Pluralizing the Past
Heritage Policies in Plural Societies

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To state that society is composed of individuals, that individuals are different and thus society must be plural is both self-evident and banal. Even to note that increasing social diversity, has reached a level of individual atomisation, is a commonplace statement of the obvious. However heritage is about common values, common purpose and common interests. Societies may be pluralizing but heritage remains stubbornly in the singular.

The link between people and places adds a further dimension in that heritage is an important, maybe the most important, instrument by which societies shape place identities. Thus plural societies should create and be reflected in, pluralized place identities: heterotopias in which social diversity, eclecticism, variety, ephemeralism, and libertarianism are manifested. This paper sets out to describe and explain this divergence and to construct a concordance of contemporary practice in heritage in the context of this pluralisation of places and the societies that shape them.

The great delusion

Heritage is delusion. It is not just that what we create is illusory and has no direct connection to any supposed realities of past, present or future, it is that the process of heritage creation, re-creation and, not to forget, obliteration, exists within a miasma of necessary delusion. This is delusion and not illusion because a deliberate distinction between illusion and reality is knowingly and purposefully maintained. It is more than the 'suspension of disbelief', or even 'operating with paradox', it is quite central to what we do and how we reflect on what we do. I am not arguing for the existence of a conspiracy theory (whether Bourdieuian or some other) where one group in touch with reality deludes another that is not. The delusion of which I write is not by 'us' of 'them' (or possibly, but less credibly, vice-versa): we delude ourselves out of philosophical and operational necessity. It is intrinsic to what we do. The 'we' is the broad 'heritage industry', whether producers, transmitters or consumers (which includes not only Lowenthal's 'heritage crusaders' but also those quite unaware that any crusade has been called, let alone its sacred purpose). Simply, my argument is that we operate as if one situation exists although we know it cannot and we base decisions upon that falsehood whereas a quite contrary situation actually exists of which we are well aware but of which we choose to be unaware. We do this because otherwise it would render most heritage actions unnecessary, unjustifiable and, more pragmatically, just impossible to perform.

All the above are part of the wider delusion that we assume and propagate, namely that heritage as public service profession is primarily about providing individual and collective aesthetic satisfaction and cultural enrichment. It is not: heritage is about power. It is both a reflection of power structures and an instrument in the exercise of power. Admittedly, given the longevity of much material heritage it reflects previous as much as present structures of power. Much monumental and artefactual heritage is just the now unintelligible litter from previous power structures that nobody has yet bothered to clear away and dispose of. Thus any designation of public heritage, whether monument listing, site or artefact labelling or guide book marking is a claim upon place and thus a political act stemming from political choices, even if, as is usually the case, those who perform it have no such knowledge or intention.

All of which leads back to the central concern of this paper which is the role of public heritage in plural societies. If the latter inevitably creates the former then our role is mere description of an autonomous process. However if the former is used as an instrument for the management of the latter, then we have a far more interesting, if more responsible and hazardous, instrumental role. This explorative paper seeks only to clarify, attempting to achieve a degree of precision through taxonomy. Simply what distinctly different options are currently evident for the management of plural societies and what roles has, can or should heritage play within such situations.

From policy to places through heritage

As is clear from the above arguments and definitions, the first question to be posed of all heritage creation and management is not, 'what have we got?' but 'what do we want to do?' Goals determine content not the reverse. Society through its political institutions sets objectives, desirable for whatever reason, to be attained through policy within which heritage policy

plays a significant role. Place and society interact with distinctive places being simultaneously goal to be attained, instrument for the attainment of social goals and measure of progress towards these. The sequence social goal – heritage policy - heritage place will now be followed in an investigation of a range of models of plural society as expressed in public policies. This list is not complete, exclusive or comprehensive and the application in particular places is also rarely clear-cut or static through time. Variants of more than one model can co-exist at the same time and place. The objective is to not only to demonstrate that there are many quite different policy reactions to the pluralisation of society encapsulated in particular social models, but also to illustrate that heritage plays a critical but different role in each. Each policy model will be defined and described and an indication given of the ways in which heritage is, or could be, used as an instrument of its application.



Fig. 1: 'Assimilatory', 'integrationist' or 'single-core' models

In these models, society accepts the valid existence of only one set of common values, social norms and practices and ethnic cultural characteristics as legitimately determining the place identity. Although, in modern Europe especially, racial characteristics could be quickly added to this list, it has not always been essential to the model. (French colonial policy would accept a black *assimilé* or Portuguese policy an *assimilados* as long as he was culturally French or Portuguese respectively.) Place identity is expressly strongly linked to social identity: the people belong to the place and the place to the people. Geographically and historically this has been probably the most widespread model. The principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* has been a deep-seated touchstone of attachment to the idea of insiders/outsiders, greatly exacerbated by the rise of nineteenth-century romantic nationalism with its concepts of the unity and integrity of a definable nation.

The extreme manifestation of this would be the absolute denial of the potential legal recognition of any pluralisation. Historically this has often been the case worldwide, the best hope of minority coexistence being 'quarters of tolerance', as in cities across Europe before and during the Middle Ages (Vance, 1977). It may remain the case in ethnically exclusivist societies such as Japan or Korea and, at worst, may result in the pogrom/ *Endlösung*/ ethnic cleansing scenarios of recent history, of which the heritage reflection is not pluralisation but denial and exclusion (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996). Such extremes, however, do remain exceptional cases.

Variants from the single core may be accepted as temporary phenomena in the process of assimilation. Some more permanent variations may be permitted only in so far as they are seen as sub-sets of such a core, contributing to rather than challenging it. Policy with regard to new additions is simply assimilatory or integrationist. Deviant cultures are seen as impermanent phenomena in transition to assimilation through policies for integration. This process does not, and must not, change the essential characteristics of the single core, which assimilates without itself being affected by such incorporation.

Few words figure so prominently in the current political debate in Europe over cultural differences as 'integration', which, generally, is seen as a self-evidently desirable attainment for both 'host' majority and 'guest' minority. Integration is often a goal of both the political right and left, although with significantly different meaning. It can be regarded as a 'default' term (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2003:7) used to avoid words with a high political charge such as 'assimilation' or 'diversity'. In the political debate, integration is used with two quite different meanings. The first is acculturation, that is adapting culturally to the majority society until indistinguishable from it. Secondly, functional integration refers to the capacity of a minority group, most usually comprised of relatively recent immigrants, to function effectively within the dominant society. This may require not only an acquisition of some essential survival skills, especially language, but also an understanding of a myriad of detailed and relatively trivial operations necessary for daily life. Functional integration is, however, more widely associated with the structural aspects of the host society such as position in the labour market, housing market, education system and civil society. Functional integration can be measured more effectively than acculturation, although this may be in a negative sense as when it is demonstrably lacking in culturally segregated residential or educational ghettoes. Functional integration is also more prominent in government policies and expenditures such as that on social services, social housing, special education and policing.

The 'assimilation thesis' assumes the existence of a positive relationship between acculturation and functional integration. Acculturation is seen as both a resultant of successful functional integration and also as a major cause, or at the very least, a necessary precondition of it (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2003). This assumed relationship is at the core of expressed government policies in many European countries. It also allows policies of assimilation motivated by fear or dislike of the culturally different to be pursued under a cloak of charitable concern for the socio-economic well-being of such groups. They must be assimilated for their own economic and social benefit as well as that of society as a whole. Government policies therefore often fail to distinguish between acculturation and functional economic integration, regarding the pursuit of one goal as contributing to the other. This assumption or deliberate adoption of a link between acculturation and functional integration is, at best, unproved and, at worst, demonstrably incorrect in many instances. Some non-acculturated groups are typically economically successful, contrasting sharply with other economically dysfunctional but acculturated groups.

Heritage in Assimilation Models

The function of heritage in this model is to act as an instrument of assimilation of 'outsiders' into the core while constantly reaffirming and strengthen it. Heritage exercises an education and socialisation role as excluder and includer. The major practical problem with the model is the management of non-conforming, non-assimilating groups and ideas. There are three policy options for managing these.

The first is incorporation into the core through transitional measures effecting social change among deviant groups. Both the teaching of geography, through 'homeland studies' (known in German as *Heimatkunde*) and history, through the invention of 'national history' are long familiar instruments for this. Both present a clear, unambiguous account of the 'nation' as unique *volk*, its characteristics, claims and boundaries, admitting of no deviation, variety or alternative narratives. The second is marginalisation through museumification or vernacularisation. Deviant groups may be tolerated if regarded as non-threatening and capable of being marginalized as quaint heritage survivals. They are rendered politically irrelevant and thus a harmless deviance. A third heritage policy option is simply denial. There is no variation or social deviation. Nomenclature alone can be effective (Turkey's Kurds become 'Mountain Turks: Greece's Vlach minority become just temporary wandering shepherds). The naming of places is a claim upon them while a social group that has no name has been denied at least official existence. Denial may take the form of the alteration, concealment or destruction of non-conforming heritage. History, archaeology, and the assembling of archives are inevitably selective as all aspects of human pasts tend to infinity. If a non-conforming group is ignored, deleted from maps or, in extreme cases, has its physical heritage removed, the existence of such a group is undermined while any possible future claim it may make to a separate existence or territorial possession is (terminally) compromised. Israeli archaeology, at least until recently, had a notorious but well documented reputation for operating as an arm of Zionist policy (Dalrymple, 1997) by simply destroying evidence of previous non-Jewish settlement so as not to encourage dispute about Zionist territorial claims in Palestine.



Fig. 2: 'Melting pot models'

The idea of 'melting pot' is simple. The analogy from the steel industry was coined and developed as a conscious policy in settler societies in which ethnically diverse immigrant streams were 'smelted' into a new creation with a new homogeneous identity. The diverse ingredients produced not a composite or an amalgam but a new and unique product. The crucial similarity between assimilation and melting pot models is that the desired end product of each is a society composed of a single core, a culture of shared values, norms and identity. The equally crucial difference is that such a core already exists in the assimilation model and new ingredients are absorbed without materially changing it. Conversely, in the melting pot, the various ingredients fuse into a new core that is not the same as any of the ingredients of which it is composed. Thus both are single core models but produced by, at least in theory, a quite different process of integration: this difference, however, often becomes blurred in practice.

The model has been applied in some form or other in three main types of society. First, and archetypically, there are the settler societies where long-term immigration from ethnically diverse sources was absorbed and a new national identity, distinctly different from any constituent immigrant group, was forged. The term itself was coined in the United States but the idea, if often less explicitly stated, was also adopted in the 'White Dominions' of the British Empire (especially Canada, Australia and New Zealand) (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996). Such settler societies of Europeans overseas have always been an uneasy balance between melting pot and salad bowl models. As long as the immigrant streams were not too racially or culturally heterogeneous then the melting pot model seemed to operate smoothly. Until the 1930s, the United States aided this process by its ethnic and racial quota system, which was intended to guarantee that the ingredients in the pot would be not so varied as to threaten its capacity to assimilate them into the new product.

Secondly there are societies confronted with the more or less immediate necessity to create a new and unique identity from existing ethnically diverse populations. The most common instance of this in the past half-century has been the ending of a colonial regime, which usually had little interest in nation-building and its replacement by a newly independent state. Often occupying an area within boundaries that were also new, such polities had to engage in the creation of a nation that had not previously existed. The new post-colonial Indonesia or The Philippines are archetypical cases, while Israel after 1948 faced the unique situation of the need to melt the recalled Jewish diaspora into a new or re-created nation.

Thirdly, there are some instances where governments have attempted to forge new social and political identities for parts of their populations. This is a form of social engineering usually undertaken for ideological reasons, with the objective of changing society from within. The concept of 'year zero' was strong in the Russian, as in many previous, revolutions. However, this denial of heritage and deliberate rejection of the baggage of an equally rejected past always coexisted uneasily with cultural nationalism inherited from centuries of Russian colonial settlement. The new 'Soviet man' was supposedly, if contentiously, to be nurtured in the socialist new towns of which Poland's Nowa Huta is perhaps the most impressive in its magnificent, monumental, architectural determinism. The philosophies behind the post-war New Towns of Britain, and later Europe, as well as the new IJsselmeer polders of The Netherlands, contained at least weak echoes of this idea of the creation of the 'New Jerusalem' where a new and better society, freed from the divisions of the past, would be fostered and flourish.

Heritage in Melting Pot Models

The roles of heritage in this process of creating new nations or new societies are clear. In settler societies, the immigrant abandons, willingly or with official encouragement, the heritage baggage that may have accompanied the migration and identifies with the new place, its heritage and its values. The new migrant learns, often through official classes, that historical events, personalities and associations that predate the migration by many centuries, are his or her heritage. Equally in post-colonial nation-building the new citizen adopts a new heritage often identifying with the pre-colonial roots or with proto-national survival during colonial rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that such societies stress the trappings of national identity, its flags, anthems, oaths of allegiance and the like. Also at an organisational level countries such as the United States, Canada or Australia have heritage institutions

and practices that often predate those of the old world and in many instances devote more national resources to heritage activities than countries with a longer history. Similarly post-colonial governments are generally quick to establish an official interest in heritage sites, associations and their interpretation. They simply have a more obvious and pressing need for the propagation of strong core values and beliefs, which more long established nation-states can take more or less for granted.

The working of the melting pot, however, was nearly always somewhat more complex in reality than in theory. In almost all cases there were residuals, namely those cultural groups that for one reason or another fail wholly or partly to be absorbed. This could be because few settler societies created their identities on a *tabula rasa*. Indigenous populations existed and these were often viewed, at least initially, as melting pot as either an undesirable ingredient outside the melting pot or just incapable of being absorbed. Secondly, some immigrant groups in settler societies, or ethnic minorities in new post-colonial states, may not melt, either because they are unwilling to abandon their existing cultural traits and adopt the new identity, or because the majority society is unwilling to accept their full participation.

The treatment of what could be termed heritage 'residues' has always posed difficulties and is a matter of continuing controversy in most settler societies. There are three main types of policy: ignore, marginalize or engage in cultural hyphenation. Most aboriginal populations were variously subject to the first two policies: Australian aborigines, US 'Indians' and Canadian Inuit were until quite recently deliberately excluded from the melting pot. Black and more recently Hispanic groups were not only racially separate from the mainstream but also economically and politically marginalized through slavery in the one case and conquest and peonage in the second. Current resolution of the non-smeltable ingredients of the melting pot is hyphenation, which recognises that the smelting process has been only partially successful. The rise of hyphen-specific heritage in the form of educational programmes, heritage trails, museums, exhibitions and statuary raises similar ambiguities about whether the intention is internal group cohesion and separation from the mainstream, or a wider inclusion of such groups in a more nuanced core product. The melting pot model thus begins to take on many of the characteristics of the core + model discussed below.

In theory the melting pot model produces an end product that will vary according to the nature of the ingredients added. If the mix of ingredients varies over time, because for example the origins of the immigration flows change, then so will the new identity that is being forged. However once initially established the new society may prove reluctant to allow further change. The original idea of melting existing diversity changes into a process whereby the end product is predetermined and the ingredients are then selected to produce such a product. Once the new nation, whether post-colonial or settler, has been created by the melting pot then, in practice, the model may be abandoned and effectively transformed into an assimilation model in which additions to the accepted core are allowed only if they do not alter that core.



Fig. 3: 'Core + models'

This is a very diverse family of models, often with quite different origins. It is found in developed western democratic societies with longstanding agreed national unities but now accommodating substantial culturally divergent migrant groups. It is also prevalent in emergent post-colonial societies engaged in the process of nation-building within ethnic diversity, where other ethnic cultural groups supplement a majority culture. Central to the model is the existence of a consensual core identity, the *leitkultur* or leading culture to which are added a number of distinctive minority cultural groups. The relationship of the core to these add-on attachments is critical. The core culture and its values are both normally that of a substantial cultural majority but are also accepted by

the minorities as having an undisputed primacy due to the numerical, historical or political dominance of the core. In turn, the add-ons do not compete with the core for dominance and do not dilute or fundamentally amend it. They may even be viewed as enhancing the core by contributing useful additions to its variety. This is significantly different from the salad bowl notions of multiculturalism discussed below, as the core+ model includes a clear rejection of any cultural relativism or parity of esteem and power between core and peripheral add-ons. Equally, however, it differs sharply from both the assimilation and melting pot models in that the objective is not the ultimate incorporation of the minorities into either the existing core or into a new composite national identity. The add-ons are accepted as having a valid and continuing existence and may be regarded by the core society in one of two ways. They may either be viewed as something apart, of no especial relevance to the core, but equally as unthreatening to it, as there is no perceived necessity for the majority to adapt, participate or even particularly notice minority cultures. Alternatively, the peripheral add-ons can be viewed as in some way contributing to or enhancing the core: as sub-categories of it; as contributory, often regional, variants; or as more or less exotic embellishments which can be selectively added as and when desired.

An important distinction needs to be drawn between what can be called 'inclusive' and, conversely, 'exclusive' add-ons to the core culture. The former not only augment the core but open it in the sense that a minority culture becomes a part of everyone's culture. All may, if they wish, participate (at least selectively) in aspects of the minority cultural expression and to an extent regard it as also theirs. Exclusive add-ons however, are regarded as relating only to the group concerned and are commonly only accessible to that group. They provide community cohesion within the minority but have little significance to the wider society, which may not even be aware of their existence. Such add-on cultures typically do not promote themselves, let alone proselytise, in the wider society.

Minority add-ons are of various type and origin. They may be part of a spatial, cultural and frequently jurisdictional hierarchy. This occurs in many European states where distinctive and recognised 'home nations' (the nomenclature itself recognises both a certain separateness of nation as well as being part of the same homeland) whether Scots, Fries, Bretons, or Bavarians relate to British, Dutch, French, or German core cultures as integral, if hierarchically subordinate, parts of a wider whole. Many European societies have adopted, whether consciously or incrementally, such core + models as reaction to the existence of relict or incomplete 'semi-nations' (such as the Basques, Welsh, Corsicans, Catalans and the like). These are non-inclusive in the sense that they concern only a part of society and participation by all is not expected or usual. Add-ons may be ethnic rather than spatial involving a racial, religious, linguistic or other ethnic variation from the core which may or may not be spatially concentrated, but which is added often as an adjective to the core noun. Such hyphenation is not seen as a weakening or qualification of identification with, and participation in, the core culture. It is a hyphenation but without the ambiguity as to which element takes precedence, to the extent that the concern with the maintenance of core cohesion is relaxed. In many other cases, the minority add-ons may be the result of an intrinsic cultural diversity, either in a post-colonial state or as a consequence of more recent immigration of groups with sharply different racial or ethnic characteristics. The degree and form of acceptance of the minority varies, both within and beyond the limits of core + models.

There is one final variant of the core+ model, which occurs when a plural society with deep social diversity adopts a leading culture, which is not the culture of the majority or indeed even of any of the diverse cultural groups involved. This 'third-party' culture provides an overarching, neutral and thus acceptable integrating element. It could be argued that the so-called imported core is not so much a leading culture in the sense argued above but no more than a set of post-colonial survivals, such as a lingua franca or familiarity with governmental agencies and practices that facilitate the efficient functioning and cohesion of society. It is thus not so much a core in the *leitkutur* sense as a convenient binding mechanism. The archetype is Singapore (Yeoh,. and Kong, 1996). This may be recognised as only a short-term transitory situation pending nation-building around an indigenous or created core culture.

Heritage in Core+ Models

Unlike most of the other cultural models discussed here, core+ models have generally not been created, at least initially, by conscious official policy. They have more usually emerged as a consequence of ad hoc reactions and adjustments of governments and individuals although, once in existence, they may shape official policy. However, unlike many of the models discussed here, core+ models have received little formal attention from theorists, policy makers or polemicists. They may even be seen as default models, emerging and being, however reluctantly, accepted as alternatives to successful assimilation or absorption, or in lieu of the adaptations needed for a multicultural salad bowl.

Often by circumstance rather than design, heritage has multiple roles in such societies. It may be used as the instrument for creating and sustaining the leading culture. It can adopt a defensive position whose task is to preserve the integrity of the core, preventing its perceived essential character from being diluted and subsumed by the periphery. Simultaneously, it can be used to promote the values and norms of the core among the peripheral add-ons thus preventing society fragmenting into non-communicating cells. This is the social inclusion role of heritage much in evidence in many recent official cultural policies. Conversely, it can also be adapted to a core enhancement role by promoting the heritage of the peripheral minorities to the core populations. This uses diversity as both strength and embellishment, as all are invited to appreciate and even participate in the minority cultures. The ethnic add-on urban district has become something of a cliché in heritage planning and in tourism product-line development. A more exclusivist use of heritage occurs when ethnic minority groups are officially seen as non-threatening and tolerated as more or less closed entities. However, they are not promoted to the core and are generally unsupported by public heritage actions while left free to encourage and develop their own heritage within their own societies.

Core+ models tend to be unstable if only because change is an intrinsic part of the essentially dynamic process described above. Such change can be of various kinds. The selection of cultural add-ons can be continuously altered as new groups become acknowledged as suitable for such selection or as old ones cease to be sufficiently distinctive and merge into the dominant culture. Similarly the relationship between core and add-ons is likely to evolve. The culturally autonomous groups may lose their internal coherence, in practice passing through a transitory phase in a process of acculturation and functional integration into the core. At this point the model clearly evolves towards assimilation. The difference between inclusive and exclusive add-ons, described above, may be significant here. Certainly the process by which the peripheral add-ons are made accessible to a wider society could be viewed as potentially destabilising the model in so far as its partial adoption by the core is unlikely to leave either core or periphery unchanged. The peripheral groups may have their integrity undermined by the selectivity and distortions of the process of inclusion. A defining characteristic of these models is that their core remains substantially unchanged by additions to it, retaining its hegemonic cultural position yet may be embellished by such additions. The point where embellishment becomes substantive change may be difficult to detect but clearly could occur. Three outcomes then become possible. The core+ model remains with an evolving leading culture that still forms the common component between the different elements. Alternatively, the core loses such potency and the society shades into the salad bowl cultural models considered below. Finally, the core could be weakened to the extent that the minority add-ons become sharply demarcated and mutually exclusive. Such an evolution could result in the 'pillar' model of society considered next.



Fig. 4: 'Pillar ['verzuiling'] models',

Pillar models have often been a defensive reaction in deeply divided societies so that an overall unity could be maintained while satisfying the fissiparous tendencies of the constituent groups. In this model, society is conceived as being a set of 'pillars', each self-contained and having little connection with each

other. Collectively, however, all the pillars support the superstructure of the unified state which imposes a minimal uniformity allowing each group to manage its own cultural, social, educational, political and even economic institutions. It depends upon the idea of maintaining separation, and minimal contact between the groups without privileging any particular group.

There are relatively few cases of the application of this model and even in those cases where it has been self-consciously implemented, it is often in many ways less complete in reality than the theory suggests. The idea originated in The Netherlands as a pragmatic solution to the problem of the post-reformation religious divisions that plunged much of the rest of Europe into civil war. The simple two-fold division of Protestant and Catholic pillars (*zuilen*) was later supplemented by others, based on socio-economic divisions and even a non-sectarian pillar for those rejecting all the others (Lijphart, 1968). The survival of the model has been threatened by a secularisation and individualisation of society, which has weakened the solidarity of the pillar groups but also by the rise of Islam, which, reasonably enough, increasingly demands its own pillar with appropriate institutional recognition and sovereignty. This dismays many who doubt the commitment of such a potential pillar to the shared values of the overarching state.

There is a tempting, and not wholly unrealistic, parallel to be traced between the Dutch separate but equal pillarisation and the ideology of apartheid developed by Afrikaner, Dutch and German ideologues in the 1930s. Physical separation based exclusively on race rather than culture, was incomplete, however, due to the economic dependence of the white pillar on non-white labour. Apartheid also contained an inequality of provision and esteem within the state as a whole.

A distinction can be drawn between intentional pillar models and unintentional or accidental pillar models. Apartheid South Africa is the clearest case of the intentional application of a carefully thought out set of theoretical ideas. The Dutch case may have originated through pragmatic compromises and solutions but, once established, the model was self-consciously and deliberately applied and elaborated into many aspects of Dutch society over a long period. Neighbouring Belgium, on the other hand, has evolved incrementally into a *de facto* and somewhat reluctant pillar society as a compromise resolution to the conflict between the aspirations of its three language groups.

Heritage in Pillar Models

The roles of heritage in such models are usually quite self-evident. Each group creates, manages and consumes its own heritage for its own exclusive consumption. The role of the overarching state would be restricted to maintaining an equality of provision. It would not as in core+ models use heritage in pursuit of social cohesion through encouraging mutual knowledge or participation between the pillars. It is, at least in theory, in effect a multiple core model with the only collective commitment of the state, operating through consensual agreement of its constituent parts, being to guarantee equity and supervise the functioning of the system.

All the models of plural societies considered so far are subject to evolution but it may be that pillar models are intrinsically transient and susceptible to metamorphosis. There is an inherent tension between the separation of society into mutually exclusive parts and the maintenance of an overall parity of esteem. Most such models emerged or were created in response to a particular circumstance. They are therefore a time-bound compromise. Changes in the demographic, economic or political environment may destabilise the carefully balanced compromise to the advantage of one of the pillars, introduce new groups not represented in the pillar system, or render the whole structure increasingly irrelevant to a different society. However, the model has demonstrated remarkable robustness in the Dutch case in particular where the imminent demise of the pillarised society in the face of social change has been regularly predicted for a century or more. The model has proved capable of accommodating pillars of different size, importance and determining criteria as well as being able to create new pillars as society changes. It has proved attractive to states constructed as loose federations of largely autonomous parts, especially when the political divisions are coterminous with cultural differences. Furthermore, although the pillar model may be unstable in the long run, it may permit the resolution of otherwise intractable inter-community socio-political problems in particular places and times.



Fig. 5: 'Salad bowl/ 'rainbow'/ 'mosaic' models

These variously named group of policy models are what is generally meant when multiculturalism is discussed as a utopian aspiration or an apocalyptic concern. They share in the basic idea is that the diverse ingredients are brought together and collectively create a whole without losing their distinctive characteristics, unlike either the assimilation or melting pot models with which this model is most commonly contrasted. The result has been described using a number of metaphors. The 'salad bowl' pictures diverse ingredients brought together to create a collective dish without sacrificing the distinctive recognisable tastes of the components. The cultural 'mosaic' envisages individual fragments together creating a recognisable pattern while each *tessera* remains unchanged and individually identifiable. More recently, the 'rainbow' society imagines different colours producing a regular pattern, by remaining distinct while merging at their edges seamlessly into each other (Ashworth, 2004).

Such policies can be either descriptive or prescriptive. The descriptive model is simply a recognition that society is a cultural mosaic and that policy operates in that context. Prescriptive models move from recognition of the existence of social diversity to policies designed to foster, strengthen or capitalise on such diversity. These models can be pluralist or separatist in their objectives. The former treats cultural diversity as an asset, which should enrich society as a whole and be, as far as possible, universally accessible. The latter in contrast, seeks to discover and foster cohesion within the different groups through an accentuation of their differences.

There are three main difficulties with the policy application of these models. First, there is the question of spatial scale. At what scale is the cultural variety apparent? Salad bowl policies may reflect a vision obvious at the national scale but less apparent, and even possibly irrelevant, at the uni-cultural local scale. Secondly, at what point on the spectrum between the individual and society as a whole is the group to be defined and who makes such a definition? Thirdly, there is the question of the necessity for some binding element: a dressing on the salad; regular structure to the rainbow; or pattern in the mosaic. Conversely, is it possible to sustain a coreless diversity without any universally accepted values or norms, beyond presumably those of acceptance of the existence of the salad bowl itself.

Heritage in Salad Bowl Models

There are two main sets of policy instruments, which can be labelled inclusivist and exclusivist. The former endeavour to include every possible social group and invite all to be part of such heritages. The focus is on openness, making all heritage widely known and widely accessible. Examples of such inclusivist heritage would be events such as New York's St Patrick's Day parade and associated festivities in which all are invited to become 'Irish for a day' or London's Notting Hill Carnival which has long reached out beyond its original West Indian origins. Such policies have two main problems. First, there is an absence of weighting within the selection: all make a contribution presumably equally without any consideration of the size, historical significance or intrinsic value of the contribution of any particular group. Secondly, inclusivist policies may be resisted as tending to dilute and distort group heritages, an objection that may come from new minorities perceiving the trivialisation of their identity as much as from old majorities fearing the diminution of theirs.

Conversely, and sometimes in reaction, exclusivist heritage policies recognise but also empower each distinctive group with the selection and management of its own heritage. The assumption often made that 'social inclusion' through heritage is a self-evident social benefit is challenged by exclusivist heritages that are non-threatening to the rest. Chinese schools in many European cities, Japanese theatre in San Francisco, the Polish language daily press in London, and many other incidences are all highly exclusive making no attempt to involve non-group members. Similarly, the rise of the idea of cultural empowerment whereby groups are encouraged to re-establish ownership and

control of their own heritage can be highly exclusivist. Not only may outsiders be afforded a lower priority for experiencing such heritage, in extreme cases that have occurred it can become not just 'ours to preserve' but also 'ours to exclude, deny and even destroy'. This is the 'Kennewick problem' named after the long-running dispute between indigenous groups and the wider scientific community about who owns, and thus has the right to examine or destroy, the 10,000 year old human remains discovered at Kennewick in the United States (Zimmerman and Clinton, 1999).

While the differences in approach and objective between salad bowl and both assimilation and melting pot models is clear and evident in official heritage policies, it is often less easy to distinguish them from core+ models. Certainly there are cases of policies which are labelled as being multicultural salad bowl models but, in practice, include caveats that reserve a special role for one, or more, of the groups. Exclusivist salad bowl models, which accent the sovereignty and cohesion of the separated groups, are difficult to distinguish from pillar models and the one may evolve into the other.

Limits of heritage policy

Having initially stated that heritage is the principle instrument for the shaping of place identities in pursuit of public policy in culturally pluralist societies, it is necessary to add some cautionary caveats. The significance of public heritage in its official instrumental role is likely to be overestimated for three reasons.

First, many, especially place managers, regard the importance of place identity as a self-evident truth. The bland assumption that people identify with places and that this identification matters to them can be challenged. There are many individuals and groups who have no particular place associations. There are diasporic nations (such as Roma or non-zionist Jews) and many social and cultural identities that need no relation to specific places. Further, I would assert that the concept of community has a decreasing place-bounded dependence. Places may matter less than we think, or would like, and therefore place bound policy is likely to be less effective than official agencies might hope or expect.

Secondly, the influence of public heritage policy is reduced by the multiplicity of official agencies and commercial enterprises operating in this field and the resulting unavoidable absence of coherence or consistency in the messages they attempt to project. Place identities will be pluralized as a consequence of the number and diversity of agents creating them.

Thirdly, most public heritage producers and promoters underestimate or just fail to consider, let alone understand, the reactions of their targeted consumers. Most public heritage is not noticed and, if noticed, is ignored. While marvelling at the large numbers of museum visitors, heritage guide purchasers, heritage trail followers or viewers of television heritage programming, we should not be blind to the even larger number who eschew all of these activities. Even if noticed and experienced, it is highly unlikely that public heritage will be understood in the way the producers of it intended. Such evidence as does exist suggests that consumers have conscious or unconscious strategies of resistance to the messages intentionally conveyed by public heritage. They change and adapt public heritage to conform to their much more significant private heritages, even to the extent of creating a counter-culture supported by a counter-heritage that, being unexpressed publicly, is unknown to the public authorities.

In short when considering public response to public policies for using heritage to shape place identities it is clear that although public heritage is important, it is less important than its producers believe. This is perhaps the most optimistic message of this paper.

NOTES TO THE TEXT

An initial description of much of the material used in this paper was published in 'Plural pasts for plural societies' In Kelly, C. (Ed) *Contemporary heritage Issues* Cultural Management Applied Research Group, University of Greenwich, London. The models are much more fully exemplified in Ashworth,G. J., Graham, B.J. and J.E. Tunbridge (in press) *Pluralising pasts* Pluto, London

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