³

In this second period new tasks were undertaken by the Party. It much resembled the period of war Communism in Soviet Russia (1918-1921) in that virtually all industry and trade not already under government control was gathered in, norms were stepped up and material incentives diminished, an attempt was made to collectivize agriculture,²⁴

²⁰H. Gordon Skilling, "Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Impact," International Journal, VI, No. 2 (Spring 1951), 112.

²¹Klement Gottwald, speech of Nov. 17, 1948. Quoted in Ducháček, op. cit., p. 368.

²²"The Character of a People's Democracy," op. cit., p. 148.

²³George C. Guins, "Constitution of the Soviet Satellites," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1950, p. 64.

²⁴Dana Adams Schmidt, Anatomy of a Satellite (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1952), p. 354.

and political opposition was removed.²⁵ Discontent was obvious, and it is tempting to speculate that one of the reasons for the liquidation of the internationalist wing of the K.S.Č. (Slánský, et al.) in 1951-52 was to cleanse the Party of identification with the harsh policies.²⁶

This discontent eventually blossomed in the riots which were touched off by the monetary reform of 1953. Since at that time both Stalin and Gottwald were dead, the effective barriers were removed to the policies of collective leadership within the Party and a slight relaxation of controls from without,²⁷ loosely corresponding to the N.E.P. introduced in Russian in 1921.²⁸ Less was heard of the "class enemy" in Czechoslovakia and some prisoners were amnestied.²⁹ A switch to more consumer goods and less rationing was promised, and loans, more housing and tax reductions were announced.³⁰ However, this appeared to be merely a tactic. In June 1953 Široký had boasted about the advances made in agriculture in collectivization. In August Zápotocký criticized the enforced collectivization and said that the peasants would not be hindered in leaving the kolkhozes. He added, however, that in a few years they would be forced to re-establish these very kolkhozes. During the same month Minister of Agriculture Josef Nepomucký attacked the kulak elements who wished to leave the kolkhozes. In September Zápotocký announced that the government had decided that the peasants must be brought into the kolkhozes not by force but by persuasion.³¹

²⁵M. Heitzman, "Events Behind the Iron Curtain," International Journal, IV, No. 4 (Autumn 1949), p. 307.

²⁶News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 1 (Jan. 1952), p. 2.

²⁷Ibid., III, No. 7 (July 1954), 21.

²⁸Ibid., II, No. 12 (Dec. 1953), 3.

²⁹"New Policy in Czechoslovakia," The World Today, IX, No. 10 (Oct. 1953), 447.

³⁰News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 2 (Feb. 1954), 51.

³¹Ibid., II, No. 12 (Dec. 1953), 8-19.

The new rule in Party leadership became "collective leadership." In a speech in honor of Stalin and Gottwald, Zápotocký denounced one-man rule as a "kind of Führer principle" and made a complete denial of the Leninist principle of collective leadership. This announcement came after Malenkov's keynote speech of August 1932.³²

What this means to the individual Czech is the subject of this chapter. It has already been discussed at some length under legal guarantees with emphasis on the statutory aspect. It has been said that Stalin substituted the proletariat for the people, the Party for the proletariat, the Central Committee for the Party, and himself for the Central Committee. In the case of the satellites the principle of democratic centralism must proceed up through the local-national Party, through Soviet trade representatives and specialists and political emissaries to the Soviet hierarchy. The "agreements on consultation" were concluded between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and all other parties at the September 1947 Cominform meeting. Each Communist Party has the right to criticize any other Communist Party.³³ The determination of the rightness or wrongness of such criticism, however, is the exclusive power of the Soviet delegation.³⁴

Function and Status of the Communist Party in Czech Society

The Party's position in the transitional phase of the "People's Democracy" is that of a political elite possessing a monopoly power over wealth in the form of real property and the organs of violence, and

³²Ibid., p. 3.

³³Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Oxford University Press, Nov. 1948), p. 55.

³⁴Joseph Mestenhauer, Function of the Cominform in Communist International Politics (Chicago: Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, 1954), p. 23.

utilizing these means to secure the restructuring of society according to its own theoretical precepts. It is difficult at times to determine whether the economic or political goals take precedence: however, such a division may be more analytical than real. There is obvious good re-doubling to the Soviet Union in the exploitation of Czech productivity, but the ultimate aims are felt to be intensive industrialization and the organization of a politically reliable urban proletariat.³⁵

Sovietization, however, is more than the introduction of Marxism-Leninism as a plan of action into the political and economic arenas. It is used as a justification for interfering in all group and most private activities. Thus section four of the "Voluntary Organizations and Assemblies Act" (July 12, 1951) states that "the state guides the development of all organizations. . . .and sees to it that their work is in harmony with the Constitution and the principles of the People's Democratic Order . . ."³⁶ These mass organizations are an attempt to mobilize whatever is constructive in the citizen, as well as his spare time, for service to the Party, perhaps because the Party fears the creative powers of man outside its control. In addition, science, education, the arts, etc., are suffused with the official philosophy, since the Party must create its own intelligentsia,³⁷ and short courses in political theory given to workers have not had satisfactory results.

Sovietization has been extended to the point that the Party has set up a special agency to conduct marriage arrangements (S. V. A. T. K. A.), which saves workers time in the process;³⁸ it has established kindergartens for children of factory workers in order to make children "in the image of the Soviet Man"³⁹ (an additional advantage in this is the release of mothers for the labor force); and official philosophy is used as thematic material in entertainment (such as the use of Zápotocký's novel, "New

³⁵ Gadourek, op. cit., pp. 196-98.

³⁶ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 1 (Jan. 1952), 12.

³⁷ Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, op. cit., p. 51.

³⁸ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Feb. 1-15, 1951, p. 9.

³⁹ Ibid., May 1-5, 1951; p. 2.

Fighters Will Arise," as a movie scenario.)⁴⁰

Thus the Party sets about restructuring personal relationships, group activities, and educational and leisure pursuits in the service of the new society. Presumably when society has been recreated in the image of the "Soviet workers' paradise," with all property socialized and classes obliterated, Czechoslovakia may win her Stalin Constitution or apply for republic status in the U.S.S.R. Political reliability is thus a long-term goal. The short-term function of the Party is to make the populace sufficiently dependent on the state, and at the same time to intimidate it so that economic plundering by the Soviet Union can continue uninterruptedly.

Prior to the coup d'état, the Party was content to conduct its maneuvers within parliamentary rules as primus inter pares with other parties, provided it could consolidate its power on the administrative level by other methods, which it continued to do. That Gottwald was aware that this state of affairs was temporary is patent from his statement of 1945, which outlined a five-point plan for annihilating parliamentary government.⁴¹ After the coup the Party was in unrivalled ascendance as an influence group until agricultural and industrial failures began to blight its administration. By 1950 the collapse had become serious and the trials of "economic wreckers" commonplace.

In 1951, however, Lidové Noviny⁴² announced that for the first time the plan had fallen short in Gottwaldov. Criticism of economic malfeasance became more heated in the press. On June 10 Rudé Právo announced a failure in completion of planned targets for the third year

⁴⁰Ibid., Jan. 1-15, 1951, p. 13.

⁴¹Quoted in detail in Paul E. Zinner, "Marxism in Action," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, No. 4 (July 1950), 644-50.

⁴²Lidové Noviny, Feb. 14, 1951. 3

of the Five-Year Plan, and shortly after a Soviet Trade delegation appeared. These failures assumed increasing importance because of the announcement of increased economic deliveries of from 55 to 61 per cent⁴³ to both the other satellites and the Soviet Union, and the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union some time in March⁴⁴ for an "expansion of trade."

In September 1951 Slansky was purged, and the Party suffered an eclipse from which it did not emerge until the deaths of Stalin and Gottwald in March 1953. Six days later, the first indication of the new course was given in the revocation of a draconic government decree punishing worker absenteeism. This was passed on June 30. During this period of eclipse almost all criticism of the Party was withdrawn from Rudé Právo; Funkcionář became merely a policy bulletin; political appointments were not announced; and there were no important addresses by Party leaders.⁴⁵

Actually the Party shares political control to some extent with the army and police. The police suffered from the heavy purging of its organization pari passu with the Party. It lost considerable influence, since it was filled with Slánský's followers; but at present under Soviet-loyal Barák it is unquestionably more influential. The organization underwent considerable reorganization in 1952 under Karol Bacílek. The early post-coup purges of the army resulted in its purification, and it may well be considered the third "transmission belt" of Soviet power to Czechoslovakia. That these three agencies are interwoven to a considerable degree is undeniable; but since it has ever been the Soviet policy to subordinate the military to the political, the assumption here is that the Party is the most powerful of the three agencies, being held in check by the other two.

⁴³Práce, Feb. 21, 1951.

⁴⁴Práce, March 16, 1951.

⁴⁵News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 4 (April 1952), 8.

After the "new course" the Party seems to have regained some of its lost influence. However, it is quite obvious from the continued trials and the difficulties of Party recruitment that the "new course" has not influenced the populace, which has remained openly hostile and suspicious.

Changing Position of the Party

The Party has become a political elite with a vested interest in maintaining its social and economic privileges apart from the masses. This has not always been the case; a combination of events was necessary to compel the evolution of such a caste. During the coup the masses of workers in Prague, the factory militia, and a national strike gave the Party the appearance of commanding a solid proletarian following. The number of agrarian votes from the provinces in 1946 where German land had been redistributed indicated substantial rural support. The broad socializing program of the Party and strong enthusiasm among the people for a national welfare state led the Party to an important victory at the polls, where it amassed 38 per cent of the popular vote, nearly twice that of the next nearest party. The Party advocated a cooperative stand of all parties on reconstruction; an unqualified program of socialization of major industries; agricultural reform and works committees; an anti-German, anti-Hungarian program of physical and cultural integrity guaranteed by the U.S.S.R.

In 1953, however, anti-government riots by the workers in industrial areas, and the progressive liquidation of farmers resisting central authority to the extent that the government was forced to abandon temporarily its agricultural program, indicated violent opposition from the strata which previously had provided the strength of Party support.

The progressive Bolshevization of the Party led to a serious rift between it and the rest of society. The increasing demands of the Soviet Union on Czech economy called for aparatchiks in place of representatives of the working class. The labor force had to be driven, not led, and the economy required technicians. The backbone of the "home Communists" was removed in the purges, and Soviet experts and Soviet-trained Czechs and Slovaks began to assume important posts.

Little insight indeed is required for speculation as to the causes of estrangement between the Party and the populace. The opportune demise of comrades Stalin and Gottwald in 1953 provided an opportunity for the revision of Party policy. The Soviets evidently felt that more was to be gained by a temporary relaxation of pressures on the flagging economic machinery.⁴⁶ The shouts of Pilsen rioters, "We refuse to accept this barefaced robbery," "Give us free elections," etc., are an acceptable indication that the public recognizes the continued rifling of the Czech economy by Russia and does not confound the external form of government with the abuses of the Party.

Size and Composition of the Party

Communist parties have traditionally been exclusionary in their membership policies. The very definitions and requisite attributes of the Party have necessitated this. The Party has variously been defined as the Political Leader of the Proletariat, the Vanguard of the Proletariat, the General Staff of the Proletariat, and so on. To perform its function properly, the Party must be highly disciplined, rigorously trained and firmly controlled.⁴⁷ Under these conditions it has generally been conceded that a Communist Party cannot be a mass party. However, the Czech Communist Party has violated this tradition of class and numerical exclusiveness. In contrast to the Soviet Union where one in every thirty-three inhabitants is a member of the C.P.S.U.,⁴⁸ the K.S.C. shows a member for every 8.2 of the population.⁴⁹ This has run as high as one member to every six to seven in the population and one member to every three citizens eighteen years old (the voting age) and

⁴⁶"New Policy in Czechoslovakia," The World Today, IX, No. 10 (October 1953), 441.

⁴⁷Stalin, op. cit., pp. 107-11.

⁴⁸Pravda, Oct. 9, 1954.

⁴⁹Using the figure 1, 589,234 given by Party Secretary Antonín Novotný in the summer of 1954 (News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 8 [Aug. 1954], 49) as the number of Party members, and 13.0 for the population (Waller Wynne, Jr., The Population of Czechoslovakia [Washington, D. C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 1953], p. 40).

over.⁵⁰ Repeated complaints concerning the social composition are voiced. On August 17, 1952, Rudé Právo printed an article by Central Committee member Bruno Koehler in which, among other things, he voiced his criticism of the fact that of the candidates admitted in the first half of 1952, "more came from local administration, state offices and households than from mines, foundries, power stations, the chemical industry and from the ranks of small and middle farmers."⁵¹

The mass character of the Party has been accounted for on several grounds by Party officials:

1. The necessity to defeat the Party's opponents psychologically by demonstration of power before the coup d'etat in February, 1948;
2. The necessity to keep the economy going after the coup--many experts holding key positions in the production process were offered membership in the party;
3. Finally, the Party considered the extended membership as a means to rapid social change: Thousands of citizens were put under the direct control of this organized body.⁵²

⁵⁰Gadourek, op. cit., p. 21.

⁵¹News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 10 (Oct. 1952), 15.

⁵²Gadourek, op. cit., p. 21.

Table 1
SIZE OF THE PARTY

Year	Month	No. of members (incl. candidates)	Candidates as % of members	No. of Candidates	% of pop.
*1945	May	27,000			.02
/1945	July	547,000			4.0
/1945	Aug.	712,776			5.2
/1946	Mar.	1,081,544			8.9
/1947	Nov.	1,281,138			10.5
§1948	Feb.	1,414,000			11.5
§1948	Mar. 1	1,500,000			12.2
§1948	Mar. 31	1,800,000			14.6
//1948	May	2,000,048			16.3
#1948	June	2,500,000-2,600,000			20.1-21.0
**1949	May	2,311,066	22.6	522,685	18.5
//1950	Aug.	1,899,423			15.4
//1951	Feb. 9	1,677,443	9.5	159,299	13.5
§§1954	Aug.	1,489,234	7.0	103,624	10.80

*"Czechoslovakia on the Road to Socialism," reprinted in Pavel Korbel, Numerical Strength and Composition of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia (New York: Free Europe Press, March 1954), p. 2.

/Rudé Právo, March 21, 1947. Quoted in ibid., p. 3.

/ "Czechoslovakia on the Road . . .," op. cit., p. 4.

§ Ibid., p. 5.

// Ibid., p. 6.

#An estimated 400,000 members were added after Party absorption of the Social Democrats in June, 1948. Korbel, op. cit., p. 6.

**Pravda (Prague), May 28, 1949.

//Paul Barton, Prague à l'heure de Moscou (Paris: Horay, 1954), p. 106.

// Rudé Právo, July 2, 1950. Quoted in Materials on the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (New York: Free Europe Press, Oct. 7, 1954), p. 33.

§§ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 8 (Aug. 1954), 49.

Physical Characteristics of the Party

Immediately after the war the main objective of the K.S. Č. was popularity. Recruiting drives were staged and requirements were lowered for entry into the Party. Necessarily, many opportunists and idealists entered the rolls who would ordinarily not be considered sound class material.⁵³ Three separate categories of opportunists can be identified: business men and professional people with conservative backgrounds who might be blackmailed; minor Fascists who were largely thugs spoiling for a brawl; bureaucrats in key positions who were looking for job security.⁵⁴ In addition there were many people who joined the Party because they favored a socialist regime, because the idea of alliance with Russia seemed reasonable, and because of the strong anti-German stand of the Party. This means that discipline and ideological affinity were considerably watered down; that the "class enemy" (members of non-toiling classes) had found a stronghold even in the Party councils.⁵⁵ The peak in enrollment was reached with the absorption of the Social Democrats after June 27, 1948. Thereafter the Party went through two "mass screenings." The first, from October 1, 1948 to January 31, 1949, reduced its number by several hundred thousand. A united Party was stressed in Party speeches and Deputy Central Secretary Švermová was quoted in Pravda on May 30, 1949, as having established "shockworker" qualifications for new Party members.⁵⁶

The Party then seemed to lose interest in recruits. On July 2, 1950, Rudé Právo announced a second mass screening to take place from September 1 to December 15, 1950. This reduced membership by over six hundred thousand. In addition, the percentage of candidates dropped precipitously; this resulted from (1) a reclassification of candidates

⁵³Ducháček, op. cit., p. 369.

⁵⁴H. Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), p. 309.

⁵⁵Paul Zinner, "Communist Tactics and Strategy in Czechoslovakia." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1953), p. 120.

⁵⁶Quoted by Korbel, op. cit., p. 8.

as members and (2) the difficulty of securing new candidates. Josef Frank, former Deputy Central Secretary of the Party, gave a report which was printed in Rudé Právo in which it was stated that the ban on membership should be lifted but that the quality must be watched.⁵⁷ In 1948, however, the purge of minor officialdom in the Party had started, and by 1951 it was sweeping away the top leaders. Many felt safer outside. At any rate, membership continued to fall so that in August 1954 First Secretary of the Party Novotný announced that there were 721,832 fewer members and candidates than in 1949, and 28,390 fewer members than at the time of the coup.⁵⁸ From November 1948 to June 1954 the Party lost about 40 per cent of its total membership.

Qualitative Factors of Party Membership

Social Origin. Probably the most important consideration in the selection of Party members is the class origin of the candidate.⁵⁹ Since Marxism-Leninism is an environmental-materialist science which conceives of the individual as so much impressionable stuff, and since the Party is a working-class party, a working-class background is *held* virtually necessary for right thinking. However, the difficulty in maintaining the theoretical position of a working-class membership is evidenced by the semantic circumlocution Novotný employed in enumerating the class membership of the Party according to original profession.⁶⁰ This would indicate that according to present occupation the Party's membership is far from ideal; that Party members have been promoted to white-collar jobs, or that recruitment has been carried out among other classes, or both.

The membership lists were closed to all except "Stakhanovites" in the spring of 1949, but after the second Party screening the necessity for recruitment on an individual basis was emphasized. On June 7, 1952

⁵⁷ Rudé Právo, April 13, 1951. Quoted by Korbel, op. cit., p. 10.

⁵⁸ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 8 (Aug. 1954), 49.

⁵⁹ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 22.

⁶⁰ Materials on the Tenth Congress. . . ., op. cit., p. 33.

Rudé Právo advocated the inclusion of "bourgeois experts" in the cadres.⁶¹ Zápotocký stressed the need for these technicians and quoted Lenin's and Malenkov's "Report of 1941" to the same effect--that despite Party orders bureaucrats were checking the backgrounds, not the work, of the candidate. Slánský was blamed for eliminating bourgeois technicians.⁶² Constant reports from mining regions indicate that the vast majority of Party members work above ground, thus relegating offensive tasks to non-Party men.⁶³ In the event of non-fulfillment of the Plan it has thus been convenient for the central Party organs to blame the local organizations for "losing contact with the masses."⁶⁴

Novotný claimed that 60 per cent of the Party was of working-class origin and that 52 per cent of the members admitted since the Ninth Party Congress were workers.⁶⁵ The composition of the delegates to the Tenth Party Congress would indicate a slightly higher percentage: workers, 72.1 per cent; agricultural workers, 7.8 per cent; intelligentsia, 6.0 per cent; white-collar workers, 8.1 per cent; miscellaneous, 6.0 per cent.⁶⁶ This may be explained by the probable predominance of senior members as delegates.

Education, Skills and Careers. Party membership is not confined to people of a certain educational level. It requires people who are experts in the arts sciences, and especially production and management

⁶¹News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 7 (July 1952), 12.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Rudé Právo, Sept. 11, 1952.

⁶⁴For an example of this, see Rudé Právo. Quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 11 (Nov. 1952), 2. Contains complaints on the Ostrava-Karvina region.

⁶⁵Social Composition of the East European Communist Parties (Research Report No. 11 [New York: Free Europe Press, Sept. 1, 1954]), p. 5.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 6

techniques to assist it in fulfilling its tasks.⁶⁷ In 1952 Rudé Právo emphasized the Party's major role: that of "the struggle for plan fulfillment."⁶⁸ If this is granted, the need for educated and skilled people becomes obvious. Three per cent of the delegates at the Tenth Congress had a university education.⁶⁹

Ethnic Origin. Actually, there is no nationality policy on behalf of Czechs and Slovaks. The Party, which purports to transcend national and ethnic differences, shows a considerable preference, at least among the delegates to the Tenth Congress, for Czech members.

Table 2
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF
DELEGATES TO TENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.C.S.*

	<u>% of Delegates</u>	<u>% of Population</u>
Czech	88.0%	69.6-64.6%
Slovak	10.2	25.0-30.0
Hungarian	0.9	4.5
Ukrainian	0.6	0.6
Polish	0.2	0.2
German	0.1	0.1
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

*Social Composition of the East European. . . ., op. cit., p. 7.
Quoted from Rudé Právo, June 16, 1954.

This would follow from the traditional agrarian, Catholic orientation of the Slovaks, and from the election results of 1946 which proved the Slovaks to be less reliable than the Czechs.

After having anathematized the Hungarians and Germans as declared enemies of the Slavs and Communism ever since the war, Funkcionár (Manual for Minor Party Officials) abruptly shifted its ground.⁷⁰

⁶⁷Gadourek, op. cit., p. 23.

⁶⁸Rudé Právo, Jan. 7, 1952. In News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 3 (March 1952), 10.

⁶⁹Materials on the Tenth Congress. . . ., op. cit., p. 8.

⁷⁰Funkcionár, May 11, 1951. In Korbél, op. cit., p. 10.

It declared:

When admitting citizens of German nationality to the Party the committees of the organization will insure an explanation to the members and the working population as to why they are admitted to the Party, that our Party is imbued with the spirit of proletarian internationalism, that international solidarity of the workers is not contrary to patriotism but is closely connected with it. . . .⁷¹

There seemed to be an anti-Semitic undertone to the great Party purges; however, Zdeněk Nejedlý and Karol Bacílek offered the absurd explanation that the purge was merely anti-Zionist, since Zionism is actually a cosmopolitan movement directed against the interests of the Jewish workers.⁷² The Soviet Union was concurrently attempting to win Arab friends in the Near East by condemning Israel and conducting witch hunts against the Jewish doctors at home. Tvorba was closed down in February, 1952, and Gustav Bares, its Jewish editor, was arrested.⁷³

Sex and Age. In 1949, 33 per cent of the Party members and 22 per cent of the candidates were women, according to Rudé Právo.⁷⁴ However, due to the Stakhanovite requirements for entry and the dissatisfaction with the "housewife" enrollment, it would seem that by this time the enlistment of women has diminished. This is borne out by the fact that at the Ninth Party Congress (1949) women comprised 14.7 per cent of the delegates, whereas at the Tenth Congress they made up 13.3 per cent of the total.⁷⁵ In Slovakia women comprised only 11.7 per cent of the Party.⁷⁶

⁷¹Korbel, op. cit., p. 10.

⁷²News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 2(Feb. 1953), 5.

⁷³Ibid., I, No. 3 (March 1952), 9.

⁷⁴Rudé Právo, May 27, 1949.

⁷⁵Materials on the Tenth Congress. . . ., op. cit., p. 8.

⁷⁶Rudé Právo, May 27, 1950.

An age breakdown shows that youth under twenty-five years of age comprises 14.5 per cent of the Party, the percentage of Slovakia being 9.72 per cent.⁷⁷ If we compare the 27,000 Party members after the war to the 1.3 - 1.4 million now enrolled, and consider the ratio 134 (delegates to the Tenth Party Congress who joined before 1945): 394 (total number of delegates), which is close to one-third, we find that the relative importance of the older group persists.⁷⁸ However, the mortality rate of the Party is 80,000 a year, and numerous speeches have been made about the importance of continued recruitment. In 1953 the emphasis in recruiting seemed to be on youth. On July 12 Rudé Právo carried an article recommending young people as the best human material for the Party. Later, on November 18, Rudé Právo complained that youth was being overlooked and that recruitment was proceeding badly. The slowness of enlistments has continued through 1954. The party seniority groupings of delegates to the Tenth Congress are as follows:⁷⁹

Founding Members	2.6%
Joined 1921-38	6.8%
Joined 1939-44	3.4
Joined 1944-February 1948	74.4
Joined after February 1948	12.8
	<u>100.0%</u>

Other Qualifications. Training in the U.S.S.R. or fighting with the Red Army has been considered an important element in securing Party membership and in rising in the organization. In addition, the Party prefers to have people in its ranks whom it can blackmail for criminal or unfavorable political backgrounds;⁸⁰ this simplifies control by both

⁷⁷Gaďourek, op. cit., p. 22.

⁷⁸Korbel, op. cit., p. 17.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 18.

⁸⁰Jozef Swiatło, "The Swiatło Story," News from Behind the Iron Curtain, IV, No. 3 (March 1955).

Party and police. Thus, after the war the Party accepted a considerable number of Fascists and collaborators into its fold.⁸¹

In addition, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (C. P. C. S.) finds itself saddled with an increasing number of Party men both from the Soviet Union and from Germany (including Sudeten Germans). These men act as advisors, exercising a considerable control over the Party and the economy. By far the most important are those men trained in the Soviet Union; the present Minister of the Interior Barák, for instance, was not only trained in the Soviet Union but has lived there most of his life. Immediately after the war the Spanish war group of Slánský, Husák, Šmidke, etc., were the most powerful, but this group has been eliminated and the most reliable people are the Soviet-trained. In addition, there are Sudeten Germans who have filled key places (Bruno Koehler, Zikmund Stein, Bedřich Steiner, etc.). It has been said that the Czech Communists actually held more authority before the coup than they do now.⁸² It is interesting to speculate that immediately after Tito's break with the Kremlin the influence of Germans in C. P. C. S. circles increased, because the Soviets felt that they were more hostile to Yugoslavia and would not follow the traditional feeling of friendship which has characterized Czech-Yugoslav relations.

Party Organization

Principles of Organization.

Democratic centralism and internal Party democracy are the two "inviolable laws of Party life and Party structure" as described by the Central Committee pamphlet, "The Year of Party Schooling."⁸³ To these two organizing principles a third was added in 1953; that is the

81

Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 3.

82

Zinner, op. cit., p. 3.

83

News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 6 (June 1952), 4.

principle of "collective leadership" which has previously been alluded to. This principle, however, does not disturb the operation of the other two principles on the rank and file and on echelons other than the top. It pertains merely to top-level decision making and is largely window trimming, as basic policy is determined in Moscow and transmitted by the C.P.C.S. representative in Moscow to the Czech. Party.⁸⁴

Democratic centralism means, in essence, that there may be discussion of Party policy at any level and that the Party hierarchy should respond to criticism from below on specific issues. These discussions are never discussions on basic policy but on the most efficient implementation of that policy. However, once a decision is made there can be no minority opinion, and the monolithic Party is committed in its entirety to the decision.⁸⁵

Internal Party democracy is the principle of responsibility of the higher Party organs to the lower, and involves the rights of criticism and self-criticism. Theoretically, these elected lower echelons elect the higher ones which are therefore responsible to them. However, the lower echelon leaders themselves become candidates only by approval of a higher organ which vitiates the accountability and sets up a reverse dependency. Zdeněk Fierlinger wrote in December 1952 that criticism and self-criticism were not rights but duties, and that neglect of these activities amount to lack of Bolshevik vigilance.⁸⁶ The right of a junior to criticize a superior Party man is usually cited as democratic, but it must be handled cautiously lest Party policy itself come into question.⁸⁷

⁸⁴Bedřich Breugel, "Methods of Soviet Domination in Satellite States," International Affairs, XXVII, No. 1 (Jan. 1951), 34.

⁸⁵News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 6 (June 1952), 4. See also Stalin's address at Sverdlov University in April 1924, in Leninism, op. cit., p. 171.

⁸⁶News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 6 (June 1953), 5.

⁸⁷Ibid., I, No. 6 (June 1952), 4.

Local Organization

During 1951 there were shakeups in the Party organization from top to bottom. Prior to this the Party had concentrated its units in the basic organization (as opposed to professional organizations)⁸⁸ which, according to Antonín Novotný, constituted 70.2 per cent of 34,942 local organizations as late as May, 1953.⁸⁹ It was decided in February 1952, two months after the Moscow conference and two weeks after the sentencing of the Slánský group, that the C.P.C.S. must make their Party structure identical with that of the C.P.S.U. (B). This meant that the emphasis would shift to the so-called "professional organization" and that most of the Party calls would function on an economic basis rather than an areal basis.⁹⁰ These changes are in accord with section sixty-three of the December 1952 Party Statute, and they implement the rule that the Party is "built on a territorial-production principle."⁹¹ Thus, Novotný was able to announce at the Tenth Congress of the Party in June 1954 that plant (professional) organizations comprised 67.2 per cent (29,933) of the total, village organizations 30.6 per cent (13,623), and street organizations 2.2 per cent (1,006); also that there were 625 communities without village organizations.⁹²

The professional organizations are established in production units. They are composed of a chairman and a secretary or two, depending on the size of the organization. This "cell" will consist of anywhere from three members for small production units to twenty to thirty for the larger industries. In large industry these units are usually organized on an intra-plant work specialization basis, and the plant itself is considered the basic unit, with these larger divisions being represented in the factory council. If these department cells are large enough they themselves can comprise basic units.

⁸⁸ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 26.

⁸⁹ Materials on the Tenth Congress..., op. cit., p. 34.

⁹⁰ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 3 (March 1952), 10.

⁹¹ Materials on the Tenth Congress..., op. cit., p. 34.

⁹² Ibid.

According to the "Party Regulation" (Prague 1949, Ch. 17) the functions of the basic organization are: (1) to carry out Party policy in its own sphere; (2) to see to it that every member and candidate participates in accomplishing the task of the basic organization; (3) to arrange for courses in Marxism-Leninism, train candidates to become good Party members, and to guide Party members and candidates in such a way that they persuade non-Party members of the correctness of Party policy and support it; (4) to assist members and candidates engaged in a public function to discharge their duties as well as possible and to give an account of their activities to the Party; (5) to fight against everything inimical to the Party.⁹³ The Party functions at the lower levels are seen to be primarily those concerned with recruitment, education, observation of members and candidates, propagation of Party policy, organization and administration of Party programs, and keeping the central organization informed as to the reception of and progress of Party resolutions.

It was a logical corollary of the dissatisfaction with production that the Party should be reorganized along production lines. When it became necessary to teach the workers Soviet methods of labor, to instruct them in the importance of "socialist competition" and to encourage "Stakhonovitism," it was necessary to shift the base of activity to the production unit. In addition, the intensity of action on the economic "front" will be increased, as the worker's place of productive activity will also be his place of Party service. There will be no excuses that a Party member was kept from doing his job for the Party because of his employment.⁹⁴ Rudé Právo also commented, in discussing the re-organization of the Party, that such an organization will fix the responsibility for production failures.⁹⁵

⁹³ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 25.

⁹⁴ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 3 (March 1952), 10.

⁹⁵ Rudé Právo, Nov. 17, 1952, in ibid., II, No. 1 (Jan. 1953), 15.

In the rural areas the village units continue to predominate as the centers of Party activity. It is assumed that when collectivization is completed the collective farm as the center of economic activity will also be the Party base.⁹⁶

There are some block or street units remaining; these are organized on a strictly geographical basis in large cities to contact the population which does not work in factories or larger production centers.⁹⁷

Intermediary Organizations

District Party Committees are elected from below; however, strict supervision over their personnel is exercised from above, and the candidate for a position on the District Committees must have the authorization of the Party Central Secretariat and presumably also of the Party Control Commission. There are 250-300 of these District organizations, and they are more or less merely a bureaucratic centralizing agency in the Party hierarchy.⁹⁸ They do play an important part in the admission of candidates to membership, and in general they execute absolute supervisory control over the work of the lower Party units. Perhaps their most important functions are the coordination of the work of local units and the keeping under control of these units. Occasionally they are requested to submit reports on special tasks in their areas, and it is presumed that the basis for their organization is likewise economic. From this echelon to the top of the hierarchy the individual members have no more control over the composition of the organs. The remainder are elected indirectly through the system of delegates.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 3 (March 1953), 10.

⁹⁷ Materials on the Tenth Congress..., op. cit., p. 34.

⁹⁸ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 13.

⁹⁹ Gadourek, op. cit., pp. 23-29; also, Vlastislav Chalupa and Mojmír Povolný, Consolidation of a Totalitarian State (Leiden: Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, 1950), pp. 1-19.

The County Party Committees are elected by delegates sent from the District Committees. The candidates for County Committees have necessarily received prior certification of desirability by the higher Party organs. There are nineteen of these committees plus the city of Prague, all of which are named and have their headquarters in the most important city of the region (Plzeň, Košice, Nitra, etc.). This echelon provides further centralization of control, and it presides over the work of the District Committee as tightly as the latter supervises that of the local Party organization. These Committees exercise some initiative in dismissing undesirable Party members and are required to submit reports to higher organs on special topics.¹⁰⁰

The Party Congress

The Party Congress is usually cited as one of the foremost examples of Party democracy. These Congresses are supposed to be called not less than once every four years. The Ninth Congress met in May 1949, and the tenth in June 1954, so apparently the statutory stipulation for such meetings is modified at Party convenience. The delegates to the Congress are elected on the basis of one for every thousand members. At the Tenth Congress there were 1,402 delegates elected, 1,392 of whom were able to attend. Of these 1,226 were from Czech regions and 166 from Slovak regions. These delegates represent not only geographical Party regions; mass organization representatives and government officials attend as well.¹⁰¹

The meetings consist of reports of Party officials on economic and political matters and the report of the Auditing Commission. In addition there is usually a speech given by a dignitary from the visiting Soviet delegation (at the Tenth Congress this speech was given by Krushchev). The real business of the Congress is to elect the Central Committee of the Party. In addition it also elects the Party Auditing Commission.

¹⁰⁰ Materials on the Tenth Congress..., op. cit., p. 5; also, News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 4 (April 1953), 10-11.

¹⁰¹ Materials on the Tenth Congress..., op. cit., pp. 6-8.

There is also supposed to be discussion of the reports given in the name of the previous Central Committee and the agencies, but these are usually limited to rubber stamping and unanimous acceptance of suggestions made.

The Party is artificially broken down into the Party of the Historic Czech Provinces (C.P.C.S.) and the Slovak Communist Party (C.P.S.) This division is merely a paper concept, as the C.P.S. exists within the framework of the C.P.C.S. Thus at the Party Congress of the C.P.S. the Central Committee for the C.P.S. is elected. This in turn elects a Buro (corresponds to C.P.C.S. Presidium) and its own Secretariat. However, the Party Congress of the C.P.S. cannot convene unless called by the Central Committee of the C.P.C.S. The C.P.S. is almost fully dependent upon the Czech Party. Its most significant member, Karol Bacílek, has important C.P.C.S. allegiances, having been Minister of State Security.

The highest organ of the Party, according to the Party Statute, is the Presidium. This unit is composed of twenty-two members and is empowered to make all policy decisions between sessions of the Central Committee, which is seldom in session because of its size and unwieldiness. It is elected by the Central Committee, usually at the time of the Congress or shortly thereafter.¹⁰²

The Central Committee also elects the Political Secretariat (Politburo) and the Organizational Secretariat (Orgburo). In addition, it elects a Party Control Commission which is responsible to it and has considerable discretion in purging lower echelons.¹⁰³

Changing Party Machinery

The machinery of the Party has altered somewhat since the Ninth Congress. According to the official reports this is due to the inability of the Party to carry out its tasks, but probably it reflects more directly Soviet dissatisfaction with Party operations and personnel, and a desperate attempt on the part of the hierarchy to model the Party on a Soviet form. Thus, a special Party conference was called for December 1952,

¹⁰²Gadourek, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁰³News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 3 (March 1953), 12.

as soon as Gottwald returned from the Nineteenth Congress in Moscow. Rudé Právo commented on November 17 that the Party organization in Czechoslovakia had ceased to meet the requirements of the new situation. It was "proved" by the exposure of Slánský, et. al., that the imperialist agencies had corrupted the Party's "power of attraction and fighting capacity." In addition, the Party organ complained that the Party was unable to cope with its organization in accelerating industrial production and in re-educating the masses along Soviet lines.¹⁰⁴

Before the dismissal of Rudolf Slánský in September 1951, the Party was differentiated into a political office under President Gottwald and the office of the General Secretary Slánský.¹⁰⁵ Slánský, through his manipulation of the Cadres Screening Committee attached to his office, had proceeded to fill Party posts with his candidates and, much as Stalin had done in the twenties, build himself a solid personal following.¹⁰⁶ The danger of this was seen by Gottwald, and after his interview with Stalin in the Crimea when the balance shifted in favor of Gottwald and Slánský was removed, the position of General Secretary was also abolished. In place of a split Party Gottwald united both the Party organs and the administrative organs in his person as President of the State and Chairman of the Party. In place of the Party Secretariat two new organs, the Politburo and Orgburo, were set up. Later, upon the increase of power of Antonín Novotný, Chairman of the Organizational Secretariat, that department's personnel, etc., were transferred, with Novotný as First Secretary becoming the new Party Secretariat. Upon the death of Gottwald the position of Party Chairman perished also. Upon the election of Zápotocký to the Presidency, Zdeněk Nejedlý, Minister of Education, remarked that there was no one man great enough to fill Gottwald's shoes; thus the policy of collegiate control announced by Malenkov following Stalin's death was effected in Czechoslovakia.

The all-important Cadres Screening Committee was abolished in

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, No. 1 (Jan. 1953), p. 15.

¹⁰⁵ Gadourek, op. cit, p. 24.

¹⁰⁶ Schmidt, op. cit, p. 467.

1951 and a Committee on Party Control was established.¹⁰⁷ This new organ is not as yet attached to the Party Secretariat and is responsible to the Party Central Committee (i. e., the Presidium).

It is impossible to designate a single branch of the Party as the most powerful. This power resides with people rather than with organs. Thus, many of the Party organs have interlocking directorates. Novotný was, for instance, a member of both the Political and Organization Secretariats and of the Presidium at the same time.

In addition, the attitude of Moscow seems dominant in the delegation of power. The first indication of Slánský's loss of favor was the shift of influence within the Kremlin from A. A. Zhdanov, powerful Party theoretician, to Georgi Malenkov. Zhdanov had promulgated the "international line" and sponsored it within the Cominform as the official credo. It was known that Slánský and Geminder (purged and executed in 1952) were Zhdanov appointees in the Cominform.¹⁰⁸ Shortly before the final collapse of the Slánský group, A. J. Lavrentiev was appointed as ambassador from the U.S.S.R. to Czechoslovakia, where he arrived November 15. Eleven days later he paid a visit to Kopecký's Ministry of Information, and on the following day the first public mention of Slánský's treason was made, accompanied by Slánský's arrest. Lavrentiev was transferred shortly thereafter to take part in Rumania's Pauker purge.¹⁰⁹

Special Party Organs

In addition to the formal Party organization there are other agencies attached to the Party, some permanent, some temporary. Such organs as "Agitprop," the Party organ for propaganda which is financed and staffed by the Party, are maintained on a permanent basis. The main organizations, such as labor unions and youth groups, are discussed elsewhere.

There are ad hoc organs set up for temporary political purposes,

¹⁰⁷ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁰⁸ Ladislav Feierabend, "The Gottwald Era in Czechoslovakia," Journal of Central European Affairs, October 1953, pp. 246-56.

¹⁰⁹ Gadourek, op. cit., pp. 48-49, 246.

such as the Electoral Commission which conducts elections, Verification Commissions for checking Party membership, and commissions to conduct public discussions on measures which the Party intends to introduce. These are largely teams of local Party functionaries.

The Party also maintains apparats, brain trusts for special jobs on ad hoc assignment by the Party hierarchy. These apparats are composed of such specialists as statisticians, social scientists, and psychologists who carry out work for the Party in their particular specialty. These men are under the Presidium of the Central Committee or the secretary of the County Committee.¹¹⁰

Mobility of the Party Elite

Due to the constant high mortality among Party elders, who still hold the majority of higher posts, the major purges, and continuing elimination of disenchanted Party members, there is great possibility for advancement in the Party elite. In addition, there are limitations on the duration of terms in many of the lower Party regional committees, which increases participation. The Central Committee contained ninety-seven members in May 1949, but in 1954 only thirty-four of these were re-elected. Three were nominated as substitutes, three were placed on the Central Verification Commission, and the rest were dropped. Of the fifteen-member Central Auditing Commission only seven were retained; of the seven-man C.P.C.S. Secretariat, two were hanged, one died, one was in prison, two disappeared and one was deprived of all Party functions. At the time of the Ninth Congress there was a twenty-two man Presidium. The Tenth Congress re-elected ten of these men. Of the remainder two were hanged, two died under suspicious conditions, two are in prison, two disappeared, two were eliminated from political life, and two were not re-elected.¹¹¹ There is thus quite a turnover in the higher ranks;¹¹² however, the members at the top are still largely men who joined before

¹¹⁰ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 24.

¹¹¹ Barton, op. cit., p. 107.

¹¹² Materials on the Tenth Congress . . ., op. cit., pp. 36-37.

World War II.¹¹³

Party Controls

Control from Moscow

The highest levels of the C. P. C. S. are under the direction of Moscow.¹¹⁴ This intimate supervision is carried out through the personnel of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Soviet technicians at various strategic places, especially in the Ministries of the Interior and Defense. Actually there is some evidence that the entire satellite police is controlled by a central Soviet operated agency.¹¹⁵ These two ministries are the only ones which are controlled directly from their Moscow counterparts.¹¹⁶ Soviet officials who administer ^{the} "Comecon" are an important controlling device, as are the Soviet military experts who assist in the satellite fulfillment of military commitments made in connection with the Warsaw Pact. This instrument places the Czech army directly under the control of Marshall Konev. In addition, there is the steady ideological pressure of the Cominform which keeps its members in line.

Control over Personnel: Selection and Training

The Party can exercise a selective control over its members by virtue of applying a yardstick of Bolshevik desiderata to past history, skills, political sympathies and so on. In addition, the prospective Party members must undergo a period of candidacy during which he may be closely observed at his place of work and during his leisure time. He is approached on the street by Party members who ask his reaction to various issues, and his attendance to his Party functions, at meetings, at Soviet films and in the Party school all are indicators of his enthusiasm

¹¹³ Zápotocký joined in 1921 (founder); Bacílek joined in 1921 (founder); Novotný joined in the twenties; Dolanský joined in 1921; Cepička joined in 1938; Široký joined in 1929 (helped found Party in Bratislava).

¹¹⁴ Zinner, op. cit., p. 126.

¹¹⁵ Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York; Macmillan, 1949), p. 119.

¹¹⁶ Breugel, op. cit., p. 38.

and sincerity. ¹¹⁷

The Party is able to train its recruits through schooling in Marxist-Leninist principles and Party history. The object is to test the reactions of the candidate or member and to indoctrinate him properly with the correct interpretation of political and economic events. Party schooling was conducted on an informal level prior to September 1952. Now, however, the "Party University" has been established which accepts applicants of ages eighteen to forty and trains them as professional Communist functionaries. The course lasts three years, after which time a degree is conferred. This school, located in Prague, is the only private school in Czechoslovakia, being financed by the Party Central Committee.

Control Mechanisms

The Party, being sole owner of the social product, is able to dispense largess in material things as well as positions of influence to its most trusted members. In addition, the negative sanction, the denial of ration cards or housing, is always possible for those who incur Party displeasure.

Group activities are important mechanisms for testing the individual member's loyalty. His reactions can be watched in classes and discussion groups and his enthusiasm checked at mass rallies and performance of Party tasks. Within the organization there exists a counter-organ of informers which runs opposite to the established hierarchy. ¹¹⁸ In this connection the practice of criticism and self-criticism are used to expose both the critic and the criticized. ¹¹⁹

Crimes Against the Party

The most important crimes against the Party are ideological deviations, the corresponding errors in conduct, and either ineptitude in carrying out assigned Party tasks or violation of Party discipline. The most important ideological errors are the "rightist-nationalist" (the

¹¹⁷ Gadourek, op. cit., pp. 29-50.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 39.

¹¹⁹ News from Behind The Iron Curtain, II, No. 7 (June 1953), p. 5.

stressing of national interests and desires in place of those of the Party as an international organization controlled by Moscow) and the "leftist-internationalist" (the overstressing of the internationalist concept of the Party, its theoretical goals and propositions, when tactical considerations issued by Moscow should be of prior importance, even where they conflict). Many of these errors, if serious enough, are masked in stereotypes which correspond to propaganda needs of the moment. These needs are largely the needs of the Soviet Union. This is illustrated by the use of the anti-Western line which is popular in the Soviet Union's "struggle for peace" and the continual trial of enemies of the state (Party) who are under the control of Western agents.

A crime against the Party, by Communist reasoning, is a crime against society. It aids the state's enemies and is open to state prosecution, therefore, in civil or military courts. The Party, controlling courts and investigations, thus is able to bring to trial, expel, and/or execute its members. It has an extra-legal power of life or death over them.

The Purge

The purges which have rocked the C.P.C.S. have been the most extensive of any behind the Iron Curtain. In the first purge (the "first mass screening") of October 1948 to January 31, 1949, 2,418,199 members were screened, 76,638 were struck off the rolls, 30,495 were expelled, and 522,683 were demoted to the status of candidates.¹²⁰ During the second mass screening (September 1-December 15, 1950) 1,846,957 members were screened and 143,590 were struck off the registry. Thus, 4.5 per cent of the members were expelled or struck off at the first screening, and 8.4 per cent were expelled or struck off at the second.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Pavel Korbelt and V. Vagašský, Purges in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (New York: Free Europe Press, Oct. 1952), p. 6. Gadourek (op. cit., pp. 44-45) remarks that there is a distinction between being crossed out (struck out) and dismissed (expelled); the former is for minor offenses with the chance of reaffiliation, and the latter for more grievous misdemeanors by more important persons. In addition, he adds a third category, the "excluded," who are enemies of the working class and suffer the severest penalties.

¹²¹ Korbelt and Vagašský, op. cit., p. 8.

This first wave of purges swept away hundreds of officials from the Ministries of Trade, Foreign Affairs and Information and local minor officials. It included the Vilém Nový, Spanish War veteran and editor of Rudé Právo.¹²² The second major wave struck the Slovak Communist Party, where many leaders were accused of bourgeois nationalism. This took place early in 1950 and eliminated Vladimír Clementis, who had spent time in the West as Czech UN representative. By November 1950 many top military and state security men had been removed and the purge was beginning to take high Party officials with it. (Otto Šling and Marie Švermova, Secretary of the Brno CP and Chief of the Orgburo of the Central Secretariat, respectively. By September 1951, the movement had taken many of the high Party men and continued to take its toll of those implicated in their trials through December 1952.¹²³

1. Of the 97 members of the Central Committee elected in May, 1949, at least 30 were completely purged or suffered a drastic decline in Party status.
2. Of the 22 members of the Presidium of the Central Committee at least eight were purged or decimated.
3. Of the seven members of the Secretariat, all except Gottwald were purged.¹²⁴

The "purge" has express benediction in the words of Stalin and had become a recognized Party instrument.

Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social pacifists. The Party becomes consolidated by purging itself of opportunist elements.¹²⁵

¹²²Soviet Affairs, Notes (Washington, D. C.) No. 155 (Nov. 25, 1953), pp. 19-20. Swiatko, op. cit., advances the thesis that there is a hierarchical arrangement for Communist purges, which is, in order of preference: (1) Spanish War idealists and internationalists (almost all gone); (2) those who spent World War II in the West; and (3) leaders of home resistance to Nazis.

¹²³Soviet Affairs, Notes, op. cit., pp. 21-28.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 20.

¹²⁵Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, op. cit., p. 123.

sold to the Chinese or in the local native market.

All of the interior peoples do a little hunting and fishing. The hunting techniques among the Dusun include communal drives and pit traps for the larger animals, deer and wild pig. The fishing techniques range from rod and line fishing to various types of basketry traps.

On the plains almost every acre of available flat land in the neighborhood of the pagan villages is under wet rice cultivation, and is split up into small fields from half an acre to three acres in extent. These fields are owned and worked individually and are planted every year. Each owner now has a Government title for his land. . . . If he wishes to sell his land to a compatriot, the transfer must be registered in the District Land Office. . . .¹

Each field is surrounded by a mud bank which retains the water when the field is flooded either by rain or by means of the irrigation system.² In August or September, while the women are planting the nurseries, the men are repairing the mud banks and constructing the dams for the irrigation system.³ When the fields have been flooded and the earth has become sufficiently soft, it is ploughed. A wooden plough, its share shod with iron, is drawn by a water buffalo over the ground until it has been well churned. A wooden framework with a number of spokes made of hard wood is then drawn over the churned mud to break up any remaining lumps of earth. A simple buffalo-drawn harrow completes the preparation of the soil for planting. The planting is a task for women. When it is completed, the field may be weeded once before harvest. The interval between planting and harvesting is taken up by the job of keeping the birds, monkeys, rodents, and other beasts from the ripening rice. For this the Dusun have devised a variety of "scarers" and traps. In addition, the people them-

¹Rutter, *op. cit.*, p. 90. The Dusun pays an annual quit rent for each acre of land, but it is nominal compared to the rent paid by a Chinese or European. The government must sanction the sale of land by a native to a non-native.

²In some districts the rain is enough to do the job; in others an irrigation system with dykes, sluices, and/or bamboo conveyors is employed.

³The building of the dams is communal work, and one who shirks after due notice is liable to a fine. The closing of an irrigation ditch or the flooding of a neighbor's field also brings a fine.

the Soviet Union to insure loyalty.¹³⁰ Given this situation, somebody had to be purged, and the removal of Slánský, et al., had some advantages which the purge of Gottwald would not have. Most of those purged were Jewish, which corresponded to the Soviet Union's position in Palestine at the time. Most were strong personalities, which might be dangerous in the nationalist sense.¹³¹ Most were unpopular with the public, and deliveries to the Soviet Union were falling behind schedule; this group would be used as a scapegoat for mal-administration to hide Soviet plundering; they could be thrown to the lions as a sop for public opinion.¹³²

Party Morale and Effectiveness

Gottwald declared that the nation had followed the Slánský trial "with passionate contempt for the treacherous criminals." However, the public reaction was disappointing. Though the trials were hailed as a great victory, most Czechs were not taken in.¹³³ The only real damage seemed to be in the Party itself; the purge seemed to have shaken the ranks of the Party seriously.¹³⁴

After the coup there was initially great spirit and enthusiasm in Party ranks; it had been a great economic and social victory for Party members. Lately, however, there has been increasing terror and distrust in the upper echelons of the Party¹³⁵ and apathy and indifference in the lower ranks. In an article in Květy¹³⁶ Gottwald stated that Party propagandists were without enthusiasm and Communist speakers bored the audiences by lack of variety and enthusiasm, that the propagandists in rural areas tried to avoid work by declaring that there was nothing to

¹³⁰Korbel and Vagašský, op. cit., p. 52.

¹³¹Ibid., p. 53.

¹³²Gadourek, op. cit., p. 50.

¹³³News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 2 (Feb. 1953), 4-5.

¹³⁴Ibid., I, No. 6 (June 1952), 12-13.

¹³⁵Korbel and Vagašský, op. cit., p. 52.

¹³⁶Květy (Prague), Nov. 13, 1952.

talk about.¹³⁷ Despite criticism, there was obvious apathy at the local levels. The press complained that meetings were only formalities and that "Bolshevik enthusiasm" was entirely absent.¹³⁸ Cadre propaganda and recruiting policies were held to be inadequate and the education of the cadres insufficient. Rovnost declared that the ideological deviations and organizational disorders of the Party were the result of poor training, and that entrants into the "Year of Party Schooling" had sharply decreased throughout the area.¹³⁹ The Tenth Party Congress blamed the lack of Party enrollment and Party weakness on the Slánský group.¹⁴⁰ It appears that the Kremlin's policy of establishing both loyalty and enthusiasm is contradictory and the values desired antipodal.

The party hierarchy's continual calls on its members to stamp out bureaucratism is indicative of the demoralization of the lower ranks and of the fear of making decisions.¹⁴¹ There is increasing evidence that factory cells and managers are being more influenced by the workers than by Party dictates in their wage policies. In July 1954, at the Tenth Congress, Premier Široký dealt extensively with the lack of work discipline and the failures of plant management.¹⁴² Ideological firmness, it appears, is also suffering and there are dangerous signs of "Social Democratism, Masarykism," etc.¹⁴³

The virtual absence of any important statements by C.P.C.S. leaders in the last few months of 1953 indicate the Party had fallen into disrepute with the Kremlin. It appears that the whole unstable edifice is being held

¹³⁷ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 1 (Jan. 1953), 7.

¹³⁸ Ibid., No. 4 (April 1953), pp. 10-11.

¹³⁹ Rovnost (Brno), Sept. 23, 1953; in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 11 (Nov. 1953), 4.

¹⁴⁰ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 8 (Aug. 1954), 48-50.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., No. 5 (May 1954), p. 5.

¹⁴² Ibid., No. 7 (July 1954), p. 51.

¹⁴³ Ibid., No. 1 (Jan. 1954), p. 47.

together from the outside through the subordination of the Czech organs of violence to the Soviet authorities.

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CZECHOSLOVAK POLICE

There are countless nets of police, spies and informers within a police state. In Czechoslovakia these are constantly being regrouped, dissolved or added to so that the outline of the behemoth at a single moment is rather difficult to identify. However, the names of some of these organs, their official functions and subordination present a rather complete picture of the tangled skein of police authority which drives its captives to excessive production "norms." Many of the units are unfamiliar to the conventional Western concept of police. The larger ones are organized along the lines of military units and operate in mass formations with military tactics and weapons. It follows that the purpose of the police is conceived differently than in the West. The primary function of the police in the "Czechoslovak People's Democracy" is to quash all resistance either actual or potential, individual or collective, to the Party and its mandates, or even to its unpublished collective will. In the West the values are somewhat more diverse and are oriented toward the protection of the individual from the abuses of the state or a submodal fringe called the criminal element. In Czechoslovakia one might say the situation was reversed, and the discreditable have the upper hand.

Police Units

The actual size of the various police and informer organizations is impossible to estimate. The strength of the police was estimated at about 150,000 in 1951.¹ The figures for security expenditures as such are not published in the budget. Even if they were published this would only be part of the story, because the police are known to have their own enterprises. The first postwar Minister of the Interior, Nosek, said that political intelligence must earn all the money it needs for

¹"The Satellite Armed Forces," The World Today, VII, No. 6 (June 1951), 233.

its work on the spot.² Many police enterprises sprang up as a result. In addition, much of the booty which the police gather as a result of their large-scale deportation activities either is appropriated by individual officers or is sold for the benefit of the police bosses. It is doubtful if any of the funds go to the state, since this sort of activity has the effect of insuring a loyal constabulary both through augmented income and criminal complicity. It is rather surprising that the architect of the Czech police system, Toman, was arrested for corruption, though undoubtedly this was the case.³

The S. N. B.

The S. N. B. (National Security Guard) is the mainstay of the regime. It is by far the largest police organ and is manned by the most politically reliable people available. This is necessary as a check on "Elemental Forces" in the army, which is a great deal less reliable than the Sovietized S. N. B. Wherever there is a country town there is a concentration of S. N. B. power. It is reported that there are 19 regional commands, 271 district commands and about 2,500 local S. N. B. stations.⁴

The tasks of the S. N. B. are many and various. They can be classified conveniently under these six headings: (1) the apprehension of criminals; (2) interrogation of criminals; (3) the protection of socialist property; (4) control of traffic; (5) large-scale actions against demonstrations; (6) guarding forced labor camps.

The S. N. B. works very closely with the Party. One of the major requisites of membership in the S. N. B. is the Party identification card, and since the S. N. B. undergoes frequent purges the ranks are filled by persons recommended by local Party units. This has the effect of pre-

²Bedřich Breugel, "Methods of Soviet Domination in Satellite States," International Affairs, XXVII, No. 1 (January, 1951), 38.

³Ibid.

⁴Rudolf Bautz, "National Security in Czechoslovakia" (unpublished manuscript, Library of Congress microfilm, 1952).

serving loyalty within the police. In addition, the Party statute states in paragraph 71 that the Party units formed within the security forces work according to directives of the C.P.C.S. Central Committee. The job of policeman is an attractive calling for Party members. There is status and material reward, and positions in the S.N.B. have attracted many Party men.⁵

The S.N.B. patrolman has several streets assigned to him. In rural areas he will be assigned several villages. In such an area he will have established his own informers. These usually consist of people who report on about ten of their neighbors. They are responsible to the police for the activities of their subjects. There are networks of informers in schools and other centers of activity. These are Party people for the most part, or are people who can be blackmailed into informing. An interesting feature of the informer system is the method of household books which was worked out in 1953. This is a readaptation of a system introduced by the Germans during the war for purposes of economy and security. These books are kept by owners of buildings or by their delegated assistants, usually the janitor. The books record the time of both permanent and temporary residence. In addition, the strategic position of the janitor has made him useful as an S.N.B. informer, and many are employed in such a capacity.

Another method of keeping the citizen in line is the Citizen's Identification Book which was introduced in 1950. This is some twenty-seven pages long, and it replaced all other cards which the citizen was obliged to carry. It contains birth registration, labor record, citizenship certificate and other information, and the possessor is obliged to carry it on his person at all times.

The police are authorized to check all passports of drivers on the state highways. Another method of interference in the lives of citizens is the large-scale searching of houses for the illegal possession of arms. During the course of such investigations the avaricious constabulary frequently impounds private papers or valuables. Such is the apprehension of the citizenry that these injustices usually evoke no protest.

⁵I. Gađourek, Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953), p. 70.

The S.N.B. supervised the large-scale deportations from Prague, Bratislava and other major centers to the country, largely to the east, and the population transfers from and into border areas. According to the "State Frontier Protection Act" of July 11, 1951, only loyal citizens who are "devoted to the people's democratic country" are permitted to reside within these strategic areas.⁶ The police conduct the transfers of the aged and unproductive or politically unreliable out of harm's way and clear the space in vital areas for workers and Party members. This is a considerable undertaking and many thousands of people have been resettled. Some have been transferred to Russia.

The political qualifications for police employment have already been mentioned. An interesting development is the increased employment of women Communist fanatics, who are considered quite effective. There are special women's training centers. Women operate false escape routes and do spy work in crowds.⁷ Many of the police are sadists and sex deviates who in a normally ordered society would be marginal men. This type is convinced of its own superiority, and the police as a group are to a great degree self-willed, treading cautiously only when Party members are involved. The terror inspired by such a system is instrumental in keeping the population subordinated.

It is interesting to speculate to what degree the S.N.B. is controlled by the Ministry of the Interior (the C.P.C.S.) and to what degree by Moscow directly through M.V.D. liaison officers. It was reported in 1952 that there were some eighty M.V.D. agents in Bratislava, separately billeted.⁸ Also in the police school at Řepý in 1951-52 there were six M.V.D. instructors, including a colonel and a major, in the counter-intelligence courses.⁹ The Ministry of the Interior is the only agency

⁶P. Korbel and V. Vagasský, Population Transfers, Deportations and Forced Labor Camps in Czechoslovakia (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, 1951), p. 4.

⁷Bautz, op. cit., p. 11.

⁸R.I.C. Bulletin #5805B (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe).

⁹R.I.C. Bulletin #5289.

which works directly with its Soviet counterpart.¹⁰ There are members of the Soviet security system in the Ministry as well as agents of other satellites. Jozef Swiatlo reports that the Polish police are staffed with some M. V. D. members and that during the Gomulka investigation he worked with the Prague Ministry in an attempt to find evidence from the Slánský proceedings to use in the Polish situation.¹¹ It has been remarked that as early as 1947 all the satellite police systems were under a unified Soviet command excepting only Chechoslovakia.¹²

The care with which the Minister of the Interior or of Internal Security is selected indicates Soviet authorization of his appointment. All of Nosek's subordinates were Moscow stooges who spent the war years in Russia (Spurný, Polák, etc.). Kopriva, in charge of the big purges, and purged himself in 1952, is said to have taken orders directly from Moscow.¹³ Bacílek frequently praised the M. V. D. and has spent some time in the U. S. S. R., while the present Minister, Gustav Barák, lived most of his life in the Soviet Union.¹⁴

The handling of the Pilsen and Prague riots was an interesting example of the technique of quashing mass demonstrations by isolating them and then breaking them up into small fragments. This action was performed in 1953 by Czech army and police units. It is also interesting to observe that the suppression of the Berlin riots, an action of Soviet troops and German police units, was executed in precisely the same manner. Certainly the tactics if not the tacticians were of the same school in these matters.

¹⁰Breugel, op. cit., p. 38.

¹¹Jozef Swiatlo, "The Swiatlo Story," News From Behind the Iron Curtain, IV, No. 3 (March 1955).

¹²Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 119.

¹³Bautz, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

¹⁴Nosek, Minister of Internal Security, 1948-1953; Kopriva, Minister of National Security, 1949-1952; Bacílek, Minister of National Security, 1952-53; Barák, Minister of Interior, 1953-

The St. B.

The St. B. (State Security Guard) is the political police, and like the S.N.B. it is subordinated directly to the Ministry of the Interior. This organization is designed to detect conspiratorial activities before they materialize. Its agents have their own network of informers. It is an elite group of the police corps, and a member receives higher pay than the S.N.B. member. The members of the St. B. receive specialized training in some branch of the economy and are sent as civilian workers to various jobs or even as plant managers to conduct operating units in the economy. Here they report on their co-workers, subordinates or superiors.¹⁵ The St. B. is the secret police of Czechoslovakia; it handles mostly political cases. It keeps vast files on virtually everybody. The information is taken in triplicate: one copy remains in the St. B. files, one goes to the Ministry of the Interior and the third is entered in the Party files.¹⁶

The V. S.

In addition, special units of the S.N.B. were established which were organized as storm troops. These were grouped under regional commands and had heavy weapons and motorized equipment, including tanks. Later, in 1952-53, these units were separated altogether from the S.N.B. and were organized under their own command as a separate organization, the V. S. (Interior Guard). They served as a counterpart to the Border Guard. They are used mainly to guard large industrial enterprises or strategic areas. Also, the V. S. provides the interior of the country with a heavy striking force to handle emergency situations for which the local S.N.B. is not equipped. These units operate

¹⁵Gadourek, op. cit., p. 70.

¹⁶R.I.C. Bulletin #5598.

much like an army with mass formations and the latest equipment. The V. S. is directly subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior.

The P. S.

The P. S. (Border Guard) is an elaborate unit under the Ministry of the Interior which is composed of members of the S. N. B. and the army. The command is broken down into seven sectors, each sector being assigned to a brigade. The brigades are further divided into units of thirty men billeted in barracks along the border. These barracks are 1000-5000 meters from the border. The guards patrol in pairs, and if one of the guards succeeds in escaping, the other is held liable for a prison sentence of up to six years.

The border itself is divided into two belts. The immediate border, the "forbidden zone," is one to two kilometers wide. In the wooded areas trees are cut in a band of eight to ten yards and the entire area is stripped of buildings and inhabitants. Anyone in this region risks being shot unless accompanied by a border guard. The second belt, the "frontier zone," is from five to twenty kilometers deep. It is heavily patrolled by the P. S. and S. N. B. and may be entered only by foresters and agricultural workers. All directional signs on roads, etc., are removed. The S. N. B. has stations in villages and guards on all trains. Switchboards are operated by the army. Unreliable people are moved out of the area. S. N. B. men wear plain clothes. The citizens are requested to report all strangers in the area. The P. S. uses the latest in equipment and is highly mobilized. Also, dogs are used in its operations.

The Factory Militia

The Factory Militia works locally under the supervision of the S. N. B. or another police unit; however, it is subordinated organizationally to the Minister of the Interior and policy decisions are made for it at that level. The Factory Militia also works under the immediate direction of the management of the enterprise. The

organization is largely an urban development. It was important during the coup and is kept in reserve now as an armed unit in the event of mass demonstrations. The members no longer carry arms, but these are held in readiness at the factory for instant use. This group consists of Party faithfuls who can be mobilized quickly. The day-to-day activity of the militia consists of informing on their fellow workers and reporting their actions to the police. It is also active in frontier areas where it questions strangers, etc. The strength of this unit was about 60,000 in 1950.¹⁷

The V. B. Z.

The V. B. Z. (Public Security of the Railroads) is an organization which was established in 1952 for guarding railroad transportation, a subdivision of the S. N. B. Its members are uniformed guards with full-time guard duty on bridges, stations and marshalling yards as well as on the actual trains.

The Army Units

The Army has its C. Z. (Counter Intelligence Service) which works within the army and abroad with the services of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The local units, which are of battalion strength, are usually referred to as D. C. Z. In addition, the Information Service of the Czech Army, which works with the Party and the Ministry of Information, controls army morale and indoctrination and keeps files on recruits. The information on recruits is gathered months before they are inducted.

¹⁷Gadourek, op. cit., p. 70.

Informal Groupings

The function of janitors has already been dealt with. In addition, foresters are organized into an informal information unit. They can demand to see identification cards of any one within forest areas, and they report suspicious or unknown people to the police in frontier areas. Also, special interest is taken in suborning conductors and trainmen who are in a position to pick up information and relay it to the police. Many of these are active police informants.

Other informal bodies include the firemen and a special body of V.B. assistants, which were recruited on a volunteer basis in 1953 from among the rural population to watch state property and Unified Agricultural Cooperatives. They are organized in units of from three to ten and act as informers as well as guards of "socialist property." They wear arm bands when performing their guard duties. This duty is done in the individual's spare time, since he holds a regular job.

The police are especially interested in having their confidants in public places where remarks may be unguarded. Their method of recruitment has been neatly illustrated by an exile from Moravia who was accused of setting fire to the farm of the chairman of the local collective. The police tried to extort a confession and promised the suspect his freedom if he would find out who listened to foreign broadcasts or intended to escape. His contact man was an St. B. agent who met him every Thursday. Upon release the suspect was successful in escaping from the country.¹⁸

Party as a Spy Net

The vast membership of the Party, many of whom are police officers, provides an all-embracing source of information. In

¹⁸News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 5, (May 1952), p. 14.

addition, there are many Russian Communists who are engaged in searching for information on anti-state activities. The Party itself has its own Control Commission and other internal spy networks. Information does not necessarily pass through channels; a Party member can go over the head of his local boss and report on him to another group or to his superior. This is even encouraged.

The internal picture of security in Czechoslovakia presents a complicated arrangement of units, some formal and some informal, some with specific tasks and some merely general organs of information. Some people may be members of more than one unit, and almost all are Party members. In addition there is the confusing element of M.V.D. supervision, which exists though it is difficult to identify. The danger to the citizen is obvious. He never knows whether he should laugh at an anti-government joke and risk being turned in, or whether he should turn in the narrator who might be either a police officer or a decent Czech like himself. This serves to cut down contacts and fracture resistance almost to the primary unit of the family, which of course is powerless to challenge the state.

The Penal System

The penal institutions of Czechoslovakia are under the authority of the judiciary, while the labor camps are under the direction of the police. The Ministry of Justice, however, controls the destinies of inmates sentenced by court action, but the Ministry of the Interior has the final say on those administratively condemned. In addition to the regular prisons there were seventy forced labor camps in 1950 with close to 300,000 inmates.¹⁹ The number of camps may have been augmented, since the trend has been away from the larger units. To guard this system there are penal guards, under the Ministry of Justice, and labor camp guards subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior.

¹⁹Korbel and Vagašský, op. cit., p. 5.

The prison population includes women, priests, adolescents and soldiers. Most of these groups have their own special prisons. Some of these labor camps are installed in old Gestapo compounds and amount to small towns of 30,000 inhabitants. There are quotas on prisoners for various police units so that the camps will not suffer from a lack of workers.²⁰ Practically no prisoners are freed during the summer months because of the heavy duties of farm work and construction. This labor pool is under the joint direction of the S.N.B., which has become a monstrous enterprise like the M.V.D.'s G.U.L.A.G., and the Ministry of Manpower, which makes its allocations according to the economic plans. Most of the camps are established around industrial and mining areas so the inmates can perform socially valuable labor.²¹

The conditions in labor camps are hard and work norms are established even for the aged and adolescents. Political education sessions are a regular feature of these camps, which possibly contributes to the misnomer "re-education centers" applied to the camps. After release former prisoners are usually not permitted to take up their old positions but are directed to a new location by the Ministry of Manpower, where they are compelled to take up a new job as "free men."

²⁰"Forced Labor in the Satellite States," The World Today, IX, No. 3, (March 1953), pp. 127-28.

²¹Ibid.

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GOVERNMENT

General Characteristics

One must be aware that the government is just one of the mechanisms which the Party employs to control society. "The Communist Party is the source of every power, and the Government is only a tentacle of the Party octopus."¹ Other mechanisms are mass organizations, both formal and leisure groups, control over material necessities, legal and extra-legal organs of force and violence and so on. Perhaps the government machinery is the most important single weapon because it combines in the traditional forms the means of force, law, and communications with the newer and since legitimized controls of subsistence, mass and professional organizations.

The government in something like its traditional form exists, but only formally does it even approximate that of the First Republic. Actually the constitution, little altered in substance, is sufficiently plastic so that a solitary political group can use it as a weapon against the people whose security it was established to protect. The misuse of democratic forms to defeat the spirit of democracy is common in this day of the modern totalitarian states.

The myth of democracy is employed to mislead the unknowing foreigner and the masses. Such phrases as "the new democracy," "the most perfect type of democracy" etc., are used by Party theoreticians.²

¹Bogdan Raditsa, "The Sovietization of the Satellites," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1950, p. 127

²George C. Guins, "Constitutions of the Soviet Satellites," The Annals . . ., Sept. 1950, p. 64.

The world is actually confronted by a ". . . government with great competency but actually without responsibility to any representative organ."³ Inside the Party higher councils the decisions are taken which affect the lives of Czechs and Slovaks, and sometimes these Party higher councils are not located inside the state.⁴ Thus the government is the recognized legal machinery, but the Party is the extra-legal force which utilizes it. The active political force is behind a constitutional curtain.

The myth of popular representation is preserved by sham elections and Party tolerance of non-Party personnel in the role of minor functionaries. The myth of the participation of all parties in the building of the "People's Democracy" is sustained by the example of the existence of separate parties in the National Front and a scattering of non-Communists in Cabinet posts. It is of some significance that the ministers of the satellite parties do not hold strategic posts and that most of them are Communist allies of long standing. The organization rules for these puppet parties are approved by the Communists⁵ and they are financed by the government.⁶

The whole Party-government arrangement represents what in business terms might be referred to as an interlocking directorate; however, it operates more like a holding company with the Party

³Gordon Skilling, "The Czech Constitutional System, the Soviet Impact," Political Science Quarterly, LXVII, No. 2(June 1952), 198-224.

⁴Eduard Táborský, "Government in the People's Democracies," The Annals. . . , Sept. 1950, p. 60.

⁵I. Gadourek, The Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953), p. 248.

⁶Ibid., p. 58.

as the parent establishment. Thus the Party is represented in a greater degree at each higher echelon of the government. The state power itself is merely an expression of the government with its representative and judicial branches atrophied and dependent upon a swollen executive-administrative division. This, as opposed to the separation of powers, is often called the "unity of the people's power."

Actually the only effective political activity which takes place in this system is the forming of "family groups" around persons in positions of influence and internecine strife among these sycophants. Thus nepotism and sub rosa influence are generally not condemned in the press.⁸

The salient features of the system of government are: (1) the Party system, which is in reality one-party dominance; (2) centralization of power in the executive administrative branches, as opposed to the Western concept of separation of powers; (3) the parallel structure of the Party and the government, which permits lateral control by the Party at all levels through the identity of personnel; (4) the election procedure, which is actually enforced endorsement of the government.

Formal Organization

National Committees: History

The organs of local authority, the National Committees, represent a complete break with the form of the First Czechoslovak Republic.⁹ These committees were first mentioned by President Beneš after his return from Moscow in February 1944. That they were part of

⁷Some analysts feel that these parties will disappear when the state of socialism is reached. Skilling, "Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Impact," International Journal, VI, No. 2(Spring 1951), p. 113.

⁸Gadourek, op. cit., p. 68.

⁹Skilling, "The Czech Constitutional System, . . ." op. cit.

changes demanded by the Muscovites in the post war administration is conceded by most authorities.¹⁰ In April 1945 the provisional government proclaimed them permanent institutions as part of the Košice Program. In the autumn of 1945, a month before the withdrawal of the Red Army, the great majority of the chairmanships of the National Committees were in Communist or pro-Communist hands.¹¹ In June 1945 Gottwald, then Deputy Prime Minister, declared that it should be understood that there would be no return to government in the districts and communities by "bureaucrats,"¹² indicating the Communist conception of the new administrative organs as a measure to destroy the old civil service. Measures for elections of these local bodies were to be incorporated in the new constitution, and democratic forces attempted without success to adjust this situation in the Constitutional Committee before the February coup.¹³ The election law for the National Committees was finally passed March 14, 1954; it contains complicated provisions for indirect nominations by workers' groups, etc., nothing which would threaten in any way their one-party composition.¹⁴

General Characteristics. The purged Constituent National Assembly passed the new constitution, which was signed by Gottwald as President, in May 1948. National Committees were to be elected on three levels, local, district, and regional elections ("universal, equal, direct and secret") which presumably makes them responsible

¹⁰ Pavel Korbek, National Committees in Czechoslovakia (New York: Free Europe Press, Feb. 1954), p. 1.

¹¹ Ducháček, "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: Czechoslovakia, 1944-1948," World Politics, II, No. 3 (April 1950), 355.

¹² Korbek, op. cit., p. 3.

¹³ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴ Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe, No. 6 (June 1, 1954), 161.

and accountable to the electorate. The government administration, like the Party, is organized on the principle of democratic centralism. Consequently the National Committees are rigorously supervised by either the next highest National Committee or the central government. According to the New Constitutional Act on National Committees, these organs are to have the power to issue ordinances in connection with their work, but these ordinances shall not conflict with existing statutes.

There are between 15,000¹⁵ and 20,000¹⁶ of these administrative organs. They are divided internally to correspond in a general way to the various ministries of the government, internal affairs, planning, security, education, public and physical instruction, and so forth, the ministries for foreign operations and the multiplicity of technical ministries being absent.¹⁷ These offices are held by functionaries of the Committees, which range in size according to the number of constituents they "represent," from fifteen to thirty-six members.¹⁸ The work of these functionaries is supervised by the chairman of the Committee and the council of the members. In addition there is a secretary attached to the local National Committee, who is chosen to help the Committee carry out its work. Originally, there were only "Circuit Secretaries" who assisted the local National Committees, but according to Lidová Demokracie¹⁹ their turnover was too great, so a more

¹⁵Gadourek, op. cit., p. 54.

¹⁶News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 6 (June 1954), 42.

¹⁷Gadourek, op. cit., p. 54.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Lidová Demokracie (Prague), Sept. 20, 1951.

stable permanent secretary was decided upon. There were in 1952 some 10,000 permanent secretaries already in the field.²⁰

The National Committee is concerned largely with supervising the economic field and in fulfilling the plan. In a governmental decree of February 28, 1950, the main function of the Committees was outlined briefly as follows:

The Local National Committee helps to suppress and to extirpate the capitalistic elements, to support and confirm the socialistic elements in all sectors of our economy and to strengthen the union of workers and peasants.²¹

In addition the local National Committees administer education, popular culture, health, and social welfare policies,²² and have local juridicial competence.²³

The Committees or single members are subject to dismissal, not by popular referendum but at the discretion of the higher Committees for inefficiency.

Controls: Administrative and Party. The Party employs the single list system to secure the election of desirable candidates. There has been only one election held at this level since 1945; this was in May 1954. The voter was handed three easily identifiable ballots, his identity was checked, and he was expected to drop one of them in the ballot box and discard the others, all in front of the election commissioners who are Communist functionaries.²⁴ Rudé Právo issued a

²⁰ Rudé Právo (Prague), Jan. 17, 1952, p. 1.

²¹ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 54.

²² Skilling, "The Czech Constitutional System, . . ." op. cit., p. 219.

²³ Highlights of Current Legislation . . ., op. cit., p. 103.

²⁴ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 7 (July 1954), 52.

warning on election day as follows:

Not to take part in the election, to vote against the National Front candidate, would mean joining the ranks of the enemies of the Republic and opposing everything in the National Front program and in our own country.²⁵

As a result of this farce, 93.6 per cent voted for the National Front candidates, and 98.3 per cent of the electorate voted.²⁶ However, there were signs of failure. Various delegations reported that, due to the Party's inability to establish contact with the masses, elections in several communities had to be held over again.

Because of frequent purges, the number of Party members in the National Committees is constantly in danger of falling below the official 6:4 prescribed ratio of C. P. C. S. members to those of the National Front; however, in 1950 the ratio was still holding.²⁸

The three lower levels of government, the local, district and county National Committees, are paralleled in the C. P. C. S. organization. Thus the members of the local Communist Party are also all members of the "Action Committee" of the local National Committee. This is the case throughout the administration. The "Action Committees," first alluded to in February 1948 by Gottwald, provide the link which binds the administration to the Party at every level.²⁹ However, these Committees performed their major task during the coup and have been relatively inactive since then. They were used to get out the vote in^{the} May elections and presumably are held in reserve for supplementary political activity. They are terminologically referred to as an instrument of the "National Front."

²⁵ Rudé Právo, May 16, 1954.

²⁶ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 7 (July 1954), 52.

²⁷ Ibid., No. 8 (Aug. 1954), p. 49.

²⁸ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 53.

²⁹ Korbel, op. cit., p. 6; and Gadourek, op. cit., pp. 51, 52-53.

Party control is further exercised by the permanent secretary of the National Committee. The secretary is appointed by the next higher National Committee and the political secretary of that Committee is responsible for the political reliability of the new secretaries. These men are recruited from among capable Communists³⁰ and it is recommended that a year of Party schooling be given to each.³¹ These secretaries are to see to it that government ordinances are carried out, and it is not surprising that it appears as an attempt to bolster up the government against the local Party functionaries, since this action occurred just after the Gottwald-Slánský crises.³²

According to the formal provisions in the Gottwald constitution, the National Committees were directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, and the individual functionaries in charge of the separate divisions were additionally under the direction of their corresponding ministry. On September 15, 1953 it was announced that the Czech government was to be reorganized along the lines of that of the Soviet Union.³³ Viliam Široký announced that the National Committees would be taken from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and placed under the direct control of the Presidium of the government.³⁴ At the same time the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National Security were consolidated into the Ministry of the Interior. It is, however, doubtful if the supreme authority of local administration succeeded in gaining more than paper autonomy from the Ministry of the Interior which, with its powerful police apparatus and inflated staff and records,

³⁰Ibid., p. 56.

³¹Lidová Demokracie, Sept. 20, 1951; in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 14.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., II, No. 10 (Oct. 1953), 3.

³⁴Ibid., p. 4.

is obviously better suited to controlling the local administrative apparatus than a collection of cabinet ministers who meet only intermittently and have no common executive organ.³⁵

The "Simple Act" on National Committees, passed at the same time as the Constitutional Act, previously alluded to, indicates the extremely limited nature of local autonomy in legislation. While the Constitutional Act stated that the National Committees should follow government directives and laws in all of their activities, the "Simple Act" further delimits the local legislative action by prescribing that local decrees must be passed on by the next highest National Committee or the government and do not take effect until fifteen days after their promulgation. If emergency regulations are necessary these may be promulgated, but they must receive the approval of the next highest National Committee at its next session.³⁶ It is obvious that local initiative is extremely restricted. In addition, the government may withdraw any field of activity from local competence on a decision of the ministry responsible.³⁷ Further, the councils of the National Committees are not elected, but are appointed by the Ministry of the Interior or the next highest National Committee with the concurrence of the "Action Committee."

Indication of the degree of control of the Party over the National Committees is the frequency with which purges occur throughout the ranks of the administration. The Party has succeeded in altering the permanent character of the Civil Service and has established itself as judge of the people's representatives in the government. Gadourek cites the example in Karlovy Vary in 1949, in which a severe purge of administrative officials who were political opponents of the Party Secretary took place.³⁸

³⁵ Korbek, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

³⁸ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 57.

Inefficiency of the National Committees. The effectiveness of the National Committees is limited severely by the multiple subordinations of their members. At any time an individual functionary is accountable to the chairman and council of the National Committee, to the "Action Committee," and to the local Party organization. In addition, he receives directives from his ministry in the central government and from the National Committee on the next highest level. The National Committee as a unit has several parallel chains of command from both the Party and the government.³⁹

In the face of absolutistic mandates and directives from these competing sources, there emerge petty bureaucracies of friends and/or relatives ("family bureaucracies"), who can depend on each other and can form a functional core for mutual defense and resistance to change. These "clans" are necessary for self-preservation but are disastrous for improvement and impervious to necessary change. Thus the system generates its own bête noire.

There has been continuous discontent with the functioning of the National Committees. In December 1951 Minister of the Interior Nosek condemned them for inefficiency.⁴⁰ In March 1952 Zdeněk Fierlinger complained that the National Committees had lost contact with the broad masses and that to remedy this the ministries should not regard them as extensions of their own power but as constitutional organs of state power.⁴¹ In the same month Zápotocký criticized delays and delivered a sarcastic speech on bureaucratism in the National Committees.⁴² Široký criticized their inefficiency in 1954.⁴³ Bacílek

³⁹Korbel, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

⁴⁰News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 14.

⁴¹Ibid., No. 5 (May 1952), p. 11.

⁴²Ibid., p. 6.

⁴³Ibid., III, No. 1 (Jan. 1954), 47.

in February 1954 hoped that the newly elected Committees would improve the worsening bureaucratism.⁴⁴ As late as May 1955, however, instead of fulfilling regime orders local officials were accused of strengthening their ties with the people by "cooperating with them against the government."⁴⁵ Thus there appears to have been little if any improvement in the cumbersome system of local administration over the past few years, and bureaucracy thrives as local initiative is increasingly stifled.

The National Assembly and the Presidium

General Characteristics. The National Assembly is defined as the supreme legislative body of the land. It is elected on the basis of a universal franchise for a period of six years from candidates submitted by political parties and mass organizations. The constitution limits membership in the supreme deliberative body to three hundred, but after the Slánský purge the number was known to be below this. During the latest election some 368 members were elected.⁴⁶ There is supposed to be one member for every 35,000 people. The Assembly meets twice a year and must select an interim Presidium of twenty-four which is vested with virtually plenary powers, its actions subsequently to be ratified at the next meeting of the Assembly.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Ibid., No. 2 (Feb. 1954), p. 51.

⁴⁵ Ibid., IV, No. 5 (May 1955), 5.

⁴⁶ Ibid., III, No. 11 (Nov. 1954), 53.

⁴⁷ Samuel L. Sharp, New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere (Washington D. C.: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1950), pp. 59-68; also Pavel Korbel, Parliamentary Elections in Czechoslovakia (New York: Free Europe Press, 1952), p. 17.

Many of the provisions in the constitution were taken wholesale from the 1920 constitution, including the scope of legislative competency; however, there are certain changes.⁴⁸ The Senate has been dropped and the Assembly is now unicameral. In addition, the Presidium has vastly extended powers which did not inhere in the former interim council. In effect the Assembly has become, like the Supreme Soviet, a "ratifying and propagating" body which meets for short intervals to publicize and unanimously approve measures taken by executive organs. The Presidium makes the Soviet analogy closer in that it performs the function of judicial review and can make binding interpretations of the laws and decide whether they are in conflict with the constitution.⁴⁹

Control of the Assembly. The Party insures the political reliability of the Assembly by manipulating the Election Commission and so framing the laws for candidature that only desirables will be nominated. All names of candidates must be submitted to the government-selected Election Commissions thirty days before the elections, which gives the Commission opportunity to review the list and disqualify those unacceptable. The Election Law (passed May 26, 1954) stipulates that candidates must be nominated by mass organizations and/or by the National Front to be acceptable for office. Since another regulation, the "Law on Mass Organizations," has restricted the legality of such organizations to only those which are approved and registered with the government, the freedom of candidature is greatly limited. In addition, candidates chosen by meetings of farmers, workers, and soldiers are to be submitted by the National Front before the

⁴⁸Skilling, "The Czech Constitutional System, . . ." op. cit., p. 212

⁴⁹Ibid.

election to the Election Commission. This Election Commission was headed in the elections of November 1954 by Jirí Salda, a member of the Party's Central Committee.⁵⁰ The right to campaign is ^{not} granted to all citizens, but only for registered candidates.⁵¹ In addition, to prevent election surprises, a candidate must be backed by at least 1,000 signatures.

Václav Kopecký, Minister of Information and Enlightenment, is quoted as having remarked: "It can scarcely be expected that there will be 1,000 suicides prepared to sign an opposition list."⁵²

The National Front is a Communist creation, symbolizing the unity of all classes of the population on national issues and their determination to work together. Actually the National Front is termed the "regenerated" or "rejuvenated" National Front; the non-Communist parties of the pre-coup National Front were purged both in the Assembly and out, and their ranks were replenished with Communists and fellow-travelers. It is defined as "the political expression of the alliance formed by the working people of town and country, on the way to Socialism."⁵³ The Secretary General of the National Front stressed the need to inculcate and popularize Marxist doctrines among people and classes, hitherto hostile--the reformed parties, in other words, are to act as nursery schools for the Communist Party.⁵⁴ The "regenerated" National Front can scarcely be said to represent opinions other than Communist orthodoxy. It is composed of the C.P.C.S., C.P.S., the Czechoslovak People's

⁵⁰ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 11 (Nov. 1954), 53.

⁵¹ Korbél, Parliamentary Elections in Czechoslovakia, op. cit., p. 3.

⁵² Ibid., p. 14.

⁵³ "Czechoslovakia Under Communist Rule," The World Today, VI, No. 1 (Jan. 1950), 19.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

(Catholic) Party (C. S. L.), the Czech Socialist Party (C. S. S.), the Slovak Freedom Party, and the Party of Slovak Rebirth.⁵⁵

The election process is a further method of Party control. It is conducted by Party members and members of the local National Committees, and the whole is supervised by the National Front. The election of May 1948 returned about 80 per cent, 240 Communist Party members.⁵⁶ The election of November 1954, which was not held in May at the expiration of the legal term of the Assembly (which met and enacted an extension of its own term of office), was participated in by 99.18 per cent of the electorate (99.1 per cent in Slovakia in the election of the Slovak Council). Of these 97.89 per cent returned ballots for the National Front (97.2 per cent in Slovakia). In addition, the Party was able to secure the re-election of all its Politburo members. The single list ballot was used, "since true democracy requires only one candidate chosen by workers meetings" (usually by the easily controlled device of acclaim), which the voters could either deposit in the ballot box unaltered or take to the booth to adjust.⁵⁷

According to Práce, the new Assembly is composed of 103 Party and government workers, ninety-five manual workers, fifty-one collective farm workers, nineteen independent farmers, forty-five members of the technical intelligentsia, thirty-four members of other intelligentsia and twenty-one members of the armed forces. Fifty-two of the members are under thirty years of age.⁵⁸ The composition as to nationalities is:

⁵⁵ Europa, the Encyclopedia of Europe (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1954), p. 67. Looseleaf insert 1/2.

⁵⁶ Ibid. According to the United Resistance Organization, the figure of 238 Communist Party deputies is given; thus the number is seen to remain fairly constant. Gaďourek, op. cit., p. 249, note 12.

⁵⁷ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, IV, No. 1 (Jan. 1955), 51.

⁵⁸ Práce (Prague), Nov. 13, 1954, in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, IV, No. 1 (Jan. 1955), 51.

253 Czechs, ninety-eight Slovaks, nine Hungarians, three Germans, and two Poles.⁵⁹ It is presumed that a nearly constant percentage of Party members are elected as deputies, this figure seeming to hover around 80 per cent. The reliability of the Assembly is thus assured. In addition, the deputies of the satellite parties are expected to have little to say unless they have previously conferred with Party members. Several Socialists were purged from the Assembly for speaking out of turn on the "Defense of the Republic Act."⁶⁰

The purge is also an effective method of controlling both Party and non-Party deputies. After the coup the Constituent National Assembly was purged of more than two-fifths of its non-Communist members and the rest were subdued to blind obedience.⁶¹ The second purge fell mainly among the Slánský group and Slovak representatives in the Assembly which included such dignitaries as Švermová, Novoměský, Bašťovanský, Frank, Husák, Šmidke and others and many among the members of puppet parties. It is estimated some one-third of the deputies elected in May 1948 were discarded by 1952.⁶² Thus the Party handles the people's duly elected representatives according to its own devices.

Operation of the Assembly. The Presidium actually does most of the work of legislature. It is at present led by Speaker Zdeněk Fierlinger and virtually all of its members are Party members. The Presidium is in session permanently while the Assembly meets only for a few days three or four times a year, largely, as has already been mentioned, to rubber-stamp the acts of the government and Presidium.⁶³

⁵⁹ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, IV, No. 2 (Feb. 1955), 48.

⁶⁰ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 59.

⁶¹ Korbek, op. cit., p. 13.

⁶² Ibid., p. 17.

⁶³ Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (London: Methuen 1950), p. 298.

Thus the Assembly has become a stage for democratic oratory, with most of its functions being performed by the Presidium. One example of action taken by the Assembly, quoted by Gaďourek, is the passage of the "Defense of Peace Act." This is a law of typical devious formulation which exacts harsh measures for certain vaguely suggested breaches of the peace, allowing much to local interpretation. The bill was reported as passed by the August legislature's rising in a body and shouting "Long live peace."⁶⁴ Apparently the Assembly has become merely a forum of democratic sentiments masking the political machinations of the Party.⁶⁵

The Central Government

The Presidency. The Presidency of the Republic is a position of great prestige and is nominally the single most powerful position in the government. Presidents Masaryk and Beneš enhanced the office with their personal stature, and it is of some significance that of all the satellites Czechoslovakia is the only one left with a president.⁶⁶ Since Beneš' resignation in 1948 the post has been occupied by Gottwald and Zápotocký, and its prominence has been somewhat eclipsed by the importance of the Chairman and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. Gottwald unified the positions of Chairman and President in his person for a short while; however, the dualism originally existing during Slánský's period as General Secretary has been re-established. Antonín Zápotocký is nominally head of the bureaucracy and Novotný, though not General Secretary, holds the powerful position of First Secretary of the Party. The President is elected for a term of

⁶⁴Gaďourek, op. cit., p. 60.

⁶⁵Táborský, op. cit., p. 59.

⁶⁶Sharp, op. cit., p. 42.

seven years by the National Assembly. He has the right to initiate legislation, to appoint his cabinet ministers, is nominally head of the armed forces, appoints all university professors and performs a host of ceremonial functions. In addition he takes an oath in which he pledges himself upon his faith and honor to discharge his duties in the spirit of the People's Democratic order.⁶⁷ The constitutional provisions of the presidency were taken over almost en bloc from the 1920 constitution.⁶⁸

Actually there is some doubt as to whether the President is at complete liberty to appoint his own cabinet or whether it must have the prior approval of the Kremlin. This would appertain especially in the case of the Ministries of Defense and Interior which have direct controls from Moscow.⁶⁹

It is known that only Czechoslovaks have been in the government, but the ministries have been filled by Soviet advisors who have commanded and supervised their activities. These advisors were in hiding at the beginning of Gottwald's term but toward the end they appeared publicly, speaking at meetings with Czechoslovak ministers.⁷⁰

The Cabinet and Presidium. The Cabinet is actually two cabinets.⁷¹

67

Ibid., pp. 69-74.

68

Skilling, op. cit., p. 211.

69

Bedřich Bruegel, "Methods of Soviet Domination in Satellite States," International Affairs, XXVII, No. 1 (Jan. 1951).

70

Ladislav Feierabend, "The Gottwald Era in Czechoslovakia," Journal of Central European Affairs, October 1953, pp. 246-56.

71

Korbel, The Eleventh Reorganization of the Czechoslovak Post-Coup Government (New York: Free Europe Press, March 1953), p. 8.

The Presidium, which exists as an elite of the cabinet, was originally established as political directorate of the National Front and included the Prime Minister and representatives of the five other parties. During the last days of the Gottwald era the number in the Presidium had increased to ten, including the Prime Minister, nine of whom were C. P. C. S. members and the remaining member, Široký, was a member of the C. P. S., though he belonged to the C. P. C. S. Political Secretariat.⁷² This is indicative of the actual distribution of power in the National Front, malgré theorizing to the contrary.⁷³

The Cabinet itself is responsible to the Assembly; however, due to the political predisposition of the Assembly, the government has extensive privileges as a legislative and executive organ.⁷⁴ In no instance, so far as is known, has the National Assembly voiced an adverse criticism of the government since February 1948.⁷⁵ Since there is no opposition voice in the Assembly which could charge the government with lack of confidence, the Party's abuses go unchallenged.

The cabinet itself reflects several things. The proliferation of ministries dealing with the economic sectors of national life reveals the primacy of importance of the productive machinery to the government.⁷⁶ The shuffling and reshuffling of ministries unveil an attempt at slavish imitation, either voluntarily or under compulsion, of the Soviet model. The increasing proportion of Party reliables in the upper echelons demonstrate the interlocking directorate established between Party and government.

⁷² Ibid., p. 1.

⁷³ In 1952 Rudé Právo (Jan. 10) reported that the Assembly had been subdivided between the newly established Political-Administrative division and the division of National Economy, and was represented in the Presidium by Fierlinger and Dolanský respectively. This was intended to tighten the Prime Minister's control.

⁷⁴ Skilling, op. cit., p. 211.

⁷⁵ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 66.

⁷⁶ Before the second National Party Congress in Prague, Zápotocký said, "Our slogan must be more work, more workers, higher output,

Development of Slovak Autonomy⁷⁷

Background and Separatist Concessions to September 1938. Prior to 1918 the lands of the Czechs and Slovaks were united only once during the entire course of their history, in the Great Moravian Empire (ca. 870-894). During the remainder of the time the Slovaks were under the domination of the Magyars.

During World War I, Thomas Masaryk opened consultation with Czech and Slovak emigré leaders in the United States. These deliberations resulted in the "Pittsburgh Convention" which guaranteed that in the new republic both Czechs and Slovaks would have their own autonomous governing institutions. At the time of the agreement, however, none of the parties had the competence to negotiate such an instrument.

Slovakia sent notice from Turčianský Svätý Martin on October 30, 1918, that it would join the Czechs. The conception of Czechoslovakia in the constitution of 1920 was that of a unitary state. There was a ministry of Slovak Affairs which was instituted in 1918 under the Provisional National Assembly because of the chaotic conditions at the end of the war in Slovakia. This Ministry was abolished in 1928 as a county administrative system; after that Slovakia was governed on a provincial basis from Bratislava, but the competence of these provincial offices was not on the ministerial level.

better quality, higher national income. . . the people who will decide are our shock workers. . ." Quoted in Táboriský, op. cit., p. 44.

77

Based on Pavel Korbel, The Development of Slovakia's Constitutional Position (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, July 1953).

The Slovak State. After Munich the preamble of the amended constitution spoke of a Czecho-Slovak Republic composed of two autonomous nations and alluded to the "Pittsburgh Convention." By this time the minority rightists of the People's Party in conjunction with a German minority in Slovakia had gained predominant influence under pressure of the Reich.⁷⁸ A provincial citizenship for Slovakia was added to state citizenship. The executive power was vested in a provincial government accountable to the Slovak Diet and a special judicial system was established. This system was short-lived. In March 1939 the protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia was declared; on March 14 the Slovak Diet voted secession.

The Slovak National Council, established in 1943, was an expression of the Slovak resistance. It defined its tasks as working for the liberation of the Slovak nation in coordination with the Czechoslovak government in exile. At the start of the Slovak uprising, August 29, 1944, the Council declared itself the governing body of Slovakia. A series of ordinances set up the various departments of government. The Council was formed out of a coalition agreement between the Communist Party and the Slovak Democrats. As the military situation became untenable, the Council was forced to disband; a Presidium was appointed in September. In October, resistance collapsed. When Slovakia began to be liberated the Presidium met, reconfirmed its powers, and established its government commissariats.

When the "Košice Program" was proclaimed, Gottwald attempted to make political capital of the sixth section by announcing it himself.⁷⁹ This section promised far-reaching administrative concessions to Slovakia and recognized the Slovak National Council as the basis of a future

78

Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York: Frederick Praeger, Inc., 1953), pp. 98-99.

79

For text see ibid. (documents), pp. 317-18.

legislature. On April 11, 1945, the Council reconvened and arrogated to itself the power of co-legislation on national issues. The "First Prague Agreement" was an attempt to eliminate some of the ensuing confusion. The Council convened in Prague and restated its position as consultant to the central government, but its administrative arm, the Board of Commissioners, was left in the ambiguous position of being responsible also to Prague for the execution of the ordinances of the central government.

Under the Pre-Coup Administration. During the period of the provisional National Government, the legislative measures of the Assembly regarding Slovakia had to be passed on by a majority of the Slovak members of the Assembly. No mention was made of the legislative powers of the Slovak National Council, but the Board of Commissioners was headed by a Chairman in place of the Presidium. In April 1946 the central government and the Council negotiated the "Second Prague Agreement," but ceremonial functions and cooperation between the two organs were the only matters acted upon.

On April 11, 1946, the Provisional National Assembly issued a constitutional act (No. 65 C. L.) which largely reconfirmed the position of the Council to issue ordinances "insofar as the Constituent National Assembly shall not regulate this question otherwise." The position of the Communist Party, however, suddenly underwent a volte face with the election returns of May 26, 1946. In Slovakia the Party received only 30.4 per cent of the vote. The Communists' true sentiments for centralism are indicated in the "Third Prague Agreement" of June 1946. This third agreement was approved by the Cabinet and was not submitted to the Slovak Council. The agreement could not restrict the constitutional position of Slovakia, but it restricted the Council's legislative powers to the point of nullifying them. It also reduced the Board of Commissioners' independence by making it increasingly subservient to the Cabinet both as to personnel and accountability. In addition, this agreement forced the reapportionment of seats in the Slovak National Council, which allotted more seats to the Communists than their actual

vote in Slovakia warranted. The Board of Commissioners was also affected by an agreement with the Slovak Democrats, who hoped to facilitate cooperation.

The Party, however, was not satisfied, and it employed every machination to unseat the democratic parties. It smeared individuals, obstructed administration, and attempted to trump up charges against leading Slovak statesmen. Finally, the Democrats were forced to yield in what Dr. Korbela calls the "little coup." This was the result of some unfortunate correspondence kept by an assistant of the Deputy Prime Minister Ursiny, the representative of the Slovak Democrats in the Cabinet. The Communists denounced the Slovak Democrats in the Cabinet. The Communists denounced the Slovak Democrats and resigned from the Board of Commissioners. For several weeks Slovakia was without a government. The Communists organized demonstrations and the National Front applied pressure to the Democrats to accede to Communist demands. They finally capitulated and surrendered their majority of seats on the Board to a Communist-led minority.

After the Prague Coup. After the coup, Husák, leader of the C. P. S., packed the Board of Commissioners with Party members and puppet politicians. The New Constitution was passed which kept up pretenses of Slovak autonomy but actually restricted it beyond the measures of the "Third Prague Agreement." In reality, though assuring the Slovak National Council of its legislative prerogatives, section ninety-three of the "Detailed Provisions" states that the Council can legislate only "insofar as uniform regulation of these matters is not necessary."

The election of members to the Council and the sessions of the Council are under the control of the government. Members of the central government are permitted to take part in the Council's sessions at any time. Its acts are signed by the Premier and can be declared void by the cabinet. The express provinces of its legislation are largely of local nature and deal with things of lesser importance to the Party. In addition, article 175 legitimized the pre-coup purged Council membership for an indefinite period. The disutility of the Council is shown by the fact that the National Assembly had to pass two acts to give the Council something to legislate on. Since that time the Council has legislated on matters of indifference to the Party merely to keep itself active.

The Board of Commissioners has suffered similarly from the centralization of power in Prague and in the C. P. C. S. In principle, the power of administration, with the exception of foreign relations and defense, resides with the Board. It is the executive of both the Central Cabinet and the Slovak Council. The Board is composed of commissariats approved by the National Assembly and staffed with men appointed (also liable to recall) by the Cabinet. They are obliged to serve under Cabinet directives. Their power of appointment is curtailed, since lists of minor administrative appointees must be accepted by the Cabinet. The government may also invalidate any measure of a commissioner or the Board. The Board has gone through fluctuations in size proportionately comparable to the Czech cabinet, having commissariats added or lopped off. Most of the important economic ministries of the Prague government are merely administered by a special plenipotentiary from Prague. In March 1953 Rudé Právo announced a reorganization of the Board, in complete violation of its legal position.

In 1953, when there were some forty-five posts at the ministerial level in the central government, only nine of these were held by Slovaks. Of these Slovaks, the ancestry of two was probably non-Slovak. Thus, despite Communist fanfare the Slovaks are as far from autonomy as under Maria Theresa.

The Economic Motive

"The Bolshevik party always regarded questions of power expressed also in economic policies as decisive. Accordingly, the Party puts them above all moral-humanitarian considerations."⁸⁰ This is the position of the satellite Communist Parties also. If the amount of space in newspapers devoted to economic items were measured it would surely surpass all others. The trials of economic saboteurs are frequent, since "the Plan" is law and falling below the norm can be construed as treason. If one grants the primacy of control of the Party by the Kremlin, Russia's relatively weak capital position vis-à-vis the West, and the purely exploitative nature of her control, this is easily understandable. The multiplication of

⁸⁰Waldemar Gurian (ed.), The Soviet Union: Background, Ideology, Reality. (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951), p. 12.

these economic ministries is an attempt more easily to regulate the production machinery of the state, is indicated in Table 1.

Table 1
MULTIPLICATION OF ECONOMIC MINISTRIES

Year	Total Ministries *	Economic Ministries †
Dec. 1947 ‡	17	8
" 1948	17	7
" 1949	17	7
" 1950	21	10
" 1951	27	15
" 1952	30	19
" 1953	29	17
" 1954 §	26	16

*Does not include deputies or premiers without portfolio.

† Includes Finance, Trade, Transport. Does not include communications, manpower (labor).

‡ Information from Council on Foreign Relations, Political Handbook of the World (New York: Harper Bros.)

§ Europa; The Encyclopedia of Europe, *op. cit.*, p. 6. Ministry chosen November 1954; list available January 1955.

Imitating the Soviet Model

The Soviet experiences in successful government organization by which the people's democracies have profited, as well as the experiences of the first reorganization of the Czechoslovak government in 1951, have shown that the division of ministries to correspond with the divisions in economic, cultural, and political life is advantageous.⁸¹

Thus ran the Prague News Letter which explained the grand reshuffling of the government which took place on January 31, 1953. The Presidium was increased to nine members (ten including the Premier). Radio Prague announced on February 2 that it was necessary to improve economic and cultural work, and that for this purpose the Ministry of Fuel and Power had been divided; the Ministry of Information and Enlightenment had been abolished, and the Ministries of Education, Science and Art had become the

⁸¹ Prague News Letter, Feb. 12, 1953. Quoted in Korbelt, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

Ministry of Education and Enlightenment and the new special Ministry of Universities; a new Ministry of State Farms had taken over the work of the Ministry of Agriculture; a Ministry of Building Materials was established and two Committees on the Arts and on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries were initiated.⁸² These are far-reaching changes and raised the number of ministers of cabinet rank to forty-four.⁸³ Mladá Fronta⁸⁴ stated that the experience of the Soviet Union had shown that it is better to have smaller and more active ministries with specific tasks than huge ministries with enormous agendas. The reorganization, hailed as a great achievement, outlasted by only a few months the death of Stalin and the reduction of posts and Presidium members in the Soviet Union which transpired in March.

On September 15 an extensive and undignified reorganization of the Czech government took place. The ministerial posts were reduced from forty-six to thirty-three and the Presidium from ten members to five. Several ministers (Bacílek and Nepomucký) associated with previous policy were jettisoned and Široký proclaimed the "new course." Radio Prague--C. T. K. --announced September 15:

. . . these changes have been carried out on the basis of experience gained during recent months in the direction of certain sectors of the national economy and culture, in the interest of reducing the costs of the machinery of government, simplifying cooperation between individual sectors of the state administration, and improving its activities.⁸⁵

This is not the only instance of this type. The Ministry of National Security was established along the lines of the M. V. D. in May 1950, a Ministry of State Control was established similar to that existing in the U.S.S.R. the parturition of economic ministries began with the basic split into heavy and light industries in 1950, and so on.⁸⁶ Since there is only one path to

⁸² News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 3 (March 1953), p. 10.

⁸³ This includes the Procurator General, the Chairman of the State Committee for Physical Training and Sports, and two chairmen of the last two committees mentioned above.

⁸⁴ Mladá Fronta, Feb. 3, 1953.

⁸⁵ Korbel, The New Course of Reorganization of the Czechoslovak Government (New York: Free Europe Press, Sept. 1953), p. 4.

⁸⁶ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 3, (March 1953), 10.

socialism it is apparently hoped that function will follow form. This would seem to be the safest course.

Party-Government Symbiosis. It will be recalled that the approved admixture of Party and non-Party members of the government at lower levels was in the ratio 6:4. In the Assembly the proportion of Communists was about 80 per cent for the November election of 1954; however, after May 1948 the figure was about 70 per cent. The range is thus between 70-80 per cent. At the Ministerial level the proportions are as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2
COMMUNISTS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. Ministers*</u>	<u>No. Communists</u>	<u>% Communists</u>	<u>No. Non-Com.</u>
June 1948. †	22	16	73	6
Mar. 1949 †	23	17	74	6
Mar. 1950 †	22	16	73	6
Dec. 1950 †	24	19	79	5
Sept. 1951 †	30	25	83	5
May 1952 †	31	26	84-	5
July 1952 †	32	27	84+	5
Mar. 1953 †	45	40	89	5
Dec. 1953 §	32	27	84	5
Dec. 1954 //	33	28	85	5

*Includes all ministers and premier.

†Pavel Korbel, The Czechoslovak Cabinet as an Indicator of Political Developments (New York: Free Europe Press, April 1953), pp. 1-4.

‡Pavel Korbel, The Latest Reorganization of the Czechoslovak Cabinet (New York: Free Europe Press, April 1953), pp. 1-4.

§Political Handbook. . . , op. cit., 1954, p. 51. Adjusted for Janda, Barák, Beran and Reitnajer, all C. P. C. S. members.

// Europa; The Encyclopedia of Europe, op. cit.

It should be observed that the number of non-Communist ministers has not altered and that these men for the most part were trusted Quislings in 1948 who turned against their party at the time of the coup. Men like Šlechta, Neuman and Plojhar have been in the Cabinet since 1948 so there is very little turnover among these obvious stooges.

The Presidium as originally constituted contained one C. F. C. S. member. After the coup it included three Communists and collaborator Laušman (a Social Democrat) for services rendered.

Table 3
COMMUNISTS IN THE PRESIDIUUM

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. Presidium Members</u>	<u>No. Communists</u>
1948 (post-coup)*	4	3
1949*	4	3
1950*	5	4
1951*	5	4
1952*	5	4
Feb. 1953 †	11	11
Dec. 1953 ‡	5	5
Dec. 1954 §	6	6

*Korbel, The Czechoslovak Cabinet. . . , op. cit.

†Korbel, The Latest Reorganization. . . , op. cit.

‡ Political Handbook. . . , op. cit.

§ Europa, The Encyclopedia of Europe, op. cit.

During three of these years the Slovak and former M. V. D. spy Dr. Ján Ševčík was the non-Party member.

It is obvious that the higher the office the more likely the incumbent is to be a Party member. It is also worthy of note that of the eleven Presidium members in 1953, five were members of the Party Political Secretariat, one was a member of the Central Committee, one was a member of both Political and Organizational Secretariats, and one was a member of the Organizational Secretariat. The only Slovak in the Presidium since 1952 has been Viliam Široký, whom most Slovaks regard as a traitor.⁸⁷

Rudé Právo⁸⁸ complained that some ministries did not run smoothly

⁸⁷ "New Policy on Czechoslovakia," World Today, IX, No. 10 (Oct. 1953), pp. 448-49.

⁸⁸ Rudé Právo, Jan. 29, 1953.

the preceding year because the top men in the economy do not know how to direct their operations. The worker-managers were also criticized for not taking responsibilities on their shoulders. They evade decisions to avoid mistakes and escape from responsibility.⁸⁹ It appears that even at the higher levels the chronic ailment of inefficiency and procrastination abounds.

⁸⁹Rudé Právo, May 1953.

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THE ARMED FORCES

Militarism

The Soviet system has brought militarism as a way of life to Czechoslovak society. The repeated celebrations of Red Army victories, the orientation of many of the mass organizations to military activities and their integration with the "Union for Cooperation with the Army," and the emphasis on military training in secondary schools all indicate the importance of the martial spirit and discipline in the country. Necessarily attendant upon this campaign is the correct political orientation. The adolescent must understand that the orders he obeys implicitly are designed to further the fight for peace against the Western Fascists. Militarism has its repercussions not only for soldiers and prospective soldiers but for women and older people also. Thus a "Law to Defend the Peace" was passed. Non-military people are instructed in their tasks for the day the West attacks.

Physical Characteristics of the Army

The numbers of troops in the army are variously estimated at from 150,000 to 250,000.¹ This figure is of course misleading, since a trained reserve composed of those who have completed military training is in existence. The rotation which is possible with universal conscription thus creates an organized military reservoir. Officers and non-commissioned specialists are preserved to train new recruits, or they are in elite cadres in the police or special security detachments. Thus ratings equivalent to army ranks are found in these organizations.

Equipment in the Czechoslovak forces is more modern than that of the other satellites. This is due to the strategic position of Bohemia in central Europe and to the fact that the Czechs, because of their industrial

¹"The Satellite Armed Forces," The World Today, VII, No. 6 (June 1951), 233. This does not include Security Troops, which number approximately two-thirds of the standing army at any moment.

plant, are able to supply their own modern equipment.² Due to the desirability of the standardization of equipment, the Czechs who were producing some war material from their own designs in 1951 may well be producing from Soviet patterns by this time. Since this is a problem in retooling, however, the impetus would have to come from Moscow at some time considered appropriate. It was announced for instance in Rudé Právo on September 7, 1952, that both propeller and jet planes of Russian design had been produced for over a year. It is interesting to note also that in satellite military training since the Korean War courses in instruction on how to use American-made equipment have been introduced.

Perhaps the most obvious level of Sovietization is in the personal equipment, forms of address and decor taught, and in the organization of the units themselves. Thus the standard division is not of the Western type (about 23,000 men) but is smaller like the Soviet division (about 8,000-12,000 men). Presumably some of this difference, as in the Soviet Union, is in lack of supporting units for combat troops. Czechoslovakia had fourteen such divisions in 1951, of which three were armored and four to five were motorized.³ In 1950, Soviet military drill regulation and disciplinary manuals were introduced into the army. Thus soldiers were obliged to follow orders blindly and were allowed almost no contact with the outside world. To offset the unpopularity of these measures it was decided to compensate the families of inductees monetarily.⁴ Officers use Soviet military terms, wear Soviet military insignia, and are required to learn Russian. Field officers and enlisted men address each other as "comrade." If a soldier is commended, he must answer, "I serve the people."⁵ On January 22, 1952, Rudé Právo announced that troops will take an oath to the Soviet Union. It was stated that January 20, 1952, was an important day for the army.

²"Soviet Strength and Weakness: The Satellite Contribution," The World Today, VII, No. 4 (April 1951), 172.

³Ibid., p. 173.

⁴Gadourek, Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953), p. 172.

⁵News From Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 7 (July 1952), 10.

New recruits appeared before their commanding officers to take loyalty oaths before their comrades and guests of honor from the working classes. They took the oath joyfully, aware that they were pledging allegiance to their own people . . . to the Soviet Union and to other allies.

The advantages of the standardization of practices and equipment, and of uniform speech, in the event of joint Czech-Soviet operations, is apparent. The psychological effect on the average recruit of Soviet supervision is difficult to predict. The "good soldier Schweik" has a long tradition of deserting his imposed superiors under fire.

Installations

On November 3, 1952, Rudé Právo quoted General Alexej Čepička's speech in the November 2nd session of the Czech Assembly concerning the fortification of the western frontier. He stated that attack threatened only along the Bavarian border and this border would be converted into "an impregnable fortress." The border is closely patrolled, is mined, timber is cut, and charged barbed wire entanglements have been strung. A complex net of gunbungers, trenches, machine gun nests, etc., has been prepared.⁶ These preparations are used to keep Czechs in as well as for defensive purposes.

In addition, refugees report that modern airfields were being constructed by convict and civilian labor. These are equipped with underground fuel storage tanks, some with direct pipelines to refineries. They are being built around strategic industrial sites, and it was reported that they were of sufficient size to accomodate Soviet jet fighters. The fields included new hangers and barracks.⁷ These reports, received in early 1952, were supplemented later by the information that during the six months preceding November 1952 at least eight new airfields for jets had been built and four others converted for jet use.⁸ In addition, new training centers for the army are being constructed and new underground army storage depots and magazines are being expanded.

⁶Ibid., No. 1 (Jan. 1952), 11.

⁷Ibid., No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 10-11.

⁸Ibid., No. 11 (Nov. 1952), 17

Thus it would appear that "Festung Bohemia" is fulfilling Herr Goebbels' frenzied accusations of 1938; it is becoming a Soviet air base in the heart of Europe.

Recruitment and Training

The Czechoslovak military system actually performs a double function. The first and conventional task of the military is to build up an efficient fighting machine for purposes of national policy. The second purpose of military training is to afford ideal conditions for political indoctrination. As early as March 1945 the Košice Program specified that

In order to see our army educated in the spirit of the state, of democracy, and anti-Fascism, the government wants to make an end, once and for all, to the "non-political nature" of the army. The government takes this view in the knowledge that under this "non-partisanship" hides underestimation of the moral factor in battle, and that under this cloak thrive reactionary, anti-democratic, and capitulationist tendencies. . .

The pronouncement continues with the resolution that "enlightenment officers"⁹ shall be introduced and that they shall be under the jurisdiction of the "General Administration of Education and Enlightenment," whose chief is subordinate to the Minister of Defense.

Military training starts for the eligible recruit when he is old enough to join the Union of Czechoslovak Youth, the Sokols, sports organizations and the numerous other mass organizations. In 1951 the "Union for Cooperation with the Army" (Svazarm) was established as part of the Military Preparedness Act. Many mass organizations were compelled to join and to work out a program of universal extra-army military training. In 1953 this organization comprehended more than half the residents of the Republic. The irrepressible Dr. Čepička was quoted in Rudé Právo of November 11, 1951, as saying, "Today the aggressor attacks the hinterland and it is therefore necessary to prepare not only the front soldiers but all inhabitants for war. . . ." Čepička announced in December, 1950, that recruiting was underway for military education centers. These centers are for youths from fifteen to sixteen

⁹Ithiel de Sola Pool, Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere (Hoover Institute Studies, Series B: Elites, No. 5.; Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, April 1955), p. 17.

years old from farmers' or workers' homes.¹⁰ At any rate, training is imposed in secondary school. The Sokol was defined as having the special function of supervising pre-military training. It should train youth in parachuting and other "defense sports" and work in close coordination with Svazarm.¹¹

Military training for males was introduced into the universities in October 1951; in January 1952 it was introduced for female students. This consists of night alerts, drills and study one day a week on military techniques. During the summer the students are sent to camps and must pledge to make the military life their future career.¹² In addition to the Czechoslovak Military Academy it is known that the Brno Poly-technical College has been assigned to teaching military science, so the training facilities at the higher level have been increased.

Military service starts at the age of twenty, and all males are required to register on coming of age. The duration of service is two years save for special branches such as the air force or Security Troops. Politically reliable recruits are assigned to patriotic tasks for six months before active service. These tasks are concerned with joining para-military and youth organizations.¹³ Rude'Právo of March 23, 1952, described the job of the Party during the registration period as encouraging the recruit to join para-military organizations or the Youth League. The military assignments of the draftees are decided upon just before he is inducted and will depend upon how he has performed his task in the interim between registration and induction. The politically unreliable recruit is drafted immediately and given six months of intensive indoctrination. His probable destination is a labor battallion.

¹⁰ Práce, Dec. 29, 1950.

¹¹ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, No. 5 (May 1952), 4.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

During a soldier's term of service he is subjected to continual political indoctrination in evening courses. These courses are administered by education officers who are a special elite cadre and are all Party members. Thus every soldier spends hundreds of hours in political discussion groups under the guidance of specialists. In an order issued to the army on New Year's Day, 1952, Čepička outlined the tasks of the officers. Two of these are revealing:

1. To strengthen the organizations of the Party and youth in order that they might become of efficient assistance to the commanders and officers in fulfilling their tasks of military and political preparations; . . .
4. To improve constantly the military and political preparations; to learn from the experience of the Soviet Army, to acquire the Soviet military art and skill.¹⁴

Gadourek remarks: "the compulsory military service forms a huge 'indoctrination machine' which should mould the personalities of those who might still have escaped the Party-control."

The soldier's life is carefully guarded lest his ideological purity become sullied. He is confined closely for the first few months and may get a few passes after he has proven his mettle; if he leaves camp, however, he is always closely watched.

Soldiers whose political character is doubtful receive no privileges. Those who are unassimilable are usually sent to the mines or work camps.¹⁵ Because a standing army is expensive, soldiers were, prior to 1950, allowed to work in labor battalions, but contact with the outside has proved harmful and this practice ceased. Since then they are permitted to do factory work but only under close surveillance. When the soldier is released from active duty he must take an oath to become a "shockworker" in a plant or factory.¹⁶

¹⁴Gadourek, op. cit., p. 76.

¹⁵Ladislav Feierabend, "The Gottwald Era in Czechoslovakia," Journal of Central European Affairs, XIII, No. 3 (Oct. 1953), 248.

¹⁶News From Behind the Iron Curtain, Jan. 16-31, 1951, p. 10.

Evolution of the Officer Corps¹⁷

Since 1945 the Party has attempted to strike a balance in the officer corps between political acceptability and professional competence. The effort has at times produced some anachronisms-- people without prior military experience are appointed generals, etc. Prior to 1948 the government had three groups of army officers to choose from: the London group; the Moscow group; and the leaders of the Slovak resistance. The Communists saw to it that prior to 1948 most of the London group, the most experienced leaders of higher ranks, most of whom were ex-Legionnaires, were either retired or were moved to unimportant positions. These were mostly purged in 1948. Along with the top generals, in the eight months following the coup 1,764 additional officers and 1,500 non-commissioned officers were dismissed.¹⁸ The air force, being composed of men who fought out of Britain, was purged almost completely of old officers. To make up the deficiency the Party has carefully selected recruits to fill the military academies from "aspirant-courses" in military training. Most of these have secondary or college educations and the percentage of workers is of course quite low.¹⁹ Čepička, however, announced that while only 7 per cent of the students entering the Czechoslovak Military Academy in 1945 were of proletarian origin, that proportion had risen to 50 per cent in 1950.

The positions of the non-commissioned officers have been filled by boys who were enrolled at the age of sixteen in the military education centers and who were taught special skills over a three-year period. These were then presented with certificates and enlisted as non-commissioned officers for two years. The Party, however, was still in need of non-coms as late as 1951, and advertisements appeared in the Party press for their

¹⁷ Ithiel de Sola Pool, op. cit.

¹⁸ Gadourek, op. cit., p. 72.

¹⁹ Ibid.

enlistment and training.²⁰ After the 1948 purge the Party was willing to leave some experienced men in top positions who would collaborate with the government. After April 1950 most of these men were swept away and replaced by Communists. The army, however, showed a preference for ability, and after the Slánský trial most of these political hatchet men, with the exception of Čepička, were purged and replaced by regular officers of low pre-war rank. The situation is obviously not satisfactory and awaits the promotion of experienced first-generation soldiers of Communist training.

An interesting trend is indicated in the present selection of top brass. Whereas many of the pre-1945 Czech army generals were men of broad staff and line service with combat records and had at one time been actual leaders of men in the infantry, the Communist trend is away from the officer who leads personally. The new Communist general is a technician or a bureaucrat in the narrow sense of being concerned with the mechanics of war, one who could not possibly build up a personal following.

Control of the Army

The army is controlled by the Czech Communist Party. The Party Statute of 1952 expressly states that Party members within the armed services shall form Party units within their organs and that these shall work according to directives of the Central Committee of the C. P. C. S. The political officer of the unit was generally the second in command and was actually the most powerful in cases where the commander himself was not a Communist during the pre-1950 period. Since that time the demand for proficiency has given the regular officer preference. The O. B. Z. (Army Counter-Intelligence) is probably powerful enough to manage objectionable officers. On January 5, 1951, Rudé Právo remarked that the group organizations in the Army are important because: (1) of the super-

²⁰ Ibid., p. 73.

ior fighting and command ability of the Communist; (2) the ability of Communists to criticize a commanding officer; (3) every Communist can reach the center of the Party; (4) the work of the Party center can be directed through military units; (5) the purification of the Party within the unit is conducted by Party members. Thus it is seen that resistance to Party and government orders is made extremely hazardous for would-be opposition.

The army is under Minister of Defense Alexej Čepička, who is a member of the Central Committee and perhaps Moscow's most reliable handyman in the C.P.C.S. Under him are the defense production industries, the chief of staff of the army and the Army Education Service. Thus in his person as a government official he combines the most important positions in the military machinery.

The question is not whether the Party controls the army, but which Party, the C.P.S.U.(B) or the C.P.C.S.? Undoubtedly the Soviet experts and observers are present to see that Soviet policy is carried out. However, the day-to-day implementing of decisions is probably done by Czechs. It is felt that the goal is not to make Soviet divisions out of Czechoslovak units, but to make of them allies as reliable as possible. The use of native officers is of course better suited for such calculations. However, the number of Soviet experts and officers was increasing as late as 1953, and as far as ultimate authority is concerned they are very probably privileged to countermand the decisions of Czech officers.²¹ This is much more likely since the signing of the Warsaw "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" on May 14, 1955.²² In this treaty the satellites have pledged to assist the Soviet Union and vice-versa, in case of a threat to any one of them. They have also agreed (article five) on a joint command. It was decided by the signatories of the document that the staff headquarters would be in Moscow and that Marshall J.S. Koniev,

²¹Feierabend, op. cit., p. 249.

²²For the text of this treaty see Soviet News (published by the Soviet Embassy in London) No. 3165, May 16, 1955.

Marshal of the Soviet Union, would be commander-in-chief of the combined forces. Unquestionably the implementation of this treaty will bring forth a new stream of Soviet experts.

Morale

It is difficult to assess just what the morale of the army is and would be under combat conditions. Despite repeated defections of officer trainees to the West, the combat army working with the Red Army will be under different pressures. The discontent in North Korea was widespread, yet that army gave a good account of itself in the field until it was actually beaten by a superior force. The Czechoslovak army is one of the best in eastern Europe. Since the satellites have now adopted the Soviet military code which holds families responsible for a soldier's acts (the hostage system), the defection in the Czech Army might be negligible until these families were out of danger.²³ Thus they may have to be beaten as any other army. The "I-have-no-other-choice" attitude stands face to face with the "Schweik tradition."

²³"The Satellite Armed Forces;" op. cit., p. 239.

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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMY

At the time when the Communist Party reached for absolute power in 1948, Czechoslovakia was one of the most industrialized and Westernized countries in central and eastern Europe. It is therefore interesting to trace the economic situation in this country, because there Communism was placed for the first time in a situation where it had to run on its own merits. Previously the Communist Party was able to establish itself in very backward agricultural countries where almost any policy introducing Western production techniques was bound to produce significant progress. Not so in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia represents the "Low Food Drain" type of community. These are

Those communities where 25 per cent or less of the income of consumers is spent on the farm-produced services that go to make up the food that is consumed. This is the demographers' 'incipient decline' or 'advanced industrial' demographic class.¹

This is true for the entire period for which income statistics are available:

Table 1									
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERSONAL INCOME GOING TO FARM POPULATION*									
	1929	1930	1934	1935	1937	1947	1949	1951	1953
Farmers' incomes	17.54	17.22	15.80	12.37	13.29	7.85	7.62	7.91	7.18
Farmer workers' incomes	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.64	3.09	2.88	1.29
Incomes of members of farm collectives	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.29	0.51	3.42

Source: Tables 2 and 4, chapter on national income, infra.

¹T. W. Schultz, The Economic Organization of Agriculture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 32.

The population density in this country was fairly high, but not oppressively so. In 1947 Czechoslovakia stood approximately in the middle of the list of European countries ordered according to this characteristic:

Table 2
POPULATION DENSITY, 1947*
(persons per square mile)

Netherlands	285
Belgium	276
United Kingdom	203
Germany	189
Italy	150
Switzerland	110
Denmark	97
Czechoslovakia	95
France	75
Spain	55
Sweden	15
Norway	10

* Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1948 (United Nations: Lake Success, 1949), pp. 19-29.

The distribution of income in these countries was relatively equal. If Lorenz curves are plotted for the distribution of incomes in Czechoslovakia and in the United States in 1947, a pair of almost identical curves will result.

Czechs and Slovaks were relatively well fed and well clothed. Again, if European countries are ranked according to the percentage of "the food of the poor"--carbohydrates--in their diet, we get the following order:

Table 3
PERCENTAGE OF CALORIES OBTAINED FROM
CARBOHYDRATES, 1939*

Denmark	33
United Kingdom	34
Sweden	37
France	45
Germany	48
Czechoslovakia	49
Italy	63
Poland	71
Yugoslavia	74
U. S. S. R.	76

* Source: Stephen Enke and Virgil Salera, International Economics (New York: Prentice Hall, 1951), p. 47.

Table 4
PER CAPITA FOOD SUPPLY AND NET ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF
TEXTILE FIBERS, 1934-38*

	Food (calories)	Cotton, wool, rayon (pounds)
Sweden	3.171	19
United Kingdom	3.095	22
Switzerland	3.151	17
Germany	2.920	14
Finland	3.016	12
France	2.979	15
Czechoslovakia	2.721	12
Poland	2.710	6
Italy	2.636	9
U. S. S. R.	2.827	7

* Source: Act for International Development (Washington: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, 1950), p. 495.

The workers of this country were relatively well aided by mechanical power. In 1939 the United Kingdom used twenty-seven horsepower per capita, Sweden nineteen, Germany eighteen, France thirteen, Finland twelve, Switzerland eleven, Czechoslovakia eleven, U. S. S. R. seven, Poland six, and Italy four.²

That does not, of course, mean that there were no problems. The industrial capacity of Czechoslovakia was built to supply the former Austrian empire. In 1918 most of these markets were separated from Czechoslovakia by custom barriers which, especially during and after the panic of the Great Depression, became very difficult to cross. The farming population suffered considerably for a variety of reasons. First of all, farm holdings were predominantly of the dwarf-size variety, and the underemployment of the farming population was substantial. The Royal (British) Commission which in the twenties studied the situation of European agriculture estimated that one-third of the Czechoslovak farming population was superfluous.

The attitudes of the people living in the society studied, their ideals, ideology, and pattern of thought are relevant to an understanding of their economic situation. There is one question which an economist in this field may ask and attempt to answer, because it is highly significant for the economic problems he is studying. This question asks what the attitudes of the members of the Czechoslovak society were towards the rigid, centralized and all-inclusive type of planning supported by the Communist Party. This is a highly complex question, but a highly tentative outline of at least a few basic factors to be considered shall be presented below.

There is no doubt that in the political sphere the Communists were in the minority from 1945 to 1948; the nation was too much imbued

² Act for International Development (Washington: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, 1950), p. 495.

with the ideals of the Western democracies to be amenable to the Communist dictatorship of the proletariat. In the economic sphere the situation was not so clear-cut.

A striking feature of Czechoslovak education was that people below the graduate level never received a single course in economics. Of those who reached the graduate level, those studying law received rudimentary training in a field which distracted law students from their professional pursuit and was treated accordingly; those studying business received slightly better training, but the overwhelming emphasis was on the "more practical disciplines" of this field. Other university graduates were no better off than high school and college graduates in this respect.

As a result, the overwhelming majority of Czechoslovak citizens, whether on the graduate level or not, had no formal training in economics. The average citizen had absolutely no understanding of the basic issues involved in decisions bearing on economic policy; what was worse, even the preponderant majority of the intellectual leaders of the nation-- teachers, college professors, most university professors, journalists-- could not, and did not, offer any articulate guidance to the electorate.

Thus the Czechoslovak citizen was largely unable to make the most elementary analysis of economic processes. The allocation of resources by the market, the working of the price mechanism, the distribution of the product to the factors of production, and similar facets of the economic system did not represent for him a system, with certain faults and certain advantages, but a purposeless and senseless confusion which exposed him and the nation to all the vagaries of chance. As far as he thought about these processes his reasoning was strongly influenced, in the absence of more precise knowledge, by his philosophy of life. It is our belief that a strong element of the philosophy was rationalism, the belief in the ability of man, and the nation, to direct its destiny intelligently, purposefully and completely. The fallacy of human omnipotence is, as we see, neither limited to a particular continent nor restricted to the field of foreign policy. Thus ignorance of the nature of

economic processes, coupled with all-pervading rationalism, led the Czechoslovak citizen either to indifference or even hostility to free enterprise and a competitive economy. But this formulation perhaps implies a greater precision of thought than there actually was: it was rather an indifference or hostility to any situation in which economic decisions are made by some unknown entity, be it the mystical market or someone behind the smoke screen of "the market."³

This attitude received additional support from the premium placed on personal and economic stability and security; this security, it was thought, can be more conveniently achieved through political power in an election booth than in the market itself.

These three factors belong basically in the realm of knowledge and ideology. No less important is the practical experience of the citizen.

One outstanding fact which largely shaped the thinking of the Czechoslovak citizen was the thoroughgoing cartelization of Czechoslovak economic life. Most commodities were either produced or sold under one type of cartel arrangement or another, from structural steel and coal to window glass and radios. The contracts executed by the members of the cartels were enforceable in state courts; even the state itself if it had an enterprise engaged in the cartelized field of endeavor was a member of the appropriate cartel.

These arrangements introduced the typical ills of a cartelized economy: restriction of output, encouragement of dwarf enterprises⁴ in both production and in distribution, and inefficient use of resources. Thus the entire experience of the Czechoslovak citizen was limited to a planned economy--planned by those not responsible to him through the usual political processes.

3

The often-heard cliché illustrates the point: "You need traffic lights to regulate traffic and you need planning to regulate the economy,"

4

Dorothy W. Douglas reports in her book Transitional Economic Systems (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), p. 74, "Out of a total of 720,000 business establishments only 2.2 per cent employed more than 20 workers."

The depression of the thirties left a deep mark on the thinking of the Czechoslovak citizen: Though the customary distrust or hate of everything German presented an insurmountable obstacle to anything coming from Germany, a plan of the Czech industrialist B^áťa which closely followed the German example of state economic planning and public works projects received widespread attention. The economic collapse was furthermore, largely attributed to the existing economic system.

In this frame of mind, and with this experience quite fresh in memory, the Czechoslovak citizen entered the postwar era. First came the issue of nationalization of enterprises with more than five hundred workers. The Communist Party and the Social Democrats pushed it with great vigor, and the other parties agreed because many of the factories of this size were in German hands and would have been taken over by the state anyway. Then came the policy question. Communist leaders could point out, besides a great variety of fancied ills of the past, some actual ills; they offered a solution in the form of thoroughgoing, centralized and detailed state planning of production.

The leaders of the democratic parties were in a highly difficult position in this field. They could not admit past ills without offering a dynamic program of their own; otherwise they would merely have strengthened the hands of the Communists. They were unable to offer such a program for a variety of reasons. First of all, the population was not ready for it. As was noted, the population was quite ignorant of the advantages free enterprise offers to the society in general--ignorant not only as far as their educational experience was concerned, but ignorant also as far as their practical experience in the past was concerned. While the advantages of private (not free) enterprise to many individuals were granted, the economic feasibility of this scheme for the society as a whole was doubted, and its ethical foundations were considered highly compromised.

But the leaders themselves were not ready to offer such a program. All their past lives they had considered the strait jacket which cartels impose upon the economy as the natural and inevitable order; indeed, in

Europe the absence of competitive conditions in general is considered the normal way of life.⁵ While these leaders certainly cannot be blamed for sticking to ideas which were always legal, customary, and quite respectable, these ideas and their effects must be taken into account.

In 1945 this past economic philosophy backfired. The democratic parties were limited to exhortations for the respect of property rights; because of the factors described above and the demoralization caused by war this could effectively appeal only to those who had business enterprises to lose. Another policy was to extol the virtues of free, competitive enterprise; but what the Czechoslovak citizens and the leaders understood by this was the privately planned cartel-economy of the pre-war period.

5

The report prepared in 1954 by fifty-four exiled statesmen from middle and eastern Europe may serve as an example. It was published "for public consideration" and without endorsement by the Free Europe Committee, New York, under the title Europe--An Examination of the Post Liberation Problem of the Position of Central and Eastern European Nations in a Free European Community (New York: Free Europe Committee, Inc., 1954).

Speaking about the Polish coal cartel, the report says:

"The convention restored order in the Polish coal industry, which was about 30 per cent dependent on exports. As in Czechoslovakia, the Polish coal mine owner was in a position to effect at least minimum deliveries of coal and was able to assure his employees that the mines would not be shut down over long periods of time. Such cartels were thoroughly supervised by the government both in Czechoslovakia and Poland. No price increase was approved by the government unless it could be demonstrated that an increase would definitely contribute to the promotion of economic development.

"The fact that prices of cartelized steel commodities such as rails, bars, rods, pipes and wire declined only moderately indicated that the cutthroat competition in other, unregulated commodities was as much responsible as the depression for bringing prices down below production costs.

"The impact of cartels on Central and Eastern Europe were manifold. First the cartels regulated both inland and export prices of most heavy industrial products. Even during the depression in 1931-35, the prices of cartelized commodities did not decline below production costs, thus enabling the producer to run his plant without loss and to pay his employees reasonable wages. Since all cartels were supervised by the governments, it was impossible to set excessive prices."

In effect it meant that, phrase-making disregarded, the electorate was offered no clear or acceptable alternative and that the democratic parties spent their energy mostly on negative measures and efforts in the economic sphere of policy-making. Unwilling to risk offering the prewar system to the electorate, and not ready to offer a new, dynamic free enterprise system, they lived to modify, slow down, or resist the Communist program of rigid planning.

The Czechoslovak electorate was mature enough to realize that the truly crucial issue before it was political and spiritual in nature: the Masaryks' ideals of humanity, democracy and freedom against the Communist police state and the "dictatorship of the proletariat." In 1946 the Communists failed to get a majority, and in the elections scheduled for May 1948 they would certainly have experienced a defeat, as they knew themselves.

Nevertheless, it can be said that the Czechoslovak citizens, because of all the reasons mentioned above, were predisposed in favor of a centrally planned economy in the postwar period. This was important for Communist economic policy after 1948. It may be that experience with planned economy will lead to basic change in the attitudes of the population, should a future opportunity arise to introduce in Czechoslovakia a free, competitive economic system.

ECONOMIC POLICIES SINCE 1948

Before the Communist coup d'etat in February 1948, economic planning in Czechoslovakia did not amount to much: a substantial part of national economy was in private hands; the Communists did not have enough power in Parliament to put through measures which would prevent private enterprise from moving in directions most desired by the consumers regardless of the wishes of the planners; the Communists had political designs requiring the greatest concessions to the workers--concessions which made the rigid type of planning impossible.

By the coup d'etat in 1948 all these barriers were overcome in one stroke, and the Communist Party started to move fast in the direction of rigid, all-inclusive planning. First of all they needed a legal basis for the necessary powers for the government and planning authorities, which was provided by the new constitution; rather than sign it President Benes resigned, and Gottwald took over.

It seems desirable to repeat some of the economically relevant passages of this Constitution.

Article XII.

- (1) Economic system in Czechoslovakia is based on the nationalization of the natural resources, industry, wholesale trade, and finances;
on the ownership of land by those who till it;
on the protection of small and medium private enterprises and on the inviolability of personal property.
- (2) All national economy in Czechoslovak Republic must serve the people. In this public interest the state directs all the economic activity through a unified economic plan.

Chapter 8. Economic System

Unified Economic Plan

162. The state through the unified economic plan directs all economic activity, especially the production, commerce, and transportation. This is to be done in such a way as to guarantee a reasonable level of national consumption, to increase the quantity, quality and regularity of production, and so that the standard of living of the population will gradually increase.
163. (1) The unified economic plan is always prepared for a certain period of time and is announced by law.

- (2) The preparation and the carrying out of the unified economic plan is the right of the government and one of its outstanding tasks. The government bases its acts on the creative initiative of the working people and on their organization.
 - (3) The government submits regular reports about the execution of the unified economic plan to the National Assembly.
- 164 (1) Everyone who is allotted any task connected with the execution and fulfillment of the unified economic plan is obliged to perform this task conscientiously and economically according to his personal and economic capabilities.
- (2) All physical and legal persons have the duty to adjust their economic activity to the unified economic plan.

These sections of the new constitution express fairly well the underlying belief of the Communist leaders that economic processes are as amenable to legislative fiat as are other activities. Herman Mannheim well describes this problem:

"From our point of view, the principal weakness of Soviet methods of dealing with economic crime is this: exaggerated reliance is placed on the possibilities of the machinery of criminal justice, and, as a consequence, the criminal courts, perhaps insufficiently aided by the administrative branch of government, are allowed to play an over-great part in the shaping of the country's economic policy. From the purely negative and protective side their functions have been too much expanded, so as to aim at performing positively constructive tasks as well."

Five-Year Plans

Thus long-term planning became the basis of all Czechoslovak economic activity. The first of the plans was, according to the Soviet example, to encompass five years, the period from 1949 through 1953. On October 27, 1948, the Czechoslovak National Assembly approved the necessary legislation in the law called "The Five-Year Economic Plan." It seems advisable to clarify briefly the nature of the numerical expression of the tasks imposed by the Plan so that no misunderstanding will arise when the official data are presented.

Gross Value of output

The economic tasks set by the 1948 law are stated in terms of the

¹Hermann Mannheim, Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction (London: Kegan Paul, Trend, Trubner, 1946), p. 141.

"gross value of output" expressed in planned (1948) prices. The law orders industry to increase "gross value of output" from 288 billion crowns in 1948 to 454 billion crowns in 1953. This figure is a simple addition of all the 1948 and planned 1953 "gross value of outputs" of individual production units. For instance, if the planned production of iron ore rises by one billion crowns, if the iron ore is used to produce steel ingots worth two billion crowns, if then the steel is used to produce motorcars worth, say, three billion crowns, the plan will register an increase of six billion crowns in the total gross value of industrial production. While this measure inordinately exaggerates the absolute rise in production, it is not too objectionable a measure of change in industrial and other outputs over time. It does not make much difference whether we say for instance that the original production of machinery was worth three billion and that an additional three billion's worth of machinery will be produced, or whether we say that the original "gross value of output" was six billion's worth of coal, iron, and machinery and that another six billion will be added--in both cases the rise is 50 per cent. But when the performance is discussed some stringent conditions must be fulfilled. "Gross value of output" is dependent among other things, on the maintenance of the formal organization of the economy, while the net value of output is not.

The First Five-Year Plan

The first Five-Year Plan was accepted on the 27th of October, 1948, and is the last detailed statement of expected performance of the economy and its individual sectors. The changes in official emphasis among branches of the economy are indicated by the following figures:

Table 1
TARGETS OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN*

	<u>Gross value of output:</u>	
	<u>1948</u>	<u>1953</u>
Industries	288.0 billion	454.0 billion
Mining	13.2	17.8
Electric power	9.3	14.1
Raw iron, raw steel	31.2	46.4
Metallurgy	47.8	92.3
Foundries	---	7.1
Heavy machinery	---	22.4
Precision machinery	---	13.7
General machinery	---	6.2
Vehicles	---	15.4
Electrical equipment	---	18.3
Other	---	9.2
Chemical	21.7	35.1
Glass	4.1	4.6
Building materials	7.6	12.1
Paper	7.0	9.9
Lumber	9.9	12.5
Textiles and ready-made clothes	46.0	77.4
Leather and rubber	15.2	21.8
Printing, records, movies	---	5.235
Sugar	8.7	10.2
Alcohol	5.3	5.6
Brewing	5.7	9.6
Flour milling	3.6	4.7
Food	34.5	61.8
Tobacco, salt		12.8
Handicraft	49.0	59.0
Agriculture	76.3	105.0
Crops	49.5	55.2
Livestock	26.8	49.8
Forestry	?	?
Building trades	?	46.0
Transportation	?	?
Investments	(1949-53)	336.2
Industry		131.9
Agriculture		26.8
Buildings		4.6
Transportation		52.9
Commerce, travel		5.0
Housing		39.3
Social care		8.1
Health, national security		10.3
Cultural institutions		10.2

* Czechoslovak Five-Year Plan (Prague:Orbis, 1949), p. 16

There seems to be no doubt that the Czechoslovak government planned to accomplish great things. "National income will be raised by one-half," and "private and social consumption will rise by 35 per cent per head," states the law. But this first plan did not last long.

Second Five-Year Plan---1950.

After the first year of the Five-Year Plan the Soviet Union increased its demands on Czechoslovak heavy industry. The Secretary of Foreign Trade, Mr. Gregor, said after he signed a new trade agreement with the U.S.S.R.:

With regard to the help which the U.S.S.R. grants to all the People's Democracies and now also to a great extent to the Chinese People's Republic, the products of our heavy and light machinery industry have extreme importance in our exports. It will be necessary to orient our production still more towards these products, which are already demanded today and which have good expectations of long-term demand from the U.S.S.R. and from the People's Democracies.

It was not announced how this decision to revise the first Five-Year Plan was carried out. But the second Five-Year Plan came fairly rapidly, because on April 8, 1950 the Czechoslovak citizens could read:

The output of coal envisaged by the plan for the second year of the Five-Year Plan is by far insufficient to fulfill the higher tasks and to increase the speed of the construction of heavy industry. A super-plan was therefore announced, which substantially raises the planned output of coal.³

Subsequently:

The re-worked plan for 1950 was approved by the government. Heavy industry will now rise by almost 17 per cent over the level of 1949; the value of investments in our productive facilities will rise over 1949 not by 41 per cent but by 56 per cent.⁴

²
Rudé Právo; February 25, 1950.

³
Rudé Právo, April 8, 1950.

⁴
Rudé Právo, April 14, 1950.

The Third Five-Year Plan

In January 1951 the President of the Republic, Mr. Gottwald, said: "The successes which we have achieved in 1950 are so substantial that we shall be able to increase the target figures of our Five-Year Plan."⁵ On February 27, 1951, the head of the Planning Office, Mr. Dolansky, spoke over the Czech radio. He said:

In 1953 production of heavy industry will be raised 2.31 times over the year 1948, instead of the originally planned 1.66 times. It will be 35 per cent higher than planned in 1953. Production of light industry will rise 1.73 times instead of 1.54 times. Overall industrial production will rise by 98 per cent instead of by 57 per cent. . . In the period 1951-53, the investment program will be 558 billion korunas. This represents an increase of almost 50 per cent over the originally planned figure. Total consumption in 1953 will rise by about 49 per cent over the level of 1948 instead of about 41 per cent. Agricultural production in 1953 will exceed the original target 16 per cent.⁶

After the new plan was introduced, production consistently failed to reach the planned figures. In one report of the State Planning Office after another, shortcomings of this or that branch of the economy were castigated. Finally, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government issued special edicts⁷ castigating a whole line of industries, such as:

5

Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin, January 15, 1951.

6

Czechoslovak Home Service, February 27, 1951, 1830 GMT.

7

In all these edicts a long line of failings precedes a number of measures to be taken to improve the situation. A typical example is the following statement by the Communist Party on December 3, and by the government on December 11, 1952:

The chairmen of the Central Committee of the Communist Party state herewith that there are grave shortcomings in the work of the power stations and in the work of the distributing networks. The power stations do not fulfill the production plan of electrical energy and they do not assure quality and regularity of the supply of electric energy to the economy and to the population. Systematic daily limitations of the supply of electric energy disturb the work of industry and the life of the citizens. New production facilities are not put into operation according to the plan. Plánované hospodárství, 1951, p. 781.

(1) Coal industry	October 15, 1951
(2) Foundries	November 9, 1951
(3) Power industry	December 3, 1951
(4) Livestock industry	February 4, 1952
(5) State Machinery Stations	March 3, 1952
(6) Sugar-beet industry	March 11, 1952
(7) State Farms	April 8, 1952
(8) Chemical industry	June 15, 1952
(9) Cotton industry	October 10, 1952

Where these edicts ordered large raises in wages and salaries to provide incentives, they were fulfilled as far as that part of the edict was concerned; in all other respects they seem to be largely unsuccessful. Already at the end of 1951 Premier Zapotocky went before the nation and practically begged for men and work.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan

On December 16, 1952, speaking of the coming year, President Gottwald said: "Moreover, . . . we shall not reach the production plans fixed by the Five-Year Plan in almost any basic raw material." (It is unclear which one of the three preceding versions of the Five-Year Plans Mr. Gottwald had in mind. Similarly, one cannot but wonder why he mentions only a failure in the raw-materials industries--surely the industries lacking these missing raw materials would be in difficulty as well.)

He went on to say that the Plan for 1953 had to be adjusted to the existing situation, and that

According to the Economic Plan for 1953 much will be done to mitigate the effects of these shortcomings and bottlenecks in our national economy which were caused by traitors, conspirators, and saboteurs. At the same time we must realize that we shall not succeed entirely during the coming year.⁸

The Fifth Five-Year Plan

It seems that Gottwald was more right than he feared when he said that "we must realize that we shall not succeed entirely during the coming year." In 1953 the Planning Office was forced month after month to report

8

Czechoslovak Home Service, December 16, 1952, 1800 GMT.

serious shortcomings in plan fulfillment. Finally, on September 15, 1953, a few months before the end of "the" Five-Year Plan, V. Široký announced a new government decision to carry out further cuts in the plan. He said:

It became evident that some tasks of the increased Five-Year Plan were put too high in the case of some industries. . . Moreover, the necessary raw material basis for the targets in heavy industry was not available. . . The Government has decided to cut the planned investments by 16.7 per cent this year and to maintain them on this revised level in 1954.⁹

Results

Announced Results

It was announced that "the Five-Year Plan was basically fulfilled."¹⁰ Official sources announced that "during the Five-Year Plan production rose by 125 per cent." Since the third Five-Year Plan promised a rise of 130 per cent, this would indicate that this plan was fulfilled by 96 per cent and that the two announced reductions therefore did not amount to more than four per cent of the original target. The same paper states that "the original targets were exceeded by 25 per cent." The original target was to increase industrial production by 70 per cent so that an over-fulfillment by 25 per cent would mean a fulfillment of 87.5 per cent, not 125 per cent.

⁹ Czechoslovak Home Service, September 15, 1953, 1900 GMT.

¹⁰ Rudé Právo, January 3, 1953. It seems a highly questionably procedure to cut the tasks imposed by previous plans on the beginning of the last year of the plan period, and it is still more disturbing that new cuts are announced three months before the end of the period. In almost every article on planning published in Czechoslovakia one finds a remark that while in capitalist countries "plans" are no more than predictions, in socialist countries plans are the laws of land. The procedures described above would indicate that these basic "laws of land" were constantly changed to let the plan fit the performance; then all plans are bound to be fulfilled.

¹¹ Rudé Právo, January 3, 1952.

It is likely that the Czechoslovak government itself has no idea how the production changed during these five years. (If in a country directed by "socialist economic science" the authority does not even know what happened, we can hardly believe that they directed this to happen.) In that case a sensible analysis of the published figures is impossible. The following pages present evidence that not only did the government not know what the performance of the economy was (aside from some easily ascertainable data about the production of some raw-materials), but that, given certain features of the statistical methods of measurement, it was impossible for it to know.

Techniques of Measurement

Planned economies are supposedly distinguished by fairly detailed knowledge of the past economic performance; only on the basis of such knowledge can intelligent plans be made for future growth. If we establish the claim of ignorance, we shall throw an important light not only on the workings of the planning processes, but also on the actual performance.

As was mentioned, the Czechoslovak government based most of its plans on, and measured the performance of these plans by, gross value of output. Some reservations about this method were registered; but the basic objection is that this method presupposed the ceteris paribus conditions, which in a changing economy are bound to hold much less than those which must be attached to the calculation of the net value of output-- one of the outstanding conditions is that the formal organization of the economy during the period must remain unchanged.¹²

12

To return to the first example, there were three basic processes: mines producing one billion's worth of iron ore, foundries producing two billion's worth of raw-iron, and machine industry producing three billion's worth of machinery.

The calculation of gross value of output will look like this:

1 billion's worth of iron ore
2 billion's worth of raw iron
<u>3 billion's worth of machinery</u>
6 billion's gross value of goods

Even the planner with the best will not to "cheat" had to make a great many decisions during the five years on how to merge similar enterprises, how to support specialization of enterprises, what is the manageable unit for a given quality of managers, etc. During these five years enterprises actually were nationalized, merged, divided, subdivided, and merged in other units, as administrative experience and necessity, if nothing else, required.

All reorganization activities cannot be described here, but there is one which was of major proportions. Frejka, the chairman of the Economic Section of the President's Office, said in 1952:

How could even the best General Director master the administration of his sector when he had under him tens of factories producing all possible things? Because of that we therefore created, as in the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies, smaller organizational sectors. The Department of Heavy Industry was, for instance, broken down into the Departments of Fuel and Energy, Mines, Chemistry, Heavy Machinery, and General Machinery.¹³

Now assume that packing and shipping costs are 10 per cent of the price; assume that next year the output remains unchanged; assume further that every enterprise gives up packing and shipping and that three new independent concerns are created from the former packing and shipping departments. The new "gross value of output" table will look like this:

0.9 billion, iron ore
1.0 billion, shipped ore (new concern)
1.8 billion, raw iron
2.0 billion, shipped raw iron (new concern)
2.7 billion, machinery
3.0 billion, shipped machinery (new concern)
11.4 billion

While the net value of output remained unchanged, namely three billion, the gross value almost doubled, thanks to the simple expedient of three new independent shipping concerns.

13

Rudé Právo, September 16, 1951.

It is evident that no statistical apparatus would be able to make adjustments to prevent the changing of "gross values" overnight through purely formal reorganizations. This in itself would suffice to make all the Czech data based on "gross value of output" highly suspect. But, unfortunately for anyone using "gross value of output" data, there is another, equally fundamental objection.

If something is measured over time, the definition of whatever is measured must be kept unchanged. It would make a large difference if in one year cars in the United States were counted as vehicles powered by combustion engines, the next year all such vehicles with more than 150 h.p., and the next year all such vehicles priced below two thousand dollars. Exactly this happened in Czechoslovakia from 1949 to 1953 when the output of the economy was measured.

Percentage Fulfillment of the Plan

The method of calculation of the fulfillment of the plan within a sector up till 1950 was the following: In the case of each specifically stated goal we counted the number of workers working on this task, and this number then became the common denominator for the mutual contact of all specifically stated tasks. In the fulfillment of the plan we counted even such cases where no planned quantity was produced: the number of workers working on this task multiplied by one entered the accounts. On the other hand we did not count such cases where a good was produced but not planned. . .

Name of Product	Planned quantity	Actual quantity	Per cent fulfillment (3 ÷ 2)	Number of workers	Connecting coefficient (4 x 5)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

This method of calculation had numerous shortcomings and therefore in 1951 we still calculated the level of performance through the use of specifically stated tasks, but the planned price became the common denominator. Only in 1952 did we finally start to follow the volume of industry according to gross production. 14

14
Statistický obzor, 1952, pp. 196-97.

Of course in any given factory it is extremely difficult to say how many workers were employed on this or that task; there is often no way to decide correctly, and there are millions of ways to manipulate these figures.¹⁵

15

Assume the following actual output and manpower allocation in an enterprise, X:

Name of product	Planned quantity	Produced quantity	Fulfillment in percentages	Workers employed	Connecting coefficient
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A	1000	500	50.0	1000	50.0
B	1000	1500	150.0	1000	150.0
Average total fulfillment of the plan-----					100.0

Assume that the managerial personnel really did not want the high premiums connected with the fulfillment of the plan. Nothing would be easier than to shift the time recording for some workers in the desirable direction:

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A	1000	500	50%	1100	55.00
B	1000	1500	150%	900	135.00
Average fulfillment of the plan-----					95.00

It of course may be that the managerial personnel and the workers want the benefits, peace of mind, and prestige connected with overfulfillment of the plan:

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A	1000	500	50%	900	45.00
B	1000	1500	150%	1100	165.00
Average fulfillment of the plan-----					105.00

It is easy for the foreman to report that more man-hours were spent on tasks which were overfulfilled than actually were spent, and that less man-hours were spent on unfulfilled tasks than actually were spent. It seems striking that in 1949 and 1950, when the "man-hour value" method was in operation, plans in general were fulfilled or more than fulfilled, while when a more objective weighting in the form of prices was used the plan fulfillment began to drop.

Even then the reporting is faulty; to the enterprises it seemed profitable to concentrate on some item in which the price and equipment were favorable and to let the rest of the plan go:

The fulfillment of the plan was achieved in many enterprises through overfulfillment of the plan of production of less important and easier tasks and by neglect of planned production of some of the most important products for our economy.¹⁶

complained the State Planning Office. As a concrete example of this practice, Rudé Právo reported that one of the large Czechoslovak factories, Českomoravská-Kolben-Daněk, "fulfilled the plan 92 per cent, while in the terms of the required sortiment of goods the plan was fulfilled circa 54 per cent."¹⁷ After a discussion of these practices, Bludovský, member of District Committee of the Communist Party, said: "It is clear that with such also-planning it can easily happen that whole enterprises, as for instance our railroad engines factory (in Plzen) remain without materials for weeks."¹⁸

The crucial point is that the method of calculating the percentage fulfillment was changed three times during the period under study. The numbers for the period are therefore not only faulty; they are not even comparable.

¹⁶ Rudé Právo, Oct. 16, 1952.

¹⁷ Ibid, Dec. 24, 1952.

¹⁸ Ibid, Dec. 19, 1952.

Gross Value of Output. With the gross value we are no better off.

1949-50.

The basis for calculation of the gross value of a plant's output was a technical unit. Depending on how many differently classified goods the plant produced, so many "technical units" it had. If the product went through several stages of production, it appeared several times in the final gross output of a plant. The value of gross output of a factory was constituted by the simple addition of the gross output of its plants, and similarly a gross output of a central administration of groups of firms was constituted by a simple addition of the gross output of its factories.

1951

Minor changes in the technique were carried out.

1952

The gross value of output of a farm was calculated in 1950 planned prices. The following goods were included in the calculation:

(1) the value of all industrial goods out of own or purchased material, the value of investments and of small short-lasting items internally produced;

(2) value of industrial services;

(3) change in inventories, if planned.

Not calculated are:

(4) goods internally consumed;

(5) rejects and refuse;

(6) value of administrative services;

(7) products of non-industrial value.

1953

Gross value of output is to be calculated in 1952 wholesale prices by the same method as above, except that multiple counting within a factory is to be eliminated. "The gross value of output for the years 1948-52 will be recalculated."¹⁹

This is a truly crucial piece of information. Any one of these methods described above would permit some indication of the changes in output

¹⁹A. Červený and F. Herbst, "Planování a sledování hrubé výroby v průmyslu" Planované Hospodárství, 1952, No. 3-4.

which took place during the period 1949-53, if consistently used. The yearly changes in the method of measurement of the "gross value of output" makes it patently impossible for the government to know what happened. The same author is quite explicit about it:

The possibility of the comparability of statistical data for different years was not assured. With the constant organizational changes in our economy, and recurrent changes of the methodology of planning, there changed not only the number of enterprises within a Department, but also the content of statistical indicators (for instance only the classification of labor force was changed several times), etc. To prepare a time series of certain statistical data from the year 1948, which would contain comparable data from year to year, means difficult calculations, inquiries in factories, etc. With these shortcomings the statistical apparatus must deal first, and in the future assure order in all changes. In the USSR, with all changes in enterprises and departments the government orders immediate recalculation of all basic statistical series for the past years. In case of organizational changes, for instance in case of a division or merger of industrial enterprises, the gross value of output and other statistical data are recalculated. In case of definitional or methodological changes recalculations for the past years are carried out very thoroughly often even in enterprises.²⁰

Actual Results

It is clear because of these difficulties any analysis of the tasks imposed upon the Czech economy and of the performance of this economy becomes impossible: national income accounting remains the only feasible way to discuss the national economy of Czechoslovakia in quantitative terms. It is, of course, feasible to say that heavy industry was evidently increased at the expense of the light industries and that industry in general was increased at the expense of agriculture; that much is clear from the emphasis which was put by the planners on different sectors of the economy.

It is possible to discuss the performance in certain sectors where the success was great enough to allow publishing some quantitative measurement, or where the quantitative measurements were simple enough to be available to the government: a prime example of such fields are the sectors producing raw materials. For the purpose of analyzing the overall performance of the economic policies of the government, this is not too

²⁰F. Herbst, "Statistika a nová metoda sestavování státního národohospedářského plánu," Plánované Hospodárství, 1952, No. 10, pp. 840-41.

promising a pursuit.

Neither does it seem useful to discuss the achievements of the economic policies by using the Plan as the yardstick. The tasks set by the Plan are not only arbitrary but were, as was seen, ever-changing and only very vaguely stated after the first Five-Year Plan, announced in 1948, went out of use in 1950. Fulfillment, overfulfillment, or non-fulfillment of the Plan is meaningless; the content of the Plan is crucial. If it is a highly ambitious plan, a fulfillment of only 50 per cent may be more stunning than an overfulfillment of a plan which grossly underestimated the productive capacities of this or that sector.

Individual successes or failures of a plan seems, from this point of view, unimportant too. After all, any economy, whether "planned" institutionally or by the price system, can double or triple the production of many a commodity almost overnight. The relevant question, when we discuss the effectiveness of economic policies, is at what costs this was done.

Planning Techniques

In discussing the planning techniques used to carry out the economic policy of the government there are two problems which must be explored. First, one must inquire whether the different segments of planning techniques used were mutually consistent and reinforced each other or whether they were mutually contradictory and pulled the subordinate decision-makers in opposite directions. This problem is purely analytical, and empirical evidence is required only to establish that the policies described actually existed. The other problem is how the policies succeeded in performing the essential tasks of any economic organization.

Fixing the Standards

Nowhere in Czech Communist literature does one find any discussion of the theoretical basis by which "scientific planning" determines the ends which are to be followed by the national economy. This is not surprising. Once the market ceases to be the predominant determining factor, any collective decision is by necessity a matter of judgment which cannot possibly be explained by any theory. Naturally one finds meaningless explanations in the terms "national welfare," "security," "catering to the ever-increasing needs and requirements of the people," but they are

no more than windowdressing with which the planners themselves in their trade publication, Planned Economy, bother not at all. What one finds is not the answer to the crucial question "why" but to the question, "How is the plan prepared?"

On September 11, 1952, an employee of the State Planning Office wrote an article which gives a good survey of the planning techniques employed during the Five-Year Plan:

The planning up till now was narrowly centralized. . . . only the State Planning Office planned. Practically all tasks of the plan were contained in the "directive numbers" issued by the State Planning Office to different General Directories and Departments. The directive numbers were not a plan but a substitute for it. It is natural that the Departments were unable to do anything else in view of this all-inclusive determination of tasks but to allot mechanically these "directive numbers" to their enterprises. These "directive numbers" were therefore allotted to individual enterprises, plants, and workshops, and there the workers created the so-called "meet-plan" (vstřicny plan). Because the initiative of the workers was directed especially towards the acceptance of higher tasks these employees tried to surpass the "directive numbers." At the same time enterprises asked for higher investment quotas, for a higher supply of raw materials, and for more labor. These demands were not correctly explained, and were mostly overdrawn because in the enterprises they knew that there is a possibility of their demands being cut.

The Departments added the demands of enterprises and submitted the grand total as their plan to the State Planning Office. Only then was it discovered that requests for investments, raw materials, electric energy, etc., surpassed in their total the possibilities which we have. Therefore understandably cuts and decreases were necessary and because there was no other sensible basis the cuts were based on guesswork.

The new planning technique (for 1953) will help to remove the existing shortcomings, because it decentralizes planning and gives exact, concrete tasks and directives to all the bodies concerned with planning.

The State Planning Office elaborated and submitted to the Government for approval the "control numbers." They do not replace the plan, but give only the main directions and unity to our plan. By not being too detailed they make possible and demand creative activity and initiative from all planning bodies. The Departments shall prepare on the

basis of concrete data their own drafts of the plan. This shall be prepared on the basis of negotiations with other Departments which are either suppliers or customers; it must be supported by evidence and by technical-economic norms and the required indicators . . . The District National Committees shall prepare plans for the development of districts and the State Planning Office shall prepare a plan for the entire national economy. All these bodies work on their plans completely independently.

The Departments and their main administrations (of industrial sectors) may give direction tasks to the enterprises and may demand from them information and certain facts. These must in no case be used as a basis of the draft of the Departmental plans; they may be compared and checked with the Departmental drafts. Then the Departments shall submit the drafts of plans to the Government and a copy to the State Planning Office.

At the time when the Departments and the District National Committees submit their drafts, the State Planning Office has already its own draft which it compares with the submitted drafts. The draft of the plan for economic development will be discussed by the Government, which will have available all the drafts of plans. Repeated checking and comparing thus will make it possible for the Government to harmonize in time all plans in such a way that disproportions shall be eliminated.

After the approval of the plan the Departments shall allocate tasks to their factories.²¹

This throws an indirect but interesting light on the claims of success of the Five-Year Plan. The new technique seems no less confused than the first, but only time can tell.

Organizing Production

The task of organizing production may be viewed as the central task of any economic system. Goods and services must first be produced before they can be distributed or used to provide for maintenance and for the future. This does not mean that the tasks are independent and unrelated: inefficient or unjust distribution, insufficient provision for maintenance or the future, or determination of standards completely unrelated to the wishes

²¹ Ladislav Svoboda, "Jak budeme nyní sestavovat plán rozvoje národního hospodářství," Práce, September 11, 1952.

of consumers will all sooner or later affect production, regardless of how well this is organized. Nevertheless, it is justifiable to put special emphasis on the task of organizing production when the efficiency²² of a given economic system is discussed.

Organizing Principles. The Plan was the most emphasized organizing principle. On the national level, it determined what products were to be produced; it is more useful to say that it determined in what ratio different products were to be produced. For planning purposes the ratios are of greater importance than the absolute quantities.²³ On the plant level, it determined what products are to be produced and how many factors may go into that production. This was done by the preparation of "technical norms:" each good to be produced had a list which specified how much copper, steel, electricity, labor, etc. is required for the output of a unit of this good.

It would appear that the Plan is an independent organizing principle which could exist regardless of whether there are other organizing principles or not. It is not true that the production problems to be solved in a Communist economy are purely technical. Very few products require fixed proportions of certain factors of production; the prices of these commodities will determine their choice: e. g., production may be either capital or labor intensive, depending on the relative prices of labor and capital. Thus the Plan in all its details depends on the price system, which in all circumstances represents another organizing principle.

²²In the absence of some absolute measure of efficiency one can speak only in relative terms.

²³If, for instance, the Plan provided for the production of a thousand electric motors and a thousand lathes into which these motors would be put, it is more essential that this ratio be kept (1:1) than that the value of production in absolute terms be reached. If the motors and lathes are of equal value, it is evidently better to produce 900 motors and 900 lathes than to produce 1,000 motors and 800 lathes; though in both cases the net value of output is the same, in the case where the required ratio of 1:1 is not kept wastes occur because some of the motors will remain unused inventories.

Thus, whether the planners wanted to admit it or not, the price system represented a second organizing principle. No "technical norm" for any good could be rationally prepared by the factory planner if he did not know the relative prices of copper, silver, aluminum, labor, capital, etc. The optimum allocation of resources was, even in Czechoslovakia, crucially dependent on the price system; the Plan itself, in this sense, was only a subordinate organizing principle, the quality of which was fully dependent on the correctness or lack of correctness of the price system. Therefore if it is known how prices were determined in Czechoslovakia it will also be known how efficient the organization of production was in the optimum allocation of resources. Prices were fixed by different authorities of the state; in 1952 all authority over prices was finally taken over by the State Planning Office. How successful the state authorities were in the determination of prices is indicated by an article published in the trade journal of the planners, Planned Economy.

Planning of prices should assure us active influence for our effort to increase the production of goods especially important to the national economy. For instance, when we made the last adjustment of the prices of foundry products in 1949, we increased the prices of goods in which we then experienced bottle-necks. High prices were supposed to stimulate production of these goods and at the same time exert a downward pressure on their consumption, but the differentiation of prices was not sufficiently pressing and intelligent. Besides that, other foundry goods today appear in short supply. From this standpoint the prices of coal are insufficiently functional as well. If the price of coke-coal is more favorable this will lead to the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the (planned) output. Differentiation of the prices of electric power for electrolytic purposes will assure the development of this progressive technique in chemistry. A support of a similar growth was assured in the case of many raw materials and semi-products and agricultural raw materials. There remain on the other hand many disproportions which act in the reverse way.

Low prices of machinery, new raw materials and synthetic raw materials should support technical progress . . . In this respect there are serious shortcomings in the Czechoslovak price system . . . The ratios between the prices of different producers do not correspond to the need to support technical progress. Prices of coal, iron ore, other ores, and foundry products are relatively low while there is no intention to support greater consumption. On the other hand the prices of machinery are extraordinarily high. Low quality metal products

are inordinately high in relation to high quality products, which prevents the development of new techniques in building trades and does not sufficiently support technical progress in the techniques used by the heavy machinery industry.

To plan prices correctly it is necessary to fix high prices on deficit materials and relatively low prices on substitute materials, higher profits on goods made out of substitute and synthetic materials, deficit prices for goods in the case of which there is the intention to limit consumption, low prices on goods made out of domestic materials and high prices on goods made out of imported materials.

To these questions we did not pay enough attention. We have incorrect relationships between the prices of non-ferrous alloys to iron products, between coal prices and electric power prices, high prices of synthetic materials. Incorrect relations are estimated haphazardly and it is not usually feasible to change prices immediately to avoid introduction of confusion into the plan and to avoid weakening of the control of the fulfillment of the plan.

[emphasis ours]

The worst shortcoming in this direction (higher quality of goods) is the absence of quality standards. When we created prices we made the mistake of too drastically simplifying former detailed organization of price lists according to quality. In detailed construction of price lists on a quality basis we saw a useless excess of capitalistic competitiveness.²⁴

The difficulties described here are really not surprising at all. In any national economy there are millions of prices in existence at any given time: any hope that these prices could be managed by some board so as to assure that they shall reflect real, alternative, or any other costs is naive. Especially in the determination of prices there is no substitute for the market. The rigidities of the market described and deplored by economists become inconsequential when compared with the rigidities introduced into the price system when prices start to be managed by governmental fiat.

On these reasons alone one could conclude that the Plan, and the production organized on its basis, were inefficient and led to misallocation of resources. It was seen that in its origins the Plan is not independent of the price system; only after values--prices--are determined does the

²⁴Kurt Rozsypal, "Zkušenosti s plánováním státních velkoobchodních cen v CSR," Plánované Hospodářství, 1952, No. 5.

organization of production become a technical problem. But the Plan was not independent of the price system even in its execution.

Execution of the Plan. For the planners the Plan was to be used by all decision-making bodies and persons in Czechoslovakia as the supreme organizing principle; any other consideration, like profitability, was considered decidedly secondary in importance, to be strived for only insofar as the first condition--fulfillment of the Plan--was satisfied.²⁵

The scheme which the planners had in mind may be summarized in the following way: (1) well-specified obligations defined by the Plan are placed on the managers. In this sphere the managers have no discretion and must act purely mechanically, directed by the Central Planning Board. These obligations consist of a prescribed number of products to be produced, for which the managers have available prescribed amounts of factors of production. (2) The managers have an area of discretion: they may use the factors made available to them in any way they desire.

While for the preparation of the Plan it is inevitable that each product has a "technical norm"--fixed proportions in production are assumed--the managers are free to reorganize the factors made available to them as they see fit. In this discretionary sphere they should be guided by the second, subordinate organizing principle, the price system.

The crucial problem proved to be how to restrict the second organizing principle, the price system, to the sphere reserved to the managers' discretion--that is, how to make sure that where the imperative of the Plan enters, the price system will not influence decisions of the managers.

In a static economy where production could go on unchanged in endless repetition, this hierarchical superiority of the Plan would be easy to establish. The central authority would merely check the number of products supplied and the number of factors consumed, and whenever an under-supply of products or an overdraft of factors appeared, the authority would call the guilty manager to task. But under these conditions the Plan, the managers and the central authority would be superfluous anyway; such checking would be an esoteric performance.

²⁵Financial plans are discussed in the chapter on monetary and banking institutions.

In a dynamic economy unforeseen and unforeseeable changes appear daily, and such mechanical checking is impossible. Managers must make decisions which theoretically should be completely out of their competence: in view of a given disturbance,²⁶ should the planned production of this or that good be raised or lowered; should the remaining resources be reorganized so as to produce this commodity or some other, etc.? Under these conditions the managers' performance, and the performance of the plants under their jurisdiction, must be measured by some aggregative index which translates all their decisions (the inevitable excellent results in one product, poor results in another product, medium results in a third product, etc.) into some common denominator. This may be "the percentage fulfillment of the plan," "gross value of output," "net value of output," or some other aggregative yardstick.

At this point hierarchical superiority of the Plan over the price system in the execution of the Plan is destroyed. While in Plan preparation the price system is, in the sense discussed earlier, superior to the Plan, in execution the Plan ceases to be the superior organizing principle, while the price system becomes another, Competing, principle.

The managers are faced with the following situation:

(1) They have a plan to fulfill, consisting of a variety of fixed outputs and inputs. Because in a dynamic economic system constant changes in these fixed outputs and inputs are inevitable, no manager can perform this task exactly as ordered.

(2) Their performance is measured by an aggregative yardstick. Whatever yardstick is adopted, it will--because it is aggregative--make possible achievement of the performance required by the authorities in a variety of ways. If there are three outputs, A, B, C, there are an infinite number of ratios of these three outputs which satisfy a particular level of performance as measured by the aggregative yardstick.

(3) The authorities themselves tell the managers to use the price

²⁶ "Disturbance" is used here to signify any change in previous economic conditions which is not predictable, whether it be beneficial (new technique) or damaging (destruction of some factor of production).

system as the second, subordinate organizing principle whenever possible. Thus the managers have the secondary task of maximizing profits.²⁷

The managers are asked to fulfill the spirit of the plan. They are subject to control whether they perform the letter of the plan or not. In theory, whenever they have to make a decision on how to achieve the requirement described by (2)--and this requirement can be fulfilled in a great number of ways--they should choose a way which would most closely fulfill the spirit of the Plan, stated in requirement (1). In practice, strong pressures are exerted to force the managers to give preference, whenever conflict arises, to requirement (3). In other words, when the managers have to decide which product-mix to produce--out of all the many product-mixes which would give the desired value according to the aggregative yardstick--they give preference to profit maximization over the production of a balanced product-mix desired by the Plan.

The reason is that, because of inevitable disturbances, the Plan cannot guarantee to the managers that they will get all the promised factors of production at the right time, if at all. If the disturbance is substantial, important, and obvious, by the end of the year the manager could explain and get absolution. In most cases the managers are faced with thousands of small, unimportant disturbances, none of them dramatic enough to excuse failure to satisfy the requirements of the Plan but all of which taken together make fulfillment difficult or impossible. In his efforts to overcome these disturbances the manager finds himself in competition with other managers, all trying to alleviate the difficulties and thus to avoid underfulfillment of the Plan. Special premiums are required to get these missing factors of production, be they new machinery, raw materials, replacement parts, or labor. To pay these special premiums the manager has to obtain more money than the Plan provides for. One way is to get bank credit, but that is time consuming and troublesome. The other way is to produce those commodities required by the Plan which bring a good

²⁷"Profit maximization" the maximization" means the maximization of the difference between total receipts and total expenditures.

selling price²⁸ and to neglect the production of those required commodities which sell cheaply

From the nature of the aggregative yardstick it follows that "the Plan" (as measured by this yardstick) would be fulfilled because overproduction of expensive goods and underproduction of cheap goods will even out. In this way funds could be amassed by the managers to pay the premiums required, either by selling to those eager to get the good regardless of the fact that it is overproduced in terms of the Plan, or by the good becoming inventory and being credited by the banking system. The premiums which the managers pay take a variety of forms: openly paying more for the factors than should be paid; buying lavish entertainment for the representatives of the supplying enterprise; purchasing rejects along with the desired good

Quite naturally, labor is a special problem; without it the manager patently could not fulfill the Plan. While fixed salary scales were established--fixed amounts any factory could pay in wages, etc.--there inevitably developed competition for and by labor. Workers naturally are looking for positions where the salary is best:

Workers were led to believe that they sell their labor like (any other) commodity: "for little music--little work" (was their motto). They hunted in the neighborhood of their plants to find out where to get more for their work, and demanded: "if I do not get a raise, I shall go elsewhere."²⁹

If the manager was unable to pay the going wage, which was constantly above the wage which he could pay if produced according to the Plan, he would lose the desirable skilled labor (though the Labor Office would send him replacements in the form of unskilled workers) and would be unable to satisfy even the measure by which he was judged, the aggregative index.

The result of all this is that production became "disproportionate;" that is, the Plan-required ratios among different goods were neglected and the only goal of the managers became the fulfillment of the aggregative

²⁸ Either because the price-fixing authority fixed the price too high in relation to other products or because the tables could be turned and special premiums extracted from buyers.

²⁹ Politická Ekonomie, 1953, No. 4.

yardstick. What commodities make up this aggregative index is determined by the relative profitability of goods.³⁰ To what destructive results this method of organizing production leads can be seen very well in the data showing the receipts of raw materials by one major machine-producing enterprise of Czechoslovakia, Prvni Brnenske Strojirny:

Table 2
SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS BY THE FOUNDRY
INDUSTRY TO P. B. S. IN 1953 *
(percentages of contracted quantities)

Name of product	1953				Total
	Quarter				
	I	II	III	IV	
Structural steel	60.0	72.1	122.1	101.5	88.2
Steel plates up to 5 mm.	53.2	94.0	52.2	56.7	65.0
Steel plates over 5 mm.	62.3	111.0	202.5	142.1	128.9
Ordinary tubes	83.5	77.8	23.6	1.5	50.4
Seamless tubes	18.4	76.0	105.7	129.9	74.6
Carbon and alloy steel	7.1	53.4	70.0	185.6	66.3
Non-ferrous metals	4.0	26.0	82.9	6.7	23.1
Brass tubes	19.9	76.4	51.5	118.1	59.3
Total received	42.6	81.8	118.7	109.3	85.3
Items received in contracted-for "mix"	42.6	79.8	87.6	89.0	79.6

* Source: Plánované Hospodárství, 1954, No. 8, p. 561.

It can be seen that the "incorrect price relationships" still existed in 1953: seamless tubes were still too cheap in relation to ordinary tubes, non-ferrous metals were still too cheap in relation to iron goods, steel plates over 5 millimeters were still too expensive in relation to steel

³⁰This should be taken into consideration when evaluating figures shown in national income accounts.

plates under 5 millimeters, etc. The first organizing principle, the Plan, was still inconsistent with the second organizing principle, the price system.

Conclusion. Thus it is clear that the most important task of the economic system was organized through the use of two independent, competing principles, the plan and the price system. There is nothing inevitable in this process. The Czechoslovak policy-makers had two possibilities for avoiding it: (1) they could fix the prices and let the Plan adjust itself to whatever performance was possible with these prices; (b) they could fix the Plan and let the prices adjust themselves to its requirements. Actually, both sets of variables were fixed, creating an overdetermined economic system which worked very haphazardly and wasted resources on a substantial scale.³¹

In theory there is, of course, nothing which would prevent the planners from fixing both sets of variables so as to make them mutually consistent. Trotsky understood this problem well when he wrote:

If there existed the universal mind that projected itself into the scientific fancy of Laplace; a mind that would register simultaneously all the processes of nature and of society, that could measure the dynamics of their motion, that could forecast the results of their interactions, such a mind, of course, could a priori draw up a faultless and exhaustive economic plan . . . In truth, the bureaucracy often conceives that just such a mind is at its disposal; that is why it so easily frees itself from the control of the market and of Soviet democracy.³²

Because no such mind is available to the Czech bureaucracy, the two sets of variables which the planners insist on fixing were necessarily and inevitably mutually inconsistent. Because of that, the factors of production are pulled in opposite directions. The workers, not burdened by a close check, give the greatest weight to the pull of the price system. The managers, over whom a closer check can be kept, try to find a compro-

³¹See especially the part dealing with provision for maintenance and for the future, where the market control was most removed and where thus the checks on producers were the most scarce.

³²L.D. Trotsky, Soviet Economy in Danger (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1931), pp. 29-30.

mise solution which will fulfill the Plan in terms of the yardstick measuring fulfillment and at the same time be in accordance with the pressures of the price system, thus making future production possible.

Some students of Czechoslovakian affairs believe that "the single serious weakness of Czech industry is the disinclination of the employees to identify themselves with the goal of the economic plan."³³ No doubt if there were such an identification the workers would be ready to stay in their jobs and not look for better wages; in the face of heavy demand, suppliers would be ready to ship their goods for much less than they could receive; the managers would try to produce different goods in the ratios provided for by the Plan even if they would thus fail to satisfy the aggregative yardstick.

It could very well be maintained that if all acted as suggested above the economy would perform worse than it does, because many illegal acts contribute greatly to the continuity and rationality of production,³⁴ as the disregard of the financial plans,³⁵ is essential for the continuing functioning of the economy. Probably the worst blow which the Communist economy could receive would be the unflinching determination of the managers to identify themselves with the economic plan and to perform all duties imposed upon them to the letter.

³³V. Chalupa, "Organisace československého průmyslu," Tribuna, 1954, No. 5-6, p. 16.

³⁴The following case may serve as a clarifying example. Assume that because of some disturbance factory A is able to produce not three machines but one. Enterprises B, C, and D are waiting for these three machines. By acting illegally factory A sells the one machine available to the highest bidder. This bidder is able to bid highest because someone else is willing to pay more for his product. There is at least some presumption that this product is considered most useful by the community. Should enterprise A act strictly legally, it would sell for the officially fixed price. Because all three enterprises, B, C, and D, are willing to pay this price the decision as to which will get it becomes purely arbitrary.

³⁵Discussed in the chapter on monetary and banking institutions.

But however this may be, an economic system which requires such self-sacrificing identification in order to function properly must be less efficient than an economic system in which the organization of production is based on the principle that personal rewards are the results of compliance with the established standards governing production and that personal sacrifice is the usual result of non-compliance.

Distribution

The crucial task in distribution with which the planners were faced during the Five-Year Plan was the equation of demand and supply of consumer goods. Because they were unwilling to permit the economy to allocate sufficient resources to consumer goods industries, to let the prices of these goods find an equilibrium, and unable to stop the constant rise in money wages in the economy, the Czechoslovak consumer faced severe inflation and constant shortages of goods.

Level of Money Incomes. The planners attempted to attach the problem from all these directions. First of all they attempted to stop the rise in money incomes. In January 1949 the Bulletin of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia said:

The work on the wages fund carried out within the framework of the wages policy, and by which the wages level is to be stabilized not only to the extent of the scales of wages but also to the amount of wages actually earned, is approaching its end, and in the years of the Five Year Plan the total sum of wages will only rise in¹ proportion to increasing productivity.³⁶

What this attempts to say is that not only wage scales shall be fixed, but the sums which any factory may pay in wages and salaries shall also be fixed.

The preparation of wage funds did not progress as fast as the National Bank expected and hoped for. On February 1951 the head of the State Planning Office, Mr. Dolanský, said:

One thing must, however, be prevented at all costs; namely a faster increase of wages than of production. In 1950 productivity increased by 7 per cent but wages and salaries increased

³⁶ Bulletin of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia, Jan. 1949, p. 1.

by 17.5 per cent . . . In this connection some wrong practices in industry must be deplored; such as transfer of workers into higher wage categories, unjustified overtime pay, and similar measures which result in the payment of higher wages than justified by the actual work.³⁷

And the Prime Minister added: "Frequently wage orders and directives of the Ministry of Labor were infringed on and ignored in industry. We are putting an end to this general state of irresponsibility."³⁸ These measures supposedly put an end to this "irresponsibility."

Wage funds shall be introduced from the 1st of January 1952. To prevent spontaneous movement of wages. . . as a preparatory and temporary measure, wage totals are introduced from April 1, 1951.³⁹

The banking system was made responsible for the functioning of the wage funds. If there were two overdrafts by one enterprise within a quarter, or one overdraft higher than 15 per cent of the original wage fund, the bank needed the permission of the General Directory of the industrial sector to issue sufficient funds for wage payments. The General Directory then demanded return of this overdraft either from the guilty enterprise or from some other enterprise under its supervision. The fulfillment or overfulfillment of Plan constituted an extenuating circumstance.

It appears from the wage statistics that the rises in money incomes continued uninterrupted. In the August 1953 issue of the journal of the Czech planners there is a table showing the development of average wages during 1952, when the wage fund technique was already in operation. From this table shown on the following page it is evident that money wages continued to rise; it appears that other incomes rose as well.⁴⁰

³⁷ Czechoslovak Home Service, February 27, 1951, 1830 GMT.

³⁸ Czechoslovak Home Service, April 13, 1951, 1800 GMT.

³⁹ Plánované Hospodárství, 1951, No. 3-4, p. 167.

⁴⁰ See the chapter on national income.

Table 3
AVERAGE WAGES IN 1952*

<u>Month</u>	<u>Average Wage</u>
January	100.0
February	101.5
March	105.8
April	105.8
May	108.2
June	109.2
July	107.8
August	110.5
September	110.4
October	113.9
November	117.9
December	125.2

*Source; Plánované Hospodářství, 1953, No. 7-8, p. 532

Equality of Incomes. The government attempted to introduce greater inequality in the distribution of incomes to create incentives. The following is a wage edict dealing with foundries, passed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on November 9, 1951 and by the government on November 13, 1951:

(1) If the plan is fulfilled over 90 per cent a premium of 50 korunas per ton will be paid, to be distributed in shared based on the relative heights of wages and salaries.

(2) Workers on piece rates will be paid a premium of 50 per cent at most if the plan is fulfilled over 100 per cent.

(3) Technical personnel shall receive the following premiums,

expressed in percentages of their monthly incomes:

	Plan fulfillment in percentages										Each point over 100		
	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100			
Director of enterprise	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	-	-
Director of production	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	15	15
Other technical personnel	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	11.5	11.5

These premiums shall be paid if the plan of monthly outlays is fulfilled too. For each percentage point by which the monthly outlays are decreased there will be paid premiums up to 25 per cent of monthly wages to the above mentioned personnel.

(4) Hourly wages of workers range from 10 crowns per hour to 46 crowns per hour (equivalent to a monthly salary of from 1,920 to 8,822 crowns).

(5) The director of production receives from 13,800 to 23,900 crowns, depending on the size of the enterprise.⁴¹

The most highly qualified worker receives four times as much as the least qualified; while workers may get a premium of 50 per cent of their wages "at most" if the Plan is fulfilled by 100 per cent, the Director of Production receives a fixed premium of 100 per cent and an additional 15 per cent for each point of fulfillment over 100 per cent. In a large enterprise which fulfills a plan by 110 per cent the incomes for workers will be from 2,880 to 13,323 crowns and for the director of production, 83,650 crowns. That such distribution of incomes influences the distribution of product is natural.

⁴¹Condensed from Plánované Hospodářství, 1951, No. 9, pp 637, 657.

Price Level. On the other hand, prices partially mitigated the inequality of income and counteracted the incentive policy followed by the government. During almost the entire period Czechoslovak economic policy served itself by a double price system, introduced in January 1949 and abolished May 1953. Consumers had to pay certain prices for their purchases of commodities within the rationed limit, and other higher prices for commodities purchased above this limit or for unrationed commodities. The development of the prices of goods on the rationed market and of prices of goods on the free market is presented below.

Table 4
PRICES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1949 - JUNE 1953*
(Rationed market April, 1947 = 100)

1949	142.06	381.79
1950	157.85	347.54
1951	181.97	371.19
1952	198.64	493.11
1953	274.20	274.20

*Source: Boris P. Pešek, "Monetary Policy of Czechoslovakia," (Ph. D. dissertation in preparation, University of Chicago), Ch. I, p. 18.

Rationing. As noted, the double price system acted in the direction of greater equality. It could not have done so systematically were it not that rationing more or less successfully assured to every citizen his share of the lower-priced goods. Rationing introduced confusion: people received ration cards of different value, depending on the kind of work they performed. The more strenuous the employment, the greater quantity of rationed goods received.

The degree of equality or inequality in the distribution of goods and services produced is naturally difficult to quantify without precise figures. An added difficulty is that most of the better-paid groups, such as managers

directors of enterprises, party officials, etc., received many additional benefits such as official housing, official cars, domestic help, etc. Whether during this period the economic policy achieved greater equality or inequality is difficult to say.

Provision for Maintenance and Progress.⁴²

Until 1951 the financing of most investments was done by the Fund of the Nationalized Economy. Reasons for its liquidation were stated as follows:

The existence of the FNE greatly confused economic relationships. The FNE was a sort of second national budget. The fact that the FNE collected all net receipts of the national and communal enterprises, and that the FNE issued to these enterprises planned funds regardless of performance of the planned tasks, caused individual Departments and General Directories to be relieved of any responsibility and thus even of any interest in proper economic performance.⁴³

After 1951 financing was based on other principles:

In the case of investment, part of the financing shall be done by the state and part of it out of the funds of individual Departments. The ratio of both parts depends on the importance of investments. Where the state has a high interest in the investment program, for instance in heavy industry, financing shall be done predominantly through the state budget, and the investing industry, on the other hand, must give up a greater percentage of its profits. Where there are investments of lesser importance, as in the case of light industry, the Departments should be as dependent as possible on their own funds; therefore in these cases the share of the state is small, and on the other hand the enterprises must hand over only a small share of their profits.⁴⁴

⁴²Analysis of the investment in quantity terms is carried out in the chapter on national income, where it is pointed out that investments in Czechoslovakia are defined as "property objects destined for continuous use, usefulness of which exceeds the period of one year and price of which exceeds 1,000 korunas," (Plánované Hospodářství, Sept. 1949, p. 186) which, in comparison with other Western definitions, makes the Czechoslovak investments appear bigger than they are.

⁴³Plánované Hospodářství, Nov. 10, 1951, pp. 764-68.

⁴⁴Ibid.

While there is absolutely no information on what basis the planners decide which investments to permit and which to reject, there is some material on their success in following up whatever principles by which they make decisions. Secretary Dolansky wrote:

A second such shortcoming is the undervaluation of investments; undervaluation of investments in the effort to get the desired investments in the plan at any costs. There is no known case that some larger investment would be carried out at lower cost than planned, but it is a daily occurrence that the cost is much higher than planned. With high heart the explanation of rising prices is given; even granted that there were some price rises, how is the following example to be explained.

The cost of one institute was calculated to amount all together to 40 million korunas. When we prepared the plan for 1950 we found out that the half-finished object will cost 300 millions, which is the cost of the building only, without internal equipment. Or some other example: In 1946 we started an enterprise which was said to cost 100 million korunas; in reality several times more was spent and after the presentation of the 1949 plan we saw that the building will cost another 1 billion korunas more.

The third shortcoming is the insufficient preparedness of investments which in some cases reaches such careless indifference of which no capitalist would ever be guilty. Investments are built without preparation, without plans, without budget. There are cases where one is not clear about the production program and some factory is already built.⁴⁵

This self-criticism did not bring results:

In 1951 the fault was the unpreparedness of investment projects. There were large building programs carried out for which the projected task was not even set, not to speak about introductory project or technical project or budget. The overwhelming part of the building program was carried out on the basis of plans which were being finished and supplemented during the actual building.⁴⁶

An additional reason for this mismanagement in investment activity was stated in the same journal of financial specialists:

Plans for buildings of factories, etc., were prepared by National Project Enterprises and were sold for a fee determined by the cost of

⁴⁵Plánované Hospodárství, Nov. 6, 1950, pp. 337 ff.

⁴⁶Ekonomie a Finance, 1952, No. 9-10.

investments. The NPE tried to sell the greatest number of projects to be able to pay the prescribed tax burden and to show successful performance of the plan. This plan was stated in the amounts of fees collected. This led as well to artificial and unnecessary increases in the proposed expenditures on investment activity.⁴⁷

The results are easy to imagine. First a great number of investment goods are started with insufficient information about the resources needed to finish them, and then completion is postponed year by year or indefinitely. In 1950 the Secretary and Chairman of the State Planning Office, Mr. Dolanský, said: "Our task is a speedy completion of buildings already started."⁴⁸

Four years later we read:

We have an extreme number of unfinished investment projects. The national economy was deprived of the investment resources which were spent on abandoned projects. An extraordinary number of investment projects had to be lowered because a great number of them were not reasonable and were not prepared as far as plans or budgets are concerned. There were no measures taken to assure that these enterprises will have enough raw materials of domestic origin.

We can best show the number of unfinished investment projects when we say that the expenditures required to finish only the state-important projects unfinished by the end of 1954 are three or four times larger than we shall be able to spend on them in the next years. The unfinished projects are especially abnormally high in the sector of solid fuels and foundries (will take 5 years to finish), in transportation, lumber industry, and water-using power industry (will take more than 3 years to finish).

We neglected maintenance. The result was that in industry, especially in foundries and in the light industry, expensive overhauls and reconstructions were required without any increases in the productive capacity.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 427.

⁴⁸ Plánované Hospodárství, 1950, No. 2-3, p. 81.

⁴⁹ Plánované Hospodárství, 1954, No. 7, pp. 479-85.

their

Conclusion

In economic policy the Communists breathe that spirit of the mid-nineteenth century which was carrying forward the rationalistic optimism of the eighteenth; however revolutionary and new-fangled the Czechoslovak planners fancied themselves to be, they actually did not succeed in overstepping the threshold of the twentieth century. They started in 1948 in the firm belief that in Czechoslovakia the crucial fact is that the whole complex of productive facilities is directed toward the fullest expression of the policy of the Communist Party, expression based on the principle of the best and most economical utilization of all resources owned by the state. Such complete and economical utilization is of course possible only on the basis of an economic plan.

The results of the economic policy based on this credo have been here analyzed. First, the statistical data claiming success for this policy was considered:

In five years the light industry was changed into the heavy industry; industrial production existing in 1948 was doubled; the production of steel per head reached the level of Great Britain's production and registered a yearly rise of 16 per cent during the years of the Five Year Plan. The production of investment goods constituted in 1953 62 per cent of the value of industrial production and over 50 per cent of exports.⁵⁰

All precise, numerical claims were rejected because it was shown to be patently impossible that the Czechoslovak government could know what really happened, since the statistical data are not available. In this we show no more skepticism than the planners themselves. In their publication, Political Economy, we read:

The fact is that we do not have today dependable data on the production of our industry during the past years and that we shall be forced very laboriously and by the use of a great number of estimates to reconstruct the development of production and of the productivity of labor during the first Five Year Plan.⁵¹

Being thus deprived of precise statistical data necessary for a quantitative analysis, a qualitative analysis was attempted in an effort to analyze

⁵⁰Tribuna, May-June 1954, p. 16.

⁵¹Politická Ekonomie, 1953, No. 1.

the prerequisites for the successful working of any economy. The suitability of Czechoslovakia's economic organization for solving the tasks imposed upon the economy, and the solution of these tasks were considered. It was found that (1) The standards are fixed on a purely arbitrary basis; in addition, the mechanism supposed to translate abstract policy decisions into actual policy is inherently faulty because it leads to two sets of standards, the plan and the price level, and therefore to the overdetermination of the system. (2) Because of these multiple standards production became seriously disorganized. (3) In the task where the market exerted no control at all, namely in provision for maintenance and progress, the disorganization of production and waste of resources reached staggering proportions.

It seems extremely significant that these are the results of economic planning in the only truly Westernized country in the Eastern bloc besides East Germany. Up till now the possibilities of this type of economic organization were gauged by the performance of the U.S.S.R. The question is whether this type of economic system received a fair test there. In a country as backward and undeveloped as Russia was in 1918 almost any system able to introduce Western technology was bound to produce significant results. In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the Communist planners for the first time were dealing with a highly developed economy, an able bureaucracy, and a well-functioning statistical apparatus, all the prerequisites of a successful trial run for Communist economic policies. Here they had to run on their own merits. It appears now that the performance of the Czech economy was definitely inferior to the performances of price-directed economies west of Czechoslovakia. This would suggest that Russian economic policies are inferior to others in an even test, and that therefore the Russian achievement in this sphere have to be explained by other factors such as the breakup of traditional ways of life and social organization and the disregard of the value of the individual which were in the way of economic development.

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INDUSTRY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Industry in the Pre-World War II Economy

Besides the favorable position Czechoslovakia occupies in central European trade and commerce channels, the country is endowed with a variety of raw materials and resources which made possible an early development of industry. Bohemia was known by medieval traders for its supplies of silver and gold. More important for modern industries are the deposits of iron and coal, and alternative sources of energy and fuels in the hill streams and forest resources.

Industries in the early history of western Czechoslovakia developed from local arts and crafts under the stimulation of foreign German or Hungarian capital and management. Early in the fifteenth century glass was manufactured from the quartz sand of the Šumava Mountains, and by the eighteenth century porcelain and china industries were developed by the Hapsburgs who took advantage of the same resource. German labor and enterprise predominated in the growth of the textile industries about this same period. Bohemia, in western Czechoslovakia, became the center of German immigration and the core of industrial development.

The basic patterns of industrial development were formed during the Austro-Hungarian Empire and were to persist until World War II. Bohemia and Moravia served as the workshop of the Empire, producing for a domestic market of 67,000,000. The Slovaks remained economically retarded as an agricultural hinterland under the Magyars.¹ The maintenance of a heavy war machine by the Hapsburgs stimulated the exploitation of the deposits of coal and iron in the nineteenth century. Large deposits of bituminous coal are found in the Ostrava-Karviná region in Moravian Silesia and in the Kladno-Rakovník region northwest of Prague. Lignite is found primarily in the Teplice-Chomutov region of northwest Bohemia, and there are some deposits in Slovakia. There are substantial supplies of iron ore near both the Bohemian and Moravian coal districts, but better ore with a lower phosphoric content is found in the Slovak Ore Mountains. The locations of basic raw materials are extremely scattered, and this makes the

¹Dorothy W. Douglas, Transitional Economic Systems (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), p. 71

industries which depend upon them extremely vulnerable in cast of attack.²

Heavy industries utilizing these basic supplies developed in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Czech and Czech-German metallurgical industries utilized a combination of Silesian coal with ore imported from Styria in Austria, where siderite iron was abundant, and from Sweden and Poland. The main production of iron and steel is located in Silesia (northern Moravia); the main center is Moravská Ostrava, with secondary centers at Prague, Most and Plzeň in central and western Bohemia. Local centers for the manufacture of special machinery have developed: agricultural machinery is manufactured in the Upper Elbe and at Prostějov in Moravia; textile machinery in the north with a long tradition of wool and linen manufacture; machine tools and parts in big Czech cities such as Prague, Plzeň and Brno.

The Czech hercynian mountains have long been a source of non-ferrous metals, and these still furnish materials for metallurgical plants, especially in Bohemia. The chief non-ferrous metallurgical area is in the Rudohoří and Krušnohoří.

The chemical industry was initiated in the mid-nineteenth century at Ústí nad Labem in the Elbe valley in northern Bohemia. Later developments in the chemical industry have been the intensification of production of artificial fertilizers.

The textile industry expanded in the nineteenth century to occupy the major position it held until the post-World War II developments in northern Bohemia and Brno in Moravia. Wool and flax were superseded by cotton, which had to be imported. Until just before World War I, the home market absorbed 80 to 90 per cent of the production, but then textiles became an important export for the procuring of raw materials to support its basic industries.

Other industries, based on farm products, were developed by German settlers in the nineteenth century. Sugar beet refineries, breweries and distilleries utilizing the malt grown in the area, grain mills, and glove and shoe manufactories relying on leather products of local cattle herders

²Harriet Wanklyn, Czechoslovakia (London: George Philip and Son, 1954), p. 265.

occupied an important place in the domestic and foreign trade

Cisar³ and Pokorný³ summarize the value of industries established in this period according to the origin of raw materials as follows:

	<u>Value in Million Crowns</u>	
	Imports	Exports
I. Industries which derive raw materials from home production: agriculture, sugar, alcohol, beer, malt, starch, porcelain, glass and timber	21	73
II. Industries obtaining part of raw materials at home: steel, iron, metal industries, chemical and leather	538	1,079
III. Industries which import all raw materials: textiles, phosphates, metals, copper and nickel	453	905
	<u>1,012</u>	<u>2,697</u>

In this period of industrial development, from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of World War I, we can see an increasing dependence of industries on outside sources of raw materials along with a steadily intensified exploitation of internal resources. The resulting picture reveals a fine adjustment between light and heavy industry and dependence on foreign capital and markets. The production of light industries such as textiles and glass provided a surplus of exports used as a balance for payments for raw materials such as the iron ores needed in heavy industry. Besides its dependence on German enterprise and labor, Czech industry was largely financed from Vienna by German and Jewish bankers who exercised a great deal of control over their holdings.⁴ Even those enterprises controlled by cooperatives, such as food distribution, building operations and agriculture were largely organized and managed by Germans.⁵ This economic interdependence with other countries within the Austro-Hungarian Empire posed a problem in the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak republic following World War I.

³Jaroslav Cisar and F. Pokorný, The Czechoslovak Republic (Prague: Society L'effort de la Tchecoslovaquie, 1920).

⁴Wanklyn, op. cit., p. 273.

⁵Cisar and Pokorný, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

It was not political action but rather the depression of the thirties which weakened the hold of foreign capital on industry. The older consumer industries initiated by the Germans in western and northern Bohemia and the Sudeten were more vulnerable because of their dependence on the German Reich banks and on foreign markets. These industries declined while newer developments, primarily in heavy industries, were developed in the interior under Czechoslovak control.⁶ Slovakia remained a backward, agricultural hinterland, convenient as a source of agricultural products which remained cheap, and as a reserve of labor power.

After the establishment of independence, the new Czechoslovak republic controlled some areas of the economy, continuing the state control formerly exercised by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The state owned all the railways; receipts from the tobacco monopoly, the post office, the postal savings bank, and holdings in the forests, mines and foundries, provided a net income of almost a thousand million crowns in 1937.⁷ Tramcars, electric, gas and water works were owned by communities or cooperatives; and the government had much capital invested in the Škoda works and in the banks. This tendency was increased by the depression. In the private sector of the economy, large concentrations of capital were for the most part limited to heavy industry such as mining, steel and chemicals with many small firms in the finishing industries. The following summarizes the position of industries in the inter-war economy:

Of 720,000 business concerns only 2.2% employed 20 employees.

Over 90% of coal production was from 7 firms.

99% of all iron ore was produced by one firm.

85% of coke was produced in four companies.⁸

Concentration of capital characterized light industry to a lesser extent. In the thirties, the Baťa shoe concern was organized both vertically and horizontally to encompass sources of supply, public works and social welfare projects in the communities in which its workers resided, and large holdings in foreign enterprises.

⁶William Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West (London: Stevens, 1947), p. 94.

⁷George Gibian, "The Czechoslovak Two Year Plan," Journal of Central European Affairs, VI, No. 4 (Jan. 1947), 375.

⁸Douglas, op.cit., p. 74.

Industry at the Eve of World War II and under German Occupation

The dependence of Czechoslovak industry on international connections for raw materials, markets and capital, the persisting hold of German management and labor in a large sector of the economy, and the concentration of capital made Czechoslovak industries vulnerable to German seizure after the desertion of the western Allies at Munich. The first move made by the Nazis was to seize the Germanized industries in the Sudetenland and Bohemia. This included a large sector of the economy: in 1937 more than 10 per cent of the coal and lignite exported was from German enterprises; almost all of the raw materials of the ceramics and glass industries, and the industries themselves, were located in German-dominated western Bohemia; two-thirds of the textiles, many wood and paper concerns, half of the glove enterprises and half of the producers of chemicals were in the German area; German-founded and operated brewing, sugar beet and distilling concerns were found here. In all, about 400,000 of 1,198,000 concerns, representing one-third of Czech industry, were German-operated or controlled.⁹

The seizure of industries in the Sudeten followed two patterns: "Aryanization" of Jewish-controlled enterprises which made possible immediate control, and putting the administration of larger concerns in the hands of Nazi commissioners, followed by a transfer of property at a later date.¹⁰ The Nazis operated these industries through semi-privately owned and publicly managed corporations of a mixed type such as the Czech Grain Corporation and the Bohemian-Moravian Corporation, as well as through compulsory cartels combining in larger capital pools business connections which had been established between Germany and Czechoslovakia before the war.¹¹

Following this invasion, Germany seized all financial institutions, which gave them control of all the holdings of these banks in internal industry as well as abroad, thus paving the way for the invasion of the economy

⁹Diamond, op.cit., p. 94.

¹⁰Antonín Basch, Germany's Economic Conquest of Czechoslovakia (Chicago: Czechoslovak National Council of America, 1951), p. 12.

¹¹Frank Munk, The Legacy of Nazism (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 156, 193.

of other central European states. With the formal establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, all state-owned enterprises fell into their hands. Among the enterprises gained in these manipulations were the Bohemian Escompte Bank and Credit Institution, the Anglo-Czech, the Prague Credit, the Bohemian Industrial and the Moravian Banks. Along with these came the shares held by these banks in the Krizik electrotechnics, the Odkolek mills, the Prague mills, the Sellier and Bellot amunition, the Explosia and Synthesia explosives.¹²

During the Nazi occupation the balance between light and heavy industry and between import and export trade was disrupted to meet the exigencies of Germany's war needs. The Nazis expanded mining or mercury ore in Slovakia and established a synthetic fuel plant at Most. In an attempt to locate at least part of the war industry beyond the range of bombing, Slovakia was further industrialized with the establishment of chemical factories and factories for the production of synthetic wool fiber and rayon. The Skoda works, Zbrojovka-Brno and Vítkovice iron and steel industries were expanded. To provide manpower and energy for this expanded production, consumer goods industries, especially textiles and glass, were closed down. In Slovakia, manpower was recruited from the peasantry, and in the industrial areas of Bohemia and Moravia an increase in working hours made the industrial production capacity of the territory of the Protectorate equal to the entire pre-Munich production.¹³

The heritage of Nazi occupation to Czechoslovakia in 1945 was a dislocated economy completely divorced from the control of private capital. Although few industrial establishments were destroyed, there were losses from reckless wear and tear, neglect and looting. The war damage was estimated at 345 thousand million crowns at prewar parity, or \$11,500,000,000, \$4,000,000,000 of which was due to physical losses and \$77,000,000,000 to lack of maintenance.¹⁴ In addition to this, the labor market was disorgan-

¹²Basch, op.cit., p. 17.

¹³Munk, op.cit., p. 41.

¹⁴Preliminary Report of the Temporary Subcommittee of Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas (Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the Geneva Assembly, Supplement No. 3 (London: United Nations, 1946)), p. 140.

ized owing to the introduction of compulsory labor, the transfer of about 440,000 workers to Germany, the transfer of labor from traditional branches of industry to man the war production factories, and the murder of 250 thousand citizens for resistance to the occupation forces.¹⁵ The productivity of the remaining labor force was cut down by deprivation in concentration camps and even in civilian life. Some sectors of the economy were destroyed to a greater extent than others. The transportation system sustained the worst damage--2,900 of the 4,800 locomotives of the prewar economy, 18,400 of 917,400 freight cars and 4,400 of 11,700 passenger cars were destroyed. Bridges were destroyed, and the number of trucks and cars was reduced. The textile industry suffered particularly because of the decimation of its labor force. Chemical works, oil refineries and engineering works at Vítkovice and Plzeň were damaged in the latter months of bombing by the Allies.¹⁶

Reconstruction of Industries in the Postwar Period

The control of 90 per cent of industry and all of the banks by the state, the shift from light consumer industries to heavy industries, and the regional shift of industry to include Slovakia effected in the Czechoslovak economy under the German occupation, determined the reconstruction policies of the postwar government in the period immediately following the exodus of the Germans in 1945. The Košice Program spelled out the general economic policy which the united Social Democratic and Communist parties hoped to follow in reconstructing the country and in expanding industry. The first step was the seizure and nationalization of the property of Germans, Hungarians and collaborators. Along with these properties, the government pledged itself to put under state control the entire financial and loan system, key industries, the insurance system and all sources of power, and at the same time pledged support to the private initiative of employers, tradesmen, and other producers by granting them loans and raw materials, placing orders with them, and guaranteeing disposal of

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 141; and Winifred N. Hadsel, "Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism," Foreign Policy Reports, XXII, No. 23 (Feb. 15, 1947), 270-80.

¹⁶ Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA (Washington, D. C.: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Act, Sept. 1946), p. 104.

finished goods.¹⁷ The second step was to build up industry in Slovakia in an attempt to raise the standard of living in this area to equal that of Bohemia-Moravia. The expulsion of over two million Sudeten Germans and the possible expulsion of 200,000 Hungarians was the government's retaliation for six years of German occupation. The plan was posited on the acceptance of the aid of Western powers through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Act and capital loans for raw materials.

The very conditions which the Nazis took advantage of in seizing and nationalizing Czechoslovak industry, i. e., the centralized control and state ownership of large amounts of capital, were intensified by their occupation and facilitated the nationalization of industries by the Czechoslovak government after their liberation. The decree of January 18, 1945, called the Statute for National Enterprises, set the early pattern of nationalization. Under this act two thousand firms and three thousand undertakings were grouped under 180 to 190 nationalized concerns. Measured by 1937 values, nationalization affected the following percentages of the value of each industry:

Table 1
NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY, 1945*

<u>Branch of Industry</u>	<u>Percent Nationalized</u>
Mining and iron works	100 %
Gas works	95
Power plants	94
Paper and cellulose	74
Glass	73
Steel and engineering	72
Textiles	66
Chemicals	54
Stone and ceramics	37
Leather	26
Paper-using and cardboard industries	12
Sawmills and woodworking	12
Ready-made clothing	11

* Vera M. Dean, "Economic Trends in Eastern Europe: I. Czechoslovakia and Poland," Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV, No. 2 (Apr. 1), 19.

¹⁷Diamond, op. cit., p. 4.

Key industries such as mining, iron and steel, and electric power were completely under national control. Food processing industries were put under the control of the Ministry of Food. Except for enterprises in which the state had particular interest, the rule of law for nationalization was to apply only to firms employing four hundred employees. In the first year of reconstruction, 19.3 per cent of industrial enterprises were nationalized, employing 61 per cent of industrial labor.¹⁸ The moderate tone of the Košice Program projected in the first months of reconstruction, which had called for nationalization only of the business properties of Germans, Hungarians, and their collaborators, along with putting key industries, insurance, power, financial and loan systems "under government control," was overstepped by the first year's program of nationalization. The balance of economic forces was sharply altered:

The absence of decisive aggregations of industrial capital obviously meant the absence of command points for a rallying of such capitalist forces in the economy as did remain. And, obversely, the major economic forces were now in State hands. What existed was a relatively dwarf capitalism in size and concentration compared to the size and prevalence of the State units.¹⁹

The absorption of this large sector of the economy into nationalized industry whetted the appetite of the more left-wing members of the government. For a while they were satisfied with a slow process of absorption of the private enterprises into the national economy, envisioning an evolutionary transition to socialism rather than outright destruction of this sector. Following this procedure, the national sector had absorbed 47 per cent of enterprises encompassing 80 per cent of the industrial labor force at the end of 1947 (excluding handicrafts). In January 1948 the Communist Party with the Trade Unions and the left-wing Social Democrats, prepared measures for further nationalization affecting apartment houses, office buildings and department stores. The Czechoslovak

¹⁸Gibian, op. cit., p. 375.

¹⁹Douglas, op. cit., p. 318.

national banks were merged in January into five units specializing in financing, industry, food producing and cooperatives, three of them located in Bohemia-Moravia and two in Slovakia.²⁰ It was only after the February 1948 seizure of power by the Communists that a completely hostile view was taken of private enterprises. At the end of that year, sixty-nine per cent of enterprises were in the socialized sector, covering ninety-six per cent of the labor force.²¹ The remaining private industries were ancillary and dependent on larger state industries for raw materials and markets. Dominated by Social Democrats, the cooperative movement had been as much opposed to state control as to capitalist control of the economy. After the coup in February, their function was shifted to acting as agents for transforming small producers and traders into socialized enterprises.²²

According to the Statute of Nationalization of October 24, 1945, national enterprises were to have the status of independent legal persons. They were to be (a) subject to provision of merchant and tax laws (b) entered as single merchants in the register of firms kept by the district court (c) to be conducted on business principles. Although their surplus earnings were to be handed over to the state for reinvestment, the state was not responsible for debts.²³ It was expected at the time of the issuance of the decree that compensation was to be paid except in the case of the German or Hungarian public or private corporations, or to owners of German or Hungarian nationality or persons engaged in activities directed against the state.²⁴ American nationals did not receive compensation for

²⁰Vera M. Dean, "Economic Trends in Eastern Europe: I, Czechoslovakia and Poland," Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV, No. 2 (April 1, 1948), 19.

²¹Economic Survey of Europe Since the War (Geneva: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1953), Table 9, p. 28.

²²Douglas, op. cit. pp. 332-34.

²³A. B. Rado, "Czechoslovak Nationalization Decrees: Some International Aspects," American Journal of International Law, XLI, Oct. 1947, p. 795.

²⁴Ibid., p. 796.

their \$67,000,000 of property until an agreement was reached at Geneva in 1948, under which nationals of the United States, United Kingdom, France and Sweden were to receive a share of yearly exports until paid for their property. The Jews, who had had property in the Sudeten amounting to 10 per cent of private invested capital expropriated by the Germans, received no restitution of this property.²⁵

The general principle governing the organization and operation of national industry was the centralization of decision-making to make for responsibility, but the decentralization of criticism and control.²⁶ The top management and supervision over national enterprise was exercised by the state through ministries and general managers, political leaders chosen because of Party loyalty and not knowledge of the enterprise. This central directorate functioned as a control and planning group, not concerned with the day-to-day operation of the firms. Its approximately twenty subdivisions were grouped according to similarity of raw materials or products. Under the direct control of this board were regional branches which had responsibility for enterprises under it. The active operating unit was the local National Enterprise itself.²⁷

In the local plant, management was recruited in some cases from among former managers, others from lower managerial and technical help. The manager's responsibility was exclusively concerned with production; market operations and demands were the concern of the state bureaucracy. Because of the scarcity of experienced management in the early period of nationalization it was possible for the director or under-director of an important factory simply to enroll himself in the Communist Party to become completely integrated into the state economic bureaucracy.²⁸ Except for some big plants built before 1948, few plants were

²⁵ News From Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 8 (Aug., 1952), 20.

²⁶ Bulletin de droit tchécoslovaque (Prague), VIII (1950), No. 4, p. 442.

²⁷ Douglas, op. cit., p. 159.

²⁸ Paul Barton, Prague à l'heure de Moscou (Paris: Pierre Horay, 1954), pp. 154-55.

formed by the fusion of smaller factories or by centralizing production of a certain branch of goods in one enterprise. This is due to the strong competition among Communists for the leading position of director as well as to the stimulation of "socialist competition" between companies producing the same sort of goods.²⁹

The development of industry in Slovakia carried on another policy initiated by the Germans. During the war the Nazis stimulated the metallurgical and textile industries. Previous to the occupation industrialization in Slovakia had lagged because of the greater attractions for capital development in Czech lands, and because it lacked coal, iron ore, communications and markets. Such industry as there was was very badly distributed, clustering in a few centers and contributing little to the prosperity of the poorer regions. So dependent were the Slovakian industries in mining, manufacturing of sheet metal and iron, and forestry, on Hungarian industrial expansion that many collapsed in the early twenties and more in the depression of 1929-34.³⁰ The new government envisioned a stimulation of the traditional Slovak enterprises in metallurgy, wood-working and food processing but with new ventures in large-scale electrification and the transfer of Czech equipment to the east for metallurgy and textile plants. It was not till the Two-Year Plan was formulated that concrete plans were laid for an industrialization program. The stated motive for the location of industry in Slovakia was the desire to raise the standards of this agricultural hinterland. Part of the attraction may be nearness to the Soviet Union and the settling of essential war industries at a later date in the mountains of Slovakia.³¹

The third step taken by the reconstruction government, the ex-

²⁹I. Gadourek, The Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953), p. 84.

³⁰Wanklyn, op. cit., pp. 302-06.

³¹Emil Lengyel, "Industrial Changes in Eastern Europe," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia), 1950, p. 75.

pulsion of the Sudeten Germans, decimated the industrial labor force of this area. Only 60,656 of the former 500,000 German industrial workers remained.

Table 2
EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRY, 1937-1945*

	<u>End of 1937</u>	<u>End of 1945</u>
Mines	93,000	117,800
Sugar mills	9,800	48,700
Alcohol distributors	7,400	7,000
Breweries & malters	17,000	14,700
Mills	6,500	7,600
Food industries	64,600	55,200
Metalworking	373,300	351,500
Electricity & gasworks	22,200	35,900
Sawmills	37,700	33,700
Woodworking	48,600	42,500
Paper	31,300	28,400
Chemicals	56,000	59,900
Stone, earth ceramics	102,100	48,300
Building	100,000	25,200
Glass	38,600	25,700
Textiles	249,800	157,700
Clothing	52,600	36,200
Leatherworking	60,000	36,400
Printing	25,000	22,800
Waterworks	2,500	3,700
Totals	1,398,000	1,159,400

* Radovan Šimáček, Czechoslovak Economy in a Nutshell, 1948 (Prague: Press Department of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1948).

In the following industries, those most severely affected by the loss of German manpower, employment in 1946 is shown as a percentage of the prewar labor force:³²

³² Preliminary Report. . . ., op. cit., p. 141.

Textiles-----	40%	Chemicals-----	60%
Leather-----	45	Cellulose-----	60
Glass-----	79	Sugar-----	76
Pottery-----	50	Beer-----	48

The difference is not accounted for by the expulsion of the Germans alone, but represents as well the losses due to Nazi maltreatment of the Czechoslovak population, political prisoners, and dispersal of the labor force engaged in consumer industries into the heavy industries.

Prior to the planning period started in 1947, recovery in industry ran parallel to the accessibility of raw materials. Ceramics, woodworking and paper fared better than rubber, leather and textile industries which depended on imports. Recovery in industries using heavy and bulky raw materials, such as building and sawmilling, was impeded by transport difficulties.³³ Special efforts were made to raise production in the coal industry, the output of which determined the success of operations in all other enterprises. The first organized effort in coal production in May 1945 yielded an output of 240,000 tons of black coal and 510,000 tons of lignite, 17 per cent and 34 per cent of prewar production respectively. By January 1946 black coal rose to 88 per cent of prewar production and lignite to 113 per cent. This production depended on extraordinary measures such as Stakhanovite incentives, extra rations, special bonuses, and labor brigades, all of which were only expedients, not long-run solutions for the problem of production.³⁴

Despite the smaller labor force, recovery in industry in 1946 not only equalled but sometimes exceeded pre war production. The pro-government Central European Observer published the figures shown in Table 3 on the following page, concerning industrial production, 1937-1946. But light industry failed to approach prewar standards because manpower and energy was drained from these industries to supply the above emphasized heavy industries, and because little effort was expended to acquire

³³Economic Recovery. . ., op. cit., p. 109.

³⁴Diamond, op. cit., p. 75.

Table 3
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1937-1946*

	1937	1946 Jan.	1946 Nov.	1946 monthly average
Black coal (1000 tons)	1,398	1,228	1,256	1,365
Brown coal (1000 tons)	1,490	1,679	1,727	1,819
Raw steel (1000 tons)	192	102	168	183
Electric power (million kilowatt hrs.)	306	410	468	470
Goods trucks	97	226	1,581	1,025
Locomotives	6	--	20	19
Electric motors (1000)	6	10	13.8	18.3

*K. Walters, "Economic Recovery in Czechoslovakia," Central European Observer (London), XXIV, No. 2 (Jan. 1947), 23.

needed raw materials from foreign sources:³⁵

	1937	Jan. 1946	Oct. 1946
Yarn (tons)	6,281	2,577	2,735
Paper (1000 tons)	16	11	12
Cement (1000 tons)	106	28	99
Wood millings (1000 c. m.)	---	134	125
Bricks, plain & colored (1000)	60,000	9,127	31,430

With little foreign credit after the war, and with no raw materials with which to supply the factories producing export products needed from foreign lands, Czechoslovakia depended on supplies of raw materials from the U. N. R. R. A. and capital loans from the United States, England and Canada to support the reconstruction of industry. U. N. R. R. A.'s chief aid to industry was in supplying transport vehicles, fuel and raw materials. Shipments from May 1945 through June 1946 included items of the following value:³⁶

³⁵K. Walters, "Economic Recovery in Czechoslovakia," Central European Observer, XXIV, No. 2 (Jan. 1947), 23.

³⁶Economic Recovery . . ., op. cit., p. 99.

	<u>Thousands of Dollars</u>
Transportation & telecommunication	28,094
Building and industry	1,445
Mining and quarrying	1,325
Fuels and lubricants	6,023
Materials, etc.	10,124

In addition to this, Czechoslovakia received food, medical supplies and agricultural tools valued at \$270,000,000.³⁷ Credits and loans were granted by the western Allies in the following quantities:

British state credits-----	\$30,000,000
British private credits-----	4,000,000
Canadian state credits-----	19,000,000
Swedish state credits-----	6,000,000
Brazilian state credits-----	20,000,000
U.S. Export-Import Bank	
cotton-----	20,000,000
tobacco-----	2,000,000
U.S. army surplus-----	50,000,000 ³⁸

At the end of the year, the State Department of the United States stopped the further purchase of American war surplus by Czechoslovakia and suspended negotiations with the American Import and Export Bank for \$50,000,000 for the following reasons: (1) Czechoslovakia had made an agreement with Rumania, subject to American approval which was not forthcoming, to sell ten million dollars of war material credited to Czechoslovakia by America on condition that Rumania pay seven per cent for administrative expenses and six per cent interest; (2) the foreign assets of American properties expropriated by the Czechoslovak government were not paid; (3) objections to the United Nations Czechoslovak delegates' criticism of American loans, seconding the Soviet line. This suspension of aid disturbed the Czechoslovak government at this time, despite its growing anti-American pronouncements, because its light industries could not survive without Western market with the increasing competition from

³⁷Hadsel, op. cit., p. 276

³⁸See itemization above.

Germany and with Russia still unable to afford luxury goods. The only retaliation they could threaten was that this might push Czechoslovakia farther into the Soviet zone.³⁹

The structural changes in the Czechoslovak economy in the reconstruction period from the end of the war to the end of 1946 largely determined the course of events undertaken later in the planning era. Czechoslovakia had established its identity as an exclusively Slav nation by the expulsion of the Germans. National ownership of all basic industries and large-scale enterprises with a steadily declining sector in private industry was an established economic fact. The emphasis on heavy and basic industries, to the detriment of the consumer industries, was to persist even after the exigencies of the reconstruction period passed. Of particular importance to the future course of political-economic events was the shift from dependency on Western capitalist nations to the Soviet bloc, initiated by internal pressures exerted by left-wing parties and accelerated after the rebuff in its U. N. R. R. A. dealings with the United States at the end of 1946.

Entering the Planning Era

The Two-Year Plan

First projected in June 1946, the Two-Year Plan was passed on October 25, 1946. The stated aim of the Plan was to increase production for the purpose of improving the standard of living. Both capital and consumer goods production was to rise 10 per cent above prewar levels by the end of 1948. However, in concrete policy specifications emphasis was still placed on capital goods--vehicles and rolling stock, energy-producing equipment especially needed for electrification projects, and proposals for the utilization of the capacity for production developed by the Germans during the war. In addition, the wartime trend of industrial production was continued in the provision for the further development of

³⁹Josef Kodicek, "The Suspension of the American Loan," Central European Observer, XXIII, No. 23 (Nov. 8, 1946), 353.

industries in Slovakia.

The total plan of investment was \$1.4 billion, two-sevenths of which was to be in industry, one-third of industrial investment to be located in Slovakia, and the remainder in Bohemia-Moravia. In terms of prewar production, the stated goals were as follows:

Table 4
PLANNED PRODUCTION GOALS OF THE TWO-YEAR PLAN

Brown coal	33% over 1937
Black coal and steel	same
Pig iron	decrease
Electric power	75% of prewar production
Locomotives	400% of 1937 output
Railway cars	13,700 units
Tractors	8,400 units
Agricultural machinery	500% over 1946

In consumer goods, shoes and textiles were supposed to be produced in an amount sufficient to meet prewar consumption and to maintain exports necessary for the payment of needed raw materials. Only the building industry was given priority, and the Plan included provision for 125,000 dwelling units. This projected output required the following investment of money and labor:

Table 5
 PLANNED INVESTMENTS AND ALLOCATION OF LABOR
 OF THE TWO-YEAR PLAN

	Investment in Billions of Crowns	New Workers to be Allocated
Mining	2.4	21,000
Power	5.1	5,000
Foundry industry	1.9	4,000
Metal and motor	3.0	39,000
Chemical	3.6	12,000
Glass	0.25	15,000
Building and ceramics	0.45	20,000
Textiles	1.5	57,000
Leather	1.4	11,000
Total	19.6	184,000

Local industries outside the Plan were allocated raw materials only insofar as they were not required for the tasks outlined in the Plan.

One of the first problems to be met in the carrying out of the Plan was overcoming the manpower shortage. The solution lay in two directions: recruiting additional labor and raising the per capita productivity of the total labor force. The shortage of manpower created by the exodus of the Sudeten Germans was aggravated by the doubling of the ratio of non-manual workers in October 1945 over what it had been previously. The government pursued a policy of relocating a large proportion of this inflated administrative and clerical help into productive jobs. Another as yet not fully tapped source for productive labor was women. In 1946 women represented 26.9 per cent of the industrial labor force, 25 per cent of trades and handicrafts, and 38.4 per cent in commerce and finance. In 1947, the first year of the Two-Year Plan, an additional 129,954 women were recruited, so that they represented 28.7 per cent of the total labor force and 30.9 per cent of industrial labor alone.⁴⁰ Another source of manpower was internal

⁴⁰Sylvia Thelenová-Havlíčková, Czechoslovak Women Today (Prague: Orbis, October, 1948).

shifts within the economy from one branch of industry to another. Table 6 on the following page indicates the employment shifts that occurred within industry. Consistent increases have been made in mining and metallurgy. The initial high allocation in sugar refining was decreased in the course of the Two-Year Plan, probably to serve other industries. Consistent increases in employment in food industries, metal industries, paper and printing have enabled them to top prewar employment, but despite gradual increases in employment in minerals, electricity and gas, wood, chemicals, textiles, clothing and leather, employment is below the 1937 level. The restriction of the glass and pottery industry where raw materials abounded is a clear case in which limitation of labor determined output.

As for raising the per capita productivity, the government faced a problem as grave as that of increasing the labor force. In 1946 the per capita output was still only 70 per cent of prewar output.⁴¹ This was attributed to the scarcity of food and consumer goods, the lack of competition in the new system and the inefficiency of "political" managers of factories. Along with this was the overintensive use of machinery without replacement during the war. Thus in order to reach 10 per cent per capita greater productivity than in 1937, the expected increase in the Two-Year Plan was 40 per cent.

The primary problem in raising the per capita productivity was the mechanization of industry. The renovation and replacement of machinery was planned to come from the output of native industry, since machinery imports would have to be balanced by comparable exports of goods which the government did not wish to emphasize. Mines and agriculture were the immediate areas for the allocation of labor-saving machinery. Along with this were to be produced energy-producing machines for the equipment of power plants and for the electrification of industries and homes. In textiles and other older industries, a higher level of rationalization was to be achieved by regrouping nationalized concerns, closing down the older and least efficient establishments, and concentrating production in those

⁴¹Hadsel, op. cit., p. 23.

Table 6
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, 1937-1948*

	Thousands of Persons Employed					% increase [†]
	1937	1945	1946	1947	1948	
Mining	93.0	117.5	125.1	125.1	136.4	1.46
Sugar refineries	9.8	48.7	49.6	22.2	17.5	1.78
Distilleries	7.4	7.0	10.1	10.6	9.2	1.24
Brewers & malters	17.0	14.7	14.8	15.0	15.4	.54
Minerals	64.6	55.2	62.7	61.8	63.2	.96
Milling	6.5	7.6	7.3	7.3	6.7	1.02
Food	373.3	351.5	366.3	371.1	420.5	1.12
Metal	22.2	35.9	37.5	36.7	39.7	1.80
Electricity & gas	37.7	33.7	31.6	32.3	33.2	.87
Sawmills	48.6	42.5	39.1	39.9	45.7	.94
Wood	31.3	28.4	30.9	31.2	33.8	1.08
Paper	56.0	59.9	68.3	69.3	81.9	1.46
Chemistry	102.1	48.3	55.2	55.3	72.0	.705
Ceramic & stone	100.0	25.2	61.4	55.9	80.0	.80
Glass	38.6	25.7	29.4	39.7	35.3	.91
Textiles	249.8	157.7	164.6	166.9	193.2	.79
Clothing	52.6	36.7	38.3	38.4	42.9	.81
Leather	60.0	36.4	38.0	38.3	43.6	.73
Printing	25.0	22.8	25.2	25.5	26.4	1.06
Water	2.5	3.7	3.2	3.2	3.6	1.44
Total	1,398.0	1,159.4	1,258.6	1,235.7	1,400.2	1.0015

*Statistický zpravodaj (Prague), XIII (1950), No. 1.
†Not included in source; derived from given figures.

factories best equipped for various specialties within each industry. The Plan called for an overall accounting system for all nationalized industries, to provide the basis for assessing the gains made in each area.

The attempt to raise per capita productivity by incentives and propaganda pressures applied to the worker will be discussed in the section dealing with labor.

The Two-Year Plan in Slovakia

Commitments were made in the Two-Year Plan to transfer enough additional plants and machinery to employ 26,000 more Slovak workers (the work force at that time totaled 140,000). In the first year of the Two-Year Plan 25,000 new workers were absorbed into large nationalized industry. Unlike the rest of the country, there was a superabundance of workers in Slovakia, but these were for the most part farm hands, and industry lacked qualified skilled workers. Wage rates were set at the same scale as for Czech industries, but living standards remained low because of scarce goods, the black market, and splitting income with impoverished rural kinsmen.⁴²

The main concentrations of Slovak industry were the mines of central and eastern Slovakia, modernization of the foundries of Filakovo Podbrezová, and the erection of hydroelectric plants on the banks of the Váh.⁴³ Other hydroelectric centers were to be built at Kralovany, Stropkov, Hlohovec Sereď, and dams were to be built on the Orava, Dubnica and Dobsina rivers. This would double electric power. In metallurgy, plans were made to reconstruct and modernize plants at Dubnica, Podbrezová, Filakovo, Trávnianské Biskupice and Krompachy. Woodworking, chemical and mechanical plants in Rožňava and Filakovo were to be established or modernized.⁴⁴ Shipbuilding at Komárno on the Danube was to be stimulated.

⁴²Douglas, op. cit., p. 96.

⁴³Gibian, op. cit., p. 380.

⁴⁴Le programme de reconstruction nationale du cabinet Gottwald (Présenté le 8 juillet 1946 a l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante; Prague: Orbis, 1946), pp. 26-27.

The transfer of confiscated properties from the Czech frontiers district to Slovakia included the following plants, providing 12,857 of the 25,000 industrial jobs promised:

Table 7
FACTORIES TRANSFERRED FROM CZECH REGIONS TO SLOVAKIA*

	No. of factories	No. of jobs
Metal	50	3,716
Woodworking	44	1,185
Textile	46	5,634
Chemical	15	381
Leather & rubber	13	789
Paper	18	883
Building	18	269
	204	12,857

*^v Simáček, op. cit., p. 17.

The strategy involved was probably as much to remove these properties from the German border, the first area to be invaded in World War II, as to employ Slovaks.

Because figures are available only for the nation and not for the regions, the Plan will be assessed in terms of the total output. Bělina observed in 1947, at the half-way mark in the progress of the Plan, that:

. . . the development of industrial output was not everywhere the same; and it is a disturbing feature that after the first enthusiasm wore off some of the basic industries like coal and iron ore mining, production of vital types of machinery, fertilizers and other chemicals, finished textiles, glass and building materials did not always come up to expectations.

He bases these remarks on the output figures to be found in Table 8 on the following page.

The disproportions in the fulfillment evident in the 1947 assessment continued throughout the planning period. Heavy industry exceeded the quota, but consumer industry fell behind the quota, showing up in

Table 8

PLANNED PRODUCTION AND ACTUAL OUTPUT, JANUARY-JUNE 1947*

	Jan. - June	June(only)	
Industry as a whole	101.0	97.2	Hard coal (tons)
Mining	102.2	90.7	Brown coal "
Power	99.5	103.0	Coke
Engineering & metal	98.3	89.0	Iron ore
Iron & steel, foundry	107.9	104.8	Electric energy
Chemical industry	88.5	88.4	(million kWh Hr.)
Glass	90.6	86.2	Gas (million cu. m.)
Earthen, stone & pottery	88.2	91.0	Pig iron (tons)
Paper	109.0	111.1	Crude steel
Timber	105.7	113.0	Castings (tons)
Textile & clothing	101.0	93.3	Rolled material
Leather & rubber	110.8	107.5	Engineering
Non-Ferrous Metals			Railway cars(units)
Copper & alloys (Tons)	2,264		Tractors(units)
Lead & alloys	4,859		Lorries & cars "
Aluminium alloys	1,063		Machine tools "
Zinc & alloys	890		Electromotors
Antimony	750		Motor cycles
Mercury	12.3		Bicycles
Chemical Industry(Tons)	432,785.8		Sewing machines
Glass industry(Tons)	124,990		Wireless sets
Textile industry	260,187.2		Telephone aparat.
			Electric bulbs
			Kitchenware,kg.

* Josef Bělina, "Czechoslovak Planning, " Central European Observer, XXIV, No. 16, 248.

scarcities in items available for purchase by the workers.

The February 1948 coup of the government by the Communist Party had important effects on the course of the Two-Year Plan. The emphasis on producer goods was even stronger. Cut off from machinery produced in Western countries, Czechoslovakia was forced to step up home production of all needed machinery. Prime Minister Gottwald justified the shift as an attempt to safeguard the economy from the effects of a foreign business cycles by developing the national forces of production and shifting trade to the orbit of countries with planned economies.⁴⁵ The following indicates the shift to producer's goods and the lag in consumer industries in the months following the coup:⁴⁶

	1948 (1937=100)					
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
Producers' goods	115	117	119	125	133	126
Consumers' goods	76	78	82	81	86	80
	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Producers' goods	117	119	125	138	134	128
Consumers' goods	62	76	85	91	90	84

Another effect on economic policy following the coup was the pressure to further nationalize private concerns. On May 1, 1948, all industries employing over fifty people were nationalized, leaving only five per cent of the labor force employed in the private sector.⁴⁷ An additional 1,173 private firms were nationalized. The status of industrial ownership is summarized in Table 9 on the following page. Additional key industries were completely nationalized--building and building materials, key food processing, distilleries, breweries and wine-making, sugar mills,

⁴⁵ Douglas, op. cit., p. 108.

⁴⁶ International Financial Statistics (Washington, D. C. :International Monetary Fund), II (1949), No. 7, 5607.

⁴⁷ Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia, III, No. 7 (Sept. 1948), 121.

Table 9
OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRY, MAY 1, 1948*

	Units	Persons (1000)
Nationalized	3,329	907.7
Confiscated	8,410	392.4
State owned	306	18.4
Local authority	375	6.2
Cooperative	862	13.2
Private	<u>6,108</u>	<u>73.4</u>
Total	19,390	1,410.2

* New Central European Observer (London), II, No. 2 (May 28, 1949), 121.

pharmaceuticals--encompassing over ninety per cent of the industrial productive capacity in national or local governmental hands or cooperatives. Resorts, hotels and restaurants, department stores and retail outlets were all put under the administration of the state. The additional plants nationalized were the marginal, less efficient firms. Moreover, in removing private capital from any significant share in the economy, failures in production could only be attributed to mismanagement by the national ministries. The government was forced to justify procedures more forcefully than ever through propaganda channels.

By the end of the Two-Year Plan, consumer industries had fallen so short of goals that scarcities were causing worker discontent. The discrepancy between high production quotas fulfilled in producer goods industries and the failure in consumer branches was sufficiently disturbing to the public to evoke official comment. Nothing that the raising of the standard of living of the people could not be attained without fulfillment of targets in all the key sectors, the pamphlet states that

Those members of the public who try to keep track of economic progress are thus often unable to explain the apparent contradiction that targets are being fulfilled,

or even exceeded, while the standard of living does not improve at the rate we should wish, or, indeed, at the rate originally assumed in the Two Year Plan itself.⁴⁸

These people, the Party asserts, fall prey to reactionary rumor mongers. The truth of the matter is, the booklet goes on to state, that the Plan was not fulfilled in agriculture and building partly because of "capitalist sabotage" in foreign trade and black market operations. Were it not for the "machinations of reactionary forces" the standard of living would already have topped prewar levels.

The acceleration of production which was at first projected for the purpose of raising the standard of living became an end in itself, especially after the Communist coup. The disequilibrium in consumer and producer goods which had already begun to plague the political leaders became sharpened in the Five-Year Plan which followed. Firmly linked to the Soviet orbit after the February coup, the industry of Czechoslovakia became an adjunct to Soviet economic policy.

The Five-Year Plan

The Five-Year Plan marks the beginning of serious overall planning for the entire economy. No longer was the planning machinery geared to the Two-Year Plan sufficient for carrying out long-range policy. At that time 47 per cent of enterprises were outside of the national economy, and specific goals were not stated for many industries, including all production of consumer items. The new Plan called for a unified authority covering all branches of industry, with allocation of raw materials and labor determined according to the needs decided upon by the political bureaucracy.⁴⁹

The assessment of the development of industry under the Five-Year Plan is based on official sources of the Czechoslovak government. Both planning and output figures are suspect. An attempt is made here to assess

⁴⁸The Czechoslovak Economic Five Year Plan (Act and Government Memorandum; Prague: Orbis, 1949), p. 31.

⁴⁹See chapter on economic policy for a summary of the planning hierarchy and an analysis of planning technique.

major trends in the economy, sectors of industry which were particularly emphasized and those which were neglected, and dislocations resulting from inefficient planning. In this kind of analysis, figures were not considered as absolute values, but as relative indices to developments. Occasional frank criticism of shortcomings in production published in the Party press, and sharp changes in policy which often reveal growing stresses in certain areas of the economy, provide a more secure base for some of the conclusions drawn. Thus, despite recognized weaknesses in the basic data, it is felt that the following analysis will be of some use in interpreting developments after 1948.

The planned distribution of investment outlay in the various sectors of the economy during the Five-Year Plan are shown in the following table:

Table 10
PLANNED DISTRIBUTION
OF INVESTMENT OUTLAY IN THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN*

Billion Crowns in 1948 Prices				
	Equipment	Construction	Total	% of Total
Industry	87.3	44.6	131.9	39.2
Agriculture	15.0	11.8	26.8	8.0
Building	3.9	.7	4.6	1.4
Transport	29.8	23.1	52.9	15.7
Trade (incl. tourist)	3.1	1.9	5.0	1.5
Housing	---	39.3	39.3	11.7
Social health & culture	14.2	14.4	28.6	8.5
Public administration-roads, bridges, dams etc.	6.0	41.1	47.1	14.0
Total	159.3	176.9	336.2	100.0

* Government Memorandum on the Five-Year Plan, Act. No. 241, October 27, 1948; quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 2 (Nov. 1953), 37.

The net investment was 219 to 235 billion crowns, the balance representing replacement of equipment and repairs. Heavy industry in this initial plan called for 28.2 per cent of investments; light industry, 11.2 per cent of the 39.2 per cent of total investments allocated to all of industry.

The industrial output planned in the original draft of the Five-Year Plan set the following goals for specific industries:

Table 11
PLANNED INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT IN THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN*

Mining:	
Hard coal (millions of tons)	20.8
Brown coal " " "	32.2
Coke " " "	8.0
Iron ore " " "	1.4
Crude oil (thousands of tons)	240.0
Power:	
Electric power (millions of millowatt hrs.)	11.2
Coal gas	2.9
Iron and Steel:	
Pig iron (millions of tons)	2.7
Crude steel	3.5
Rolled products	2.5
Engineering Industry:	
Railway wagons & coaches (thousands)	7.7
Motor vehicles (thousands)	24.0
Electro motors (under 0.5 kw & from 0.5-25 kw)	890.0
Chemical Industry:	
Phosphate fertilizer (thousands of tons)	438.0
Nitrate fertilizer (thousands of tons)	220.0
Soap (thousands of tons)	53.0
Building materials Industry:	
Cement (millions of tons)	2.6
Lime (millions of tons)	1.3
Bricks (billions of tons)	1.3
Plate glass (thousands of tons)	114.0
Food production:	
Refined sugar (thousands of tons)	790.0
Butter (thousands of tons)	49.0
Milk (millions of hectolitres)	47.0
Beef (thousands of tons-live weight)	864.0
Light Industry:	
Paper (thousands of tons)	320.0
Cotton (millions of meters)	479.0
Linen & half linen (millions of meters)	52.0
Silk (millions of meters)	78.0

*Economic Survey of Europe in 1954 (Geneva: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1955), Table 27, p. 43.

Except in the case of iron ore, railway wagons and plate glass, plans for production under the Five-Year Plan exceeded those for 1948.

Industrialization of Slovakia was still given high priority in the Five-Year Plan. A program of technical education of skilled workers through factory evening courses and small full-time schools, as well as through sending Slovaks to Bohemia for training, had been initiated to make possible the fulfillment of industrial goals. By the end of 1949, progress in the industrialization of the region was up to plan. Compared with the 1937 output, the index of production in 1949 was 225. By 1951 this had risen to 327. In the year 1949, fourteen new concerns were put into operation, in 1950, twenty-six, and in 1951, thirty were planned to be opened.⁵⁰

The pace of industrial production in the first quarter of the Five-Year Plan followed the initial plan as projected in 1949. In 1949 production exceeded prewar output by 24.1 per cent. In 1950 a shift to even greater emphasis on heavy industry was made. The United Nations Economic Survey commented on the tendency discernible at this stage:

The decision to stake everything on rapid development of heavy industry seems to have been taken in 1950 after the general deterioration of East-West relations and the tightening of links between the eastern European Governments implied by the formation in 1949 of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance with headquarters in Moscow. It was in that year, too, that eastern European Governments first devoted any considerable sums on defense.⁵¹

The years 1951 and 1952 were the crucial period in translating this shifting policy into economic terms. From September of 1951 to April 1952 major changes were effected in leadership with an increase in the number of Soviet-trained men in the ministries. Soviet cost-accounting methods were taken over, and Soviet standardization of materials and machinery were adopted. New planning insisting on detailed technical and economic justification at all levels was introduced to overcome some of the glaring dislocations in the economy.⁵² In April, 1951, Dr. Jaromír Dolanský,

⁵⁰ Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin, No. 222, May 1, 1951.

⁵¹ Economic Survey of Europe Since the War, op. cit., p. 29.

⁵² P.B., "Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy," The World Today (London), IX (1953), p. 74.

cabinet minister, announced the increased goals for the Five-Year Plan and the reasons for the change in policy.⁵³ The higher quotas were, he said, an acceleration of socialization to make Czechoslovakia independent of the West and ensure it against crises in capitalist countries. He called for an increase in the exploitation of home sources of raw materials and an increased concentration on the production of goods for which there would be a steady market for many years. Iron ore production was to be expanded to meet the increased demand, as well as a speed-up of crude oil and the production of pyrites. The chemical industry was to shift to the manufacture of artificial fibers, artificial rubber and other artificial materials to substitute for raw materials available only in the western zone.

The aims of the Five-Year Plan were no longer stated even in Party propaganda in terms of raising the standard of living within the country. The political motivation of serving Soviet needs with stepped-up production was stated clearly in the Práce announcement in December 1950:

The agreement with the Soviet Union brings us increased production tasks, and we have to take into account agreements with the other people's democracies. The main task is the reconstruction of heavy industry which strengthens our independence from capitalist countries and by which we contribute to the building of socialism in the other people's democracies.⁵⁴

The revised plans called for an increase of more than one-half the initially planned sums in investment. In addition to the 157 billion crowns already invested, 558 billion crowns were added for the remaining period of the Five-Year Plan, making a total of 715 billion. However, the initial investment values must be deflated in terms of 1950 prices to give an accurate picture of the increase. In these terms, the 336.2 billion crowns initially proposed was at the time of the revision equal to 475 billion, and the percentage increase is forty, not fifty as first appears true.⁵⁵

⁵³Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin, No. 220, April 1, 1951, pp. 5-6.

⁵⁴National Committee for a Free Europe, publications, (New York) Feb. 15-18, 1951, p. 10.

⁵⁵Barton, op. cit., p. 311.

The dramatic shift in the emphasis of heavy over light industry is graphically illustrated in the percentage distribution of investments before and after the revision:

	<u>Initial Plan</u>	<u>Revised Plan</u>	<u>Realized 1952</u>
Heavy industry	28.2%	49.5%	43.0%
Light industry	11.0	--	7.0

Because of the new concentration areas, manpower was displaced, putting additional stress on the housing shortage. A 50 per cent increase in workers in the building trades, from 210 to 315 thousand, and a 19 per cent increase in industrial workers, from 1,362 to 1,616 thousand, was called for. Some of the increase was recruited from agriculture and forestry. Despite the emphasis put on construction, the supply of housing did not reach the planned quotas. The Plan called for 133,000 houses, of which only 72,750 plus 4,753 homes built by industries were realized.⁵⁶ Preference in lodging was given to workers in heavy industry.

Along with productive changes were changes made in administration and control of industry. The number of ministries was increased, with a corresponding subdivision of the area of control. Barton's analysis of this "directorial revolution" shows how the attenuation of the powers of the ministries caused control of industries to be centralized more exclusively in the hands of the directors and their leader, Jaromír Dolanský.⁵⁷

The question of whether the economy was able to withstand the additional stresses put upon it, and at the same time increase output, arises. According to propaganda issued in the Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin,⁵⁸ the increased goals were attained 99.7 per cent, the total volume of output compared with 1950 grew 14.9 per cent and productivity rose 9.7 per cent. The overall attainment percentage does not reveal failure in the production of specific items which caused cumulative dislocations in the economy.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 326.

⁵⁷Ibid.,

⁵⁸Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin, No. 245, April 15, 1952, p. 12.

In the beginning of 1952 the government declared the new aims for output in heavy industry to be 21 per cent above the 1951 level, giving to heavy industry a share of the total gross production of 55 per cent as compared with 49 per cent in 1951. This would bring heavy industry to two and one-half times the 1937 level. Slovakia's share of the increased burden was the greatest, but in the first five months of 1952 coal output dropped 20.6 per cent and iron ore 8.3 per cent behind schedule, and hydroelectric power, transportation, housing and geological research were dangerously behind the Plan.⁵⁹

Russian demands for increased exports of heavy machinery, evoked by the need for a display of strength in the cold war, continued to stimulate industrial expansion in 1952. The Bata works was transformed from the production of shoes to a heavy and light machine industry, with a considerable part of the new production, as well as the old shoe machinery, being sent to the U.S.S.R.⁶⁰ Production of iron, steel ingots and rails by the newly constructed HUKO was planned to provide about one-half the total exports in 1953 destined for Russia, China, and the People's Democracies, raising the potential strength of these countries in case of war.⁶¹

The dislocations in the economy resulting in the forced acceleration program are illustrated by the construction of the heavy engineering combine, HUKO, and the foundry engineering combines in the Czech Moravian highlands and at Žďár on the Sázava River. Planned to produce one million tons of steel a year, the construction of HUKO called for 60 million man hours and the allocation of 10,000 workers alone. Abandoned when only half constructed, this tremendous increase in working capacity was never utilized. The structure lay idle while plans were put forward for new factories.⁶² Despite such short-run dislocations and the resulting inefficiency, one should not underestimate the cumulative increase in potential

⁵⁹P.B., op. cit., pp. 76-77.

⁶⁰News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 25.

⁶¹P.B., op. cit., p. 79.

⁶²Ibid., p. 80.

in heavy industry. In the first four years of the Five-Year Plan the total gross product was raised 82 per cent and reached 197 per cent of prewar industrial output.⁶³ Industrial construction for the year included four hydroelectric plants, three blast furnaces, six martin furnaces, three open hearth furnaces, four gas furnaces, three coke smelters, and assembly-line areas equalling 1,115,000 square meters. Other construction for industrial expansion equalled 1,107,000 square meters.⁶⁴

At the end of 1952 Prime Minister Zápotocký, commenting on the fulfillment of the Plan for that year, said that it was usually the gross production plan which was fulfilled and exceeded in less important things, while plans for machines and other products are not fulfilled.⁶⁵ Failures were encountered in the production of hard coal, iron, manganese, copper ores, pig iron, crude steel, rolled consumer goods, steel casting, steam boilers, steam and water turbines, diesel motors over one hundred millimeters, turbo generators, transformers and relays, nitrogen fertilizers, cement bricks, etc.⁶⁶ The scapegoats for these failures were Slánský and the other "traitors" who confessed to sabotaging the structure of industry by failing to adopt the socialist organization and by persisting in reinforcing ties with the West rather than the East.⁶⁷

Entering the final year of the Five-Year Plan, the economy suffered from the cumulative effects of failures during the first four years of the planning period in basic industries such as coal and iron and in construction of housing and agricultural production. In the spring of 1953 a lowering of total investments by 16.1 per cent and a new repartition of funds to

⁶³Ibid., p. 79.

⁶⁴News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 3 (March 1953), 22.

⁶⁵Rudé Právo, Dec. 24, 1952; quoted in ibid., p. 23.

⁶⁶Rudé Právo, Jan. 30, 1953; quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 3 (March 1953), p. 23.

⁶⁷See Barton, op. cit., for a detailed analysis of the significance of this trial.

stimulated production in basic industries, agriculture, and lodging was announced by the Prime Minister, Viliam Široký, to the National Assembly.⁶⁸

The Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations has compiled a table showing the 1953 production according to the initial plan, the revised 1951 plan and the actual results. (See Table 12 on the following page.) Basic industries remained below the revised Plan in 1953 except in production of coke and crude oil. Steel and iron products were even farther under goals than the above figures reveal, because they were of consistently poor quality.⁶⁹ Electric power excelled the goal, but still did not reach the increased demand. The current in the latter part of 1953 had to be cut off periodically and only twelve hours of guaranteed flow was given in twenty-four hours. Even during these hours there were many cuts. Stoppages of current slowed down production in all enterprises dependent upon electric power. Despite additional transport facilities available, the increase in construction increased the load of traffic. In the winter of 1953-54 there was a serious breakdown and passenger traffic was restricted.⁷⁰ In light consumer industries even the low goals of the revised Plan were not met.

The rate of expansion in industry had declined from the level reached in the preceding year. The following table lists the index of expansion for 1952 and 1953, the same period of the preceding year equalling one hundred:

⁶⁸Barton, op. cit., p. 342.

⁶⁹Barton, op. cit., p. 320.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 314.

Table 12
1953 PRODUCTION ACCORDING TO THE INITIAL PLAN,
THE REVISED 1951 PLAN, AND THE ACTUAL OUTPUT*

Commodity	Unit	Actual Prod. 1948	Plan Pbl. 1949	Plan Pbl. 1951	Actual Prod. 1953
<u>Mining</u>					
Hard coal	Millions of tons	17.7	20.8	25	20.3/
Brown coal	Millions of tons	23.6	32.2	35.8	32.8/
Coke	Millions of tons	3.3	8.0	8	8.5/
Crude oil	Thousands of tons	49	1.4	3.8	2.3/
<u>Power</u>					
Electric power	Millions of mw hrs.	4.1	11.2	12.3	12.4
Coal gas	Millions of cu. m.	611	2.9	2.9	0.9
<u>Iron and Steel</u>					
Pig Iron	Millions of tons	1.6	2.7	3	2.8/
Crude Steel	Millions of tons	2.6	3.5	4.5	4.4/
Rolled Prod.	Millions of tons	1.6	2.5	3.3	2.9/
<u>Engineering Industry</u>					
Railway wagons and coaches	Thousands	11.0	7.7	--	12.5
Motor vehicles	Thousands	13.2	24	32.8	20.9
Electro motors under .05 kw and 9.5-25 kw	Thousands	276.2	890	890	623
<u>Chemical Industry</u>					
Phosphate fertilizer	Thousands of tons	48	438	514	477
Nitrate fertilizer	Thousands of tons	31	220	330	193
Soap	Thousands of tons	28	53	--	60
<u>Building Materials</u>					
Cement	Millions of tons	1.6	2.6	3.4	2.3
Lime	Millions of tons	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.1
Bricks	Billions	0.9	1.3	--	1.3
Plate glass	Thousands of tons	130.9	114	--	147
<u>Food Production</u>					
Refined sugar	Thousands of tons	518	790	972	637
Butter	Thousands of tons	--	49	52	34
Milk	Millions of hl.	--	47	--	32
Slaughtered meat-- beef	Thousands of tons of live weight	--	864	993	571
<u>Light Industry</u>					
Paper	Thousands of tons	260	320	320	317
Cotton	Millions of meters	--	479	479	347
Linen and half linen	Millions of meters	--	52	52	48
Silk	Millions of meters	11.7	78	78	44

*Economic Survey of Europe in 1954 (Geneva: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1955), Table 27, p. 43.

/Figures for production of items marked / differ in the compilation given in Economic Survey of Europe in 1954 as follows (in above order): 20, 195; 34, 213; 9, 216; 2, 243; 2, 897; 4, 149; 2, 843. These may be more accurate than above.

Table 13.

INDEX OF RATE OF INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION, 1952-53*

	1952	1953		
		1st. qr.	2nd. qr.	3rd. qr.
Industrial production	118.3	109.8	111.	111.
Heavy industry	127.3	114.3	115.	116.
Coal	110.	---	--	103.
Anthracite	110.	103.	103.	102.
Coke	110.	106.	105.	--
Electricity	113.	106.	107.	108.
Light industry	110.	103.8	104	103.
Productivity of workers	115.5	108.8	109.3	108.5
Investments	116.7	106.5	---	---

*Barton, op. cit., p. 337.

Assessment of the Total Course of the Five-Year Plan

Chairman of the State Board of Planning J. Pučík, in a speech in March 1954, extolled the achievements of the Five-Year Plan.⁷¹ He said that heavy production had increased in the course of the Plan 2.1 times. The share of producers goods in the total industrial production had risen from 56 per cent to 62 per cent. The production of machines accounted for 26 per cent of total industrial production as compared with 16 per cent in 1948. In an attempt to show the advantages of socialism, he drew a comparison between increases in production as a whole in Czechoslovakia in the five-year period with that in the Western countries: while Czechoslovakia's production in heavy industry doubled, that of the United States rose 14 per cent, Great Britain 14 per cent and Sweden 10 per cent (all of these having highly developed economies in the initial period). The private sector was completely liquidated except for agriculture, with the socialist sector now accounting for 99.6 per cent of production and 99.7

⁷¹Gospodarka Planowa (Warsaw), III, March 1955, p. 50.

per cent of distribution. Labor productivity had, according to his figures, almost doubled. According to official sources, the index of production in industry for the period covered by the Five-Year Plan is given below:

Table 14
INDEX OF PRODUCTION DURING FIVE-YEAR PLAN*

Year	Index 1937=100	Index 1948=100	Per Capita Output 1937=100	Value
1949	126.0	115.9	---	329.9
1950	145.6	133.9	---	381.2
1951	167.3	153.9	---	438.0
1952 Plan	202.8	186.5	---	530.9
1952	198.9	182.1	---	518.3
1953 Original 5YP	173.4	157.0	180.0	454.0
1953 Revised 5YP	215.0	198.0	---	563.5
1953	219.0	202.0	247.0	574.8

*Compiled from Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin, 1951-53, by News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 7, (July 1954).

While one is forced to rely almost entirely on such official accounts of progress in the economy, several precautions must be observed in analyzing the data. After 1948 statistics were more and more used as a propaganda weapon. The policy of the regime is reflected in a statement in Hospodár: "Statistics is not a mathematical science, but a social science and a tool in the class struggle,"⁷² and the warning was given that care must be taken in publishing statistics as long as capitalism exists.

Several techniques are known to be employed to inflate figures. The indices of production include rejects and third-rate products.⁷³

⁷²Hospodár, April 1951; quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 7 (July 1954).

⁷³News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 7 (July 1954).

Comment is frequently made by Party officials in government publications on the poor quality particularly of steel and iron products, and the inferior grade of bituminous coal mined. Confusion is created by the frequent reclassification of groups when production is found to be way below quota in one of them. Figures are presented in non-comparable units--as in textiles, a shift to meters instead of tons. Some of the increase in production in the nationalized sector is due to further nationalization after 1948, not to absolute production increases.

The success or failure of the Five-Year Plan need not be assessed on the basis of production figures alone. From sporadic criticisms in the Party press it is possible to judge the economic conditions which industries faced at the end of 1953. The general picture was one of disproportion in production, over-exploitation of existing facilities and over-extension of new plant facilities, seriously crippling the projection of new planning.

One of the serious defects of the Five-Year Plan was the emphasis on building new factories rather than modernizing existing plants. The 1948 Plan had provided for a 30-35 per cent investment in replacements, the remainder to go into new construction. After the revision of plans in 1951 this disproportion was widened, and ten thousand crowns out of sixty thousand crowns were to be devoted to renovation. Barton comments that this policy permits temporary increases in production without corresponding increases in capital; production thus inflated is lowered abruptly when the old industries stop completely.⁷⁴ Old buildings were obsolete before new ones were in use, and the setbacks in established industries upon which future production depended could not be equipped. Thus partially equipped factories remained idle long after the plant was constructed. Such large-scale enterprises as HUKO were reported nearly abandoned in October 1953.⁷⁵

⁷⁴Barton, op. cit., p. 316.

⁷⁵P. B., "Changes in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning," The World Today, IX (1953), p. 546.

Illustrating the inefficiency of this planning procedure are the cases of the energy-producing industries, electricity and coal. Basic to the operation of other industries, failure in these industries meant breakdowns throughout the entire economy. The production of electric power surpassed the revised goals of 1951, but it was achieved by using plants which should have been overhauled. The result was that there were many breakdowns, with additional costs of overtime for repairs and idle time of men and machines in dependent industries.⁷⁶

The accelerated program of production in heavy industry throughout the course of the Five-Year Plan put particular stress on the coal industry, resulting in uneconomical expansion similar to that in electric power. A coal-exporting country before the war, Czechoslovakia's coal supply was unable to keep up with the newly created demand, and from 1948 there was a growing differential between industrial production and coal output, causing severe dislocation in the economy.

Table 15
INDUSTRIAL AND COAL OUTPUT INDICES, 1948-1953*

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Industrial production, gross value in 1948 prices.	103	127	147	166	196	204
Hard coal output	105	101	110	110	119	120
Brown coal output	132	148	153	167	182	191

*From State Statistical Office, Ministry of Information and Public Culture (Prague), reprinted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 3 (March 1954), 3.

The disproportion between hard coal output and industrial production is so great that it is difficult to believe that these indices, particularly for industrial production, represent anything like the true output. However, even if exaggerated they indicate a trend which if continued will seriously

⁷⁶Economic Survey of Europe in 1954, op. cit., p. 42.

endanger the base of the economy. The disproportion became particularly acute after the revision of goals in 1951. Despite increases in brown coal production, four to five million tons were siphoned off for the production of synthetic motor vehicle fuel. A very costly and inefficient process, the production of synthetic fuel was necessitated by the cutting off of supplies from the Western zone. Stefan comments on the chronic coal shortage:

Failure to meet production quotas in certain district, particularly in the Ostrava-Karviná and Kladno basins cannot be regarded as the principal cause of the coal shortage. The cause is rather to be found in planning the rate of industrial expansion without a realistic appraisal of the possibilities of expanding the output of the coal industry.

Part of the increase in industrial consumption has also been the result of wasteful practices in industrial plants. Little attention is paid to proper storage of fuels, which are not always protected from the elements. In industrial plants there are frequent instances of spontaneous combustion, the firing equipment is not kept in satisfactory condition and its operation is not properly controlled, and there is also waste in the use of steam, hot water and compressed air. The resulting losses may run as high as 10% of the entire annual output.⁷⁷

Considering the fact that the coal production achieved during the Five-Year Plan was always supported by the use of special labor brigades and overtime schedules, as well as at the expense of exploring new deposits and installing needed machinery, one can see that the shortages were to have cumulative effects.

Closely related to the production of coal is the iron and steel industry. Because of the low iron content in native ores and the low output per man per year, iron ore mining is highly inefficient in Czechoslovakia. A comparison with output and iron content in the United States shows the

⁷⁷ Ladislav Stefan, The Coal Industry in Czechoslovakia (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, June 7, 1954), pp. 22-23.

disadvantage at which home production is pursued:

	<u>Production</u> 1000 tons	<u>Output per man</u> per year of ore in tons	<u>Iron</u> content
Czechoslovakia 1952	2,077	258	81
United States "	90,480	3,379	1,732

New steel units without a natural base of coking coal or rich iron ore have been constructed despite this scarcity in basic materials. This represents an unsound expansion which will not contribute to a better standard of living within the country.⁷⁸

The insufficiency of supplies of basic materials and the insufficient provisions of consumer goods, causing discontent among the working class upon whom increased industrial output depends, are the primary weaknesses with which the economy was faced at the end of the first Five-Year Plan. The prewar structure of the economy was similar to that of the United States and other developed Western economies: a harmonious intercooperation of industries with diversified production, a combination of light dollar-producing industries with basic dollar-consuming industries, had been achieved which created a stable economic base. Because this adjustment depended on a balance of trade with Western countries, this basis of cooperation was destroyed when the Communists seized power and turned to the Eastern economic orbit for trade and sources of raw materials. In meeting the demands of Russia and other central European countries for heavy industrial products, Czechoslovakia's industries were paced at a rate of expansion which entirely neglected the consumption needs of the country and overtaxed the industrial potential. The automatic allocation of scarce economic goods through the price mechanism was not compensated for by bureaucratic state controls which were less sensitive to fluctuations in the supply of basic materials and labor.

⁷⁸Economic Survey of Europe in 1954, op. cit., pp. 113-16.

The New Course

The weaknesses in the economy, resulting in the reckless exploitation of resources in the course of the Five-Year Plan, necessitated a downward revision in the plans for industrial expansion in 1954 and 1955. Pučík, chairman of the Czech State Planning Office, announced that the next planning period would extend only from 1954 to 1955, with the second Five-Year Plan to begin in 1956 when Russia's new planning period would start. The object was to provide the greatest possible advantage from cooperation with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. The planning period of Hungary and Bulgaria was also to be held up two years, for the same reason.⁷⁹ Despite the organization of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid, which was to coordinate planning in all the satellites, Czechoslovakia had up to this time cooperated closely only with economic developments in Poland; future planning was to emphasize its role as part of the total Soviet bloc.

The main trends defining the new course were the deceleration of industrial expansion and the decrease of emphasis on heavy industry in an attempt to raise living standards and eliminate the disproportions in fuel, power, ores and agriculture. At the beginning of 1954 heavy goods accounted for 62.3 per cent of the gross value of industrial production. The New Course called for a falling off of the annual increase in the total gross industrial product from 10 per cent in 1953 to 5.1 per cent in the current year. Investments were to be repartitioned as follows:

Table 16

DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENTS IN 1954 (per cent of 1953)*

	Plan	Reported
Agriculture	205	almost 200
Cultural & social	172	182
Trade & cafeteria service	167	---
School construction	142	---
Housing	136.6	139
Heavy industry, fuel, power	105.5	---

* Trends in the Czechoslovak Economy in 1954 (New York: Free Europe Committee, 1955, pp. 51-2.

⁷⁹ The Economist (London), CLXX, No. 5763 (Feb. 6, 1954), 377.

Within industry, the slowing up of the rate of expansion can be seen from a comparison of the reported increase in 1953 over the planned increase in 1954:

Table 17
YEARLY PERCENTAGE INCREASE
OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1953-54*

Industry	Reported Increase in 1953 (% over 1952)	Planned Increase in 1954 (% over 1953)	Reported Increase in 1954 (% over 1953)
Means of production	15.0 †	6.0	4.2
Consumer goods	4 †	5.3	4.7
Hard coal	---	8.5	6
Lignite	3	7.9	10
Electric power	6	12.2	10
Coke	6	5.5	4
Steel, crude	16	4.5	---
Steel, rolled	15	13.4	2
Iron ore	8	10.4	---
Pig iron	20	8.3	---
Aluminum	---	over 500.0	---
Nitrate	20	19.3	10
Phosphate	17	19.8	21
Silon fibre	77	25.8	31
Machinery	---	10.6	---
Ball bearings	12	35.2	19
Agricultural machinery	---	164.4	150
Velvet	---	100.0	---
Sugar, refined	8	10.7	---
Cheese	---	84.8	39
Cement	5.0	21.7	10.0

*Trends in the Czechoslovak Economy in 1954 (New York: Free Europe Committee, 1955), p. 5.

†Second quarter of 1953 over second quarter of 1952.

However, to achieve the increases in both light and heavy industry, moderate as they were, was a difficult task in view of the economic exhaustion of

the country. There was no diversion of capital goods production to light industry; increases were called for in both branches. Because of the shortage of investment funds, the provision for expansion was expected to come from increased labor productivity.

The kingpin for the increase of labor productivity was the machine industry. According to plans, installations for producing energy were to be doubled, mining installations were to increase 91 per cent, chemical installations were to be increased 154 per cent over 1952, and building of agricultural machinery was to double.⁸⁰ Considering the status of the industry in 1953, the plans were extremely unrealistic. While the gross production in the third quarter of that year was reported as 97 per cent, the production of certain important types of turbines, boilers and rolling equipment was met by only 40 per cent.⁸¹ Unable to produce desperately needed machinery in 1953, it was not unexpected that the additional 7.9 per cent increase in production was not met in 1954. In the third quarter the production plan was fulfilled only by 87.8 per cent of scheduled production. Labor productivity was extremely low, and over half the rejects produced in industry as a whole came from the machinery industry alone.⁸² Shortages of raw materials and the disorganized circulation of finished and semifinished goods exaggerated the disorganization in the industry.

Failure to fulfill the installation of power plant equipment in both 1952 and 1953 made for an emergency situation in power production in 1954. When equipment was not forthcoming from the machine industry in 1954, power shortages and breakdowns continued. The entire industry was in need of a long-term improvement program which would not be forthcoming for some time.

Underdevelopment and over-exploitation of the coal mines again showed up in low per capita output and high production costs. The reserves

⁸⁰Gospodarka Planowa, III, March 1955.

⁸¹Rudé Právo; quoted in The Economist, CLXVIII, No. 5744 (Sept. 26, 1953), 863.

⁸²Trends in the Czechoslovak Economy in 1954 (New York: Free Europe Committee, 1955), p. 10.

of coal ready for exploitation had decreased by 25 per cent in the first Five-Year Plan period, and the time had come when additional capital for improvement was imperative. Production in 1954 rose to 6 per cent over 1953 in hard coal (21.561 million tons) and to 10 per cent over 1953 in lignite (37.840 million tons), but at great cost in labor and investment.

The New Course program for the improvement in the standard of living called for an investment program increasing allotments in agriculture, the building industry and consumer goods, as well as improvement in distribution and retail outlets. Higher wages and lower prices were to make possible increased consumption by workers. The important shift in the plans for the increase in living standards was the emphasis on individual consumption, not social services as hitherto planned. Social consumption, the public services, hospitals, and public recreational facilities took up only 16.3 per cent of total consumption expenditures in 1954 as compared with 18.2 per cent in 1953. Communal developments included improvements in city transportation, sewage and canal systems, and the construction of new schools. Individual consumption called for improvement in the quality and variety of items such as textiles and foods. Real wages were for the first time higher than before the war with the increase of wages by 10 per cent and the reduction of prices by 20 per cent.⁸³ The Ministry of Trade authorized an increase in investments totaling 111 million crowns for the repair of retail shops, and increased supplies of consumer goods in the countryside were to be made available through the organization of local purchases of surplus agriculture by country cooperatives and through the increase generally in supplies going to the country.⁸⁴ The construction of dwelling units continued to fall behind plans in 1954; only 28,000 of the 40,000 units planned were completed in the year. This was due to the failure in material supplies and the inability to raise labor productivity by 10.3 per cent as scheduled: productivity in construction

⁸³ Gospodarka Planowa, III, March 1955.

⁸⁴ News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 7 (July 1954).

supplies industries fell by .1 per cent and rose only 8 per cent in the total industry.⁸⁵

Expectations that the improved standard of living would make workers produce more were not justified. In the first half of 1954 there were shortcomings in the fulfillment of specific tasks in all branches of production. The reported fulfillment in light industry of 103 per cent of plan, in engineering of 100 per cent of plan and in local industry of 111 per cent was achieved at great expense due to consistently low productivity. In a speech reported in the London Times⁸⁶ Mr. Novotný complained of poor working morale and millions of crowns lost in shoddy production. Power station had to be closed down soon after opening because of shortages in basic materials. Mining, machinery, food, timber, and consumer goods had not fulfilled their goals. Capital accumulation had consistently fallen behind schedule, and over the first eight months of the year 25 per cent of the planned profits of the state did not materialize because of inefficiency in production in almost all branches. The machine industry alone owed 42 per cent of the planned profits.⁸⁷ Listing items in which some success was achieved, the official summary of production fulfillment for the year was announced as indicated in Table 17 on the following page. Actual production figures for 1954 published by the United Nations seem highly unreliable because of inconsistencies within this same publication (e.g., hard coal is given as 23.3 millions of tons, brown coal as 37.1 millions of tons--a total of 59.4 millions of tons in the former table and 57.6 millions of tons in the latter.⁸⁸ On the basis of what data has been published, only general conclusions can be drawn. There were changes in the structure of investments in an attempt to stimulate production in agriculture, building, the installation of energy-producing machinery and

⁸⁵Trends. . . ., op. cit., p. 11.

⁸⁶The Times (London), June 14, 1954.

⁸⁷Trends. . . ., op. cit., p. 3.

⁸⁸Economic Survey of Europe in 1954., op. cit., Table 27, p. 43; Table 57, p. 266.

Table 18
FULFILLMENT OF PRODUCTION IN 1954*

	<u>Increase over 1953</u>
Producer goods	total of 4.4%
Electric energy	10
Hard coal	6
Crude oil	3
Busses	93
Motorcycles	20
Tractors	27
Consumer goods	4.7%
Silk textiles	24
Cooking utensils	11
Television	32
Frigidaires	2.4 times
Vacuum cleaners	69.0%
Electric washing machines	3.4--times previous
Sewing machines	60.0% yr's production
Photo cameras	23 increase
Watches	22
Foods	
Animal fats	28.0%
Butter	5
Vegetable fats	6
Fish	18.0%

* Gospodarka Planowa, III, April 1955.

transportation facilities. Gains were made by workers in improving the level of living. However, there was little success in attempts to increase worker productivity or in lowering production costs, the basis for further amelioration in economic conditions.

Summary

Czechoslovakia has emerged from over eight years of planning with a completely transformed economy. Entering the first year of the Two-Year Plan, only 19.3 per cent of industrial enterprises employing 61 per

cent of industrial labor were nationalized. After the Five-Year Plan the private sector was completely liquidated except in agriculture, with the socialized sector comprising 99.6 per cent of production and 99.7 per cent of distribution.⁸⁹ The economy was completely oriented to the Soviet bloc of countries, with planning adjusted to the needs of these countries as much and sometimes more than to its internal demands. The industrial potential for the production of heavy producers goods was greatly expanded. This highly accelerated expansion extended beyond the means of basic industries to supply needed materials. Uneconomic production of iron ore and synthetic motor fuels put additional strain on the taxed resources of the basic industries.

Dislocations in the economy, resulting in the disproportionate production in heavy industry and basic industries, necessitated a shift in policy at the end of the Five-Year Plan. Low worker morale resulting in low productivity drew attention to the needs of the neglected consumer industries. The crisis was recognized in revised investment and labor allocations in the New Course planning program. Planning was still unrealistic however; with low investment funds available, increases were expected in all industries though at a lower rate of acceleration than formerly. In the past year, expected increases in productivity have not materialized despite improvements in the standard of living of workers and the pressure put on the machine industry to supply labor saving equipment. The prospects remain dim for future expansion.

Czechoslovak industry in the new planning period to begin in 1956 will be even more closely geared to the needs of the Soviet bloc. The course of planning will largely depend on the international political situation at that time. However, certain conditions created by the first two planning periods will have to be taken into consideration to a greater extent than formerly: the problems of supplying fuel and ores to industry at less expense and stress to the entire economy, and of ensuring improvement in the standard of living of workers, will have to be met to avoid breakdown or political disruption.

⁸⁹Gospodarka Planowa, II, March 1954.

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NATURAL CONDITIONS AND GENERAL CHARACTER OF CZECHOSLOVAK AGRICULTURE¹

Climate, Soils, Topography

While physical conditions vary considerably from one part of the country to another, it can be generally said that both the climate and soil of Czechoslovakia are rather favorable for agricultural production.

The situation bordering the main paths of barometric depression in Europe tends to produce relatively unsettled weather, but the orographic configuration contributes much to the existence of a number of regions with climatic conditions highly favorable to agriculture. The conditions of temperature are fairly uniform and normal, the difference between the warmest and the coldest month being about 20° Centigrade. The length of the growing season and the amount of sunshine are sufficient for growing a wider variety of plants than in Poland, Germany, and some countries in northern Europe. The mean annual rainfall (about 650mm.), while not very high, is greater than in Poland, and two-thirds of it occurs in spring and summer months which are most crucial for vegetation.

Geological and soil conditions are far from being uniform. Almost all kinds of soil are represented, from deep fertile alluvia in the lowlands to gravelly and stony mountain soils, from impermeable loams requiring drainage (amelioration) to sterile sands hardly suitable for the cultivation of the fir tree, here and there containing some lime.


The topography affects both climate and soils. The deepest and most fertile soils are in lowlands and valleys; there also the climate is mildest. As one moves higher into hilly and mountainous regions the soils become lighter and more difficult to cultivate, the weather harsher. The eastern part of the country has a more continental climate than the western.

¹Based mainly on Vladimír Brdlík, "A Short Survey of Agriculture in Czechoslovakia," Fifth International Conference of Agricultural Economists, Canada (Edited by Institute of Agricultural Accountancy and Economics, Prague, 1938), and W. Horbaly, Agricultural Conditions in Czechoslovakia, 1950 (Chicago:Research Paper No. 18, 1951).

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

INDUSTRY

Source: H. Wanklyn, Czechoslovakia, London, G. Philip & Son, 1954.



The western part of the country (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) is more industrialized and more densely populated than the eastern part (Slovakia). The intensity of agriculture also decreases from the west to the east. Carpathian Ruthenia, lost after the last war to the Soviet Union, was relatively extensively farmed, but its excellent highland pastures were highly valued by the cattle breeders.

Land Utilization and the Regional Differentiation of Agriculture

In spite of the mountainous character of a large part of the country (twelve per cent is more than 750 m. above sea level, and over one-third is more than 500 m.), about 60 per cent of the total area is used for agricultural purposes (60.6 per cent for the prewar territories); nearly one-third is forested. A more detailed picture of land utilization in 1946 is presented below.

From a total area of 12,776,064 hectares there were




Figure 1. Utilization of Land in Czechoslovakia, 1946*

* Source: Statistical Digest of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1948 (Prague: State Statistical Office, 1948), p. 44

The area in wheat began to increase before the last war and now stands in first place, followed by rye, barley, potatoes, oats and sugar beets, in that order.² Of the commercial and industrial crops, the following have also been of considerable importance: hops (11,547 ha. in 1947), cultivated in the western part of the country; tobacco, raised in the eastern provinces; and flax, grown especially in the poor regions. Gardens and vineyard occupy about the same proportion of the total area in the western and eastern provinces, but there are relatively more gardens in Czech regions and more vineyards in Slovakia.

The present territory of Czechoslovakia could be divided into the following five agricultural regions:

(1) The Elbe Plain-Moravian Basin agricultural region, while not a continuous area, represents the most intensive and commercialized agriculture in the country. In the fertile soils of these lowlands sugar beets, wheat and barley are grown. More machinery is used there than in other regions, and the density of livestock, particularly of cattle and hogs, is highest. In the northwestern part of the Elbe Plain hop production has been of considerable importance.³

(2) The Danube and Tisa Plains agricultural region of Slovakia is in some respects similar to the plains of the Czech area. It has rich alluvial soils and a favorable warm climate, but the agricultural technique and yields are below those in the Elbe Plain-Moravian Basin region. Corn, tobacco, wheat and sugar beets are the main crops. The Tisa Plain has much pasture land supporting white long-horned cattle which are well adapted to those surroundings, but give large quantities of neither milk nor meat.

(3) The Hill Country agricultural region covers a large area in the Czech lands of Bohemia (southwest, south and southeast of Prague)

²For detailed acreages see the last section of this chapter.

³In the Zatec district it covers 78 per cent of all agricultural areas, but in the country as a whole the area in hops has dropped from 0.2 per cent before the last war to about 0.015 per cent of all cultivated area in 1950 (op. cit., p. 20).

and Moravia-Silesia (western part). Except for a few small areas, such as the Plzeň Basin in western Bohemia and the České Budějovice in southern Bohemia which are quite rich, it is a poor agricultural region with potatoes and rye as the leading crops. Cattle production is high, and the average density per unit of agricultural land is only slightly less than in the Elbe Plain area.

(4) The Western and Eastern Mountain regions are similar both in generally poor physical conditions and in their basic agricultural occupancy. Differences exist mainly in the conduct of agricultural activities. The climate is quite humid, but rather harsh with very short summers. Micro-areas with more fertile soils and protection from cold wind can be found, particularly in the Eastern region. In those protected valleys rye, oats, and potatoes are cultivated and some fruit trees are grown, but the raising of livestock based on pastures is the single most important activity in the economy. Almost all crop production is of a subsistence type and only livestock products are sold off the farm. The Eastern region has more extensive grazing areas and Alpine herding is quite common, while it is almost absent in the Western Mountain regions. At one time sheep raising was quite prevalent in the eastern Moravian part of this region, but it has almost vanished; efforts are presently being made to revive it again.

Other Features of Czechoslovak Agriculture

Crop yields have of course been highest in the lowlands and lowest in the mountainous regions, but they have been also generally higher in the western than the eastern part of the country due to improved crop rotation, greater use of farm machinery and fertilizers in the Czech lands. Yields in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia before the war corresponded closely to those of western and central Europe; yields in Slovakia were about one-fourth lower. Communist policy was not very favorable to agriculture, and the crop yields in Czechoslovakia have only reached approximately

prewar level, when in most western European countries they have risen by 10 to 20 per cent.⁴

Although war damages were relatively slight in Czechoslovakia, the number of livestock dropped during the last years of the war and again during the very dry year of 1947. Only hogs and possibly sheep are now more numerous than in the 1930's

The cow has been a multi-functional animal in the economy of small Czechoslovak agricultural enterprises. The cow is capable of doing considerable amounts of work, which, however, has an effect on its other functions. The work causes a drop in milk yield from 10 to 30 per cent of what a cow would give if left in peace. Farmers have known this, but could not afford to keep horses; it takes one to one and a half ha. of land to feed a horse, while the land required for feeding two horses can feed three cows, which can give both the draft power required and also perform other functions.

With agricultural conditions as they have been up to the present time, the majority of farms up to 25 acres (10 ha.) in size do all or the greater part of their farm work with cows. Of the total number of milk cows on all farms, 50 per cent are used as draft animals. On ⁵ farms up to 25 acres, 75 per cent of all draft work is done by cows.

The number of cattle fluctuated between 4.1 and 4.7 million in the interwar period. On January 1, 1947, there were not quite 4 million head of cattle as compared to 4.4 million on the same territory in 1937. The drop that took place in 1947 was not made good by 1953, when the number of cattle was about 3.5 million.

With hand milking a generally adopted practice, shortage of labor was one of the factors delaying an increase in the number of cows.

4

European Agriculture (Geneva:U.N.-F.A.O. 1954), Table 4, p. 9. According to Gospodarka Planowa (Warsaw), Aug. 1954, yields of wheat have risen by 18.7 per cent, of barley by 17.1 per cent, and rye by 13.1 per cent over the average of 1934-38, but yields of potatoes, sugar beets, flax and hops were lower so that the overall agricultural production of 1953 was at about the prewar level.

5

Horbaly, op. cit., p. 46.

While increasing hog production compensates to some extent for the decline in number of cattle with respect to meat supply, mechanical and horse draft power have probably more than offset the decrease in cow draft power. The percentage of cows used for work tends to decrease. The number of horses is about the same as it was on the larger prewar territory and the number of tractors per 1,000 hectares of agricultural area rose from one in the late 1930s to five in 1952-53. The number of draft animals per 1,000 hectares has declined slightly from 230 in 1938 to 210 in 1952-53.⁶

A new feature of Czechoslovak agriculture are the State Machinery Centers, which own a major portion of the country's tractors and heavier farm machines, such as combines, threshers, or mowers. The State Machinery Centers work primarily for collective farms and only secondarily for individual farmers.

In 1953 about 44 per cent of all field work on collective farms was done by the State Machinery Centers, which also harvested half of all grain in the country.⁷ As in other Communist countries, the activities of the Machinery Centers are not limited to technical functions. They include aid and control in economic planning and also political influence. A formal occasion for giving economic advice is provided by working out a detailed program with the United Agricultural Cooperative as to the time, spacing, and type of services it can render. The station is organized into teams of four to six tractor drivers who work most of the time together on a single job, are acquainted with the details of the plan and see it through the various stages. Charges for various services are calculated in farm products, and they vary slightly according to the actual amounts harvested.

6

European Agriculture, op. cit., Table 11, p. 22

7

Gospodarka Planowa, (Warsaw), Aug. 1954.

Land Reforms and the Sovietization of Czechoslovak Agriculture

Interwar Period

The land tenure system of the First Czechoslovak Republic was based on private ownership, the farms generally being freeholds of their operators. The cases of leasehold of whole establishments represented only about one per cent,⁸ and they were mostly larger establishments. What happened more frequently was that owners of small farms took a few additional acres of land on lease from a larger, neighboring estate.

In Czechoslovakia there were over 21,000 different enterprises worked by the state, districts, communities and other legal persons. Their role in agricultural production was, however, small. The state administered nearly one million hectares of forests, but much less agricultural land.

There were also very few agricultural producer cooperatives. The first ones (about thirty-six) were established in 1922-23 by Social Democrats who insisted that large estates should remain undivided and be managed collectively or cooperatively.⁹ The members of these first cooperatives, mostly former employees of the large estates were assured excellent farm holdings from these estates at very advantageous prices.

Thereupon various lease-holding and farming cooperatives began to appear like mushrooms after a rain for the purpose of obtaining land reform act and for its joint cultivation. In 1925 there were 188 cooperatives of this type with 22,809 members, and by 1926 there were 428. They began to disappear as rapidly as they had sprung up, however. There was delay in obtaining land and the experience of the groups who had already begun cultivating cooperative farms was not very encouraging. By 1928,¹⁰ there remained only 61 such cooperatives with 6,598 members.

8

Brdlík, op. cit.

9

Ladislav Feierabend, Agricultural Cooperatives in Czechoslovakia.
(New York:Mid-European Studies Center, 1952).

10

Ibid., p. 46.

Those remaining did not show very good results either, and most of them were gradually liquidated in the 1930's.

These were genuine producer cooperatives; they failed because their members were not collective minded. The Czechoslovak peasant, like most peasants, is an outspoken individualist in matters of agricultural production, and his attitude cannot be easily changed by participation in a cooperative. As Feierabend says of the peasant,

To him cooperation was neither an economic system nor an ideology, but a means to achieve his rightful share of the fruits of his labor. He himself thought cooperatives to be a special form of capitalistic enterprise, and was bitterly opposed to those members, particularly of consumer cooperatives, who considered cooperation an instrument for the destruction of capitalism and the building of socialism.¹¹

The Land Reform legislation of 1919-20 recognized this attitude of Czechoslovak peasants and aimed merely at a more equitable distribution of a land among individually operated farms. This redistribution was felt necessary because two-thirds of all agricultural holdings were below five hectares in size, while a number of large estates extended over more than a thousand hectares each. Moreover, many of these large estates belonged to German or Hungarian aristocrats.

The First Land Reform, as the laws of 1919-20 are now referred to, was of a relatively mild character. It provided that land in excess of 250 hectares, or more than 150 hectares of agricultural land of any holding, could be purchased by the government, partitioned and sold or rented to farm workers, small farmers, artisans, and also, though in rather exceptional cases, to cooperatives, communities and other public bodies.

Property held by public bodies was not subject to confiscation. Under certain conditions persons were allowed to hold up to 1,250 acres (500 hectares). In addition many properties were exempted from confiscation out of various considerations held to be for the public benefit.¹²

¹¹Ibid., p. 47.

¹²Stanley Mayer, "The Farmer and His Land in Communist Czechoslovakia," Foreign Agriculture (Washington, D. C.), July 1950, p. 56

About 1.8 million hectares of land--including nearly one million hectares of agricultural land (11 per cent of the total)--were expropriated and distributed to more than 600,000 applicants.¹³ Easy credit was provided for them by the state and Cooperative Credit organizations. The land was allocated so that the recipient would have enough to support a family, but not more than a family could work without hired labor. He could not sell this land again for at least ten years.¹⁴

The First Land Reform did not change the pattern of land tenure very substantially:

Table 1
FIRST LAND REFORM BY SIZE GROUPS OF THE FARM ESTABLISHMENTS*

Size Group of Farm	Before Land Reform	After Land Reform	Change in % of Each Group
Up to 2 ha.	7.8%	7.6%	-2.1%
2 - 5 ha.	14.3	18.8	+ 31.0
5 - 20 ha.	44.1	46.5	+ 5.5
20 - 100 ha.	17.8	17.1	- 4.0
over 100 ha.	16.0	10.0	- 37.4

*Source: Brdik, op.cit., p. 19.

The main shift was from the large farms of several hundred hectares to the small farms with less than ten hectares of agricultural land. While in the course of the land reforms many farms of less than five hectares were enlarged and therefore moved to a larger size category, the process of splitting the peasant farms into smaller units as a result of settling the rights of different members of the family to the inherited property acted in an opposite direction, so that the number of the smallest holdings tended to increase rather than decrease. In 1930, out of a total of 1.6 million establishments, about 70 per cent were smaller than five hectares in

13

E. P. Young, Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy, (London: St. Botolph, 1946), p. 25.

14

Ibid.

size. While most of these smallest units were just back-yard gardens of industrial workers or other part-time agricultural undertakings, it cannot be denied that the small size of the majority of farms caused some hidden underemployment among peasants, particularly in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, and that, combined with the fragmentation of fields, it presented a hindrance to efficient, more mechanized agricultural production.

The disadvantages of the fragmentation of farms, of their being composed of many separate strips frequently situated quite a distance apart, was recognized in Czechoslovakia, and voluntary unification of fields and farms, encouraged by the government, has taken place in hundreds of villages, particularly in Moravia-Silesia and in Slovakia. But the topography of the country, combined with the custom of dividing the farm in a way which would give to each of the heirs a certain proportion of good and bad land, of the easily accessible and the more distant high in the hill fields, made any progress in the unification process very difficult. In the late thirties there were reported to be as many as 33,000,000 field plots, that is, about twenty per farm.

There still remained about 5,000 farms of over 100 hectares of agricultural land each, but their size has shrunk substantially, the average being about 170 hectares of agricultural land.

Reforms of the 1945-1948 Period. ¹⁵

No material change in the land tenure system took place in Czechoslovakia under German occupation.

15

This and the following section on collectivization of Czechoslovak agriculture are primarily based on: Mayer, *op. cit.*; F. Meissner, "The Socialization Process in Czechoslovak Agriculture," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Feb. 1953; K. Hulička, "Land Reform and Politics in Czechoslovakia: 1945-52," *Land Economics*, Aug. 1953; and a paper on collectivization in Czechoslovakia and Poland presented by E. Koenig (U. S. Department of Agriculture) to the Conference on Collectivization in Eastern Europe held at the University of Kentucky in April 1955.

After the liberation of 1945 which left Carpathian Ruthenia outside the boundaries of the restored republic, Czechoslovakia enjoyed nearly three years of a democratic, or almost democratic, system of government. The Communists assured for themselves the Secretariat of Agriculture and held several other important posts, but they had to share control with three other political parties. This explains why changing the agrarian structure of the country was delayed and carried out in stages.

The first stage should be called a land transfer rather than land reform. In July 1945 a presidential decree was issued whereby "Agricultural property belonging to persons of German and Hungarian nationality and citizenship, to persons who have shown their hostility. . . is confiscated without indemnity." There were about three-quarters of a million Germans engaged in agriculture, and their land, located mainly in the western, so-called border districts, amounted to 1.5 million hectares of farm land. Together with the land belonging to Hungarians (mainly in Slovakia) and persons accused of being collaborators, about 1.8 million hectares of farm land--about 23 per cent of the total--was subject to expropriation.¹⁶ In six months over two-thirds of this land was allotted to Czech and Slovak nationals: about 60 per cent of them were former farm laborers, and 40 per cent were small land holders. The resettlement problem in Czechoslovakia was of no less relative importance than in Poland, because, while the area involved was smaller, hidden unemployment in the countryside was also of a much smaller dimension and the number of prospective new settlers was not great. Therefore, the Communists had no strong argument for immediate steps against Czech and Slovak large landowners. There was plenty of land to be distributed, and that was given away at a low price--equal to the value of one crop, or at most two average harvests.

16

Mayer, *op. cit.* His figure is a total of 4,400,000 acres of farm land and an additional area of 3,200,000 acres of forest land taken over by the Czechoslovak government on similar grounds.

Revision of the prewar First Land Reform Act came in July 1947, and was still of rather moderate character. It was primarily intended to do away with numerous exemptions from confiscation allowed on holdings of more than 150 hectares of agricultural land. But there was also a provision that farms which had been formed from previously confiscated land were limited to fifty hectares; that absentee landowners would not be tolerated; and finally that

in case of urgent local need of land or in the public interest. . . anything in excess of 50 hectares can be taken over. . . Indemnity to the owner was to be the same as in the First Land Reform Act of 1919-20---based on average prices prevailing in 1913-1915.¹⁷

This would amount to only a small fraction of the current value of the land. About 0.6 million hectares of agricultural land were expropriated under the 1947 act. Most of this land was given to small and medium farmers (five to fifteen per family), but some land was given to create small holdings, that is, for home sites and gardens.¹⁸

But, as in 1945, some of the confiscated land again went to public corporations, some to public purposes or was just converted into state farms.¹⁹ The net result of these transfers and parcelling of land was that the proportion of large and small (below five ha.) farms decreased while the proportion of farms of five to twenty hectares increased. It is interesting to note that, to prevent fragmentation of agricultural land into still smaller fields and farm units, a special Law on the Indivisibility of

17

Ibid., p. 157.

18

A possible 150,000 farm families received land and an additional 35,000 received small plots in the course of land distribution in 1945. Ibid., p. 158.

19

According to Hulicka, op. cit., p. 234, 180,942 ha. of agricultural land in Bohemia and Moravia and 42,502 ha. in Slovakia were withheld from private ownership, as well as 1.2 million ha. of forests.

Agricultural Land was put into effect in July, 1947. The Law set a minimum area for any individual holding or single field resulting from dividing a farm in the process of inheritance.²⁰

The third stage was the New Land Reform enacted in March 1948, a month after the Communists took complete control of the government. The law incorporated the following significant changes:

1. Fifty hectares is the maximum amount of land (including woodland) that may be owned by a farmer's family.
2. Nobody is allowed to own agricultural land that he does not work himself (with some specified exceptions).
3. Inventory, including livestock, is²¹ to be expropriated in the same proportion that land is.

It was estimated that there were only about 670 people who had more than 50 ha. in March 1947, and that the total excess of land over this limit was less than 100,000 hectares. But the significance of this land reform lay in its intention of undermining the existing legal basis of land ownership, to hit the larger farmers strongly opposed to the regime and to foster class warfare in the rural population. It should be noted that the provision that only those working the land may own it, combined with increasing control of agricultural production (to be discussed later in this chapter) gave the state the very important power of deciding whether the farm owner is working his farm adequately or properly. The provision that inventory be expropriated in the same proportion as the land facilitated effective crippling of operations on farms where expropriation had taken place, since there is no obvious and simple direct ratio between the acreage of a farm and the amount of livestock and machinery. The Communist government did not hesitate to make full use of the provisions of the new legislature. According to a statement of Mr. Đuriš, the minister of Agriculture, in April, 1949, for Czech lands alone the number of agricultural enterprises over twenty hectares decreased by 18,086, i. e.,

²⁰Mayer, *op. cit.* The minimum size of a parcel varied from 5 ha. of the best land to 15 ha. of pasture. The minimum size of a single field was set at .5 ha.

²¹Ibid.

by 33.4 per cent. Of the newly expropriated land 127 hectares was still distributed among individual owners, and the state and publicly-owned farms received more than 100,000.²² Thus, the liquidation of the large estates was completed, the position of the remaining somewhat larger (20-50 ha.) farmers weakened and undermined, and the ground was ready for the next stage--collectivization of agriculture.

Collectivization.

In 1947 it was reported that only about 20 percent of the total number of inhabitants in Czech provinces and about 48 percent in Slovakia were engaged in agriculture.²³ There was no rural population pressure on the land, as in most countries of southeastern Europe, and, on the contrary, some shortage of labor was already felt in agriculture. The lowering of the maximum size of the farm to fifty hectares or less had no economic or social justification, but served the Communist aims well:

A class of persons most strongly opposed to the regime was economically ruined; the support (however temporary) of the numerous small farmers and farm workers was enlisted; the many persons receiving land from the Government found themselves with very insecure title to the land and, of necessity, responsive to the state's agricultural directives; and the operations per farm had by and large been reduced to such a small scale that a hue and cry could be raised about the inefficiency of small farms.²⁴

The way to consolidation of land (or collectivization) through its division was advocated by Lenin and followed by all Communist countries. But while in most of them there was a gap, a period or interlude between the two processes, in Czechoslovakia one followed immediately upon the other. The distribution of small pieces of confiscated land was hardly completed when the Minister of Agriculture declared in November 1948:

²²Editorial team of *Rudé Právo*, "Czechoslovakia on the Road to Socialism" (Prague: Orbis, 1949), pp. 137-38.

²³J. Krblich, *Survey of Czechoslovak Agriculture* (Prague: Institute for International Collaboration in Agriculture and Forestry, 1947), p. 3.

²⁴Mayer, op. cit., p. 158.

It is obvious that the number of 1,400,000 small farms thus split up is a very great obstacle to reliable agricultural planning and food supply. Here even the highest assistance and support to small and medium farmers cannot remedy the shortcomings of small-scale farming. . . . under large-scale production, prices could also be lowered since costs of production would be cut.²⁵

The Minister could add that the yields on large private farms (now liquidated) used to be much higher than on small peasant plots, but to admit this would be rather embarrassing. Large individual farms were condemned and considered completely out of the question, so that the Prime Minister could make the otherwise false statement: "Only in collectivized farming can machinery be properly utilized."²⁶ The necessity of reducing the number of workers employed in agriculture in order to secure workers for expanding industry soon became the most important economic reason for collectivization. At all times the ideological motives of Communism (aversion to private ownership of means of production), the practical political consideration of increasing political and economic control, and, finally, the influence of the powerful patron--Soviet Russia-- has played a great, if not a decisive, role in shaping the agricultural policy of Czechoslovak governments in recent years.

As in other countries which came under Russian domination after World War II, collectivization in Czechoslovakia has proceeded gradually, step by step. Means to this end have not been government orders immediately enforceable by the executive organs of the state, but primarily propaganda, inducements and economic pressure. The pressure was so strong that it frequently took the form of coercion, which has even been admitted by official government spokesmen.²⁷

The first steps toward collectivization were made rather cleverly under the guise of the traditional type of cooperative movement. The

²⁵ Ibid., .

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Cf. Široký, Speech before the National Assembly, Sept. 15, 1953. Rudé Právo, Sept. 16, 1953.

Communists managed to infiltrate several cooperatives and their central organizations during 1945-46, and to make them largely subject to government control.

The instrument of collectivization of farms was the law on Unified Agricultural Cooperatives--J. Z. D. (Jednotné zemědělské družstvo) of February 1949,²⁸ which affected all non-financial cooperatives except consumers' groups or those which served a large number of communities.

From the act itself it is not at all clear that its aim is to inaugurate a collective system in agriculture. Article One reads:

In order to ensure the salutary development of agricultural cooperatives and eradicate the fragmentation of operations inherited from the past, unified cooperatives shall be founded on a voluntary basis, which shall unite existing associations and produce significant benefits for the class of working farmers.

Article Two mentioned such things as commassation of the soil (by consolidating the scattered strips of individual farms), mechanization of agricultural labor, participation in planning production and fulfilling of delivery quotas, participation in actual purchases of produce, its care and storage, etc.²⁹

The process of amalgamation was rather simple. A preparatory committee of five to ten members was formed in the village. It listed the cooperatives suitable for transformation into a collective and enlisted those villages willing to join. If the proposals of this preparatory committee were approved by the so-called Central Cooperative Council (the government agency supervising all cooperatives and collectives) the former cooperatives ceased to exist and became part of the new organization. The members of the previous cooperatives automatically became members of the new organization, unless they resigned within two weeks. The new collective came into possession of all financial assets and prop-

²⁸Law of Feb. 23, 1949, No. 69 in the Collection of Laws and Regulations of Czechoslovakia.

²⁹Feierabend, op. cit.

erty of the old cooperatives, and thus was well provided with funds at the outset of its operations. The general assembly of each unified cooperative had to accept a model constitution,³⁰ which contained directions for initiating and developing collective farming. The process started with the relatively harmless-appearing type of cooperative which envisaged only the carrying out of some farm operations collectively and having some form of communal laundry, chick hatchery, calf station or similar enterprise. The boundaries of particular plots remained intact and only in some cooperatives of this type would the farmers agree to sow some of the fields to the same crop simultaneously in order to facilitate more efficient team operations.³¹ Usually only after these forms of cooperation were firmly set did the village proceed to more advanced forms of collective farming, the highest of which is very similar to the Soviet kolkhoz.

The prior existence of cooperatives was not indispensable for founding a collective. A preparatory committee could be easily organized in any village and this was sufficient to commence the process. If pooling of the organizers' resources proved insufficient to establish a collective farm, land might be contributed by the state from its own holdings, or through the confiscation of land of some larger farmers.

Grants of land were, for instance, frequently made to the so-called "metal agriculturalists" (kovorolníci). These are industrial workers who are employed in cities but live in villages; even those who do not own their own agricultural land are usually fairly well acquainted with farming. While deeply rooted in the village community, their political attitudes have tended to be more similar to city workers, and Communist influence among them has been relatively strong. These "metal agriculturalists," and also some landless laborers and small peasants who had little to con-

³⁰ It is then assigned to the proper division of the Central Cooperative Council and comes under the detailed control and direction of appropriate officers nominated by the Minister of Agriculture. Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

tribute to the common pool but could expect to gain from it, were most ready among the rural population to establish collective farming.

Once a collective is founded, its influence goes far beyond the field of its own activities. It becomes the sole spokesman in agricultural matters for the entire community where it is located, representing all farmers in transactions with the government.³²

The delegation of Russian experts to Czechoslovakia by the Kremlin, under K. G. Golovaty, and the study trips undertaken by Czechoslovak farmers and agricultural officials to the U. S. S. R., were among the propaganda measures taken to foster collectivization.³³ But the government's preferential treatment of collectives, once the nucleus of a collective has been established, in contrast to the treatment given private farmers, has been the most important level for extending collective farming. The advantages granted to collectives consist of lower taxes,³⁴ preferential allocation of means of production and technical services and, perhaps most important, lower compulsory delivery quotas.

The discriminatory distribution of technical services may be seen from the following example: during operations in the spring, 1952, State Tractor Stations devoted 71 per cent of their work to collectives, 13 per cent to State Farms and only 16 per cent to private farms,³⁵ which at that

³²Horbaly, op. cit.

³³"Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy--The Effort in Agriculture," The World Today, IX, April 1953, p. 173.

³⁴According to the Agricultural Tax Act of 1952 (Sbírka zákonů Republiky Československé, No. 37 12/22 1952), for collectives of the higher types ". . . the tax shall be fixed at 2% of the taxable base (the lowest rate). In case of regular agricultural cooperatives which have adopted . . . model status . . . a rebate of 50% of the amount assessed shall be granted for a period of two years." (Article 16 [3]). As regards richer peasants who pay high taxes already, "District national committees may at their own discretion or on the proposal of the local national committee increase the tax assessed in respect of local affluent persons by 30 per cent." (Article 10 [3]).

³⁵Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin (Prague), 1952, No. 253.

time still occupied about 60 per cent of the agricultural land. It was particularly hard on the larger farmers, deprived of heavy machinery in the course of the execution of the 1948 land reform, who could not buy new machinery or hire adequate farm labor. Under these conditions it was quite impossible for many farmers to deliver the progressively rising compulsory quotas of different farm products (see Table 2), and those who did not fulfill their delivery obligations were severely punished by imprisonment and confiscation of all their property.³⁶

Table 2
INDEX NUMBERS SHOWING DIFFERENTIATION
IN COMPULSORY DELIVERY QUOTAS
PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND*

	Collectives (Types III & IV) Average Size 266 ha.	Private Farms					
		Size Group					
		2 ha.	4 ha.	6 ha.	8 ha.	12 ha.	20 ha.
Grain	100	32	100	115	115	167	188
Potatoes	100	24	100	134	134	158	186
Meat	100	68	105	110	110	120	125
Milk	100	†	111	117	117	128	133
Eggs	100	133	133	133	133	133	133

* Source: European Agriculture (Geneva: U.N. -F. A. O. 1954).

† 400 liters per cow.

Under such circumstances it is understandable that many a peasant has sought the solution of his problems by joining a collective, though as an individualist with a sentimental attachment to his land he feels an aversion to any form of collective agriculture.

³⁶ Tension within the Soviet Captive Countries: Czechoslovakia (Congressional Report, 83rd Congress [Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954]). Document No. 70, Part 4.

The original plan of the Communist Party was to have all peasants, including the "village rich" (equivalent to the Russian kulak) within the unified cooperatives, but later, probably afraid of the anti-Communist influence of those usually better-than-average farmers, the plan was changed. Since 1951 the "village rich" have been called the chief enemies of the small farmers by the Communists. They were not to be admitted to the cooperatives, and those who joined previously have been closely watched, and even expelled. The intention of the Communist Party apparently is to liquidate this group of larger, or ex-larger, farmers completely, to force them to quit farming and move to non-agricultural employment as laborers. (They are not allowed to sell their land.)

There were 5,115 united cooperatives of all types at the end of 1950, and 8,558 at the end of 1952 when the cooperatives with plowed field boundaries extended over 2,598,073 hectares of agricultural land and 1,859,997 hectares of arable land.³⁷ This was slightly more than one-third of both all agricultural and arable land, and a unified cooperative in six out of ten villages in the country. In 1953 collectivization was pushed still farther and collective farms with plowed field boundaries of individual units covered 40 percent of agricultural and 44 percent of arable land. Together with state and other public farms the socialist sector of agriculture covered more than half of all land used for agricultural purposes.

In 1954, partly because of the poor economic results of Czechoslovak agriculture and partly because of a general easing and some change in emphasis in economic policies all over Soviet-dominated eastern Europe, the discriminatory practices and pressure for collectivization relaxed somewhat, and there was even some decline in the area of collective farming.

This does not mean that the idea of collectivization has been abandoned, but rather that many existing producer cooperatives are weak and must be strengthened before further expansion can be undertaken. Progress

³⁷"Sovietization of the Economy, . . .," op. cit., pp. 176-77.

has also become more difficult as it grows increasingly costly to give preferential treatment to the type of farming which extends over nearly one-half of the total agricultural area.

Individual, Collective and State Farms

Individual Farms

Individual farms are not only more numerous than other farms, but they still occupy more than half the agricultural land (about 55 per cent of Czechoslovakia).

There are no private estates in Czechoslovakia today; the campaign against the "village rich" pushed the size of farms well below fifty hectares (the official maximum), and only a few farmers hire extra labor, and that seasonal. But while in Poland and some other Communist countries the large landowners were deprived of all their property and ordered to leave their ancestral homes, in Czechoslovakia many of the landowners, while deprived of a large part of their property and thus socially and economically degraded, could stay on the part that was left to their disposal; by tilling the land themselves they could continue to farm, but on a much smaller scale.

The postwar land reforms somewhat reduced the proportions of the very small farms and created some new compact units, but more could be done to improve the agrarian structure if the reformers really wanted to base the land tenure system on sound individual family-sized units. Most farmers have land divided into a dozen or two small fields scattered all around the village, or in more than one village. Such small fields are not conducive to the use of machinery, if available; some land is wasted serving as dividing strips between fields, and much of the farmer's time is wasted traveling from one field to another.

Most farms are largely self-supporting, that is, they produce most of the food consumed by the farmer's family plus some surplus for the market. Except for some garden plots, vineyards and orchards, practically all farms are mixed crop-livestock enterprises. Raising livestock is the best way to intensify and expand the small-scale agricultural enterprise. It provides farmyard manure and the necessary draft power. Cows

and some poultry can be found on almost every farm, and pigs on most of them. They at least partly replace cattle in the mountainous regions and goats on the smallest plots, particularly in the industrial districts.

The use of cows as draft power may be economically justified in the smallest units, but not all farm operations can be so well performed by cows, or even by horses, and loss of time for traveling and the actual work is much greater.

Farming techniques may be considered as largely advanced, particularly in the Czech lands. After the loss of the least developed Carpathian Ruthenia and with the industrialization of Slovakia, economic conditions and the level of farming tended to level out between east and west. The pronounced regional differentiation in physical conditions brought about some degree of specialization, and the commercialization of agriculture is somewhat higher than in neighboring countries.

In spite of some shortcomings, private farming shows great vitality, the best evidence for which is the fact that when the pressure for collectivization relaxed in 1954 the area of private farms expanded. The individual farmer is no longer free as to what to produce and what to do with his products, to a large extent he has to comply with national economic planning.

Collective Farms³⁸

There are four types of unified agricultural cooperatives in Czechoslovakia, which differ among themselves with respect to the extent of or severity of socialization.

Type I is the initial form from which other types of Unified Agricultural Cooperatives developed. It has no special by-laws and it resembles cooperative organization in the non-Communist world. Both land and livestock remain private, and some heavier machinery or special installations are usually the only common property. The collective character of this type consists merely of the common execution of certain farm operations, such as sowing, harvesting, or threshing. Records are kept of labor services, implements and draft power furnished by each member, and at the

³⁸Based on Feierabend, op. cit., pp. 64-73.

end of the year the accounts are settled among the members. Crops harvested from their fields belong to them individually.

With Type II most of the field boundaries are abolished to facilitate more efficient land cultivation, but records of individual plots are kept and remain individual property. All farm work is done collectively. An average yield per hectare is computed, and the crop is prorated to the participants according to their acreage contribution. A member's share may be increased or decreased depending upon whether his contribution of labor, draft power, and equipment was more or less than proportionate to the output of land. The whole livestock husbandry remains individual.

Cooperatives of Type III have a collective management. Crops belong to the cooperative, not to its members, while fields still belong to the peasants in the title registers. However, the owners give up all rights to disposal or management of their plots. Most livestock and inventory becomes the property of the cooperative; a member may retain one cow and calf, hogs, sheep, goats and poultry. He also retains a garden plot averaging half a hectare. Sometimes the barn and farm buildings are also leased to the cooperative. The members are paid on the basis of labor units; those who contribute land get a separate compensation.

In the cooperative of Type IV no such percentage is paid for use of land, and the entire profits from operations are divided according to labor units. This is the real Soviet kolkhoz, in which private property has become a fiction.

Plans, Planning, Results

Overall plans for agricultural production were already set for the years 1947 and 1948 as a part of the so-called Two-Year Plan. The general task was to reach the general prewar production level by the end of 1948. The disastrous drought of 1947 caused a sharp decrease in agricultural production. The targets for 1948 were cut down severely, but even these lower targets were attained in bread cereals and oats only.³⁹

³⁹Government Memorandum on the Five-Year Plan, the Czechoslovak Economic Five-Year Plan (Prague: Czechoslovak Ministry of Information and Culture, 1949), p. 100.

Goals of the Five-Year Plan

After the taking over of power by the Communists, the scope and rigidity of economic planning increased. The Five-Year Plan envisaged not only a general increase but also structural changes in agricultural production.

The total value of agricultural production was to rise by 1953 thirty-seven per cent above the abnormally low 1948 level, i. e., 16 per cent above the 1948 target of the Two-Year Plan. The value of plant production was to be raised by only 11 per cent, that is, not above the prewar level, while the value of animal production was to rise by 86 per cent, and thus to exceed the 1937 level by a wide margin.⁴⁰ These figures plainly indicate the intended change in the structure of agricultural production. In 1948 plant production amounted to 65 per cent and animal production to 35 per cent of the total output; at the end of the five-year period this proportion would be altered to 52 per cent and 48 per cent respectively.⁴¹ The special emphasis laid on livestock breeding is expressed in the sowing plan (Table 3) by an increase of the fodder crops area at the expense of cereals. A more intensive high-grade animal economy was to be based not only on an increased forage crops area, but also on intensified higher quality cultivation. Intensified animal production would in turn, it was hoped,⁴² help to increase yields, by furnishing increased amounts of farmyard manure.

The government memorandum promised an adequate supply of synthetic fertilizers.

In 1953 a total of 45,400 tons of nitrate fertilizers, i. e., almost 40 per cent more than in 1948, and 68,000 tons of phosphate fertilizers, i. e., 40 per cent above the 1948 level will be used. Potassic fertilizer consumption will amount

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 102.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., p. 103.

Table 3
 PLANNED AREAS AND YIELDS PER HECTARE
 FOR INDIVIDUAL YIELDS, 1948, 1953*

	Planned area 1000 hectares		± (per cent)	Yields (1000 kg./ha.)	
	1948 ⁷	1953		1948	1953
Wheat	819	795	-2	17.6	19.6
Rye and mixed grain	693	560	-20	16.8	17.8
Barley	616	685	+11	17.6	18.5
Oats	588	615	+5	17.3	18.5
Maize	123	125	+2	22.5	24.0
Legumes	46	52	+14	12.2	12.5
Potatoes	604	640	+6	124.4	152.4
Sugar beet	186	190	+2	253.6	291.6
Oil crops	80	77	-4	6.0	8.9
Oats and vetch	66	68	+3	12.3	17.5
Fodder crops	3,500	3,514	+6		
Tobacco	7	7	--		
Hops	8.9	9	+1	15.0	17.0

* Source: Government Memorandum on the Five-Year Plan, op. cit.,
 pp. 107-108.

⁷ Reduced plans

to 43,000 tons or about 30 per cent less than in 1948, while the consumption of lime will remain constant at 150,000 tons annually. By means of the inclusion of planned quantities of nutrients in artificial fertilizers the mutual ratio of nitrogen, phosphoric acid and potash will be regulated at 1:1 5:0.8, which is in accordance with the results of agronomical research as best suited to local agricultural conditions.⁴³

⁴³ Ibid., pp 109, 110.

Mechanization of farming was the other main means for fulfillment of the Plan. To the existing 22,000 tractors in 1948, 30,000 new ones were to be added; after allowing 7,000 for replacement, the total in 1953 would reach 45,000. The number of accompanying plows was to rise at a similar rate to 48,000, and of binders, to 50,000. The number of milking machines was scheduled to rise from 9,000 in 1948 to 26,000 in

Table 4
NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK IN 1937, 1947, 1948, AND THE
PLAN FOR 1953*

	Jan. 1, 1937	Jan. 1, 1947 (1,000 heads)	July 1, 1948	Plan 1953	Increase in %, of 1948
Cattle, (total)	4,376	3,975.0	3,446	4,400	28
Dairy cows	2,340	2,021	1,881	2,350	25
Pigs	3,756 ^f	2,841 ^f	2,671	4,050	52
Poultry, (total)	41,748 ^f	26,135 ^f			
Chickens	32,098 ^f	19,395 ^f	13,000	18,500	42
Horses	662	653			
Mules and donkeys	1.3	2.4			
Sheep	486	491			
Goats	1,045.0	1,115.0			

* Source: For 1937 and 1947, Statistical Digest of the Czechoslovak Republic (Prague: State Statistical Office, 1948), pp. 48, 49. For 1948 and 1953 (plan), Government Memorandum on the Five-Year Plan, . . ., op. cit., p. 112.

^f July 1st.

1953.⁴⁴

In the field of livestock production the greatest increase was planned for hogs; the increase in the number of poultry would be the second greatest but it would leave the number of chickens still substantially below the prewar level. The number of horses was expected to decrease slightly. The government apparently had no definite policy with respect to sheep and goats at that time.

The increase in livestock production was also to be obtained by increased live weights of animals for slaughter⁴⁵ and higher output of other animal products. Production of beef was expected to rise from 241,200 to 365,900 tons, that of pork from 281,600 to 497,500 tons. Production of beef was expected to rise from 21.72 to 46.95 million hectolitres, and production of eggs from 920 to 1,967.5 million.⁴⁶

Planning technique

The agricultural part of the Five-Year Plan was prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Food in cooperation with the Central Planning Office. To be executed, the long-range targets were broken down into yearly assignments and a more detailed operative plan for each year was worked out at the beginning of the year. The yearly national plan, which had to conform to the general outline but also had to take into account past experience, was developed in a rather lengthy manner. The tentative yearly goals were broken down by the Ministry of Agriculture on a regional basis. The regional authorities subdivided them among particular districts, and there they were further subdivided among particular villages. The village authorities (a Unified Coopera-

⁴⁴Ibid. The memorandum stated that "All types of heavy and medium mechanical equipment will be supplied on a priority basis to machinery stations, state farms under national administration and to farmers equipment cooperatives, so as to ensure a greater degree of utilization than would be possible if they were used on an individual basis" (p. 115).

⁴⁵The average weight of cattle slaughtered would rise from 400 to 427.5 kg. each, and of hogs from 80 to 115 kg. each.

⁴⁶Milk production was 43 million hectolitres in 1937 and 25.7 millions in 1947. Egg production was 1,889 million in 1937 and 776 million in 1947. (Statistical Digest of the Czechoslovak Republic, op. cit.)

tive or local National Committee) were given the chance to examine the assignment with regard to the productive capacity of individual and collective farms. These opinions and suggestions were then collected by the district and regional authorities, who would add their own remarks and send all these materials, amounting to a counter-plan, to the central authorities. The aim of such forwarding down and up of the draft of the plan was to test its feasibility and to fill it with concrete details not available on a higher level. On the basis of the original draft and the counter-plan a final plan was established by the central authorities, mainly by the Central Planning Office, and after it became law through a parliament's resolution, it was once more broken down and assigned to smaller and smaller administrative units till it finally reached the particular villages. The disadvantage of such a lengthy procedure was that the final goals reached the villages when spring sowing had already begun, and the influence of planning on plan production was very limited.

Beginning with the National Economic Plan for 1953, the main responsibility for establishing the agricultural yearly plan rests on the Ministry of Agriculture and the regional National Committees. The Central Planning Office gives only a few general objectives, while the lower echelons of the administrative ladder furnish statistical data of past performance and any suggestions they care to make. This has simplified and speeded up the procedure, but plans became even more authoritatively determined. Production of state farms has been planned all along directly by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Simultaneously with the production plan, a financial plan is worked out by the government; prices are fixed for all commodities as well as for means of production.

Compulsory delivery quotas introduced by Germans have never been abolished. The Communists integrated them with a comprehensive contracting system which, under the guise of a beneficiary guaranteeing fixed prices for all main farm products, exercises far-reaching control over the managerial functions of farmers.

On the basis of the final plan, farmers must enter into contract agreement to carry out the production and delivery tasks assigned to them by the local authorities. The contracts are made between the Local National Committees (the village administrations) and the individual peasants within the time limit fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture. . . A second agency that is a party to the agreement is the Central Agency for Trading in Agricultural Products.⁴⁷

In villages with a Unified Agricultural Cooperative, the Cooperative participates in concluding the contracts representing the state alongside the Local National Committee. In the two lowest types of producer cooperative the members have to sign individual contracts, but their delivery quotas may be lowered by 10 to 20 per cent.⁴⁸ The contract is quite detailed; it covers not only land utilization and numbers of livestock, but it specified production and delivery quotas and even contains certain pledges with respect to land utilization, use of fertilizers and the services of machinery stations.

While the government pays for the compulsory delivery quotas, force is low and the system amounts to a tax on farm incomes. Land is divided into categories by reference to quality and location, and the quotas vary accordingly. In Czechoslovakia the delivery quotas are relatively high and rigid, but there is a limited possibility of distributing one crop for another or livestock for products or certain crops (but not the other way around). There is thus a limited scope for local planning and adjustment of contracts to the conditions and possibilities of individual farms. But this flexibility has created also a good deal of friction in the villages, which does not help to attain production goals.

The state stands ready to buy all available surplus over the compulsory quotas at a higher price. Since 1953, peasants, excepting the "village rich," are also allowed to sell surpluses directly to consumers, which is usually most profitable. But the compulsory quotas are set

⁴⁷E. Koenig, "Planning in Czechoslovak Agriculture", Agriculture, (Washington, D.C.:U. S. Department of Agriculture), June 1952.

⁴⁸European Agriculture, op. cit., p. 53.

high⁴⁹ and there is little left for sale on the free market after they have been fulfilled and the necessary allowances have been made for seeds, home consumption and feeding livestock.

Results

The Five-Year Plan has not been fulfilled in agriculture. The development of agriculture lagged behind other branches of the national economy, thus causing serious disproportions, slowing down the development of national economy and preventing the standard of living from rising to the planned level. The unsatisfactory results in agriculture were officially admitted,⁵⁰ and as half of agriculture was already socialized the government could hardly put the blame on small-scale individual farming. In fact, serious shortcomings in the work of agricultural administration were given by comrade Siroky (at the Tenth Party's Central Committee meeting) as the main cause for not utilizing all the production possibilities of Czechoslovak agriculture.⁵¹ That administration did not prevent a serious shrinkage of the area of arable land, nor did it ensure application of modern "agrotechnical methods" in plant cultivation, which particularly affected production of roots and other industrial plants. The equipment of machinery stations⁵² was below the Plan, and their work was not always satisfactory because of a shortage of well-trained personnel.⁵³

During the five years covered by the Plan, livestock production rose

⁴⁹For example, per hectare of average land there were required 5.3 quintals of wheat per hectare on co-operative farms Type III and IV, and on individual farms 4 hectares in size; on farms of 20 ha. the compulsory quota was 10 quintals per hectare (European Agriculture, op. cit., p. 54).

⁵⁰Speech of the Chairman of the Central Planning Office, J. Pucík, to the National Assembly (Rudé Právo, Jan. 23, 1954).

⁵¹Gospodarka Planowa, August 1954. An article based on the materials of the Tenth Meeting of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

⁵²The number of tractors of the state farms and at machinery centers was 25,000 in Spring 1953. (J. Dolansky in For a Lasting Peace. . ., July 3, 1953.)

⁵³Gospodarka Planowa, August 1954. An article based on the materials of the Tenth Meeting of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

faster than plant production but was far short of the Plan. The number of cattle rose 10 per cent, pigs, 33.5 per cent; the attained numbers, 3,790,000 and 3,566 respectively, were in the case of pigs short by 0.5 million, and in the case of cattle, short by 0.6 million. Most spectacular was the increase in the number of sheep--128 per cent.

In plant production the yields per hectare have risen 26.1 per cent in wheat; rye, 16.8 per cent; barley, 25.9 per cent; potatoes, 12.1 per cent.⁵⁴ This would mean that per hectare yields of grains reached the assigned goals and were slightly higher than before the war, but the area sown has shrunk so that the total production was short of the plan. Yields of potatoes, sugar beets, flax, hops and other crops were below both the Plan and the prewar level, so that agricultural production as a whole in 1953 stood just about on the prewar level.⁵⁵

This may still be a too optimistic estimate, for a food shortage, unknown before the war, became so serious that the government had to admit it. Antoin Zapotocký, the present President of the Republic, said

You know where the shoe pinches and what our wants are. It is to supply our people with food, meat, etc. It would be useless to conceal from ourselves that we haven't yet overcome all these shortcomings and that we haven't produced all that is required to satisfy fully all the needs of our citizens.⁵⁶

A few months later, J. Uher, Deputy Premier and Minister of Agriculture, made a more revealing confession when he declared:

To restrict the production of small and middle-size farmers and kulaks in the interest of further collectivization is a mistake. Such measures will actually reduce the food supplies of the people.⁵⁷

This statement touched the real causes of the unsatisfactory results in agriculture, and signalled the beginning of the new course in economic policy all over the part of eastern Europe dominated by Soviet Russia.

⁵⁴J. Pučík, op. cit.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Rudé Právo, Aug. 2, 1953, quoted in Tension Within the Soviet Captive Countries: Czechoslovakia, op. cit.

⁵⁷Tension within the Soviet Captive Countries: Czechoslovakia, op. cit.

This new course meant doubling the sums devoted to new investment in agriculture (in the Five-Year Plan the share of agriculture was only 9 per cent of the total investment program) and relaxing discriminatory practices against individuals, particularly larger farmers, with respect to supplies of fertilizer, seeds, and machinery.

Some results have been achieved in the number of pigs, increased in 1954 by 570,000, and in the increase of poultry by one million, but the number of cattle has just been maintained on the 1953 level. The yields of oats, sugar beets, rape, and flax were a small percentage higher, but those of other crops were not, and the total area sown was two per cent below that planned.⁵⁸ No overall estimates have been published, but it is certain that the planned increase of total production has not been attained. An increase in supply and a more equitable distribution of the means of production must have had some effect, but a more basic change in agricultural policy, and in the overall economic policy, is necessary to ensure success.

The chronic shortage of labor on state farms and the recent shrinkage of the area of collective farms (though they still enjoy the government's support) clearly show the unpopularity of the socialist forms of farming among Czechoslovakian peasants. It has been revealed only recently that the postwar confiscations of land resulted in a decrease in area sown amounting to five hundred thousand hectares.⁵⁹ There was a sufficient number of very small farmers who could till this land with some government aid, but the Communists would rather have this land lie idle than strengthen individual farming and increase the number of kulaks. The shrinkage of the cultivated area has not been confined to state farms; it has been observed on individual and possibly on collective farms as well. This has been primarily the result of the high compul-

⁵⁸ "Przeglad Osiagniec Gospodarczych Krajow Obozu Socjalizmu w 1954 R," Gospodarka Planowa, April 1955.

⁵⁹ "Likwidowami adbogoz w krajach Demokracji Ludowcj," Gospodarka Planowa, Feb. 1955. An increase in the cultivated area of 200,000 ha. is expected by 1957.

sory quotas based on the area of arable land. Part of the shrinkage may be fictitious, but some is real, because the kulaks, deprived of their machinery and of an adequate supply of hired labor, could not cultivate all the land they possessed. Excessive industrialization drew so many people from agriculture to other occupations that the government lost hope for making up this loss by increased mechanization. A plan directing 320,000 workers from other occupations to agriculture in the years 1954-1955 has been recently announced.

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INTERNAL TRADE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In this chapter problems of the organization of internal trade and the consumption patterns revealed by data on the internal trade will be discussed.

Organization

Before the war internal trade in Czechoslovakia was distinguished, as was the production branch of the economy, by a high degree of cartelization and by all the ills which follow in the wake of this type of economic organization. The essence of a cartel is that prices are fixed above the competitive level, with the result that the production (or quantity sold) in the cartelized parts of the economy are lower than they would be in a competitive situation, that employment in the cartelized fields is lower than it should be (and therefore that the wages of workers in noncartelized fields are lower than they should be), and that in contrast to an outright monopoly the cartelized activity is broken down among many producers, with all the waste of resources this entails.

The prices demanded by the internal trade industry in Czechoslovakia were fixed for many products by three different methods. The first was an outright cartel agreement executed by the retailers; the second method was the maintenance of a fixed retail price by the producer; and the third method, comparatively rare, was the setting of the price by the state. One result of price fixing is the encouragement of the continued existence, and creation, of dwarf distributors working far below the level of efficiency which would be required in more competitive circumstances. While figures on the internal trade organization in Czechoslovakia are extremely scarce, and those which exist are not overly dependable, they are useful at least to illustrate the order of magnitude of this problem. They are presented in Table 1.

Table I
 NUMBER OF RETAIL STORES, PERSONS ENGAGED IN RETAILING,
 AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THESE PERSONS ACCORDING TO
 THE SIZE OF THE STORE IN 1930

Land	Number of enterprises	Number of persons engaged	Percentage of the labor force in enterprises employing:				
			1-5 per- sons	6-10 per- sons	11-20 per- sons	21-50 per- sons	over 50 persons
Bohemia	121.662	244.195	72.3	9.0	6.5	5.8	6.4
Moravia	50.677	94.728	77.1	8.9	6.4	4.1	3.5
Slovakia	27.394	54.482	81.8	9.9	4.8	2.9	0.6

*Source: H. O. Ziegler, Die berufliche und Soziale Gliederung der Bevölkerung in der Tschechoslowakei (Brünn: Rohrer, 1936), p. 175.

On the average every retail outlet employed two workers, the owner included. Over three-quarters of the labor force worked in retail outlets with less than five workers; almost ninety per cent worked in outlets with less than twenty employees.

Some attempts were made to break through this barrier of "imperfect competition," as the essentially cartel-type arrangements are often called. One of the attempts which achieved some degree of success was the cooperative chain store. There is no evidence showing what percentage of the internal trade was handled by these cooperative stores, but it appears that in most cities there was at least one such store in existence. Two other major breaks succeeded in two quite essential fields. One success, in the case of shoes, was spectacular; the other, in the case of ready-made clothes, was moderate. The Bata enterprise in shoes established its own retail outlet in almost every city and village in Czechoslovakia, and in many places there were several of

of them. There is no study available which would establish what part of the savings presented to the customer was due to superior large-scale production techniques, unhampered by cartel agreements, and how much of it was due to a more efficient technique of distribution. In ready-made clothes the two outstanding names, though of much less importance than Bata economically, were Rolný and Nehera.

After the war the population was ready for some reforms and certainly would not have tolerated the cartel inefficiencies to continue. The Communists were ready to supply their own prescription. After the coup d'etat in 1948 they lost no time in carrying their ideas into practice. They swiftly liquidated the wholesalers and slowly took over much of the retailing. Soon they were to discover that wholesalers are an essential part of distribution and not just "the parasitic middlemen who force their way in between the producer and the retailer," a refrain they sang in unending variations between 1945 and 1948.

Soon after 1948, and up till the present, a great number of complaints about the distribution appeared, many of which can be directly connected with the elimination of experienced wholesalers from the structure of internal trade in Czechoslovakia. Some retailers receive merchandise of only one size, while other retailers receive only merchandise of another size; one group of retailers gets a great supply of one type of merchandise while another group gets a large supply of merchandise of another type; summer apparel is shipped in winter and winter apparel in summer, etc. Similarly, retail trade was centralized in a few mammoth institutions which proved unable to control the employees; they were also unable to master problems of the proper allocation of goods in thousands of retail stores. These monopolistic stores were in no fear of losing business to a competitor, and care for the merchandise, service to the customer, and plain honesty were adjusted to this state of affairs.

In summary, the prewar organization of Czechoslovak internal trade was in urgent need of revamping to make it more competitive and more efficient. Instead of this, the Communists, in accordance with

their doctrines, moved in the opposite direction and eliminated competition altogether.

Market structure

During and after the war a special phenomenon arose in the internal trade which greatly affected both the kind of service which the consumer could expect from the internal trade industry and the efficiency of this industry. Instead of being faced by one market, as before the war, the consumer had to find his way in a variety of markets, and his ability to utilize most effectively "the crossrates" existing among these markets and to gain access to several or all these markets was almost more essential for the degree of his wellbeing than his earning capacity itself. The following markets have existed in Czechoslovakia since the German occupation as far as consumers goods are concerned:

(1) Market of rationed goods: most foodstuffs, textiles, footwear, tobacco and tobacco products were rationed.

(2) Market of allocated goods: radios, tires, bicycles, motorcycles, cars, watches, etc., were available only if a purchase permit was secured.

(3) Market of non-rationed goods: all the remaining goods were sold on this market, if available.

(4) Black market: most of the goods sold on the aforementioned three markets could be secured on this market provided that financial means were available, contact ready and the seller satisfied as to his security.

(5) Governmental "free market:" in 1949 most of the goods in the first three categories began to be sold by the government in special stores for prices which, very roughly and imperfectly, cleared the market.¹

(6) Foreign exchange market: most of the goods sold in the first

¹Producers goods were never included in categories (5) and (6).

three markets, as well as some high quality goods not available in them, were sold for foreign exchange either directly or indirectly. By "directly" is meant direct payments by foreign exchanges (for this purpose the purchaser in this store was granted amnesty for breaking the regulations prohibiting ownership of foreign exchanges); by "indirectly," that the purchaser presented a certificate attesting that foreign exchanges were deposited to the account of government company Darex in foreign countries.

The following table depicts the existence of these markets during the past ten years:

Table 2
MARKET OF CONSUMER GOODS, 1938-1955

Market	1938-46	1947	1948	1949-53	1953-55
(1) Rationed goods	X	X	X	X	
(2) Allocated goods	X	X	X	X	X
(3) Non-rationed goods	X	X	X	X	X
(4) Black market goods	X	X	X	X	X
(5) "Free" market goods				X	
(6) Foreign exchange goods		X	X	X	

Prices in all these markets (except, naturally, the black market) were fixed by the state. While we may distinguish these markets it should be remembered that many goods were sold in either several or most of these markets, for prices which were sharply different. Thus, for instance, many foodstuffs and textiles were sold in markets (1), (4), (5), and (6); some textiles in markets (4), (5), and (6), etc. The multiplicity of these markets makes it extremely difficult to state in a more exact fashion the development of the living standard during this period. Of course, even from the standpoint of the regime these mult-

iple markets lead to inefficiencies; so that a substantial simplification was ordered along with the monetary reform in June 1953. Though apparently three markets remain, the market of allocated goods is extremely limited (only coal is allocated), and the black market is, according to all appearances, inconsequential.

Patterns of Consumption

Most patterns of Czechoslovak consumption which are presented to the Western reader are based not on the actual expenditures made by the consumers but on the calculation of what shares of their incomes the consumers would have to spend to maintain the consumption pattern prescribed by the weights allotted to different goods by the Czechoslovak price index. This is quite openly the basis of the consumption patterns which are presented in the publications of the Free Europe Committee² and less openly in the publications of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.³

For understanding what happened to the Czechoslovak consumer it appears more useful to inquire, as far as possible, not what division of income would be required for the consumer to maintain the 1928 consumption pattern,⁴ but what were the actual consumption patterns in different years. The difficulty with this method is that figures for this are much more difficult to obtain than figures for the index-based division of income.

Fairly complete figures are available for Czechoslovakia for the years 1946 and 1947, and for the Czech regions for 1937.

²National Committee for a Free Europe, Workers' Living Standards in Communist Czechoslovakia (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, n. d.).

³United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1953 (Geneva: United Nations, 1954), p. 64.

⁴1928 is the basis for weighting of the price index.

Table 3
CONSUMPTION PATTERNS IN 1937, 1946 AND 1947*

<u>Group</u>	<u>1937†</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>
I. Foodstuffs	42.9	45.1	37.9
II. Household goods	6.8	5.0	5.1
III. Rent, water fees	7.3	4.4	3.6
IV. Textiles, footwear	10.1	12.7	14.1
V. Miscellaneous	32.4	32.8	39.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Source: Boris P. Pesek, "Monetary Policy in Czechoslovakia, 1945-53," (Ph.D dissertation in preparation, University of Chicago), Ch. 4.

† Czech regions only.

Table 4
EXPENDITURES ON FOOD AND BEVERAGES
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDI-
TURES 1937 and 1946-49*

<u>Group</u>	<u>1937†</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>
Foodstuffs and Beverages	51.4	56.7	50.2	47.1	45.9

* Source: Boris P. Pesek, op. cit., Table 15, Ch. 2.

† Czech regions only.

Though the prewar and postwar figures are not strictly comparable because of the territorial difference in coverage, both tables nevertheless reveal a distinct pattern. In 1946 the shortages and scarcities of industrial products created a greater emphasis on food and drink. Starting in 1947, as industrial goods appear on the market (included in group IV and partly in group V) the consumers modify their expenditure patterns, partly to

replenish inventories of industrial goods decreased during the war, partly to acquire new inventories (new households created during the war and postwar years).

In addition, it may be that there was a genuine income effect in operation too: that increased real incomes, after a certain level of income was reached, caused the percentage share of income spent on food to decrease. The assumption of a higher real income than before the war appears highly doubtful. The statistical data available are too fragmentary to permit any proof that this is the case, or to demonstrate a shift in the tastes of the consumers. In the absence of more evidence it appears wiser to interpret the data only as showing oscillation around the accustomed patterns of consumption.

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FOREIGN TRADE

The Role of Foreign Trade

Czechoslovakia, like most small European countries, has a considerable stake in foreign trade. The basis of its foreign trade was the importation of food and raw materials, which accounted for four-fifths of all imports, and the exportation of labor and technical skill--finished products amounted again to four-fifths of all exports. This had important effects in many fields. First of all, Czechoslovakia was greatly dependent on an orderly international exchange of goods unhampered by political discrimination or political and economic upheavals. As a result of that dependence, the degree of interest of the Czechoslovakian citizen in the maintenance of international law, order and prosperity, and consequently in the international organizations created to produce these things, was considerably higher than one would expect to find in countries less vitally concerned with the international scene. This interest was strong enough to make it possible for the government to secure heavy losses in pursuance of this goal of international order. When, after Italy's African adventure, the League of Nations under the leadership of the United Kingdom imposed economic sanctions against Italy, Czechoslovakia was among the few states to redirect its foreign trade accordingly.

Policy Consequences

The second consequence of the extensive dependence on foreign trade was that the country could not even think about engaging in a rigid type of economic planning. With one-fifth of the gross national product derived from foreign trade, a fifth of the employed resources of the country were dependent not on legislative fiat but on foreign markets outside the scope of government competence. Yet the Communists introduced this type of economic planning in 1948. It may be asked whether they accomplished the impossible or whether the claim that rigid planning under such substantial dependence on foreign trade is impossible proved to be unjustified; neither appears to be the truth.

First, the Communists were ready to force the population to forego the advantages of the international division of labor whenever they could not impose their rigid system on foreign trade. Trading among states and

bilateral agreements were the order of the day. All private enterprises engaged in foreign trade were nationalized and their management was taken over by the Department of Foreign Trade.

This was not and could not be done in isolation. The entire Soviet bloc of nations was engaged in the same pursuit, and thus the obvious policy was to remove Czechoslovak foreign trade from the influence of countries which could not make long-term commitments to the Czechoslovak exporters and shift it to member countries of the Soviet bloc which were quite ready to make such commitments. That this policy entailed losses for Czechoslovakia and for both parts of the formerly unified world market was inevitable.

But even this was not sufficient to make it possible for Czechoslovakia to engage in a rigid type of planning. As Professor Viner has stated,¹ such interstate trading is bound to create frictions. Those purely in the economic sphere would take different forms: one is that every so often one of the member states would find it more advantageous to break out of the circle and engage in outside trading. Trade opportunities probably shift more rapidly than international alliances. Some special stabilizing influence was required to make this special market created in eastern Europe and northern Asia a dependable unit. It appears that nothing less than the presence of a single, omnipotent party in all these states and the control of the U.S.S.R. were required to keep the member countries in line, to prevent them from utilizing the profitable but disruptive advantages their economies could reap in foreign trade with the West.

World Prices

The orientation of Czechoslovak foreign trade to the Soviet Union and its satellites was a part of Soviet policy. After the war, as Stalin said, "two parallel world markets" were created:

The disintegration of the single, all embracing world market must be regarded as the most important economic sequel of the Second World War and of its economic consequences.

But the fundamental cause, of course, is not the economic blockade

¹Viner, "International Relations between State-Controlled National Economies," American Economic Review, March 1944, pp. 315-30.

(imposed by the West, but the fact that since the War these countries have joined together economically and established economic cooperation and mutual assistance. . . It may be confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development, it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist countries, but will themselves feel the necessity of founding an outside market for their surplus products.²

But before the moment arrives when the Soviet bloc will be in the throes of "the typical capitalistic illness of overproduction" (as other Communist writers call this phenomenon) and will feel "the necessity of founding an outside market," there are some problems which have to be solved as far as the internal foreign trade of the member countries is concerned. One of them is the problem of prices. It is often said that when the determination of relative prices is taken away from the impersonal mechanism of the market and entrusted to some elected or otherwise created state authority, the seeds of discord are released. Internally the preponderance of the Communist dictatorship is strong enough to control this discord, but on the international level the problem is bound to appear again. In the absence of an external market all price relations within the individual states of the Soviet bloc become arbitrary and provide no basis for judging relative costs; on the international level (within the Soviet trading sphere) the market has to be excluded for doctrinaire reasons primarily. But not entirely: consideration must be given to the fact that all-inclusive state monopolies make an orderly foreign trade market and price determination on the market impossible for practical reasons as well. Thus there was not and, due to the nature of Communist economy and doctrine, could not be any unified system of standards.

As in the case of internal economies of the Communist states, where in the absence of the free market standards were imposed by the governing authority, in the case of inter-Soviet foreign trade the predominant authority, the U.S.S.R., could likewise have imposed such arbitrary standards of its own. On the positive side, it is true that these standards could be constructed so as to be profitable to the Soviet Union; on the negative side, in the case of trade among satellites such standards would haphazardly favor one satellite over another. While the U.S.S.R. appears to be willing

²J. V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (New York: International Publishers, 1952).

to incur the distaste of the satellites whenever a controversial action is profitable, why should the U.S.S.R. incur the wrath of the satellites where only inter-satellite trade was concerned and the U.S.S.R. had no stake in this? Therefore, in the absence of any impersonally determined, mutually acceptable standards, the U.S.S.R. considered it much more sensible to avoid discord, to make certain of the profitability of its own trade by other means, and to suggest that outside world prices be used in commercial dealings within the Soviet bloc.

From the standpoint of those who devised and defend the Communist economic system this represented an admission of failure. They had to announce, for all practical purposes, that the economic system they represent as the most efficient is unable to facilitate an orderly exchange of goods on the international level, and that, by analogy, it is unable to do so internally as well--only there the dictatorship is able to impose purely arbitrary standards.

Many Czech articles contain allusions to the fairness of Czech trade with the U.S.S.R., being based on world prices; this after the world market has been described in the same Czech publications as the abject slave of Anglo-American monopolies which manipulate and dominate it.

In considering the consequences of the "world prices principle" on Czechoslovakia's foreign trade, there first appears the problem of allocation of resources. It is inevitable that there are scarcities of different intensity within the "Soviet world market" and the "non-Soviet world market." The acceptance by one market of the price ratios of the other for the purposes of international transactions is thus bound to lead to misallocation of resources.

To give an example: Assume that in the Soviet world labor is relatively plentiful and capital relatively scarce; that in the non-Soviet world the reverse is true. Then in the Soviet world goods requiring a good deal of labor should be cheap and goods requiring a good deal of capital, expensive; in the non-Soviet world, on the contrary, goods requiring a good deal of labor should be expensive and goods requiring a good deal of capital, cheap. If now the Soviet bloc accepts the non-Soviet world prices, then labor-intensive commodities in foreign trade within the Soviet bloc are more expensive than they should be and capital-intensive goods are cheaper

than they should be. This gives the participating countries completely wrong signals as to what goods should be economized and what goods used lavishly. And--as far as Czechoslovakia, as an eminently industrial nation, is concerned--the "world prices principle" surely works injury on her because, were the market permitted within the Soviet sphere, her goods would be relatively more expensive than they are, and goods which she buys from the non-industrialized nations of the Soviet bloc would be relatively less expensive than they are. Thus the principle of world prices leads both to misallocation of resources within the Soviet bloc and to exploitation of the more industrialized nations by the less industrialized ones.

But there is still another difficulty with the world prices principle. Prices on the world market are not independent of the actions of the countries of the Soviet bloc. Especially are they not independent of the actions of the U.S.S.R., which because of its size has direct influence on the prices in the world market. Thus, for instance, when shortly after the war the U.S.S.R. refused to continue its exports of manganese, iron, and other metals essential for the production of high quality steel, the world prices of these commodities rose substantially. With the more plentiful supplies available to the Soviet bloc, the prices there would have decreased under free market conditions. When Czechoslovakia was asked to pay world prices, it meant, for all practical purposes, that economically she was pushed by the U.S.S.R. outside of the Soviet sphere and thus had no better standing with the U.S.S.R. than any hated state outside the Communist market, be it Yugoslavia or the United States. Surely the U.S.S.R. did not declare a blockade of the West to exploit Czechoslovakia; but by asking Czechoslovakia to pay the high world prices created by the Russian blockade it nevertheless exploited Czechoslovakia.

Exploitation

Nevertheless, in general the world prices principle assured few controllable profits to the U.S.S.R. After adopting this seemingly unsailable principle of world prices and using it for propaganda purposes, the U.S.S.R. had to consider how to make its foreign trade with the satellites as profitable as possible.

It is probably inevitable that in a state like the Soviet one all negotiations (except perhaps the present ones with China) are carried out more or less by sufferance to preserve appearances--and for convenience's sake. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that errors of commission and omission are made quite often.

It is well known that Czechoslovakia buys cotton from Russia at world prices. It is fortunate for Soviet Russia that world prices deal with standard long-staple cotton, while Russia delivers inferior short-staple cotton. In at least one year, as far as is known, Czechoslovakia paid world prices for Russian iron ore; the difficulty was that this ore was adulterated with sulphur. One version has it that Czechoslovakia, unable to eliminate the sulphur, had to dump the whole shipment; another version asserts that an expensive treatment plant had to be built.

Of course, only a few of the more obvious cases of exploitation through the fraudulent use of the "world prices principle" or through outright imposition of force come into view.

Statistical Data³

Needless to say, only the figures calculated on the basis of misleading data are available. While they represent some approximation to

³It is extremely difficult to rely on the statistics on foreign trade published by the countries of the Soviet bloc. To clarify the problem by the use of a simple schematic example let us assume the trade balance of Czechoslovakia in some year appears like this:

Trade with				Total Trade		
U.S.S.R.		WEST		Exports	Imports	Net foreign investments
Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports			
1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	2,000	2,000	--

On the basis of this table the official statistician would say that during this year the Czechoslovakia became neither debtor nor creditor (see net foreign investments); that the U.S.S.R. absorbed 50 per cent of Czechoslovakia's exports and furnished the same amount of imports; and

reality they no doubt are far from expressing reality completely, and should therefore not be taken too seriously for the years after 1948.

that therefore the U. S. S. R.'s share in the total value of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade was 50 per cent.

Now assume that because of all the trading practices described above Czechoslovakia imported considerably less in real terms and exported considerably more in these terms. The "true" balance of trade would then appear like this.

Trade With				Total Trade		
U. S. S. R.		WEST		Exports	Imports	Net foreign investments
Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports			
1,500	500	1,000	1,000	2,500	1,500	1,000

On the basis of this statistic expressing the "real situation" (which, unfortunately, is impossible to reach in practice) we would say that Czechoslovakia made 1,000 million crowns net foreign investments in the U. S. S. R. which (because no claim for the future was acquired by Czechoslovakia) was actually a "gift" or a "bounty." The U. S. S. R. absorbed 60 per cent of Czechoslovakia's exports and furnished 33 per cent of Czechoslovakia's imports.

According to official statistics the percentage share of the U.S.S.R. and other countries in the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia was as follows:

Table 1
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CZECHOSLOVAK
FOREIGN TRADE, 1937-1953 *

	U.S.S.R.	Soviet Bloc	Rest of the World
1937		11	89
1946		24.8	75.2
1947	5.8	15.0	85.0
1948	16	31.5	68.5
1949	24	45.4	54.6
1950	29	52.0	48.0
1951	31	60.0	40.0
1952	n. a.	71.0	29.0
1953	n. a.	75.0 (plan)	25.0

* Source: Prague Home Service, November 4, 1953, G.M.T. Reuters December 3, 1953, quoting Svět Práce. Plánované Hospodářství, III, No. 2-3, and IV, No. 3-4. Rudé Právo, January 1, 1953. Rudé Právo, April 22, 1953.

The next table shows the percentage distribution of Czechoslovak imports and exports among different categories of goods.

Table 2
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CZECHOSLOVAK IMPORTS
 AND EXPORTS AMONG DIFFERENT GOODS
 1937-1948*

Commodity	Import			Export		
	1937	1946	1948	1937	1946	1948
<u>Food, beverages</u>	12.9	22.2	30.2	8.2	21.4	4.5
Cereals	1.4	2.3	12.5	--	--	--
Fats	2.7	3.1	4.0			
Fish	0.3	1.8	0.9			
Seeds	1.9	0.6	2.0			
Tobacco	2.3	4.6	2.3			
Sugar				2.0	9.0	2.5
<u>Raw materials, semi-finished products</u>	57.4	51.5	48.8	19.8	16.5	13.8
Cotton	9.5	7.0	8.1			
Wool	7.3	5.6	3.8			
Silk	2.2	0.8	0.9			
Hides	4.6	2.1	3.2			
Non-ferrous metals	5.7	2.0	5.5			
Hard Coal	1.5	0.2	3.4			
Oil	1.1	1.7	1.0			
Iron Ore	2.9	6.2	3.5			
Soft coal				1.6	0.1	1.4
<u>cake</u>				1.3	1.7	3.3
Lumber				4.2	2.9	2.7
Pulp				2.0	1.5	1.1
<u>Finished goods</u>	29.7	26.3	21.0	71.8	62.1	81.7
<u>Chemicals</u>	2.2	4.3	4.2	2.3	3.1	3.4
Machinery	4.3	1.4	3.2	12.7	14.3	16.6
Cotton goods				8.0	4.0	7.1
<u>Precious metals</u>				0.2	--	0.0

* Source: Wirtschaftsdienst, Hamburger Weltwirtschaft Archiv, June 1949, p. 53.

The geographical distribution of Czechoslovak foreign trade is depicted in Table 3.

Table 3
GEOGRAPHICAL PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF
CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN TRADE, 1937-1948 *

Continent		1937	1946	1947	1948
Europe	Exports	74.1	86.1	80.8	79.7
	Imports	69.1	85.9	76.4	80.4
Asia	Exports	7.0	2.1	5.4	7.1
	Imports	9.1	1.0	3.4	3.8
Africa	Exports	3.9	1.7	3.7	2.9
	Imports	5.0	1.8	3.9	3.2
America	Exports	14.3	10.0	9.5	7.5
	Imports	15.3	11.1	15.7	10.6
Australia	Exports	0.6	0.1	0.4	1.5
	Imports	1.3	0.1	0.6	0.5
New Zealand	Exports	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1
	Imports	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.2

* Source: B. Kiesewetter, *Die Wirtschaft der Tschechoslowakei seit 1945* (Berlin: Duncker und Humboldt, 1953), p. 187.

Conclusion

There are some facts which are clear despite the dearth of statistics on the field of foreign trade. First of all, the share of Communist countries in the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia was predominant. The composition of imports changed in favor of agricultural products. In part this is not unexpected. The strong protectionist tariffs of the thirties, designed to keep out much of the agricultural produce of neighboring countries for the benefit of the Czechoslovak farmer, and at the expense of the industrial branch of the economy, were dropped. This by itself could

have been expected to raise somewhat the share of agricultural goods in Czechoslovak imports. The expulsion of the German population decreased the performance of domestic agriculture. And finally, the Czechoslovak decision to specialize in manufacturing more than had been done in the twenties and thirties could be expected to cause increased dependence on foreign trade as far as farm products were concerned.

In addition, Communist policy towards agriculture decreased the product which would have been available under some course of action more favorable to the farmer. The policy of collectivization hoped to liquidate the independent farmer and create more efficient large units at the same time. This policy failed, and the expected rises in production did not materialize: instead of the planned 53 per cent rise in output during the Five-Year Plan, a 13 per cent rise was actually achieved. The industrial policy which was supposed to provide for imports of agricultural goods also succeeded only in part, and thus another cause for shortages of farm commodities arose.

In the export field, as was seen, almost four-fifths of the total constitute finished goods. In 1948, 40 per cent of all exports were products of heavy industry, while another 40 per cent were products of light industry (paper, textiles, shoes, etc.). According to official announcements, in 1953 heavy industry exports reached 50 per cent of all exports.⁴ This rise of heavy industry's share of exports from 40 to 50 per cent during the Five-Year Plan is not small, but it is not surprisingly large either. In the announcement of the 1950 version of the Five-Year Plan the government said that the Plan was changed because of the great demand for products of heavy and light machinery industries by the U.S.S.R., China and other People's Democracies. From this arose the customary assertion that

⁴The report speaks about exports of "investment goods." In a number of Communist publications it is stated that because of the difficulties of classification all products of heavy industry are taken as constituting investment goods and all products of light industry are taken as consumption goods.

Czechoslovakia is to become the heavy industry arsenal for the Soviet bloc. While there was some rise in exports of heavy industry, this rise during the Five-Year Plan amounted to not more than six billion crowns.⁵ Even if the entire output of heavy industry was redirected towards Russia and its satellites--and this was not the case--the contribution of Czechoslovakia to the industrialization of these countries in 1953 would amount to some 450 million dollars in current dollars and not more than 350-400 million 1948 dollars.⁶

Taking into account the still existing trade with countries outside the Soviet bloc, the United Nations estimate of total exports of investment goods to the Soviet bloc as being 320-360 million current dollars seems very reasonable. Because Czechoslovakia in turn imported some of the same type of goods, the net exports of investment goods probably reached 220-280 million current dollars in 1953, compared with the 660-775 million dollars net exports of East Germany and the 85-125 million dollar net exports of Hungary. These three states are the only nations of the Soviet bloc with next exports of investment goods. Thus all the remaining huge areas were helped in their industrialization programs in 1953 by no more than one billion dollars.

When it is realized that the Soviet bloc encompasses over half the world's population, the importance of foreign trade within the Communist sphere for the industrialization efforts of this bloc appear to be negligible, especially since exports of capital goods from Germany, Hungary, and

⁵The value of exports in 1948 was 37 billion; in the last known year, 1951, it was 42 billion (in current crowns). Extrapolating for 1953 we get 45 billion. 40 per cent of 37 billion gives the value of exports of heavy industry--15 billion crowns. In 1953, 50 per cent of 45 billion gives 22.5 billion crowns as exports of heavy industry. Thus the rise in the value of heavy industry exports did not surpass 8 billion current crowns. Taking into account the rises in world prices, 6 billion crowns seem a very generous estimate of the actual rise in exports at 1948 prices. This is equivalent to 120 million dollars.

⁶All these estimates appear in substantial agreement with the United Nations estimates. According to those estimates, all Czechoslovakia's exports in 1953 amounted to 935 million dollars--one-half allegedly investment goods, their value would amount to 467 million current dollars. Cf. Economic Survey of Europe in 1954 (Geneva: 1955), p. 113.

Czechoslovakia had to replace losses which arose from the Chinese People's Republic's severance from the world market after China's inclusion in the Soviet sphere. While the contribution of the three above-mentioned states, including Czechoslovakia, surely represents some contribution to the industrialization drive of the Soviet bloc, they are, whether taken singly or collectively, far from being in a position in which they could be described as "arsenals" of the Soviet bloc of nations.

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MONETARY AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS

The prewar Czechoslovak monetary and banking system was characterized by a very complex formal structure and legal relationships. All influences and accidents of the past have left their imprint on the banking and monetary institutions of the country. A systematic simplification of the structure was undertaken in the postwar period, until finally a monolithic system exists with only two banking and monetary institutions besides the Treasury.

Organization of Leading Monetary Institutions.

Prewar Period

The graph on the following page clarifies the structure of monetary and banking institutions and the relationships among them.

The Treasury

Under the law of April 14, 1920, the Treasury was permitted to issue only subsidiary coins in amounts prescribed by law. The maximum amount was originally 600 million crowns in 1932 when 10- and 20-crown state-notes were permitted the limit was raised to 1,200 million. In May 1938 the Treasury received the exclusive right to issue state-notes bearing the denomination of 50 crowns and the limit was raised to 150 crowns per head or roughly 2,356 million crowns. And finally in September 1938 the 100-crown bank-notes were changed into the obligation of the Treasury and no limit was imposed on this issue. Only in 1938 did the Treasury receive the legal right to control the quantity of money in the country, although it enjoyed de facto power to do so earlier. The Treasury had crucial influence on the privately owned National Bank, it had supervisory rights over the whole banking system, and it was directly represented in several large commercial banks which fell into difficulties and had to be bailed out by the Treasury.

National Bank

The Bank, privately owned, with minority State participation, had the exclusive power of note issue and of foreign exchange controls. It was the responsibility of the Bank to maintain the exchange value of the Czecho-




Figure I. Prewar Structure of Monetary and Banking Institutions.

slovak koruna at the level stated by law. The Bank was permitted to engage in most of the ordinary central banking transactions, except that it was forbidden to make direct loans to the government or to purchase stocks and other ownership certificates. Since the Bank was forbidden to engage in open market operations it transacted them through other financial institutions, mainly the Rediscount Institution and partly other banking institutions. This was legalized by permitting the discount of government bonds and notes maturing within less than three months. The Bank was also obliged to discount several types of Treasury bills.

Postal Savings Bank

This institution was created to replace the old Austrian Postal Savings Bank. It had a large checking account and deposit account business, and in addition it acted as agent for the Treasury. It collected taxes and carried out the disbursements in behalf of the administration; it acted as an agency of issue of government bonds and loans, and it covered short-term Treasury deficiencies. In special emergency situations it was called upon to finance bankrupt financial institutions. The non-governmental part of the Bank's turnover amounted to two-thirds of the total turnover.

Czechoslovak Rediscount and Lombard Institution

This institution was created in 1934 with state-provided capital of 100 million crowns. All deposits were guaranteed by the state, and up to 500 million crowns of loans by the National Bank and other banks were guaranteed as well. The Institution was made a depository of the newly required reserves of financial institutions of Czechoslovakia: financial institutions had to maintain deposits equivalent to five per cent of their total savings deposits in it. These required reserves were supposed to be built up gradually over time: each year ten per cent of the increase in savings deposits had to be handed over to this institution. Similar requirements were made of the social insurance agencies and of life insurance companies.

The Rediscount Institution was allowed to refinance mortgages, rediscount commercial bills, participate in the credit operations of the government, and to regulate credit in government securities.

Provincial Banks

The provincial banks were founded in the last century by the three provinces in the western part of Czechoslovakia, namely in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. They were to deal in mortgages, municipal financing and general banking. The Czech Provincial Bank, called Zemska' banka, was assigned many public functions by the government. The Rediscount Institution had no offices of its own and the Zemska' banka was ordered to act for it. Similarly the Zemska' banka administered the special fund and the general fund of provincial institutions, the task of which was to insure the liquidity of the member banks.

Funds

After World War I, when many of the Czechoslovak banking institutions found themselves in difficulties, two funds were established: the Special Fund for the Alleviation of Post-war Losses and the General Fund of Financial Institutions. Both Funds issued bonds which all financial institutions had to purchase and out of the funds thus accumulated banks which found themselves in difficulties were financed. The Special Fund in 1924 collected and distributed 1,640 million crowns; in 1932, an additional 770 million crowns. The General Fund issued bonds and collected yearly contributions from all provincial institutions for the purposes of bailing out banks in difficulties.

Commercial Banks

The first commercial bank on Czechoslovak territory was a branch bank of the Austrian Kreditanstalt, established in 1857. Soon afterwards domestic banking started to grow, and by 1914 most banking business was done either by domestic Czech or German banks. In 1914 the Czech banks had balances half as high as the German banks; by the end of the war their balances were two and a half times as high. In addition, while the German banks invested heavily in the bonds of the Austrian government and advanced credit to the holders of these bonds, Czech banks succeeded in keeping these assets, which later on became worthless, to the minimum.

The relative strength of Czech banks vis-à-vis the German banks did not last long. The Czech banks participated in the creation of a boom of 1919-21 and then suffered considerably when the Czech government

passed a decision in 1922 to reevaluate the Czech crown, presumably to the prewar level. Within a year the price of crown rose by more than three times on the foreign exchange markets. The export industry, unable to adjust its cost structure speedily enough, suffered greatly. General deflation led to the expected results--unemployment, bankruptcies and bank failures. Two small Czech commercial banks and one large German savings bank collapsed. The collapse of 1929 again found the banking system in grave difficulties.

The most specific way in which the government intervened was to purchase stock of the collapsing banks. At the end of 1937 the Treasury held stock with the par value of 118 million crowns in banks which had a total capital of 381 million. The capital of these banks represented about 25 per cent of all the bank capital in Czechoslovakia.

The government guaranteed credits extended to different banks to the amount of 746 million crowns; another 600 million crowns worth of bonds was guaranteed by the government to settle the obligations of the Central Bank of German Savings Banks and of the (German) Carlsbad Bank. Between 1930 and 1938 the banks suffered losses estimated at roughly 2,900 million crowns; they reduced their capital and reserves by roughly one billion crowns while the rest was absorbed by the Funds and by the government. And finally there were the Treasury's "deposits for special purposes"--repayable subsidies.

There was a tendency of the banking system to decrease the number of institutions and to concentrate operations in a smaller number of large banks. In 1925 there were 164 banks in existence; in 1929, only 115; and in 1933, just 82.

Political Alignments of the Leading Banks

An interesting feature of Czechoslovak banking was the close connections between either political parties or other well defined political interests and commercial banking.

The largest bank, Živnostenská banka, was closely connected with the Czech National Democratic Party. The Anglo-Československá banka and Pražská úvěrní banka were controlled by a group of domestic industrialists, the Czechoslovak government, and the Prince of Lichtenstein.

The Česká banka Union was founded by Jewish and German shareholders. In the Česká escomptní banka and Úvěrní ústav, the Živnosteriská banka acquired an important interest. One-fifth of outstanding shares of the Moravská banka were owned by the government, and in 1937 the bank owed the government half a billion crowns. Banka Československých legií was founded by those who fought on the side of the Allied Powers against the Central Powers during World War I and later against the Red Army. Československá agrární banka was the domain of the powerful Czechoslovak Agrarian Party. The General Cooperative Bank was controlled by the Social Democrats and the Czechoslovak Commercial Bank by the Czechoslovak National Socialists (no connection with the German National Socialists). The Czechoslovak Discount Bank was under the leadership of the Czechoslovak Small Entrepreneur's Party. The People's Bank in Slovakia was controlled by leaders of the separatist Hlinka movement.

Banking Business

Besides conducting usual banking business, the banks in Czechoslovakia engaged in activity which sounds peculiar in the light of American banking practices: the commercial banks dealt heavily in stocks of industrial enterprises, and in most of the important ones the banks held controlling interests.

No material is available which would either prove or disprove the thesis that the essential similarity between the development of Czechoslovak and German industrial structure was due to the same cause--extensive bank ownership of industrial enterprises. The extreme cartelization of economic life in which the German banks played such an important part could, in the case of Czechoslovakia, possibly be explained either by the same tendencies of the banks or by foreign pressures which economically small Czechoslovakia could not resist. The fact remains that Czechoslovak industry was cartelized to a degree which is difficult to imagine in American circumstances.

Other Banks

Savings Banks

In accordance with a law passed in 1920, all savings institutions had to be owned by the local governing bodies, which had to assume

unlimited liability for the obligations of these savings institutions. These institutions were limited by law to certain kinds of business: mortgages, purchase of government securities, purchase of securities with "orphans' security" (a class of exceptionally secure assets), advances on such securities, discount of domestic bills, loans to pawn-shops owned by these institutions, and deposit of funds in other financial institutions authorized to accept such deposits. In 1937 there were 529 such savings banks.

Credit Co-operatives

These institutions were a special type of savings and credit organizations strongly fostered by law. By 1937 the number of these institutions substantially exceeded ten thousand.

There were three basic types of these co-operatives: (a) Citizens' Loan Associations and Small Entrepreneurs' Associations, active in cities and towns; (b) The Reiffeisen Institute, or Kampelík Institute, organized by small farmers and farm workers; and (c) Slovak and Ruthenian Loan Associations, organized by farmers in those parts of Czechoslovakia.

The first type operated on the principle of limited liability (though exceeding the value of member's share), while the second and third types operated on the principle of unlimited liability. All these institutions organized in federations to pool their resources and hire specialists in banking. The federations themselves in some cases formed another organization with similar purposes in mind. Some of these federations were based on party loyalty (National Socialist Union, Social-Democratic Federation, Federation of the Small-Entrepreneurs' Party, Czech Agrarian Federation, Czech Catholic Federation, etc.), some on national loyalties (German Federation, Czech Federation)--usually both.

District Loan Offices

These offices have an extremely curious historical foundation. In the eighteenth century the Czech peasants were, as serfs, obliged to deliver crops or money in good years above the requirements of the tax law; in bad years these deliveries were credited to their tax obligations. In 1863 the two special funds then in existence were liquidated, the obligation to prepay taxes was abolished, and the funds available were allotted to the

District Loan Offices. The assets in the name of which these property taxes were paid were then credited by the corresponding amounts and the owners of these assets, whoever they were, were entitled to use the services of these District Loan Offices. The capital funds could not be decreased, nor all profits distributed. The financial importance of these Offices was negligible.

Private Bankers

The number of private bankers is hard to establish. Some sources list 110 for 1937, but the figure is probably no more than an informed guess. There was one important private bank, Petschek and Company, which was of nation-wide importance. The next six smaller private banks put together did not have the importance of Petschek and Company. The rest were either small banks financing family industrial interests or, in the lowest class, just brokers for the state lottery.

Reserve Requirements for Monetary and Banking Institutions

Financial institutions in Czechoslovakia were obliged to keep reserves in a variety of forms. First of all, as described above, reserves had to be held in the Czechoslovak Rediscount and Lombard Institution; in addition to that, commercial banks were obliged to maintain cash or deposit reserves equal to 8 per cent of their deposits and less liquid reserves equal to another 7 per cent of their deposits. All savings banks had to deposit 5 per cent of their deposits with the private central institution of savings banks, the Sporobanka. This bank itself had to invest 20 per cent of funds collected in this way in cash or governmental bonds, in deposits with the National Bank or with the Postal Savings Bank. Another 20 per cent had to be invested either in eligible securities or deposited with the Rediscount Institution. Then a new law in 1938 prescribed a new reserve requirement. Provincial banks were obliged to hold 25 per cent of savings deposits in either government bonds or Treasury notes, savings banks 22 per cent for the first fifty million of savings deposits and 25 per cent for the amount above that, commercial banks 12 per cent for deposits not exceeding paid-up capital by four times and 20 per cent for deposits above this limit.

Most of these reserve requirements were designed either to assure that the bank would be in a liquid position in case of need, or to assure that the banking system as a whole would be in such a position; further, an easy source for governmental debt was thus tapped. There was nothing in the legislation which would permit any authority to vary the reserve requirements according to the overall economic policy of the government. In contrast, therefore, to the laws of the United States, the Czechoslovak reserve requirements could not be used to influence credit policies of the banks and to stabilize economic conditions; on the other hand, again in contrast to the United States, the reserves as described above were true reserves, which in time of need were available either to the individual bank which deposited them or to the system as a whole.

Monetary Management

As far as legal framework is concerned ample room seems to have existed for monetary management to provide for economic stability. First of all, the government possessed a variety of means: in periods of crisis the government received power to issue orders and decrees to regulate the banking and financial institutions (1934-37, 1938-39); in 1933 the law established the Financial Advisory Board on which government, banks, agriculture and business found representation. This Board was expected to advise the government, establish fair practices among financial institutions, and after 1933 it started to fix the interest rates. The Treasury had a number of levers itself: it could conduct open market operations, it exerted decisive influence in some of the largest Czechoslovak banks either by virtue of ownership of large amounts of stock, or by virtue of giving substantial help in times of need, or by virtue of "deposits for particular purposes" (a respectable term for repayable subsidies). While the National Bank was restricted by a required gold reserve of 32 per cent (after 1934 25 per cent) which was to be held against notes and other liabilities payable on sight, it was permitted to increase the quantity of money over and above this limit, provided it paid a penalty of at least 5 per cent for each ounce of gold by which it was short of the prescribed amount of reserves. (This provision appears to be similar to that im-

posed upon the Reichsbank in 1875). The general impression is given that all these powers were seldom used during the period from 1918 to 1938.

Changes During World War II

After the Munich agreement a substantial part of Czechoslovakia was ceded to Germany; Hungary joined the Axis powers and occupied southern parts of Slovakia; and Poland joined the grab-away to seize the Tessin border district. In 1939 Slovakia, under German auspices, became a satellite state, and the Czech regions were occupied by Germany. When we take the distribution of currency and savings deposits as a criterion we get the following order of importance of the different parts of Czechoslovakia:

	Currency	Savings Deposits
Protectorate	66.3 %	67.8 %
Districts seized by Germany	19.9	24.5
Slovakia	9.4	6.2
Districts seized by Hungary	4.4	1.5
	100.0 %	100.0 %

Banks in the Czech Regions

While in the territories ceded either to Germany or Hungary all financial institutions were taken over, respectively, by German or Hungarian institutions, the process of Germanization in the Czech regions was slower; in Slovakia most of the institutions retained a substantial degree of independence.

In March 1939 the government granted the Treasury extensive control of Czech banking and financial institutions; in 1942 this control was shifted to the Department for Economic Affairs and Labor of the German State Ministry for the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia.

In March 1939 the National Bank of Czechoslovakia became the National Bank of Bohemia and Moravia, and the government gained extensive control over bank management. Governor K. Engliš resigned in the same month. (In February 1948 the same K. Engliš was ousted from his position as president of Charles University in Prague.)

From 1940 on the Bank was empowered to buy and sell Treasury notes and bills as well as the notes and bills of the German treasury. The German Reichsmark became the second medium of payment in the Protectorate; banks were ordered not to put Reichsmarks into circulation but to forward them to the National Bank, which was obliged to exchange them for domestic crown notes. These notes were then sent back to Germany where the account of the National Bank with the Reichsbank was credited by a corresponding amount. Thus as far as the issue of money is concerned the Bank ceased to be an independent central bank and became only a tool of the Reichsbank, converting Reichsmarks into crowns, never vice versa. By the end of 1944 the Reichsmark holdings of the National Bank rose from nothing to 55.6 billion crowns, while its note issue rose from 6 billion in 1939 to 35 billion in 1944.

The Postal Savings Bank continued its normal operation, while the Rediscount and Lombard Institutions continued to be used for the financing of government credit operations. The Special Fund was abolished in 1941, while the General Fund remained in operation during the war. The Financial Advisory Council was replaced by a "Central Banking Federation" controlled fully by the Germans. The provincial banks remained in operation, while in the group of commercial banks important changes were carried out.

All extensive Jewish property in banking was expropriated by the German Reich. Through a series of involved banking operations, expropriations, use of controlling interest, etc., all Czech banks except the powerful Živnostenská banka were taken over by German banks.

In addition to these changes in ownership and control there were changes in the structure itself. A number of banks were liquidated or joined with some other bank. Thus, Živnostenská banka took over the Česká banka and Česká průmyslová banka, Česká banka Union took over Německá zemědělská banka and Pražská úvěrní banka, etc. The number of commercial banks in existence was thus decreased considerably.

Savings Banks and Savings Institutions. As in the case of commercial banks, the savings banks and savings institutions were subjected to forced mergers. The government order of 1942 established a new central bank for these institutions, the Central Bank of Cooperatives for Bohemia and Moravia.

Private Banks. The huge Petschek and Company voluntarily liquidated in 1938 and was taken over by the Živnostenská banka. Over two-thirds of private banks were liquidated by 1942, and presumably the process continued after 1942 as well.

Slovak Banks

The Slovak branch of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia became the National Bank of Slovakia. The government of Slovakia owned 51 per cent of the stock and, because the voting strength was based on the number of shares owned (and not as before in the case of National Bank of Czechoslovakia on the basis of one vote to any owner), the government controlled the Bank. In place of the former Czechoslovak institutions, Slovak ones with slightly changed names were created after March 1949. There was some simplification of the banking structure as Slovak banks took over branches of the former Czechoslovak banks. As a result, out of thirty-one commercial banks which operated in Slovakia in 1939 only a third remained in existence in 1944. Only Živnostenská banka and Moravská banka succeeded in maintaining their branches in Slovakia.

Abroad

After the recognition of the Czechoslovak government in 1940 and 1941 by the Allies, the Czechoslovak government in exile had its own treasury. A British loan to Czechoslovakia in 1938 was converted into a Refugee Trust Fund; other assets were consolidated in Czechoslovak Financial Claims Funds. The Savings Bank of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces Abroad was guaranteed by the government.

Post-War Development

The post-war situation is characterized by a highly confused development in the Czechoslovak monetary and banking structure. Many of the banks liquidated by the Germans appear, only to be swallowed again

by nationalization decrees and concentration of the Czechoslovak banking and financial institutions. Some simplifications in the structure introduced by Germans are being permitted to function for a few years until the new Communist government has the time (and the power) to achieve the desired reorganization. The development of the structure of the Czechoslovak banking and financial institutions is illustrated by Table 1 on the following pages. In 1952 the process of reorganization ended because, it appears, the Communists reached a situation in which they have only three types of institutions: the State Bank, as the bank of issue and fiscal agent; a commercial bank, the Investment Bank, with a self-explanatory function; and the State Savings Banks, designed to collect the savings of the population and carry out very minor banking operations.

The Monetary and Banking System at Work¹

In Czechoslovakia very little was said about monetary policy and the public issues involved in it. All discussion of banking policy problems limits itself strictly to the micro-economic point of view and no mention

¹The law of 1952 which finished the reorganization of the banking structure illuminates the present formal organization and operation of monetary and banking institutions in Czechoslovakia; the following are several important parts of this law:

Law issued on the eleventh of December, 1952 and concerned with the organization of monetary institutions.

Part 1. Basic purpose

1. The plan of the development of the national economy makes it the task of the monetary institutions to carry out financial control over the production and circulation of goods, over the investment activity, over the fulfillment of the plan of supply and the plan of sales, over the fulfillment of the plan to decrease costs and over the fulfillment of the plan to raise the productivity of labor, over the acceleration of the movement of inventories, over the fulfillment of the principle of economizing and over the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the principles of chazrastchot. This plan makes it the task of the financial institutions as well to pay attention to the raise of the savings of the toiling people and to utilize these savings for the building of the socialistic economy. To make it possible for the financial institutions to carry out all these tasks more effectively, the following changes in the organizational structure are herewith carried out.

2. Monetary and financial structure is constituted by state financial

Table 1 (A)
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURE OF BANKING AND SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS TO 1950 *

Date	Banks of Issue	Commercial Banks	Private Banks	Postal Savings Banks	Special Banks
Before 5/10/45	(1) Národní banka pro Čechy a Moravu (2) Slovenská národní banka	great number	great number	(1) Poštovní spořitelna (2) Poštová spořitelna	(1) Československý reeskontní a lombardní ústav (2) Slovenská hypotečná a komunální banka (3) Zemská banka (4) Česká hypoteční banka (5) Moravská hypoteční a zemědělská banka (6) Slezská zemská a obecní úvěrní společnost
5/10/45	(1) and (2) consolidated in Národní banka Československá	consolidated: (1) Legio banka (2) Zemědělská banka (3) Živnostenská banka (4) Pražská úvěrní banka (5) Ústřední bankadružstev (6) Moravská banka (7) Plzeňská banka (8) Slovenská banka (9) Sedliacká banka (10) Stredoslovenská banka (11) Tartra banka (12) Myjavská banka (13) Ľudová banka		(1) and (2) consolidated in Poštovní spořitelna	

Table 1 (A) (continued)

Date	Banks of Issue	Commercial Banks	Private Banks	Postal Savings Banks	Special Banks
10/24/45 1/16/48 2/3/48	↓ nationalized reorganized	nationalized (1) & (2) consolidated in (A) Legio banka (3) & (4) consolidated in (B) Živno banka (5), (6) & (7) in (C) Moravska banka (8) - (13) in (D) Slovenska banka (E) Tatra banka (A), (B) & (C) in (I) Živnobanka (D) & (E) in (II) Slovenska Tatra banka	nationalized and liquidated		
7/20/48		Reorganized as "National Enterprises"		Reorganized as "National Enterprises"	(1) through (6) consolidated in Investicni banka
3/9/50	became "Statni banka" ↓	↓ Státní banka		↓	↓ Investiční banka

* Source: Boris P. Pesek, "Monetary Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1945-53," Ph. D. dissertation in preparation, University of Chicago.

Table 1 (B)
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURE OF BANKING AND SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS TO 1950*

Dates	in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia		in Slovakia	
	Central Unit	Members	Central Unit	Members
5/10/45	(1) Ústřední banka československých sporitelů (2) Peněžní ústředí družstev	Spořitelny Okresní hospodarské záložny Všeobecné záložny Záložny Družstva	(1) Ústředná federácia Slovenských Sportelů (2) Svaz rolnických uzajomných pokladnic (3) Ústredne družstvo (4) Živnosväz	Spořitelně Úverné družstvá
7/9/50	(1) and (2) consoli- dated in Lidové peněžní ústředí	consolidated in Okresní spořitelny Okresní záložny Spořitelny Záložny Družstva	(1) and (2) consolidated in Lidové Peněžní ústředie	Okresní spořitelna Okresní pokladnica Spořitelna Pokladnica Družstva
3/9/50	Státní spořitelny			

* Source: Boris P. Pesek, "Monetary Policy in Czechoslovakia, 1945-53," Ph. D dissertation in preparation, University of Chicago.

is made of the effects of this policy on the level of prices; even so some conclusions can be drawn.

Implicitly, all the rules indicate that the established belief was that if only the banks would limit themselves to credit based on real bills, currency would become stabilized. When money is discussed, Stalin's

institutions, namely

(1) State Bank of Czechoslovakia

(2) Investment Bank

(3) State Savings Banks

3. (1) The State Bank of Czechoslovakia is the only bank of issue, the only bank supplying short term credit, and the fiscal and clearing agent of the Czechoslovak Republic both internally and externally.

(2) The Investment Bank finances investments and supplies long term credit.

Part II. State Bank of Czechoslovakia

7. The State Bank of Czechoslovakia is subject to the supreme leadership of the Treasury.

8. The State Bank prepares and presents the plans of credit and the plans of money issue to the Treasury which passes these plans, after appropriate negotiations, further on to the Government for approval.

Part III. Investment Bank

13. (1) The Investment Bank ceases to be a national enterprise and is organized as a state financial institution.

(2) The organization, sphere of activity and the method of operations of the Investment Bank will be regulated by a statute to be issued by the Government.

Part IV. State Savings Banks

14. (1) The existing institutes of peoples finances are converted into state financial institutions.

(3) The State Savings Banks care above all for the collection of monetary savings of the toiling people in the form of deposits and State loans and they administer them. Other tasks will be specified by the Treasury.

15. The activities of the State Savings Banks are regulated and controlled by the Treasury.

dictum is often found:

Money is a tool of bourgeois economics which the Soviet Government took over and adjusted to the interest of socialism, to develop to the maximum the Soviet trade and thus to prepare conditions for a direct exchange of products.²

Thus money is a passing phenomenon in the Soviet society, tainted by its past and headed for extinction in the future. As such it presents ideological and dogmatic pitfalls which the Czech writers preferred to avoid by sticking to practical discussion. Still, here and there more general discussions of money were published, translated from Russian economic journals. Even there one learns about the author's views on desirable monetary policy, learning what the author supports, but indirectly by learning what the author rejects. Nevertheless, in all of them the idea of real bills is distinctly present. Thus A. Aleksejev writes:

In the times of pre-monopolistic capitalism the predominant part of currency was constituted by banknotes supplied by banks of issue on the basis of gold quantity or on the basis of real bills. That was the cause of relative elasticity of the supply of money--this is, of the ability of this supply to increase or decrease according to the requirements of trade--though there was no assurance that catastrophic convulsions will not happen in times of crisis.

In the times of general crisis of capitalism not a trace was left of the once-existing elasticity of money supply. Nowadays banknotes are not supported by gold nor by real bills but mostly by state securities. Under these conditions, for all practical purposes the limits to the note issue were abolished, the basis of note issue became fictitious and banknotes changed into common, devaluating paper money which only assumed the name of banknotes. We cannot take seriously the theory, submitted by the ideologists of German imperialism and accepted now as a weapon of Anglo-American propaganda, which asserts that state securities and treasury notes represent better cover for bank notes than "evidently backward gold," real bills, and foreign exchanges.

²J. V. Stalin, Otázky Leninismu (Prague: Svoboda, 1952), p. 462.

The beliefs of Keynes and of his overseas admirers on the stability of paper money "regulated" by the state (of course in the interest of monopolistic capitalists) are modernized versions of nominalistic³ theories of Knapp and Bendixen and their Fascist supporters. All these quasi-theories are constantly failing.⁴

These and other similar articles point out in abstract language what the Czechoslovak economic policy expressed concretely: that having the supply of real bill as the foundation of money will provide the country with a firm, solid currency.

In Czechoslovakia the application of the real bills doctrine can be seen from the very start of the postwar period. The policy applied was essentially Adam Smith's, and the worries resulting from it could be expressed by two of his terms: "overtrading" and "fictitious bills."

The following passage serves as a preliminary outline of the actual rules imposed on the banking system. It may be noted that this is a description of the intent and not the actual working of Communist banking policies.

Financial plans should be prepared so as to maximize profits. Financial plans are the plans of production, of labor, of supplies of raw materials, of decrease of production costs, and of sales. The Statute of Nationalized Enterprises explicitly orders how profit should be reached: not by increase in price or decreases in quality or in wages, but only through the decrease of production or other costs. Profit is the regulator of the activity of the enterprise and it guarantees that the enterprise, while fulfilling the plan--which remains its task--will attempt to utilize resources most economically. Control through monetary accounting is carried out by the State and Investment Bank. Both have monopoly positions in the money market because they concentrate and control all accounts of the enterprises. Because notes are used only to pay wages, and because credits among enterprises are prohibited, the banks can follow the movements of funds on the accounts of the enterprises. Control consists in the comparison of actual and planned results. . . . Whenever financial results are worse than the provisions of the plan permit,

³This is sometimes known as the "chartel" theory of money. Cf. Howard E. Ellis, German Monetary Theory (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 21, 37-38.

⁴A. Aleksejev, "Zrušení měnového chaosu," Planovane Hospodářství, 111, No. 2-3, p. 145.

the bank carries out a revision; it has the right to examine the accounting of the enterprise and the enterprise is bound to supply to it the required data and to document these data. The plan and the control of performance are not limited to the final balance, but this balance is broken down in detail. Thus, for instance, the State Bank checks whether the enterprise overstepped the amount permitted for wage payments; the Investment Bank pays the permitted credit only in stages, with the progress of investments, and controls whether the money is used according to the plan.⁵

As can be seen, it was intended that the banks should scrutinize every payment to make sure it was ordered by the enterprise in accordance with the plan. It is easy to imagine what tasks this rule would impose on the banking system. While there is no good measurement of the total turnover of deposits of business enterprises, existing estimates indicate that this turnover is probably five to fifteen times as high as the yearly gross national product--which would imply that the Czech banking system was supposed to scrutinize yearly payments amounting to 3,000 billion crowns. This would be impossible even if bank employees were receiving dependable documentary evidence, but they were ordered to make sure that the goods for which payments were made, especially those on the basis of which credit is granted, did actually exist.⁶ Similarly, the officials of the Investment Bank were supposed to visit each investment project monthly, to make sure personally that the report of the building concern on performance and the acceptance of this piece of work by the investing enterprise were truthful, and that work of the described quantity and quality were actually performed.

The expectation that the officials of the State and Investment Bank will be able to check the physical existence of the credited goods and their quality also appears impossible; and yet, what else could be attempted within the conditions given in Czechoslovakia? In many cases fraud in business activity is difficult to establish. The main deterrent to less than

⁵V. Chalupa, "Organisace československého průmyslu," Tribuna, 1954, No. 5-6, p. 13.

⁶Finance a úvěr, 1953, No. 2, p. 80.

honest dealings between debtor and creditor is the danger that if the enterprise works less than efficiently, even if not fraudulently, future credit will be refused. This deterrent could not be used in Czechoslovakia, for

Among offenders appear exactly the most essential enterprises. Surely no one could get the idea that we should refuse. . . to these enterprises the delivery of coal, for instance. Why? Because we realize that would punish not only a certain enterprise, but we would cripple the entire national economy and thus punish all of us.⁷

To limit and regulate the quantity of credit, stringent conditions were imposed. Credit was classified in several categories. The first distinguished between planned and unplanned credit. Unplanned credits were permitted only to enterprises which got into financial difficulties, through no fault of their own, but because of the failure of some other enterprise to perform adequately. Another category was inventory credits and turnover credits. Inventory credit was considered bad because enterprises maintain inventories all the time, therefore inventory credit is permanent. On the other hand, turnover credits could be granted on goods being used by the enterprise and be limited in time from the purchase of raw material to the sale of finished product. In one case the problem is to force the decrease of inventories, in the other to force the speed-up of turnover. (This seems to be merely a terminological difference.)

Credit, quality-wise, was supposed to conform to certain qualitative requirements: (1) It had to be "direct" or "centralized." Both these terms are used to describe the monopoly of the two banks in granting credit. (2) It had to be "specific." According to the provisions of the law, credit could be granted only for specifically defined purposes foreseen by the plan, and should be tied directly to performance. (3) It had to be "returnable," that is, it had to be provided only for those activities which would end in the foreseeable future. A permanent increase in inventories, for instance, could not be credit financed. (4) It had to be time limited.

⁷Ibid., 1954, No. 4, p. 92.

The length of time it would be granted had to be specified. (5) It had to be secured by goods. In 1952 it was explicitly stated that credit must not be granted on security consisting of "surplus goods, useless goods, unsalable goods, goods of subnormal quality, goods improperly stored, and rejects."⁸

As mentioned earlier, these rules were unworkable, and enforcing them was beyond the physical capacity of the banking system. The idea of preparing financial plans for every enterprise in which every payment and every receipt will be foreseen month by month for the next twelve months is hardly realistic: in an economy where good allocation of resources is taken into consideration, changes in relative prices are inevitable; even if optimum allocation of resources is disregarded, wrong price ratios prevent fulfillment of the plan.⁹

Price changes naturally invalidate the financial plans. Thus, one of the costs of the financial plans is that incorrect price relationships are kept to prevent breakdown of the controlling mechanism. But, of course, the line can not be kept everywhere: some prices will get so much out of line that adjustments are inevitable. As is usual, the end result is that the planner sitting on two claims falls in between them. Prices are desperately maintained to prevent breakdowns in financial plans and thus the allocation of resources and the fulfillment of the plan are impaired. But this is impossible to do consistently and in the end some price adjustments are made, either officially or, by sheer force of economic necessity, unofficially, and the financial plans break down anyway. Further, even if it is assumed that prices have no reason to change, there are inevitably some disturbances in the economy: one enterprise works much more efficiently than expected; another enterprise encounters unforeseeable difficulties. As a result of this, trade patterns must be rearranged either temporarily or permanently. As the disturbance,

⁸Ibid., 1953, No. 1, p. 10.

⁹Cf. chapter on economic policies.

either in the positive or negative sense, is absorbed by the national economy, its effects spread in all directions. With changing patterns of trade go changing patterns of payments.

If anyone were to take the financial plans (on which the credit operation of the banks were supposed to be based) seriously, the rigidity they would introduce into the economy would probably be unbearable and disastrous. The cost of unworkable schemes appears to be that the disregard of them becomes more widespread than required: actually, even the break in the dam holding credit expansion in Czechoslovakia was bound to become, and became, more widespread than required.

State Banks and Investment Banks permitted, even in 1952, automatism to rule their credit operations and . . . granted credit on the basis of the reports of the enterprises about their needs for money to pay workers, suppliers, and for other purposes.

Many leaders of enterprises base their thoughts on the damaging viewpoint that in the end the State Bank shall supply them with money for all their needs.¹⁰

Greater difficulties were revealed later:

Commercial credit (credit of one enterprise to another) is forbidden and should have disappeared. Instead of disappearing it spread to enormous proportions and today is not an exception but a rule.

The credit system was supposed to discover shortcomings in enterprises. But shortage of money is even greater in enterprises other than those which cause the entire situation (by not paying properly).

The credit system was supposed to differ from the previous (1951) in that credits would not be granted automatically. The truth is that credit is not automatically supplied by banks but it is automatically supplied by other enterprises and by the state budget. And even the banks are crediting automatically, whether they like it or not, when normal credits become overdue.

Shortcomings should not be credited. From the foregoing it is clear that they are automatically credited, only now they cannot be discovered so well and fast.¹¹

¹⁰ Finance a úvěr, 1953, No. 2, p. 80.

¹¹ Ibid., 1954, No. 4, p. 92.

The burning problem, discussed vigorously in 1953 and 1954, became the "chain-indebtedness of enterprises." Out of the available funds the enterprises paid wages and salaries, and if something was by any chance left, it was sent to the suppliers. These did not worry unduly, because to secure public peace the Bank was always ready to supply funds for wages and salaries; the suppliers of these indifferent creditors could fend for themselves. The situation gained a humorous touch when one of the financial specialists exclaimed:

We are now so far that enterprises have not only printed forms on which to bill the non-payers penal fees, but they have even printed forms in which they acknowledge their obligations but declare themselves unable to pay because of lack of money.¹²

Monetary policy in Czechoslovakia appeared to be based on the real-bills doctrine. It was shown that even if the stringent conditions required for the operation of the real-bills doctrine were maintained, it would be purely a matter of chance whether the system would be stable, inflationary, or deflationary. In addition to the requirements imposed on the real-bill technique of credit by Law, Stewart, and Smith, and their successors, the Communists imposed the additional condition that all credit must be planned a year in advance. Regardless of whether the assertion of unworkability and unenforceability is correct, in Czechoslovakia the rules imposed upon the banks and enterprises as far as credit is concerned were actually not operative before the monetary reform in 1953. The resulting inflation disrupted economic processes to such a degree that the reform of June 1953 was required. In this reform all prices were reduced to one-fifth of their pre-reform level; state debt in the form of cash and deposits was reduced from one-fifth to one-fiftieth of the nominal value, depending on the type of holding (cash or deposits) and on the amount of funds held. State debt in the form of securities was repudiated completely.

Many of the most crucial documents quoted above are dated after the monetary reform. This suggests very convincingly that the inflationary process is uninterrupted even after the monetary reform. The policy

¹²Ibid.

that the oldest and easiest way out of trouble is to pay yourself out of it has its attractions as well as dangers. Its worst fault is that it leads to waste of resources. Inflation means a seller's market; anything resembling a good sell. This is true not only about consumer goods but about investment goods as well. It may be a sensible method for carrying out a crash program in some particular field, regardless of costs elsewhere; it can hardly be a sensible way to run a national economy all along. It is sometimes said that because the Russian rulers are interested in specific Czech fields, like heavy industry, inflation is therefore not surprising and that it may be a deliberate tool for this crash program. This claim is hard to credit because no rules were observed which would channelize inflationary forces: inflation appears to be free to start spontaneously in any enterprise in the economy, regardless of whether it produces butter or guns. It appears that there was little difference between the rises in price of consumer goods and investment goods.¹³ In the absence of such channels, and in the absence of substantial disparity between the prices of consumer goods and investment goods, inflation can hardly be considered a sensible policy tool. Again, as in many other places, the dogmas of planning enthusiasts appear to be the real culprits. These dogmas require that every economic variable be set in advance, closely regulated, controlled and "fulfilled" lest "automatism" creep in.

As was said, this appears to be an impossible goal. By fixing all possible sets of variable (the price system, the pattern of credit, the pattern of payments, pattern of output), the planners are bound to create contradictory and inconsistent forces at the outset of each year. But even should they succeed in fixing all these sets of economic variables correctly, in any other than a purely static economy this mutual consistency cannot last long because of inevitable changes and disturbances. The more rigidities in the system, the more costly the disturbance. Financial plans and planned credit proved to be, and are, among the outstanding rigidities of the Czechoslovak economy. Inflation was the result; for the period 1946-1953 it was amply documented. All the news on relevant variables seems to indicate that another round of it is in progress now.

¹³ See Table 8, chapter on national income.

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NATIONAL INCOME OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

National income accounting is an eminently suitable tool for the analysis of the structure of the national economy and its growth processes. In countries where centralized economic planning is absent and economic changes are decided upon and executed by countless individuals, such accounting is essential for the measurement of performance; without such measurement the ceaseless economic change would go undetected. On the other hand, in countries where most of the economic capacity is subject to centralized planning, national income accounting is needed lest one succumb to the temptation to generalize on the basis of spectacular successes or failures in certain sectors of the economy. For Western countries national income accounts are prepared either officially or semi-officially; for countries of the Soviet bloc there are some official data of highly questionable value and a great number of high-quality studies dealing with the U.S.S.R. exclusively. Other countries of the Soviet bloc were, until recently, completely neglected.

In the case of Czechoslovakia there are two main periods, the periods before and after 1945. For the former, data on Czech national income were prepared by Miloš Stádník.¹ For the period after 1945 there are some figures by Stádník which are of but questionable value. Why these data are questionable is easiest to understand if it is noted that his national income accounts for 1947 were published in November 1947.² For the period 1946-53 there are the national income accounts prepared by Boris P. Pesek.³

¹Miloš Stádník, Národní důchod v Československu (Prague: Československá společnost národno hospodářská, 1947).

²Dr. Jaromír Dolanský, Výklad k rozpočtu na rok 1948 s přílohou. Národní důchod a národní výdaj ČSR v letech 1946 a 1947 (Prague: Treasury Department, 1947).

³Boris P. Pesek, "Monetary Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1945-53," Ph. D. dissertation in preparation, University of Chicago.

On several grounds it seems preferable to treat these periods separately and not to attempt any comparison. First of all, Stádník was able to draw upon all the statistical data available to the administration, while Pesek could only attempt to fit together scattered pieces of information; a great margin of error in Pesek's estimate is therefore inevitable. There is a more fundamental reason. The prewar market is distinguished by being a buyer's market: high-quality goods are sold with good service to a buyer who has a wide variety of choices. The postwar market is essentially a seller's market: low-quality goods are sold with almost no extra service to a buyer who has very little choice.

Prewar Accounts

Stádník's figures indicate the following development of the national income of Czechoslovakia during the prewar and war period:

Table 1
NATIONAL INCOME OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1929-1949*

Dates, 1929-1944	National Income	Cost of Living Price Index	National Income in 1929 Prices
1929	66.1	100.00	66.10
1930	66.9	100.21	66.70
1931	62.3	95.83	65.00
1932	55.4	94.12	58.80
1933	52.6	92.94	56.61
1934	52.2	91.88	56.80
1935	51.5	94.65	59.40
1936	51.5	94.40	53.90
1937	58.6	96.79	60.54
1938	55.2	101.28	54.50
1939	38.9	111.11	35.00
1940	45.5	-----	-----
1941	51.5	-----	-----
1942	57.1	-----	-----
1943	60.8	-----	-----
1944	61.3	-----	-----

* Miloš Stádník, op. cit., p. 24.

It is especially striking that the national income of Czechoslovakia in money terms continued to decline until the advent of war in 1937. It is

interesting to compare this development with the United State and the United Kingdom, where the decline of national income was interrupted when the gold standard was abandoned. It seems that the belated Czech devaluation of 1934 could do no more than interrupt this decline.

As there are no overall price indices which could be used to deflate the money income, the consumer price index was used for this purpose. The resulting deflated figures are, of course, burdened by this imperfect method. The data for the war years were not deflated at all because the only index available is the official price index which is based on the prices of price-regulated commodities. This index then expresses the reality (consisting of sharply rising prices of investment goods, of black market prices of consumer goods, and of fixed prices of consumer goods) so poorly that no meaningful result would be obtained. In addition, the data for the war years exclude the territories which were ceded to Germany, Hungary and Poland.

As far as the distribution of this income is concerned, only incomplete data for selected years are available. These are presented as Table 2 on the following page.

Postwar National Income Accounts

Estimates of personal income, which are an important tool for judging the changes of standard of living which were going on during the period under study and for understanding the distribution of income among different sectors, are presented in Table 3.

On the basis of the many tests to which these accounts were subjected it seems that they are a fair expression of reality. To mention the two most obvious: (1) Both sides of the account--the personal disposable income on the one hand and personal consumption expenditures on the other--stay in reasonable proximity during the whole period, despite the fact that in money terms the figures treble within the eight years under study. (2) Deflating these rapidly increasing values yields a very stable personal consumption expenditure in real terms; again this would seem to indicate that both the tables on personal income and disposition of income

Table 2
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1929-1933*

	(in percentages)				
	<u>1929</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1937</u>
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Farmers' income	17.54	17.22	15.80	12.37	13.29
Rental value of farms	0.82	0.80	1.07	1.09	0.98
Income from forestry	0.85	0.82	0.13	0.15	0.60
Entrepreneurial income	13.40	12.78	14.03	13.66	12.45
Wages and salaries	53.41	53.10	51.50	50.73	51.40
Interests	6.20	6.37	6.39	7.07	6.08
Rents, subrents	1.10	1.24	2.50	3.02	2.75
Undistributed profits	0.75	0.29	----	0.38	0.69
Profits of public enterprises	2.08	4.96	3.70	4.32	4.59
Other incomes	3.85	2.42	4.88	7.21	7.17

*Source: Miloš Stádník, op. cit., p. 41

and the price indices express reality well. Because the deflating procedure is essential for the estimate of the quality of the final results (the tables presented give the national income accounts in real terms) it seems advisable to mention that indices take into account both the rationed market prices and the black market prices in

the period from 1946-1948, and both the rationed market prices and the "free" (governmental) market prices in the period 1949-1953.⁴

⁴These two indices are used:

(a) For the period 1946-48:

$$I_n = \frac{(p_{i_n} \cdot q_{i_0}) + a(p_{i_n}^i \cdot q_{i_0}^i) + bB(p_{i_n}^i \cdot q_{i_0}^i) + c(p_{i_n}'' \cdot q_{i_0}'') + dB(p_{i_n}'' \cdot q_{i_0}'')}{P_{i_0} \cdot Q_{i_0}} \times 100$$

Where p_i and q_i stand for prices and quantities of goods included under the heading of "household goods", rent", and "miscellaneous" in Pesek's price index;

p_i^i and q_i^i stand for prices and quantities for goods included under the heading of "food";

p_i'' and q_i'' stand for prices and quantities of goods included under the heading "textile" and "footwear";

a and b are the implied average weights of the rationed market purchases and free market purchases of foodstuffs from 1949 to 1953;

c and d are the average weights of the rationed market purchases of textiles and shoewear from 1949 to 1953;

B stands for the ratio of black market prices to rationed market prices at any quarter of the years 1946-1948;

P_i and Q_i stand for prices and quantities of goods included in the index, with prices as existing on the rationed market; finally

n denotes time ($n = 0 = 1928$; $n = 0' = \text{April } 1947$; $n = 1 = 1946$, $n = 2 = 1947$, etc.)

(b) For the period 1948-53:

$$I_n = \frac{(p_{i_n} \cdot q_{i_0})}{(p_{i_0} \cdot q_{i_0})} \times 100 \quad P_{i_n} = \frac{(p_{fn} \cdot q_{fo}'') + (p_{rn} \cdot q_{ro}'')}{P_{fo}'' + q_{ro}''}$$

Where p_i and q_i stand for prices and quantities of the i -th good included in the index and subscripts

f and r denote free and rationed market respectively; other notations are the same as before. The $n = 0'' = 1952$.

It is obvious that the index for 1945-48 is a cruder and simpler version of the index for 1949-53.

Table 3
PERSONAL INCOME AND DISPOSITION OF INCOME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*
(in millions of crowns)

	1946	1947	1948	1949
1. PERSONAL INCOME	149.323	176.080	199.052	230.998
2. Self-employed	31.405	33.762	32.365	30.432
3. Farmers	14.750	13.830	15.352	17.593
4. Members of farm collectives	-	-	-	675
5. Entrepreneurs	15.346	18.415	15.397	12.164
6. Professions	1.309	1.517	1.616	-
7. Employed	106.616	127.338	147.347	164.403
8. Salary employees	30.728	36.589	41.661	47.819
9. Salary workers } 10. Wage workers }	68.359	83.223	97.122	107.857
11. Agricultural workers				
12. Others	6.690	6.414	7.197	7.151
	839	1.112	1.367	1.576
13. Other incomes				
14. Rents	3.672	3.955	4.127	4.234
15. Interests	3.512	3.512	3.512	3.512
16. Transfer payments	160	443	615	722
17. Pensions	12.930	16.975	21.513	31.929
18. Family allowances	6.045	7.136	9.913	15.888
19. Cash sickness compensation	2.466	3.596	3.858	3.945
20. Less: Personal contributions for social security	4.419	6.243	7.742	12.096
21. Less: Personal tax and non-tax payments	5.300	5.950	6.300	-
22. Equals: DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME	9.801	11.604	13.125	15.095
23. Less: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPEN-	139.522	164.476	185.565	215.903
DITURES	127.883	152.362	182.565	219.958
24. Equals: Personal savings	11.639	12.114	3.362	-4.055

*Source: Boris P. Pesek, op. cit., Ch. 2, p. 41.

Table 3 continued
 PERSONAL INCOME AND DISPOSITION OF INCOME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
 (in millions of crowns)

	1950	1951	1952	1953
1. PERSONAL INCOME	285,001	312,667	345,675	449,829
2. Self-employed	33,718	35,194	35,689	53,785
3. Farmers	21,573	24,740	22,156	32,313
4. Members of farm collectives	1,388	1,591	5,872	15,405
5. Entrepreneurs	10,757	8,863	7,661	6,067
6. Professions	---	---	---	---
7. Employed	205,263	228,633	254,668	314,610
8. Salary employees	61,848	62,055	72,782	95,012
9. Salary workers	---	---	---	---
10. Wage workers	134,024	155,164	172,341	210,407
11. Agricultural workers	7,372	9,016	6,827	5,819
12. Others	2,019	2,398	2,718	3,372
13. Other incomes	4,234	4,234	4,234	4,234
14. Rents	3,512	3,512	3,512	3,512
15. Interests	722	722	722	722
16. Transfer payments	41,796	44,606	51,084	77,200
17. Pensions	22,004	24,764	25,663	77,200
18. Family allowances	4,973	6,000	6,721	77,200
19. Cash sickness compensation	14,819	13,842	18,700	---
20. Less: Personal contributions for social security	---	---	---	---
21. Less: Personal tax and non-tax payments	23,100	9,300	20,100	25,817
22. Equals: DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME	261,911	303,367	325,575	424,012
23. Less: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPEN- DITURES	271,428	306,825	351,193	433,947
24. Equals: Personal savings	- 9,517	- 3,458	- 25,618	- 9,929

The price index then yields the following values:

Table 4
PRICE INDEX FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1946-53*

<u>Year</u>	<u>Index</u>
1946	106.5
1947	100.0
1948	122.4
1949	162.3
1950	169.1
1951	187.6
1952	219.6
1953	238.7

* Source: Pesek, op. cit., Ch. 2, p. 38.

The personal income and disposition of income accounts deflated by this index of consumers' prices are presented in Table 5; the individual components as percentages of total appear in Table 6.

Gross National Product

On the basis of the table presenting the personal income and disposition of income and on the basis of other evidence, accounts on sources and uses of gross national product are summarized in Table 7.

In this table a much higher figure for investments is found than in any other publication; these figures are considered superior because not only the budgeted amounts are taken into account but also actually spent amounts, the spent amounts being the addition of the originally appropriated sums and the extra sums which were spent above that amount and covered (with a two-year lag) by supplementary appropriations. For the same reason the figures for governmental expenditures are higher than those in other

Table 5
PERSONAL INCOME AND DISPOSITION OF INCOME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1946-53*
(millions of 1947 crowns)

	1946	1947	1948	1949
1. PERSONAL INCOME	141,645	176,070	162,624	142,372
2. Self-employed	29,790	33,762	26,441	18,756
3. Farmers	13,991	13,830	12,542	10,843
4. Members of farm collectives	---	---	---	416
5. Entrepreneurs	14,557	18,415	12,579	7,495
6. Professions	1,242	1,517	1,320	---
7. Employed	101,134	127,338	120,381	101,327
8. Salaried employees	29,148	36,589	34,037	29,472
9. Salaried workers	64,844	83,223	79,348	66,476
10. Wage workers	6,346	6,414	5,880	4,407
11. Agricultural workers	796	1,112	1,117	971
12. Others	3,483	3,955	3,372	2,609
13. Other income	3,331	3,512	2,869	2,163
14. Rents	152	443	502	445
15. Interest	12,265	16,975	17,576	19,678
16. Transfer payments	5,734	7,136	8,099	9,792
17. Pensions	2,339	3,596	3,152	2,431
18. Family allowance	4,192	6,243	6,325	7,455
19. Cash sickness compensation	---	---	---	---
20. Less: Personal contributions for social security	5,027	5,950	5,147	---
21. Less: Personal tax and non-tax payments	9,296	11,604	10,723	9,304
22. Equals: DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME	132,349	164,466	153,535	133,068
23. Less: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES	121,308	152,362	149,166	135,567
24. Equals: PERSONAL SAVINGS	10,041	12,104	2,747	-2,499

* Source: Pesek, op. cit., Ch. 2, pp. 42, 43. Due to rounding, components do not add up to totals.

Table 5 (continued)
 PERSONAL INCOME AND DISPOSITION OF INCOME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1946-53*
 (millions of 1947 crowns)

	1950	1951	1952	1953
1. PERSONAL INCOME	168.540	166.666	157.411	188.449
2. Self-employed	19.940	18.760	16.252	22.532
3. Farmers	12.757	13.188	10.089	13.537
4. Members of farm collectives	820	848	2.674	6.454
5. Entrepreneurs	6.361	4.724	3.489	2.542
6. Professions	—	—	—	—
7. Employed	121.386	121.873	115.969	131.801
8. Salaried employees	36.574	33.078	33.143	39.804
9. Salaried workers	79.257	82.710	78.479	88.147
10. Wage workers	4.359	4.806	3.109	2.438
11. Agricultural workers	1.194	1.278	1.238	1.413
12. Others	2.304	2.257	1.928	1.774
13. Other income	2.077	1.872	1.599	1.471
14. Rents	426	385	329	302
15. Interest	24.716	23.777	23.262	32.342
16. Transfer payments	13.012	13.200	11.686	—
17. Pensions	2.914	3.198	3.061	32.342
18. Family allowance	8.763	7.378	8.515	—
19. Cash sickness compensation	—	—	—	—
20. Less: personal contributions for social security	—	—	—	—
21. Less: personal tax and non-tax payments	13.660	4.957	9.153	10.816
22. Equals: DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME	154.885	161.709	148.258	177.633
23. Less: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES	160.513	163.553	159.924	181.796
24. Equals: PERSONAL SAVINGS	-5.628	-1.843	-11.666	-4.160

Table 6
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1946-53*

	1946	1947	1948	1949
1. PERSONAL INCOME	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
2. Self-employed	21.03	19.17	16.26	13.17
3. Farmers	9.88	7.85	7.71	7.62
4. Members of farm collectives	—	—	—	0.29
5. Entrepreneurs	10.28	10.46	7.74	5.27
6. Professions	0.88	0.86	0.81	—
7. Employed	71.40	72.32	74.02	71.17
8. Salaried employees	20.58	20.78	20.93	20.70
9. Salaried workers	45.78	47.27	48.79	46.69
10. Wage workers				
11. Agricultural workers	4.48	3.64	3.62	3.09
12. Others	0.56	0.63	0.69	0.68
13. Other income	2.46	2.25	2.07	1.83
14. Rents	2.35	1.99	1.75	1.52
15. Interest	0.11	0.25	0.31	0.31
16. Transfer payments	8.66	9.64	10.81	13.82
17. Pensions	4.05	4.05	4.98	6.87
18. Family allowances	1.65	2.04	1.94	1.71
19. Cash sickness compensations	2.96	3.55	3.88	5.24
20. Less: Personal contributions for social security	3.54	3.37	3.16	—
21. Less: Personal tax and non-tax payments	6.56	6.59	6.59	6.53
22. Equals: DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME	93.44	93.41	93.41	93.46
23. Less: Personal consumption expenditures	85.64	86.53	91.72	95.22
24. Equals: PERSONAL SAVINGS	7.79	6.87	1.69	-1.75

* Source: Pesek, op. cit., Ch. 2, pp. 44-45. Because of rounding, components do not add up to totals.

Table 6 (continued)
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1946-53*

	1950	1951	1952	1953
1. PERSONAL INCOME	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
2. Self-employed	11.83	11.26	10.32	11.96
3. Farmers	7.57	7.91	6.41	7.18
4. Members of farm collectives	0.49	0.51	1.70	3.42
5. Entrepreneurs	3.77	2.84	2.22	1.35
6. Professions	---	---	---	---
7. Employed	72.02	73.12	73.67	69.94
8. Salaried employees	21.70	19.85	21.05	21.12
9. Salaried workers	47.02	49.62	49.86	46.77
10. Wage Workers	2.59	2.88	1.97	1.29
11. Agriculture workers	0.71	0.77	0.79	0.75
12. Others	1.48	1.35	1.22	0.94
13. Other income	1.23	1.12	1.02	0.78
14. Rents	0.25	0.23	0.21	0.16
15. Interest	14.66	14.26	14.78	17.16
16. Transfer payments	7.72	7.92	7.42	---
17. Pensions	1.74	1.92	1.94	17.16
18. Family allowances	5.20	4.43	5.41	---
19. Cash sickness compensations	---	---	---	---
20. Less: Personal contributions for social security	---	---	---	---
21. Less: Personal tax and non-tax payments	8.10	2.97	5.81	5.74
22. Equals: DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME	91.90	97.03	94.19	94.26
23. Less: Personal consumption expenditures	95.24	98.13	101.60	96.46
24. Equals: PERSONAL SAVINGS	-3.34	-1.10	-7.41	-2.21

Table 7
THE SOURCES AND USES OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1946-53*
(millions of crowns)

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
1. Consumer purchases	127.883	152.362	182.565	219.958	271.428	306.825	351.193	433.947
2. Gross private savings								
3. personal savings	11.639	12.104	3.362	-4.055	-9.517	-3.458	-25.618	-9.929
4. savings by enterprises								
5. Statistical discrepancy	6.620	17.684	37.854	36.123	58.960	18.692	56.648	-6.518
6. Taxes (including social security contributions minus transfer payments)	34.387	37.195	54.769	108.887	140.070	218.859	279.200	326.800
7. GROSS NATIONAL EXPENDITURES	180.529	219.345	378.550	360.913	460.941	540.918	661.423	745.3..
8. Consumer purchases	127.883	152.362	182.565	219.958	271.428	306.825	351.193	433.947
9. Gross domestic investments	16.250	24.750	43.736	89.041	122.735	147.316	157.830	167.000
10. By enterprises	5.000	16.239	23.489	29.400	43.800	22.800	31.000	37.000
11. By government	11.250	8.511	20.247	59.641	78.935	124.516	126.830	130.000
12. Government purchases of goods and services	44.996	49.433	56.549	51.005	62.348	92.019	133.4..	166.8..
13. Government investments () or disinvestments () in emergency stocks of consumption goods								
14. Net foreign balance	-8.600	-7.200	-4.300	.909	4.430	-6.250	n.a.	n.a.
15. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	180.529	219.345	278.550	360.913	460.941	540.918	661.4..	745.3..

* Source: Pesek, op. cit., Ch. 3.

publications; this difference is often substantial. For instance, for the year 1951 the budgeted expenditures⁵ amounted to 166.2 billion crowns; this figure is by all other writers taken to represent actual expenditures⁶ while according to this table the actual amount spent reached 218 billion. Discrepancies of the same type can be observed in all other years. These monetary magnitudes were then deflated so as to present the gross national product in real terms. The implicit deflators used are presented in Table 8.

Table 8
IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATORS FOR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY
MAJOR SEGMENTS, 1946-53*

Consumption expenditures	106.5	100.0	120.0	162.3	169.1	187.6	214.7	238.7
Investments	92.0	100.0	106.8	191.5	188.5	226.3	215.0	236.9
Government expenditures:	87.2	100.0	107.3	144.7	151.1	174.0	176.4	192.3
on goods	92.0	100.0	106.8	191.5	188.5	226.3	215.0	236.9
on services	85.6	100.0	107.7	113.5	126.6	139.1	150.6	162.5
Net foreign investments	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

* Source: Pesek, op. cit., Ch. 3.

By the use of these deflators the gross national product in real terms was then calculated as shown by Table 9 on the following page. Another useful technique of presentation of the data is to show relative changes in

⁵Including transfer payments and other payments which are later subtracted for the calculation of the gross product.

⁶Cf. Bruno Kiesewetter, Die Wirtschaft der Tschechoslowakei seit 1945 (Berlin : Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, n. d.) p. 28.

Table 9
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN CONSTANT CROWNS, 1946-53*

	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
8. Consumer purchases	121.308	152.362	149.166	135.567	160.513	163.553	159.924	181.796
9. Gross domestic investments	17.663	24.750	40.962	46.505	65.106	65.106	73.387	70.500
12. Government purchases of goods and services	51.600	59.433	52.701	35.249	41.263	52.884	75.623	86.739
13. Government investments () or disinvestments () in emergency stocks of consumption goods						.533	8.853	-9.386
14. Net foreign investments /	-8.600	-7.200	-4.300	.909	4.430	-6.250	n.a.	n.a.
15. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	181.971	219.345	238.529	218.230	271.312	275.826	317.787	329.649

* Source: Pesek, op. cit., Ch. 3.

/ Left undeflated.

the gross national product and its components over time. This is done in Table 10.

Table 10
RELATIVE CHANGES IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN
CONSTANT CROWNS, 1946-53 (1947 - 100)*

Consumption	79.6	100.0	97.9	88.9	105.3	107.3	104.9	119.3
Investments	71.3	100.0	165.5	187.9	263.0	263.0	296.5	284.8
Government expenditures	104.3	100.0	106.6	71.3	83.5	106.9	152.9	175.5
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	83.0	100.0	108.7	99.5	123.6	125.7	144.8	150.3

*Source: Pesek, op. cit., Ch. 4.

And finally, a table showing the percentage distribution of gross national product in each year of the 1946-1953, comparing these data with the data for prewar Czechoslovakia and for the United States, is presented in Table 11 on the following page.

Conclusion

After 1948 the regime did not publish any accounts at all; it just published percentage changes in the final figure of "national income," which probably means "gross national product." Of course, a single figure for each year is useless, because it defies any interpretation. The comparison is presented in Table 12.

Thus while there is substantial agreement as to the percentage of G.N.P. invested, our figures taken without qualification lend support neither to the official claims of stupendous progress nor to other claims of gloom and doom.

Table 11
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT*
 IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND UNITED STATES, 1937 AND 1946-53

Year	1937		1946		1947		1948	
	ČSR	USA	ČSR	USA	ČSR	USA	ČSR	USA
1. Personal consumption	81.4	74.1	66.6	70.1	69.5	71.0	62.5	69.0
2. Gross private investments plus governmental new construction plus changes in emergency stocks (in ČSR only)	6.3	15.3	9.7	14.1	11.3	14.3	17.2	17.9
3. Government expenditures on goods and services	12.6	10.5	28.4	11.2	22.5	10.8	22.1	12.3
4. Net foreign balance	-0.3	0.1	-4.7	2.2	-3.3	3.8	-1.8	0.8
5. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Year	1949		1950		1951		1952		1953	
	ČSR	USA	ČSR	USA	ČSR	USA	ČSR	USA	ČSR	USA
1.	62.2	70.2	59.2	68.1	59.3	63.5	50.3	63.1	55.2	63.1
2.	21.3	15.1	24.0	20.5	23.8	20.2	25.9	17.1	18.5	17.2
3.	16.1	14.5	15.2	12.2	19.2	16.2	23.8	19.2	26.3	20.3
4.	0.4	0.2	1.6	-0.8	-2.3	0.1	n.a.	---	n.a.	-0.5
5.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Source: Pesek, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4.

Table 12
COMPARISON OF TABLES 10 AND 11 WITH OFFICIAL DATA*

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
G. N. P.	100	108.7	99.5	123.6	125.7	144.8	150.3
Official figures for national income	100	108	122	132	145	167	178
Investment figures as percentage of G. N. P.	11.3	17.2	21.3	24.0	23.8 [†]	25.9 [†]	18.5 [†]
Official investment figures as percentage of national income	n. a.	n. a.	23.6	22.3	24.7	24.3	24.8

* Source: Tables 10 and 11. Official figures taken from Economic Survey of Europe in 1953 (Geneva: United Nations, 1954), p. 60.

[†] Includes government investment (disinvestment) in stocks of consumer goods.

It must be realized that in 1947 production still had not recovered from the disorganization caused by wartime events and postwar political disorder and nationalization. Therefore stabilization of the economy was bound to provide rises in the national income apart from any genuine progress. Furthermore, Table 9 indicates that one-third of the rise in the G. N. P. is caused by a rise in the production of goods and services by the government.

The government production of goods and services rose 70 per cent from 1947 to 1953. Part of it was a genuine rise in the production of final goods: health services, production of certain cultural values, etc. Part of it, on the other hand, was production of intermediate goods which left the available amount of final goods unchanged: creation of the departments of Heavy Industry, Chemical Industry, Coal Industry, etc., which started to administer and control existing production and allocate resources formerly allocated automatically through the free market. This

part should be eliminated from the governmental product which is counted in the gross national product; unfortunately there is no way of distinguishing numerically between governmental production of final and intermediate goods. In a state where government functions of the above-described type do not change drastically over short periods of time this error is negligible; in Czechoslovakia in the period from 1947 to 1953 the overestimation of the rise of G.N.P. on this account is probably substantial. If we, purely arbitrarily, assume that one-half of the increase was genuine production of final goods, the rise in G.N.P. would decrease to 41 per cent from 1947 to 1953.

The second difficulty is that the gross national product figures cannot distinguish between useful and useless goods. The national income approach disregards this valuation problem, because it is insoluble. Of course it is necessary to realize that in prewar Czechoslovakia and in Western countries most investments are made on profit-cost basis, while in Czechoslovakia of today this sobering requirement does not exist. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the amount of waste which appears in the national income counted as goods rose substantially from 1947 to 1953. This is more than sufficiently supported by the evidence presented by the Czechoslovak government itself. In 1952 the chief of the Planning Department, Ing. Pučík, said, "74,000 square meters of newly built factory space remain idle because necessary machinery was not yet supplied."⁷ Dr. Dolanský, Secretary for Planning, wrote in the magazine of Czechoslovak planners:

The third shortcoming is the insufficient preparedness of investments, which in some cases reaches a careless indifference of which no capitalist would ever be guilty. Investments are built without preparation, without plans, without budgets. There are cases when no one knows what the production program will be when some factory or factory building has already been built. One such typical example [emphasis ours] is the building of one enterprise on the Sázava River. After the investment was half finished it was realized that there was no housing for the workers and no transportation to the outside world because contact with the railroad is difficult. This would require the building of a new railroad bridge and the building costs would double. Another example [emphasis ours] is the

⁷Rudé Právo, March 26, 1952.

building of a metallurgical enterprise. In the case of this enterprise, a heavy consumption of electrical energy was expected; but neither heavy industry nor the power industry have plans for such supply nor for the transmission facilities. The enterprise does not have the required water supply, and it will be necessary to build a dam (to provide for it); no one foresaw these additional outlays. Besides the unpreparedness of these projects, a further shortcoming is the well-known gigantomania.⁸

The national economy was deprived of the resources which were spent on abandoned projects. An extraordinary number of investment projects had to be lowered because a great number of them were not reasonable and were not prepared as far as budgets or plans are concerned.⁹

It is evident that if, for instance, in one year one dam used for the generation of electricity is built and the next year another three, the yearly investments in those dams trebled--and this figure would appear in the national income accounts. But, because of the substantial expansion of the investment program, and because of certain features in the mechanism of decision-making in Czechoslovakia, some part of this construction program will prove to be a failure. If it is assumed that one of the three new dams lacks water and can be used only rarely, then the national economy is really only richer by two dams. The third dam could either be deducted from the investment program or considered as cost which has to be incurred if this expansionistic program is to be carried out; in either case the building of this dam should not appear in a "correct" national income account.

Again, in the absence of any quantitative measurements of this waste it is not known by how much the apparent figure for investment expenditures should be "deflated" to provide for investments which cost three times more than the planners thought justified in view of the expected contribution of these investments to the production of goods and services, or which had to be abandoned altogether. If it could be assumed that one-fourth of the in-

⁸Plánované Rospodárství, 1950, No. 6, p. 337.

⁹Ibid., 1954, No. 7, pp. 479-85.

vestment expenditures was thus wasted--and in view of the admissions of government officials this does not appear exaggerated--the rise of G.N.P. from 1947 to 1953 would be decreased to 36 per cent.

Consumption expenditures themselves are relatively free from over-valuation, but not completely so. The quality and service deterioration is marked and could not be fully expressed by the price index used. And then there is one cost which was completely neglected. During the entire period under study the shortage of electricity required that electric service be regularly interrupted for an hour or two daily. The cost of the daily elimination of a tremendous amount of investments in power-distributing and power-using equipment must surely be substantial; how substantial can be gathered when it is considered how much factories would have to pay for electric current to outbid the normal family consumers to eliminate them from the supply of electricity for several hours daily. Even so, disregarding the immeasurable deterioration in quality and the additional costs described above, the consumption expenditures component of the G.N.P. rose by only 2.1 per cent yearly from the much less than normal year 1947 to the year 1953.

The figures for the G.N.P., taken at their face value, show a yearly rise of 7 per cent. Whether downward adjustments for the special circumstances involved should be made is not in question; but rather how great these adjustments should be. It is believed that an actual rise of G.N.P. by 4 to 5 per cent yearly is still exceedingly generous in view of the mismanagement admitted by the regime.

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STRUCTURE, CONDITIONS OF WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE LABOR FORCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Occupational Distribution and Recruitment in Industries

In the twentieth century there has been a steady decline in the proportion of the Czechoslovakian population engaged in agriculture, forestry and fishing with a corresponding increase in all other branches of the economy. Except in Slovakia, where an intensified program of industrialization in the postwar years has been carried out, the change has not been an abrupt dislocation of the population from one sector to the other; it has for the most part been a gradual relocation.

In 1947 the allocation of manpower according to sector of the economy was as follows: 27.91 per cent in agriculture, forestry and fishing, 2.91 per cent in mineral production, 33.12 per cent in crafts and trades, 5.77 per cent in commerce, banking and insurance, 6.13 per cent in transportation, 8.30 per cent in public service and administration, 0.63 per cent in liberal professions and 2.12 per cent in personal and domestic services. 11.26 per cent of the population were persons without gainful occupation and 1.85 per cent persons without specified occupation.¹ After 1948 a steady growth in the category crafts and trades has been reported. The Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin² claims that in 1950, with the Two-Year Plan completed and the Five-Year Plan well under way, 42 per cent of workers were employed in industry, and that by 1952, 66 per cent were so employed. The changes in the economic policy particularly affected the distribution of the working force in Slovakia.

In the year 1946 the number of workers employed in industry rose to the same extent as during the entire period from 1900 to 1938, while in

¹Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia (Prague), III, No. 6 (June 1948), p. 100. For data on the development of the distribution of manpower during the last fifty years see Table 2 in the chapter on social stratification. Table 1 of the same chapter shows the differences in allocation of the industrial and agricultural working force in the Czech regions and in Slovakia.

²Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin (Prague), No. 246 (May 1, 1953).

the period from 1946, employment in industry increased two and a half times that of 1937.³

Index of Yearly Increases Of Industrial Employment in Czechoslovakia						
<u>1937</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>
100	121	168	196	225	273	327

The rapid industrialization program carried out in Czechoslovakia was as much in the interest of creating proletarians (who, it was felt, would be more favorable to the government than peasants) as in increasing the standard of living of these people.

Recruitment of Labor

In a country in which "unemployment . . . has been a serious problem ever since the world economic crisis began to take effect on her export industries . . .,"⁴ labor shortages now threaten plans for the expansion of industry. The requirements of the planning programs in 1947 and 1949 put such demands on the labor force that rigid forms of recruitment were utilized by the government. The peasantry and women were to bear the greatest burden in the pressure to employ marginal labor. People released from agriculture were not free to choose employment. The majority were directed into heavy industry which had chronic labor shortages. The demands for female labor can be shown in the employment of women in 1921 as compared with that in 1946:⁵

	<u>1921</u>	<u>1946</u>
Industry	21.9 %	26.9 %
Trades and Handicrafts	21.0 %	25.0 %
Commerce and Finance	30.1 %	38.4 %

³ Ibid., No. 222 (May 1, 1951).

⁴ Edgar P. Young, Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy (London: Gollanz, 1938), p. 147.

⁵ Sylvia Thelenová-Havličková, Czechoslovak Women Today (Prague: Orbis, October 1948), p. 8.

While the total increase in the work force in the period from November 1945 to November 1947 was 23.2 per cent, the total increase in employed women was 33.5 per cent. In 1947 alone the increased recruitment of women in industry raised their percentage of total employment in industry from 26.5 to 28.7. Textiles drew the largest percentage of women: 97,547 were employed here in 1947. In metal industries 67,688 were employed; in food industries, 28,055; 24,620 in clothing; and 22,529 in chemical industries.⁶

What were undertaken as emergency measures expedient for the post-war period of recuperation became standard procedures in rounding up labor for industry. Voluntary labor brigades which at first relied on the enthusiasm of workers from all ranks of the labor force to supplement normal workers, began to lose their "voluntary" character after 1948 as they became an indispensable part of the productive unit. On penalty of losing rations or other favors from the regime, workers were expected to show up in the mines after a full working week elsewhere. When new labor could not be recruited, miners were forced to work overtime up to twelve hours a day.⁷ The normal work week was forty-eight hours with one-third fewer holidays than in pre-war times. Overtime "draft" assignments without overtime pay were common.

The revised program of the Five-Year Plan in 1951 instigated more rigid controls over the labor force. Havelka, Labor Minister, was quoted in Rudé Právo as follows:

New methods of labor recruitment have been introduced by the government ordinance of December 27, 1951 . . . By this new ordinance the entire existing system, which was based on the voluntary movement of labor under State supervision, will be abandoned, and a new system will be applied which will directly control labor recruitment for the most important sectors of our

⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

⁷ Pavel Korbel and V. Vagašský, Forced Labor, Population Transfers and Deportations in Czechoslovakia (New York: National Committee for Free Europe, 1953), p. 3.

industry in the same way as our entire Socialist economy is directed.⁸ Workbooks containing a record of all previous employment were issued to workers, and these were necessary as a passport to future work.⁹ The use of these workbooks was commented on in Práce:

The Cabinet has decreed that no worker can be hired unless his previous work relationship has been dissolved. Every newly-hired worker must prove this by a notation on his identification card. In cases where he has not been employed before (e. g., an independent farmer on entering into employment, he must have an acknowledgment of his former occupation entered in his identification card.¹⁰

Forced labor in Czechoslovakia became not only a method of political coercion, but was an important element of the national economy according to a report by Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of India, Hr. Paal Berd of Norway, and Sr. Sayan of Peru to the United Nations Economic and Social Council in July 1953.¹¹ As early as October 1948 the state decreed (Law No. 247) that forced labor would be expected of those persons eighteen to sixty years of age who are physically and mentally fit but who shirk work, especially in food supply, as well as of persons who aid and abet them therein, and of persons convicted for black market activities and subversion of the Two-Year Plan, under the law concerning penal provisions for the protection of national corporations, undertakings and so forth.¹² Since no traditional defense in court was allowed, the demands of industry and not the letter of the law regarding political activities determined the number of people drawn into compulsory labor camps. The New York Times reported that in October 1949 there were mass arrests of professional men, former owners and managers of businesses, and small tradesmen. 20,000-30,000 were believed

⁸ Rudé Právo (Prague) Jan. 15, 1952, as quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 3 (March 1952), p. 22.

⁹ Albert K. Herling, The Soviet Slave Empire (New York: Funk, 1951), p. 172.

¹⁰ Práce (Prague), Sept. 7, 1952, as quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 1 (Jan. 1953), p. 18.

¹¹ The Economist (London), CLXVIII, No. 5732 (July 4, 1953), 32-33.

¹² Herling, op. cit., pp. 169-70.

arrested previously, and 10,000 in the roundup of this year.¹³ In Brno in 1953 a camp of 400-450 inmates who worked in groups of twenty was reported. A forced camp for absentee miners at the Zápotocký mines in the Kladno hard coal basin, penal barracks for workers who had not fulfilled norms, was instituted to discipline the negligent workers. In Jáchymov ordinary criminals were put in charge of disciplining political prisoners.¹⁴

Conscript labor was another unsatisfactory measure instituted to swell the labor force. In 1951 it was decreed that all juveniles who have completed compulsory schooling by the age of fourteen work as apprentices in various fields according to the plans of the country. In important fields, such as mining and smelting, machine production and heavy industry, the youths were given up to three years of training, after which they were expected to work three to five years. University people as well as manual workers were restricted in their choice of place of employment; after graduating they were assigned to a place of employment where they had to remain at least three years (Decree No. 20 of May 6, 1952).¹⁵ The Lány Program for recruiting adolescents into mining proved unsuccessful after a few months' trial. In 1950 under this program 10,000 "sincere apprentices" were acquired in the industry. In the period from September to December 1, 1950, 1,606 left school, and another 1,550 left during the first three months of 1951. Disorder, lack of sanitation, drinking in the dormitories and inadequate supervision defeated the program. Official publications admitted losing more recruits than were gained.¹⁶

Labor Turnover and Absenteeism

Despite rigorous recruiting policies, the gains made in the labor force were lost in the waste caused by labor turnover and absenteeism. Constant complaints issued from the Party publications on the number of

¹³Tensions Within the Soviet Captive Countries. Czechoslovakia (83rd Congress, Document No. 70, Part 4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954)), p. 11.

¹⁴Korbel and Vagašský, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁵Tensions . . ., op. cit., pp. 98-99.

¹⁶Nová Svoboda (Ostrava), June 3, 1951, as quoted in National Committee for Free Europe, publications, June 15-Sept. 1, 1951.

changes in jobs and the resulting man hours lost. In Práce¹⁷ it was reported that there were 13,000 deliberate changes in the first quarter of 1952, and approximately 95,000 workers changed their place of work in the first half of the year, making for a loss of approximately 380,000 man hours. Absenteeism was such an ever-present plague to the planning program that some sources have described it as deliberate sabotage of the system.¹⁸ In 1949 absenteeism in Slovakia had increased to double that of 1947. From 1948 to 1951 three quarters of a million work shifts were lost by un-excused absenteeism. In 1952 Zápotocký was quoted as saying that absenteeism was 20 per cent of man hours lost in industry, while before the war 10 per cent and 11 per cent were considered high.

Attempts at discipline were rejected by the workers. In 1953 legislation was drawn up requiring that any worker absent one working day without excuse was to be reprimanded by the manager; a public reprimand was to be given a worker absent for a second day or two successive days in a year, and absence on a third day entailed temporary transfer to a lower-paid position. So strong was worker reaction to these restraints that the ruling was repealed July 6, 1953, in fear of revolt.¹⁹ Less stringent controls remained in force; according to the holidays bill for 1950, paid holidays required a qualifying period of eleven months in the same job. Two days were to be deducted for each day of leave without cause. Some of the high turnover rate and absenteeism may be accounted for by the increase of marginally employed people in the intensive roundup of labor in the planning period. However, the figure is so high, and the working force so resistant to disciplinary controls, that it suggests worker reaction to speedup without great improvement in their standard of living.

¹⁷ Práce, Sept. 9, 1952, as quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, II, No. 1 (Jan. 1953), 18.

¹⁸ Tensions . . ., op. cit., p. 103.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 105.

Labor Productivity and Compensation

Raising the Norm

The Communist regime attempted to overcome the low productivity rates of labor by several methods, ranging from Stakhanovites to capitalist measures such as piece work wage rates, once termed by them immoral exploitation. In sectors where production was low and workers ascribed it to technical difficulties, Stakhanovites were called in and asked to break the record. With the assistance of foremen they were able to reach top output. They traveled around the country lecturing about efficiency. In May 1950 it was reported that there were 31,170 Stakhanovites, 2.17 per cent of all personnel in the industry.²⁰ Unofficial channels revealed that there was growing opposition to Stakhanovites throughout the course of the Five-Year Plan. One incident reported in Rudé Právo²¹ reveals the popular antipathy to the Stakhanovite. One factory worker stated that after raising his work to 180-200 per cent, the norm was set at a new level, and when he raised his production 20 per cent higher, he began to notice that his output fell off. Finally his machine broke down, and he discovered that a piece of metal had been bolted in the mechanism which caused the breakdown.

"Collective obligations" were expected of every worker. First used only by Party workers, it later became general that all workers were under obligation to state special quotas which they were to fulfill within a specified period.²² Artificially stimulated competition between production workers was euphemistically termed "socialist emulation." Pressure was put on workers to engage in such competitions, especially after production quotas for the Five-Year Plan were raised in 1951. The Czecho-

²⁰Gadourek, Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden: Stenfert-Kroese, 1953), p. 89.

²¹Rudé Právo, Dec. 16, 1951, as quoted in News from Behind the Iron Curtain, I, No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 18.

²²Gadourek, op. cit., p. 88.

slovak Economic Bulletin²³ reported that the percentage of employees engaged in "socialist emulation" rose from 26 per cent to 65 per cent of the total number of industrial workers in 1951.

Incentives to Individual Labor Productivity

Despite the propaganda bolstering such competitive programs, individual incentives had to be resorted to in order to stimulate worker productivity. Individual promotions from the assembly line to administrative positions were common, as were making officers of workers in the army. This policy shows a preference for a system of individual incentives, while the aspirations of the working class as a whole remained unfulfilled. The Soviet Union system of piece rate wages and standard norms was instituted. At the beginning of the Two-Year Plan there was an attempt made to rationalize the wage rates in terms of production both of the individual and of the industry. The sum total of wages and the subdivisions for a given period were supposed to be limited by that industry's fulfillment of the Plan quota, subject to revision as conditions between industries changed.²⁴ Eight categories of productive work were rated, with rates of from 8.20 to 18.20 crowns according to skill. Pieceworkers could earn 10 to 20 per cent more than the basic rates.²⁵ The National Bank reported the the following average hourly wage and index for the years 1939 to 1947:

²³Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin, No. 222 (April 1, 1951), p.6.

²⁴Dorothy W. Douglas, Transitional Economic Systems (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), p. 209.

²⁵P. B., "Industrial Conditions in Czechoslovakia," World Today, VI, (1953), p. 426.

Table 1
AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE IN INDUSTRY, 1939-1947*

	All Manual		Skilled Male		Assist. Male		Skilled Female		Assist. Female	
	Crowns	Index	Crowns	Index	Crowns	Index	Crowns	Index	Crowns	Index
1939	3.45	100	4.09	100	3.23	100	2.26	100	2.17	100
1944	5.69	164.9	6.64	162.3	5.25	162.5	4.15	183.6	3.75	172.8
1946	10.43	304.3	11.59	283.4	9.82	304.0	9.11	403.1	8.18	377.0
1947 (1st mo.)	10.66	309.0	11.70	286.1	9.82	304.0	9.74	431.0	8.18	377.0
1947 (6th mo.)	10.86	314.8	11.87	290.2	10.36	320.7	9.74	431.0	8.22	378.8

* Bulletin of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia (Prague), Feb. 1949.

Despite the propaganda slogan of equal pay for equal work, wages of women were not raised equal to that of the incentive raises given to men in the first year of the Two-Year Plan, and they remained consistently lower than men for all years covered. Some of the wages were inflated by bonuses given for overtime, and for hard or dangerous work.

While there is less difference in the pay of manual workers and clerical employees, higher pay for the latter still exists.²⁶

Average Monthly Wage In Crowns		
	Manual Workers	White Collar
1948	3,239	5,378
1949	3,556	5,657
1950	3,894	6,259

Although the salary of the white-collar worker was considerably above that of manual workers in 1948, increments granted were also higher. The highest paid manual workers earn from 6,500 to 7,200 crowns a month. In comparison with this, the managing director received 16,000 to 30,000, a deputy engineer from 14,400 to 27,000, a secondary school teacher from 5,000 to 7,500 crowns.²⁷

The attempt made in 1947 to rationalize wages and make comparable the rates for jobs between and within industries were not successful. In 1950 many industries remained without proper standards for individual operations. Differences between industries existed in the setting of rates. Added to this was the widespread anxiety among industrial workers that the standard tasks would constantly be raised and that they would have to work harder than ever to maintain the same incomes. In an attempt to eliminate some of the dissatisfactions and to increase the incentives to workers, the Labor Minister put an end to the continual and automatic revision of norms whenever the wage ceiling was reached and ordered that the shockworker be allowed to enjoy his increased wage at least for a while. Premiums were to be extended to as many workers as possible.²⁸

²⁶ Gaďourek, op. cit., p. 91.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 93.

²⁸ P. B., op. cit., pp. 428-29.

Throughout the Five-Year Plan wages for both manual and salaried employees rose at a constant rate, due to soft norms and worker resistance to changes in the norms. The figures in Table 2 show this increase.

The Standard of Living: Prices and Rationing

The rising cost of living ate up much of the increased wages so that there was no comparable increase in the standard of living. Using 1939 as the base year, the National Bank of Czechoslovakia compiled indices of the increase in average wage and the cost of living for manual workers in Prague from 1939 to 1948 as shown in Table 3. While rents were forcibly kept low, food, heat and light, clothing, and miscellaneous items rose higher than the increase in salaries in 1947. However, the total increase in cost of living lagged behind wages, and in 1948 lowered consumer prices made for a slightly more favorable balance.

In 1951 Práce reported a greater improvement in the standard of living.²⁹ In 1949 average monthly earnings were reported as 3,672 crowns (\$71.40); in 1950 they had increased to 4,341 crowns (\$80.60). Prices of commodities were reduced so that the purchasing power was doubled. In consumption, farmers and peasants were reportedly better off, at least up till 1949; through black market sale of produce they were able to get high returns for their crops. Small businessmen, shopkeepers and professional people, because of their advantageous position in the market, similarly profited over the industrial worker.³⁰ The government attempted to break this pattern by the rationing system. Industrial workers were given ration cards with a minimum allowance of clothing, food and necessities at the lower prices of the controlled market, while the self-employed were forced to buy all their goods on the free market at much higher prices. The policy behind the system was explained by

²⁹Práce, March 1951, as quoted in National Committee for Free Europe, publications, March 15-19, 1951.

³⁰David Scott, "Czechoslovak Workers Consume More," The New Central European Observer (London), II, No. 7 (April 2, 1949), 16.

Table 2
GROWTH OF WAGES OF WORKERS AND SALARIED EMPLOYEES, 1948-1953*

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953-I	1953-IV	1953-end
Workers Salaried and workers	735	766	908	996	1,065	1,228	1,145	1,250
Slovakia: Workers Salaried and workers	---	791	935	1,003	1,081	---	1,166	1,275
	722	754	819	877	973	---	1,076	---
	783	802	877	933	987	--	1,087	---

* Trends in the Czechoslovak Economy, 1954 (New York: Free Europe Committee, 1955), pp. 21-22.

Table 3*
AVERAGE WAGE AND COST OF LIVING FOR MANUAL WORKERS IN PRAGUE, 1939-1948

	Crowns per hour	Index	Food	Heat, Light	Rent	Clothing	Misc.	Total
1939	3.45	100.0						
1945			149.8	147.5	118.9	212.1	229.3	169.7
1946 (Jan.)	10.43	304.3	326.7	228.6	118.9	319.9	410.4	306.7
1947 (Jan.)	10.66	309.0	312.6	241.2	122.6	381.3	417.5	313.3
1947 (June)	10.86	314.8						
1948 (Jan.)			299.7	252.0	122.6	367.7	359.0	290.9

*Bulletin of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia, Feb. 1949.

David Scott as follows:

The new price and rationing system has a number of immediate aims. It is intended to soak up the surplus money now in circulation or being hoarded, diverting it to the treasury to create funds for Five-Year Plan investments, to eliminate the black market by forcing its prices down, to create incentive for the worker and small farmer while improving their standard of living, and to pave the way for complete liquidation of the rationing system.

. . . .

As the demand for goods at the current high prices drops off, prices will be gradually lowered in accordance with what the general demand and purchasing power at a given price level is calculated to be. In this way it is hoped that a constantly shifting balance between buying power and goods available can be maintained until current production can meet all domestic demands as well as export requirements. Increasing productivity of industry and the resultant supply of consumer goods are prerequisites for lowering prices, and every possible incentive is being given the workers to ensure this happening.³¹

Rationing was more utilized as a tool for labor control than this article reveals. Withholding the ration card meant that it was hardly possible for a worker to sustain a minimum standard of living, and even small tradesmen were forced to become industrial workers. Workers who shirked work were deprived of rationed food, and this restriction extended to the members of their households.³² Cards were specifically withheld from "remnants of the capitalist class: former factory owners, bankers, wholesale dealers, shareholders, boards of directors, retired members of the Republic and Protectorate, and even from women who could take an active part of the economy and do not."³³ The controlled market was conceived not as a social institution, rendering assistance to large families

31

Ibid., p. 76.

32

Tensions. . . , op. cit., p. 101.

33

Zápotocký in a speech of Jan. 9, 1953, quoted by Korbel and Vagasský, op. cit., p. 7.

or to aged persons and the like, but rather "The controlled market is and should be, an advantage for those who take the most active part in our economic construction effort. This is the spirit of the new regulations, and in this spirit we all must understand them."³⁴

But even before consumer industries had revived, and before an equilibrium in incomes and available consumer goods had been reached, rationing was abandoned. The following rationale supplied in the publication Bulletin de droit tchécoslovaque asserted that it was because of egalitarian tendencies frustrating incentive wage systems:

The system of rationing, indispensable in its time, from the liquidation of the war economy and its transformation into a peace economy, has become a great obstacle in the development of the forces of production. By its nature egalitarian, it prevents putting fully into practice the principle of equal remuneration of work according to merit, and of realizing the principle demanding a just recompense for the work to the building of socialism. The system of tickets succeeded in disrupting the development of our forces of production for it did not constitute any stimulus to increase the productivity of the work and the quantities of production, and to perfect manufacturing. It did not contribute to attaching the interest of the individual to that of the country.³⁵

On June 1, 1953, one free market was established, rationing abolished, and price levels were equalized. The crown was devalued and its value set closer to that of the Russian monetary system: twelve crowns to one ruble at an exchange rate of fifty old crowns to one new crown. Outstanding debts of the Republic were liquidated and savings of workers and the remaining middle class were wiped out. While new prices were set lower than the free market, they remained higher than former ration prices.³⁶

³⁴ Zápotocký in a speech of Jan. 21, 1953, quoted by Korbel and Vagašský, op. cit., p. 9.

³⁵ Bulletin de droit tchécoslovaque (Prague), XI (1953), pp. 288-89.

³⁶ The Economist, CLXVII, No. 5729 (June 13, 1953), 745.

Besides the advantages this move meant to the government in voiding debts and seizing savings, many people of independent income were forced into the labor market. Mothers of families, old retired workers and invalids were required to earn their own keep, and the labor force was thus inflated. However, the government lost much ground in the propaganda battle in internal as well as international esteem. The wave of riots which followed the reforms were particularly violent in Plzeň and Ostrava, the two main industrial centers.³⁷

Worker discontent rose to such a pitch in 1953 that an ameliorative policy was forced upon the government in 1954. The projection of the "new course" for increasing and improving consumer goods, and at the same time lowering prices and raising wages, it hoped, would assuage this discontent and also improve the low productivity rates. Savings of 5,600 million crowns to the consumer were brought about by the reduction of prices of 53,000 consumer goods.³⁸

Labor Organization

Pre-World War I Trade Union Organization

The Right of Association and Assembly was won by Czechoslovak workers under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1867, and the Right of Combination was granted in 1870. However, owing to ethnic disputes between Germans and Czechs as well as to government obstruction, no more than sixteen trade unions were formed during the seventies. In 1897 the Czech Unions set up a separate organization, the Odborové sdružení české (OSČ) comprising sixty-eight unions with a membership of 5,230. By 1906

37

Tensions. . . , op. cit., p. 106.

38

News from Behind the Iron Curtain, III, No. 5 (May 1954), 49.

this federation grew to a thousand unions with a membership of 60,000.³⁹ Modeled on the French, English and German trade unions, these unions were dominated by an internationalist ideology alarming to more conservative sectors of the society. In order to compete with their strength, rival nationalist unions were set up, but they had formed no more than sixty-eight locals by 1905.

The Inter-War Period

Under the First Republic trade unions continued to be split according to ethnic groupings and political ideology. The O. S. C. continued to be the strongest. Its membership included metal-workers, railroad employees and textile workers, and was oriented to the Social Democratic Party. The second strongest group was the Česká obec dělnická (Č. O. C.) attached to the Socialist Party and including railroad employees, textile workers, employees of postal and telegraph office, and masons. The Communist Trade Unions were first created in 1923. The first such union, Mezinárodní všeodborový svaz, was succeeded by the Rudé průmyslové svazy in 1929. The membership grew from 60,000 in 1929 to 136,000 in 1937 and found its strongest allegiance among textile workers, masons, miners, metal workers, chemical industry employees and agricultural laborers. The German unions remained separately organized under the Zentralgewerkschaftskommission des deutschen Gewerkschaftsbunds with twenty-three unions until they became amalgamated with the Czechoslovak Federation in 1926. Catholic trade unionists were organized in the Christian Socialist Union.⁴⁰

White-collar workers were more strongly organized in trade unions than manual workers. In 1918, 78 per cent of white-collar workers were organized, as against 22 per cent in manual trades; in 1925, the proportion

³⁹Young, op. cit., p. 182.

⁴⁰See ibid., pp. 182-84, and Vladimír Walzel, History of Czechoslovak Trade Unionism (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1952).

was 60 per cent to 40 per cent; and by 1935, the disproportion was lowered to 52 per cent to 48 per cent. During this entire period the proportion of manual workers to white-collar workers was always two to one.⁴¹

Cooperative societies dealt primarily with the purchase of supplies, the distribution and sale of products and the credit needs of the primary producers in agriculture and crafts. Because they are not of great concern in the organization of industrial workers, they will not be discussed in this context.

Despite the early organization of labor, the eleven-hour day was customary until the Czechoslovak National Assembly established an eight-hour day in 1918. This was due as much to the liberal political atmosphere of the post-World War I period as to the efforts of labor itself. Overtime was allowed in building and agriculture and other seasonal occupations, but was limited to a maximum of two hours a day and to not more than twenty weeks in a year. Frequent wage disputes which occurred in 1919 were settled by 1920. Sickness insurance covered all workers and members of their families with a week maternity benefit for women in 1919. Child labor under fourteen was prohibited, and no man under sixteen or girl under eighteen could be employed in heavy industry detrimental to their health.

The primary problem in labor in this period was with the unemployed. In 1921, 95,000 were unemployed, and 45,000 were supported as dependents of the government. There was an increase of unemployment in 1922 which declined somewhat in 1923. The Ghent system of unemployment benefits won by trade unions put a premium on membership in the union and thus strengthened their organization. Financed by joint subscriptions from the trade unions and the state, only members could enjoy their benefits.

41

Walzel, op. cit.

The development of workers' councils in the mining industry in 1920 gave to these workers additional control in setting working conditions. They were consulted by management in regard to the discharge of employees, in enforcing laws for the protection of workmen, and in supervising observance of wage contracts. In 1921 workers' councils were set up in all industrial concerns, and in 1932 they penetrated banks and financial houses.

On the eve of the Munich Pact, in 1938, there were 709 unions, 485 of which were combined into 18 centrals. The Social Democratic Center was the largest with three-quarters of a million members, followed by the Czech Socialist with one-third of a million members. The Agrarian Party controlled one-quarter of a million trade union members, the Communists, 136,000, and the Catholics, 124,000.

The Occupation and Reconstruction Period

In the summer of 1939, three months after the German occupation, the trade unions were amalgamated in the Národní odborová ústředna za meznanecká (NQÚZ). It included 875,539 members in 1940, both manual workers and white-collar workers, excluding state employees who were organized separately. Within the framework of this national union, officials and members met in underground meetings to form a unified resistance movement called the Revolutionary Trade Movement. This movement took a lead in the resistance effort, and even during the war projected a nationwide industrial labor organization to function in the postwar period. Projected reforms for labor such as the Social Security Act were drawn up, and details of an economic program for liberation were worked out.

The postwar Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH) was established on May 1, 1945, in Prague. It was guaranteed a monopoly of all trade union organization by the law forbidding establishment of any other organization passed on May 16, 1946. The assets of all previously existing trade unions were turned over to it. Membership in the Union was voluntary, and there were no closed shop provisions except in textiles.⁴²

⁴²Douglas, op. cit., p. 203.

Because of the political role assumed by the Revolutionary Trade Movement during the war, the works councils organized in the ROH were in a position of power in the period after the Nazis were expelled. Within industrial enterprises, the factory committees of workers controlled working conditions, participated in the engagement and dismissal of employees and passed on applicants. They even assisted in the nomination of the director of the factory by having a representative of the Union sitting in on the board of the Ministry of Industry along with the government representative. But beyond this active role within the factory, the power of the trade union organization extended to influencing government decrees such as that nationalizing large sectors of the economy.

The Trade Unions Under Communist Government

When the Communists seized power in February 1948, the functions of the Trade Union were changed. The workers had, theoretically, won their victory against capitalism. The function of the Trade Union was no longer to win improved working conditions and higher interests, but rather to assure high productivity.⁴³ The pre-1948 membership of 2,249,976 rose to 3,072,956 by December 1949. There were 250,000 functionaries operating in 17,000 work councils organized in 5,535 local councils. Any worker who might try to intervene in the functioning of the unions could be branded a saboteur⁴⁴. No free elections were introduced, and the nucleus of reliable Communists retained complete control of the Union without challenge. The complete conquest of the Trade Union movement was assured in 1949 at the meeting of the Congress in April. When pioneers of the Czechoslovak Trade Union movement commented on the lack of militancy in the present Congresses, Zápotocky pointed out that the workers were

43

Czechoslovakia's New Labour Policy (Prague: Orbis, 1949), p. 14.

44

Gadourek, op. cit., p. 94.

now masters, and that the task of the Congress was to increase productivity.⁴⁵ Political affiliation in any party other than the Communist was discouraged completely after 1948. Before the coup in February, Social Democrats counted about 22 per cent of trade union members as their sympathizers, the Czech Socialists 20 per cent, the Czech Catholics about 8 per cent and the Communists 50 per cent. In the elections of factory committees at the end of 1946 and in early 1947, a retreat from Communism and a turn to Social Democracy was noticed. This tendency was cut off in 1948, but even up to 1954 there were remnants of old Social Democratic trade unionism. In 1954 the Times⁴⁶ reported the arrest of eighty former members of Social Democratic Trade Unionists, defined by Fierlinger, chairman of the National Assembly, as "our worst enemy."

The anti-democratic procedures of the ROH were under criticism at the International Conference of Free Trade Unions in Geneva in 1953. They listed the following abuses: (1) the abolition of the five-day week-- anyone who complained was labelled an enemy of the regime; (2) the works councils have ceased to be independent ("Functionaries of these new commissions are released from manual work, thus becoming officials of the works management instead of representing their fellow workers."); (3) forced labor operating the Kladno coal basin and other areas--prisoners at these camps receive one and a half crowns a day, but the management of the pit pays the administration of the forced labor camp 150 crowns for each worker; (4) speedup in mining--three eight-hour shifts are worked Saturday, and work is even required on Sunday; (5) monopoly of the right of association in the one unified trade union movement.

The whole character of the trade union organization was under attack.

45

Patrick McKenna, "Czechoslovak Trade Union Congress," New Central European Observer, II, No. 26 (Dec. 24, 1949).

46

The Times (London), June 15, 1954.

The Conference participants charged that the tasks of a trade union as defined by Czechoslovak government legislation was contrary to the goals of a free trade union. Charged with the function of increasing production, the R. O. H. could not be conceived as a movement organized in the interests of workers. Even at the level of the Works Councils there is a management rather than trade union orientation in that the main function is the easing of relations between management and workers. Their total subordination to the Central Trade Union means that they can be dissolved peremptorily by that organization if they should step outside the imposed limits. While the right to strike was not specifically listed as a penalty, Article 85 of the Penal Act, No. 86, passed in 1950 effectively prohibits such activity. The act states that

Whosoever does not fulfill a duty of his occupation, of his employment or his service, infringes or seeks to avoid such an obligation, or in any other manner commits an action conducive to (a) preventing or impeding the implementation or the achievement of the single economic plan in a given section, or (b) creating serious disturbance in the work of an office, other organization or public undertaking, shall be punished by loss of liberty for a period of from five to ten years.⁴⁷

With its only organization manipulated and directed by government officials, labor was left with no independent voice. The State Wage Commission, chaired by the Prime Minister with the chairman of the R. O. H., the Minister of Manpower and most of Industrial Ministers participating, had ultimate authority in wage decisions. With this exclusive jurisdiction, the regime was able to control policies, setting wages high in areas which the government wished to emphasize and reducing wages in independent trades or other areas which the government wished de-emphasized. Social

⁴⁷International Labour Office, Trade Union Rights in Czechoslovakia (Tenth Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office [Geneva], Studies and Reports, New Series No. 37, 1953).

security benefits, socialized health and welfare benefits eased the burdens of a low-paid labor force, but forced upon them greater dependence on the government. The only resistance the labor force can make currently is low productivity and absenteeism.

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