Supplementary Materials: Caldeira and Lempert, "Justice Level Heterogeneity in Certiorari Voting: The U.S. Supreme Court October Terms 1939, 1968, 1982."

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Figures

	From baseline of ~.15	1581
stw68	•••••••	
har68	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
bre68	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
bwh68	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
hlb68	······	
war68	·····	
mar68	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
dou68	······	
pow82	••••••	
bur82	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
ree39	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
for68	••••••	
reh82		
dou39	······	
hab82	······	
bwh82	······	
mar82	•••••	
bre82	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
mcr39	·····O	
mur39	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
rob39	······	
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hug39	······	
oco82	······	
sto39	······	
jps82		••••••
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Figure 2. Individual justice effect sizes for effects summarized in Table 1. Solid circle indicates that the effect for a given justice is statistically significantly different from the average effect for all other justices; hollow circle indicates otherwise.



Figure 3. Individual justice effect sizes for effects summarized in Table 1. Solid circle indicates that the effect for a given justice is statistically significantly different from the average effect for all other justices; hollow circle indicates otherwise.



Figure 4. Individual justice effect sizes for effects summarized in Table 1. Solid circle indicates that the effect for a given justice is statistically significantly different from the average effect for all other justices; hollow circle indicates otherwise.



Figure 5. Individual justice effect sizes for effects summarized in Table 1. Solid circle indicates that the effect for a given justice is statistically significantly different from the average effect for all other justices; hollow circle indicates otherwise.



Figure 6. Individual justice effect sizes for effects summarized in Table 1. Solid circle indicates that the effect for a given justice is statistically significantly different from the average effect for all other justices; hollow circle indicates otherwise.



Figure 7. Individual justice effect sizes for effects summarized in Table 1. Solid circle indicates that the effect for a given justice is statistically significantly different from the average effect for all other justices; hollow circle indicates otherwise.

Tables

Covariate	eta	s.e.
US Petitioner	2.166^{*}	(0.165)
Actual Conflict	2.148^{*}	(0.124)
Alleged Conflict	-0.132	(0.100)
Dissent Below	0.530^{*}	(0.122)
Intermediate Reversal	0.561^{*}	(0.101)
Incompatible Decision Below	0.960^{*}	(0.089)
Civil Liberties	-0.205^{*}	(0.093)
Amicus Present	1.184^{*}	(0.146)
Justice is Hughes (1939)	0.794^{*}	(0.152)
Constant	-3.456^{*}	(0.110)
\times with Justice is Hughes (1939):		
US Petitioner	-0.425	(0.424)
Actual Conflict	0.712^{*}	(0.360)
Alleged Conflict	0.185	(0.223)
Dissent Below	0.297	(0.275)
Intermediate Reversal	0.333	(0.205)
Incompatible Decision Below	-0.226	(0.218)
Civil Liberties	0.206	(0.429)
Amicus Present	0.429	(0.763)
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Table 4. Example of regression used to derive effect estimates and second difference p-values; here, for Justice Hughes (1939). Dependent Variable: Did a justice vote to grant cert (=1) or not (=0), all paid dockets, OTs 1939, 1968, 1982. N = 32,867. Logit regression; robust standard errors clustered on docket number. (*: p < 0.05; [†]: p < 0.1.)

Covariate	β	s.e.
US Petitioner	2.731^{*}	(0.238)
Actual Conflict	2.298^{*}	(0.161)
Alleged Conflict	0.309^{*}	(0.136)
Dissent Below	0.567^{*}	(0.159)
Intermediate Reversal	0.752^{*}	(0.130)
Incompatible Decision Below	0.968^{*}	(0.129)
Civil Liberties	0.221^{+}	(0.135)
Amicus Present	1.920^{*}	(0.220)
Tenure	-0.001	(0.006)
Distance to Median	-0.014	(0.030)
OT 1968	-1.592^{*}	(0.136)
OT 1982	-2.216^{*}	(0.139)
Constant	-2.652^{*}	(0.133)
\times with Tenure:		
US Petitioner	-0.008	(0.011)
Actual Conflict	-0.012	(0.008)
Alleged Conflict	0.019^{*}	(0.007)
Dissent Below	-0.019^{*}	(0.008)
Intermediate Reversal	-0.012^{\dagger}	(0.007)
Incompatible Decision Below	-0.007	(0.006)
Civil Liberties	0.009	(0.006)
Amicus Present	-0.004	(0.010)
\times with Distance to Median:		
US Petitioner	-0.320^{*}	(0.065)
Actual Conflict	-0.085^{*}	(0.035)
Alleged Conflict	-0.049^{\dagger}	(0.030)
Dissent Below	0.114^{*}	(0.034)
Intermediate Reversal	0.033	(0.029)
Incompatible Decision Below	0.079^{*}	(0.032)
Civil Liberties	-0.005	(0.028)
Amicus Present	-0.090^{*}	(0.046)

Table 5. Dependent Variable: Did a justice vote to grant cert (=1) or not (=0), all paid dockets, OTs 1939, 1968, 1982. N = 32,867. Logit regression; robust standard errors clustered on docket number. (*: p < 0.05; [†]: p < 0.1.)