A na z a p t a : T he com i ng of t he fi ft h horsem a n Prepared by Dr. Ewen McLean and Dr. Jean-Yves Mevel Links to web pages do not in any cases represent the opinion of the writers Copyright-1999, unless referenced to other web pages PPLLA AG GA A Plagues, a word derived from the Latin plaga, meaning a blow, stroke or wound, have infested Europe throughout history. The first plagues were, by all accounts, devastating in human terms and the high mortalities associated with early plagues resulted due to the “first contact” effect. That is, the European population had not been infected with the diseases before. Another reason why early outbreaks of plague were so consuming, in human terms, was due to their length of stay, generally lasting many months and even recurring over decades. The first great European plague, sometimes called the Antoine plague, after the ruling Caesar of Rome, devastated the Roman Empire between AD 165 and 180. A contemporary coin bust of Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus (AD 161-180) the Roman Emperor who holds the questionable distinction of having his name associated with the first great plague (AD 165-180) to devastate Europe. 1 It is believed that the disease reached the Mediterranean via troops returning from the Parthian campaigns in Mesopotamia (AD 161-166). This plague is presumed to represent the first case of smallpox in Europe. It killed The first smallpox epidemic took the European population totally unawares with devastating effects on the human population. Smallpox, introduced to Mexico by the Spanish erased the population from an estimated 25 million in 1518 to around 3 million in 1568. The virus was also used by the British against American Indians. They deliberately contaminated blankets which were traded to the tribes. around half the people in infected regions, leaving towns empty, fields untended and estates deserted. Smallpox has also been credited with having led to the general decline in the Mediterranean population that continued for several hundred years. AD 251-266 bore witness to the second plague to hit the Roman Empire. At its height it murdered over 5000 people per day in Rome alone. This pestilence likely represented the first outbreak of measles in Europe. And, as with the earlier smallpox epidemic, infected populations were without resistance. The consequences, in human numbers, were also appalling, but these and earlier plagues were merely practice runs for the “gold standard” of pandemics – the Black Death. 2 TTH HE EB BU UG G While the word plague may be associated with a number of different disease outbreaks, and indeed, throughout history has been, today, it has become synonymous with the disease caused by the bacteria Yersinia (formerly Pasturella) pestis. Fundamentally Y. pestis is a disease of the Rodentia - a diverse and abundant group of gnawing animals typified by the rat - and their fleas (Siphonoptera); specifically Xenopsylla cheopis. M odified from the Black plague, City College of N ew York http://www.humanities.ccny.cuny.edu/history/plague/ 3 Some rodents (e.g., the Norwegian rat and Siberian marmot) although afflicted with the disease are able to move about, thereby transmitting the infection to others. Typically fleas spread the disease within rodent colonies during feeding. But it is now clear that Y. pestis is able to survive for several months in fleas that do not feed, awaiting new victims. The bacterium is also able to survive in decaying carcasses for many days; while in frozen cadavers the Black Death lingers for many months or even years. While far from clear, the origins of the plague are thought to have been the Himalayan regions between India and China. The disease is transmitted to humans coincidentally: when an infected rat dies and its attendant fleas only have humans as a refuge. The flea serves as an excellent incubator for Yersinia since it expresses a curve in its proventriculus (part of the stomach) which provides a collection and pooling point for coagulating blood: the perfect Yersinia culture medium. The Flea Photo: http://communityhigh.org/ ~katelevy/plague/index.html W WE EF FA ALLLL D DO OW WN N:: TTH HE E SSYYM MPPTTO OM MSS The Black Death is thought to be ancient and has likely infested man for millennia. However, it was not until the 14th Century that it became known by its popular name which is derived from the discoloration of the skin surrounding the infected area. Once bitten by an infected flea, cells in the Plague victims exhibit a number of external symptoms the most characteristic of which are blisters which may be of varying sizes. A feature of plague infection, from which the name bubonic plague is derived, are the socalled buboes or swellings of lymph nodes. Photo courtesy of US Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 4 wounded area die quickly creating a blackening necrotic pustule or blister. The lymphatic system drains debris and bacilli from the pustule to the regional lymph nodes located in the inguinal, axillary or cervical regions. However, the spread of the bacteria is so rapid that infection can not be contained. This results in the formation of acute regional lymphadenopathy or buboes which may be the size of a goose’s egg. From flea bite to bubo only 4-6 days pass. During this period, the victim experiences high fever, excruciating headache, vomiting of blood, and delirium sometimes associated with a ‘death dance’. By day 10, 60% of those infected will have died - more than twice the rate of death for many other virulent diseases. The bubos, of course, are the derivation of the name "bubonic" plague, although, in rapid infections, they do not always appear. Sometimes, and specifically during winter months, the disease infects the lungs and becomes airborne and even more infective. Septicaemic plague occurs when Y. pestis invades and multiplies in the blood. This form of the disease can occur secondarily to bubonic plague or can occur without formation of buboes. Complications of septicaemic plague include septic shock (sic) consumptive coagulopathy, meningitis and ultimately coma prior to death. The importance of the Black Death to society in general are reiterated to this day in children’s nursery rhymes: Ring around the rosies A pocketful of posies Atishoo atishoo We all fall down The rosies were descriptors for the blackish rash which developed following infection although other historians have suggested that it simply refers to rosary beads used to seek the guidance of God. A posy referred to a short motto or a line or verse of poetry which people used to ward off evil in general. The atishoo referred to another sign of the pestilence-the onset of cold and flulike symptoms that preceded death. 5 C CO ON NTTE EM MPPO OR RA AR RYY IID DE EA ASS O ON N TTH HE EC CA AU USSE ESS O OF F PPLLA AG GU UE E Outbreaks of diseases that are lethal and without cure, generally results in attempts being made to determine the causes of the catastrophe. While limited information is available with respect to how people regarded 2500 the causes of the first plague cycle, a number of treatise on 2000 the subject were written during 1500 the Medieval outbreaks. Most often, it was seen as a sign of 1000 God’s wrath, where sinners 500 were taken for not adhering to the Ten Commandments. 0 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 year Global occurrence of plague (1983-1993). The Americas recorded lowest numbers of people infected (orange line) followed by Asia (yellow line), with greatest numbers being recorded in Africa (blue line). The red string represents the summed total of plague occurences. Of greater concern is the trend (black line) which indicates increasing prevelance. Source: WHO Plague was also viewed as a cure to social fragmentation and sin. Indeed, many Christians of the time viewed the plague with respect to Revelation and the coming of the horses of the apocalypse: war, famine pestilence and death. Others sought to explain the disaster as a sign of the imminence of the coming of Christ, whereas others still placed the blame firmly on the shoulders of prostitutes and Jews. The Paris Consilium a treatise put together by the best medical minds of the University of Paris, on behalf of King Philip IV stated categorically that the plague resulted due to the conjunction of Saturn, Jupiter and Mars under Aquarius. While such a conclusion might seem strange given that it was constructed by some of the finest minds of Europe, it is not too surprising given that medicine at that time stressed the importance of astrological links. 6 PPLLA AG GU UE E PPR RE EV VE EN NTTIIO ON N While most people in Europe consider plague to be a risk for developing nations, it is important to note that outbreaks are still recorded on a regular basis in industrialised countries. For example, in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1 noted that between 1970-1995 there was 341 cases of plague. Of these, 222 patients were infected following flea bites some 20% were infected by direct contact with plague-carrying animals and a further 7 after inhalation of droplets from infected animals; five of which were exposed to pet cats. Clearly, cases of plague only occur where the host vector is present such that the risks associated with becoming infected largely depend upon the availability of good places for rodents to nest together with adequate food supplies. Greatest risk of becoming infected generally occurs in the summer months with high risk groups being hikers and campers. Vaccination & alternatives2 Formalin killed bacteria have been used in plague vaccines since late last century. In general, bacteria are present at concentrations of around 2x109 cells per mL. While live (attenuated) vaccines have also been tested, these are not commercially available. Indeed, even the formalin killed vaccine preparation 3 has not undergone extensive testing although data derived from American troops, who were at high exposure risk during the Vietnam war, appear to support efficacy. Plague vaccines are administered as three doses with the first being of 1 mL volume, followed by a booster 1-3 months post first injection and a further boost at 6 months post-primary inoculation. Both of the last doses should be at around 0.2 mL vaccine. Additional boosters of 1.0 mL should be administered to those in high risk environments at yearly intervals. However, CDC recommends that, irrespective of whether a person has been vaccinated or not, exposed persons should be provided with a seven day course of antibiotic 1 2 3 http://www.cdc.gov/ http://www.909shot.com/ http://www.brown.edu/Courses/Bio_160/ 7 therapy. Effective antimicrobials include tetracycline, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. doxycycline, or Clearly by eliminating food supplies and nesting areas for rodents reduces the risk of coming into contact with the disease’s vectors. This might include modifying the architecture of houses to reduce the risk of rodent access. Regular treatment of domestic animals with pesticides also reduces risk of infection via fleas. Other preventative measures include avoiding contact with very sick or dead rodents and cats. D DIISSE EA ASSE EC CYYC CLLE ESS Diseases often occur at regular intervals over time, and Europe has experienced the ravages of the Black Death at three clear periods in history. The first plague in the cycle escaped from Asia following periods of drought and famine and other catastrophes, including earthquakes. Travelling westwards, people of the Middle East, North Africa, the Roman Empire and Western Europe were taken before the plague eventually ran its course. This is not to say that the disease disappeared from the face of the earth however. In the Great Crusades of 1190, famine, plague, and desertions reduced the army of 100,000 men that set out to the Holy Lands to 5,000. The percentage that succumbed to plague remains an enigma but it is likely that the disease took its fair share. Clearly, small pockets of plague infested vectors remained in the Middle East. During the second half of the 14th century, the bubonic plague made at least four appointments with Mediterranean cities, recurring in Europe every generation for the next three centuries. Often these rendezvous were associated with Arabian invasions. Indeed, the plague likely played a significant role in reducing the Islamic armies and thereby provided a protective shield around Europe: not allowing anyone in and forbidding excursions too. From 1347-1722 plague visited Western Europe on a regular basis, recurring in 1361-63, 136971, 1390, and 1400. This was followed by the Great Plague of the 1660s. In London the 1665 plague killed 17,440. A fire that burned most of the city ended 8 the outbreak and brought with it architectural and engineering changes in urban planning which further reduced the risk of future epidemics. The last cyclical event commenced with a plague in Marseille in 1720, during which over half of the city population of 93000 succumbed. Sporadic plague outbreaks were recorded throughout the 1700 and 1800s, generally being associated with conflicts and natural disasters. The famine-associated plague of 1890 in Manchuria had its effects felt in London, with a Financial Times article mentioning reduced income from the protectorate and an overall decline in productivity being directly related. The Manchurian plague had holidays in San Francisco in 1900 and parts of Western Europe too. By the time the plague had begun to die out, it had killed 12,597,789 people primarily in India and Asia. Throughout this century, there have been several occurrences of the plague, mainly in regions in which the disease is endemic. The most recent scare was in 1995, when India was rocked. This event caused massive emigration from the infected city to other centres, underlying the dangers inherent in not only regional but global travel. JJU USSTTIIN NIIA AN N’’SS PPLLA AG GU UE E It is important to note that plagues don’t just happen. As with most disease outbreaks, the classical host-pathogen-environment triumvirate must take up their positions before onset. During the years heading up to the first yersinia epidemic, there existed increased civil unrest. This environment ultimately resulted in the fall of the Roman imperial government and transition to a disease military despotism. This pathogen host change in government style As with other disease outbreaks, the plague required that a certain set of conditions were met and interacted before its onslaught 9 stabilised the Empire until the death of Diocletian (AD 285-305), whereupon the Empire once again fell into civil war which was ultimately repressed by Constantine the Great (AD 306-337). Constantine transferred the Empire’s capital from Rome to Byzantium, with an associated name change to one befitting the egotist: Constantinople. By AD 395, the Roman Empire was split into two, one being administered from Rome and the other from Constantinople. Justinian (AD 527-565) ruled the latter, or Greek component which enjoyed military and religious adventure as well as stability and prosperity. Justinian’s main objective was to reunite the Empire. Accordingly his armies undertook campaigns into the western Mediterranean, North Africa and parts of Italy and Spain. By 542, Justinian’s aim appeared in sight when another plague was to strike the Empire. The cause of this, the second plague, is not in doubt and it was clearly the first exposure of Europe to the bubonic type. We know this to be a fact because contemporary writers, including that of the Byzantine Procopius of Caesarea made several accounts. The disease was characterised by large swellings of the lymph nodes under the armpits and around groin. This plague, which lasted between AD 542-543, signified the first of a cycle that continued until the mid-800s. Procopius further stated that the plague had its origins in Egypt. Rufas of Ephesus wrote of a similar plague that struck Libya and Egypt in the third century. It is interesting to note that it was during this time that trade commenced between India and Egypt. The homeland of Rattus rattus being India, it is highly likely that the plague was ship-borne because rats are good climbers and could board ships by their docking lines. Thus, plague-infected rats would have dispersed from their origin along the shores of the Indian Ocean up the Red Sea, to Egypt, the Mediterranean and thence to Europe. It is also likely that the Indian rats also infected their European counterparts, thereby spreading the disease even more rapidly. At its height Justinian's plague was killing 10,000 people each day and it was due to this mass slaughter, with consequent reduction in army size, that A contemporary coin bust of the Emperor Justinian (AD 527565) whose plans to reunite one of the greatest Empires ever known to mankind were thwarted by the first epidemic of Yersinia pestis. The effects of this plague were to be felt throughout the coming centuries. 10 Justinian's aim of reuniting the Roman Empire had to be halted. The plague reached southern France and stretched north to Britain by 544, returning later in the first cycle during 664 as recorded by the Venerable Bede (AD 673-735), one of the greatest scholars of the Early Middle Ages. Observers of the time placed mortality at 100 million people although this may be an over-estimate. Nevertheless, the political, economic and social outfall brought by the plague were felt over several centuries. One consequence of the weakened Roman and Persian armies was the expansion of Islamic military might, beginning AD 634. Furthermore, the preeminence of the Mediterranean nations as centres of European civilisation waned and allowed more northerly states to develop (McNiell, 1976). Concomitantly, Justinian’s plague was precursor to the Dark Ages. Following the ravages of the first bubonic plague were significant reductions in city populations which had the effect of lessening trade and enhancing barter economies. As the importance of cities declined, Feudalism spread, religions were modified and Europe became inward looking. Furthermore, the continent was effectively barricaded by Islamic imperialism, which included outposts on the Iberian peninsula. Trade routes between Europe and Asia were thus eradicated with the possible benefit of reducing the risk of re-exposure. Christian sources last mention the plague in 767; something that was to last for a period of over half a millenium. TTH HE EB BLLA AC CK KD DE EA ATTH H The mother of all plagues. The scythe of Death tickled every part of Europe. In some parts of the continent, including Denmark, the death toll was upwards of 70% of the population. In many regions complete towns were quite literally wiped off the face of the earth – some never to reappear, others being dwarfed. Long before the Black Death reached the borders of Europe however, stories were told of pestilence, famine and death that had laid waste India and China. In China a cycle of prolonged and numerous disasters preceded the pestilence. For example, in 1333 sustained drought brought on wide spread 11 famine. This was followed by flash flooding and written accounts indicate earthquake and locust swarms before the onset of plague. In one province more than 5 million people were believed to have died. By 1346 stories reached the major European seaports of a plague wreaking havoc throughout the Far and Mid East. India was depopulated through to Syria and the dead blanketed Armenia. Like the plague of Justinian’s time, the disease triumvirate was also at play. Between AD 700 and 1250 the population of Europe had grown from 25 to 75 million. This explosion in human numbers strained in the agricultural systems of the time and led to the clearance of forests, the drainage of lands and cultivation of mountain slopes to increase production. In doing this, livestock was displaced from the land with a concomitant reduction in manuring. This led to a decrease in overall soil fertility and production and hence ever-wider hunger. At about the same time, the climate became colder, with the Baltic being frozen on more than one occasion. Moreover, Viking settlements in Greenland became ice-locked with the people ultimately dying from starvation. Crops failed throughout the first half of the 14th century and resulted in widespread starvation. One effect of this hunger was the eating of dogs and cats and even cannibalism. The significance of the two former foods upon later events is obvious. Several long hot summers and short winters followed this “Little Ice Age”. This encouraged increased cropping which further increased the population and hunger. The arrival of the plague in 1348 saw a continent that has been likened to drought-ridden food-insecure populations of today. During the 1330s the changing climate also impacted rodent life on the steppes of Mongolia, with the warm dry winds driving them out of the desert and into trade caravans. Fleas loaded with Yersinia may then have ridden on the backs of Mongol caravans as they travelled across Asia to Europe. A visa for Europe While still debated, the origin of Europe’s Black Death was likely invading Tartar armies of Kipchak Khan Janibeg. Backed by the Venicians, a competitor of the Genoese, Tartars besieged the Genoese trade city of Kaffa (Feodosiya). One contemporary writer, Gabriele de’Mussi, in his book Istoria de morbo sive 12 mortalitate que fuit de 1348, related that as the siege army succumbed to the plague they decided to leave. However, before doing so, the corpses of their dead were catapulted into the city. Though the Greek historian Thucydides had accused the Spartans of deliberate biological warfare by poisoning the wells of Athens in 430 BC, the actions of the Tartars possibly represented the first example of biological warfare in the modern sense and it left Kaffa with thousands dead. The Genoese merchant survivors, however, left the city by boats and unwittingly brought the plague to European shores. At the same time of the Kaffa siege, a Muslim traveller, Ibn-Bãtuta (the traveller) remarked that in Persia, Damascus, Cairo and on to West Africa plague was rife, particularly along Muslim trade routes. T he slaughter Estimates of the total kill of the Black Death vary depending upon source. A general figure has been proposed as 20% of the Eurasian population, which was estimated at 100 million at the time. Other estimates suggest that around 30 million had died by the time the plague ebbed in 1351. Body counters for Pope Clement VI figured that between 1348 and 1351 the plague killed 23,840,000 people - 31% of the total population of Europe. In densely populated nations, such as France, the plague emptied half the country. England recorded around a million plague dead, while in Eastern Europe, which was less densely populated, fewer than 15% of the population is believed to have died. Perhaps the most accurate accounts of the death rates however are seen for specific cities. The city of Smolensk boasted a mere 5 survivors. Orvieto, a city of 12000, counted over 10000 dead. Venice lost three-quarters of its population, Pisa seven tenths. London lost 35000 of its original 60000 inhabitants. After 8 major epidemics, Florence, which boasted a population of 120000 in 1330, counted no more than 37000 in 1427. One chronicler of the time noted that following the plague of 1348, 96000 people died between March and October. A Florentine, born in 1349, Marchione di Coppo Stefani, wrote that bodies were so numerous that they were thrown into newly dug graves en masse before being hurriedly buried. Soaring death rates everywhere prevented normal burial practice. Some of the mass graves of Sienna, a city which lost 80000 of its population over seven months, contained 1500 bodies. 13 T he impact Many eyewitness accounts describe mounds of rotting cadavers and the inability of collecting, much less burying, the bodies. Obviously, those who were in greater physical contact with plague victims were also at higher risk. For example, the number of doctors declined rapidly, with many ultimately refusing to treat sick patients for fear of their own and family’s lives. Lawyers too refused to meet with their clients such that considerable havoc resulted in that the Wills of the dead remained unread, with obvious social and economic turmoil. In Montpellier only 7 of 140 Dominican friars survived the plague and in Marseilles a monastery of 150 Franciscans was silenced. In Germany a third of the clergy perished and in England half of the 17500 clerics died. The death of so many clergy demanded that they were replaced somehow. This often led to the hiring of replacement clerics who could not speak either Latin or French, the religious and academic languages of the time. This had the effect of promoting use of the common language at universities, schools and colleges with the concomitant translation of many texts from the Latin. This scenario was repeated in Parliaments across the continent with the impact that a much greater number of people could understand the intricacies of government. Another problem surrounding the plague years was that many clerics refused to assist the dead and dying such that the population started to distrust the church. This in turn led to decreased church power both politically and socially. Plague also spawned Lutheran thought with respect to religion. Poets and other writers of the time, including Chaucer and Boccaccio parodied the church unyieldingly. T he benefits The great die-offs that accompanied the plagues also produced great change and benefit for the peasant. The reduction in the European population effectively ended the subsistence-level living of many people. Indeed, the population of the 13th century was not to be reattained until the 16th century. The mass die-offs rid Europe of its chronic underemployment that characterised the 13th century. To retain semblance of order, landowners were forced to increase wages and to break up their estates or leave their land unproductive. In combination, the pressures brought about by post-plague 14 labour markets and the lord’s need to break up large estates led to a break in the traditional bonds of respect between peasant and landowner leading to the end of Feudalism as a form of government. A major post-plague consequence was that many harvests were left rotting in the fields and animals were left to roam the countryside unattended. Forests also gained time to rebound from their over-exploitation. By 1200 Europeans had more or less eradicated the continent of large forests due to the increasing pressure to produce more food for a growing population. With few exceptions, Europe’s great forests date from the late Middle Ages. Following on the heels of the plague, people came to the realisation that too many mouths meant hunger, followed by disease. This led to great social changes particularly regarding family size and marriage. While freed of the shackles of landowners, peasants were now more responsible for their own and family’s well-being. Accordingly, the peasantry had fewer offspring. This was generally accomplished by marrying at a later stage than usual. Thus, in France, some farmers did not marry until their early 20s. On a global basis, 90% of females bore children by the age of 14 but after the plague, only 65% of European women bore children by 14. Bureaucracy While not unique to the Black Death, one outcome of massive disease outbreaks was an enhanced reliance upon spies. Thus, merchant cities, in order to gain insight into how competing trade centres were fairing, would send out agents to evaluate deaths and spy on other city-states. These spies were often under the employ of newly established Health Boards, which were also responsible for issuing “health passports” to certify plague-free status of citizens who wished to travel between states. It was under the auspices of a Health Board that in 1377, Ragusa (Dubrovnik), developed and introduced a quarantine of 30 days for all ships entering the harbour. The decline in people meant that businessmen faced a shortage of customers at home. This forced traders to travel further afield to Africa, Asia and the New World in search of new markets. The plague thereby facilitated the expansion of Western European empires on a global basis. The Black Death also brought with it "merchant's time" as workers demanded shorter working hours. This spawned our 15 dependence upon the clock and timetables. In total, the plague introduced a new meaning to the term bureaucratic state. Fewer peasants to tend the land also resulted in increased numbers of livestock. Indeed, in England, the sheer abundance of sheep following the plagues gave birth to a powerful wool industry which ultimately gave impetus to the industrial revolution. Recurrent plague also damaged the demographic and economic well-being of Muslim societies and it is likewise possible that their diminishing numbers reduced the chances of plague reaching the West. Nevertheless Europeans continued to expect the plague to return and stepped up quarantine measures and isolation efforts. It was not until the plague of the late 19th century which hit Manchuria and thence Hong Kong, that Alexandre Yersin isolated the causal agent of the plague, the genus of which now bears his name. 1 Clearly, serious pandemics, such as the plague, can have significant and far reaching consequences to society. Today more than at any time in history, devastating pandemics are high on the menu of possibilities with the introduction of genetic engineering and increased understanding of the genetic basis of virulence, it has become relatively simple to produce “super bugs” B BIIO OA AR RM MA AG GE ED DD DO ON N Bioweaponry: the costs Biotechnology provides the means by which the genome of almost any organism can be manipulated for benefit, whether this is agriculturally desirable or strategically so, as illustrated by biological weapons. To many people and government consternation, the methods required to produce genetically modified organisms are, in nature, relatively elementary and most graduates in biotechnology, and related subjects, are generally equipped with the necessary skills and techniques to support a bioweapons project. The technology and 1 http://www.sciencenet.org.uk/teletext/disease/dansinfections.html 16 infrastructure needed to initiate a bioweapons programme 1 are not only widely available in the civil sector (e.g., pharmaceutical companies, vaccine manufactures etc.) they are also relatively inexpensive. Consequently, bioweapons are appealing not only to certain countries, but also to other groups. Terrorists in particular regard bioweapons as extremely attractive due to the fact that they are easy to conceal and thus represent the perfect weapon for covert attacks that can cripple even the wealthiest of nations. Furthermore, they are highly lethal and exert significant psychological impact upon societies. Bioweapons are also cheap. 2 Conveyance Warhead Casualties Scud missile 30 kg anthrax spores 30,000-100,000 A-bomb 12.5 kilotonnes TNT equivalent 20,000-80,000 H-bomb 1 megatonne TNT equivalent 550,000-2,000,000 Aircraft spraying 100 kg anthrax spores 420,000-1,400,000 In a report drawn up by the Office of Technology Assessment (1993), it was calculated that to "affect" 1 km2 of a battlefield (or city), with artillery and conventional weapons it would cost around $2000. Expenses incurred by a nuclear weapon would amount to about $800 for the same task, whereas chemical weapons would be only slightly cheaper at $600. A biological weapon would do the same task for precisely $1. According to the North Atlantic Assembly (1998), building the capacity to Halabja after the attack 1 2 2 http://www.konformist.com/1998/cleansing.htm http://www.sandia.gov/media/disease.htm 17 develop bioweapons 1 “would cost less than $100,000, require five biologists, and take just a few weeks using equipment that is readily available”. Bioweaponry: the possibilities In 1960 A US Army general estimated that two aircraft, each carrying 4,500 kg of biological agent across the US could kill or incapacitate around 60 million people (Livingstone, 1982). While such figures are extraordinarily frightening, they are not beyond the realms of possibility. When examining toxicity of various agents, such as type-A botulism 2 , which has been described as “the most lethal substance known” (Kupperman and Smith, 1993), calculations, while varying, indicate that around 250 g could kill every living animal on the planet (Mullins, 1992). Other authors put the amount of botulinin toxin required to kill 60 million people at 25 g (Jenkins and Rubin, 1978), while Livingstone (1982), suggests that around 14 g, “properly dispersed, could kill every man, woman, and child in North America". Other bioactive agents, such as anthrax 3 , are considered even more lethal and according to Kupperman and Smith (1993), it would require less than a gram of material, to eradicate a third of the population of America, provided that the anthrax was distributed appropriately. Irrespective of the theoretical magnitude of deaths that could occur following purposeful and well planned dissemination of a bioweapon 4 , it is however, very unlikely that such scenarios could be enacted in “real life”, due to both biological and technical reasons. Clark (1980) has covered a more realistic scenario. Citing a report undertaken by the US Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in March 1977, it was estimated that delivery of approximately 25 g of anthrax spores into an air-conditioning system at an enclosed sports stadium could infect 70-80,000 spectators within an hour. An 1 2 3 4 http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/co/2292/1.html http://www.vdh.state.va.us/epi/botuf.htm, http://iaith.simplenet.com/botulism/ http://hlunix.hl.state.ut.us/els/epidemiology/epifacts/anthrax.html, http://www.sciencenet.org.uk/teletext/disease/anthraxteletext.html http://www.mayohealth.org/mayo/9802/htm/anthrax.htm 18 accidental explosion of an anthrax weapon in Sverdlovsk during 1979 is believed to have caused the deaths of up to 1,200 civilian and other personnel (Flood, 1991). It has been calculated that single application of 100 kg of anthrax spores over Washington DC, would, on a clear, calm night, kill between 1 and 3 million citizens. One should remember the recent incident of a small airplane landing on the lawn of the White House to underline the ease of such undertakings. 1 1 1 http://www.newscientist.com/nsplus/insight/bioterrorism/allfall.html 19 Bioweaponry: the commodities & their uses In essence, bioweapons fall into two categories and include microbes, such as the plague and viruses, and toxins derived from bacteria, as exemplified by botulinum. Bioweapons have several potential uses, including application to opposing forces (military and civilian), against animal and plant crops, potable water and irrigation supplies. They may be deployed locally, regionally and/or internationally and may be used to kill or cripple individuals or entire populations. Organisms and their toxins can be delivered using simple (small arms fire, umbrella tips{!}, flasks, etc.) through to technically complex mechanisms (sprays, bombs, missiles, etc.). From a military perspective, a primary reason for employing agents of biological warfare relates not to the losses that they can impose in the arena of battle, but also because they can incapacitate the civilian population. Nonmilitary personnel are essential to the war machine, as illustrated by Justinian’s failed attempt to reunite the Roman Empire. Civilians are responsible for the manufacture of munitions, supply and production of food and general support of all armed services. Disruption of these activities would create havoc for military operations. Moreover, deployment of comparatively few devices could disperse crippling diseases among livestock and crops that would be impossible to imitate using conventional resources. 20 Examples of functional organisms that could be deployed in a theatre of war as biological weapons Disease Effects Anthrax 2-6 days Lethal 95%+ Plague 2-6 days 95-100% Venezuelan equine encephalitis 3-6 days Incapacitating 1-2 weeks Highly infectious Brucellosis 7-60 days Incapacitating Several weeks May last 1 yr. No vaccine available Yellow fever 3-6 days 1-2 weeks Potentially uncontrollable in new host reservoir Tularemia 2-10 days 30-40% lethal 4 weeks Hardy bacteria that can in 4-6 weeks survive in soil Q fever Coxiella spp. 15-18 days 40-100% lethal Incapacitating Duration Military considerts Incubation period 4-5 days Contamination of ground, rapid decay rate 1-3 days Potentially uncontrollable 1-2 weeks Highly infectious, easily cultured Non-conventional uses Use of bioweaponry outside of normal conflicts has also been contemplated, if not applied, in efforts to gain control or to subvert the economies of opposing nations. For example, a political adversary’s critical plant and animal crops could be annihilated almost over night - think of the 21 impact of the recent BSE 1 crisis upon the British economy. Such actions could destabilize not only a country’s economy but perhaps the political system too. 2 Another benefit of economic warfare would be that a country with an abraded economy would not be able to afford to enter into a traditional conflict. A Position of various m utations im portant for prion possible example of such a disease developm ent in hum ans m odelled on the scenario was seen in Cuba. ham ster structure PrPc 2 Over several months this island nation suffered from the cumulative effects of several diseases that hit the nation in sequence. The civilian population suffered from an outbreak of dengue fever 3 . Then, swine fever 4 wiped out pig production, while blue mold disease destroyed the valuable tobacco crop and cane smut attacked and undermined the sugarcane crop. President Castro, of course, accused the CIA, of causing these outbreaks. As recently as May 1997, the US State Department was accused of biological aggression following the outbreak of thrips palmi infestations of potatoes. proboscis of an A edes aegyptifeeding 3 1 2 3 4 http://www.airtime.co.uk/bse/ , http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/bse/ Photo:http://www-micro.msb.le.ac.uk/335/Prions.html Photo:http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/dhspot97.htm http://www.ohsu.edu/cliniweb/C22/C22.905.html 22 Bioweaponry: refinements The previous examples of biowarfare, illustrate not only the degree of planning that must be undertaken in mounting a biological cold war, but also that use of only a few agents can have devastating economic and social impacts. During battlefield aggression, another aspect to take into account in the selection of a bioweapon is that the disease or toxin should not be lethal, but only debilitating. This is because incapacitation occupies strategic personnel who might otherwise be useful during battlefield operations (doctors, nurses, pharmacists etc.). The ideal biological weapon, therefore, should be: • easy to produce • effective at low doses • stable under storage and during transportation • technologically accessible to a range of delivery systems • infallible with regard to its incubation and intended impact • deployed against previously unexposed targets • untreatable by the enemy • controllable post-delivery Obviously, the exploiting nation should have access to total protection for its military and civilian population. It is because of the above provisions that biological weapons have rarely been used in the battlefield situation. Nevertheless, military researchers have examined the feasibility of using bioweapons throughout history, both ancient and modern. One can only admire the ingenuity of contaminating water supplies with the carcasses of dead animals two thousand years ago and the inventiveness of Tartar commanders in catapulting plague victims into a besieged city a thousand years later. More recent developments however, are generally viewed as being repugnant. 23 B BIIO OW WE EA APPO ON NSS:: M MO OD DE ER RN N TTIIM ME ESS In contemporary terms, bio-, rather than chemical warfare programmes, likely commenced with the establishment of Unit 731 by the Japanese in 1918. Unit 731 1 operated in the remote northern regions of the Japanese Puppet State of Manchuria, China. The Unit consisted of eight divisions, three of which considered bacteriological research, warfare research and field experimentation, and the mass production and storage of bacteria respectively. Unit 731 examined the impact of various biological agents, including bubonic plague, anthrax, botulins, smallpox and their vectors upon humans. During their experiments, the Japanese murdered at least 3000 Chinese who were considered to be dissidents. The Unit designed several delivery systems for bacteria, as exemplified by porcelain bombs and steel containers holding anthrax pellets and tetanus emulsion. They also contrived to produce chocolate bars infected with anthrax. During the Chekiang campaign of 1942, the Japanese purposefully infected rivers and reservoirs with anthrax, dysentery, plague and tetanus. This resulted in the deaths of incalculable numbers of Chinese and some 10000 Japanese troops who unwittingly entered a contaminated region. Perhaps even more repugnant than the use of bioweapons was that at the end of WWII the US gave immunity to all those Japanese scientists involved in the bioweapons programme of Unit 731 in order to gain their accumulated knowledge; a scenario re-enacted with German rocket scientists. Historically, the British have also examined the feasibility of using agents for bioactive warfare. Perhaps the most well known episode in their history has been the gifts of smallpox infected blankets from a smallpox hospital to Native American Indians during the French campaigns. During the Second World War British scientists turned their attention to anthrax. The notorious Scottish isle of Gruinard was used for testing. It was not deemed fit for habitation until 1987. Since the early 1970s the number of countries suspected of producing biological weapons has increased from four to ten. According to the CIA, both toxins and live organism biowarfare agents have been developed and tested specifically in countries that, in the eyes of the west, are oppressive. Even 1 http://aiipowmia.com/731study.html 24 though prohibited by international treaty, several countries, including Israel, Syria, Russia, together with their former states and Iraq are known to have stockpiled such weapons. Other countries that are believed to retain biowarfare capabilities include China, Iran, Japan, Libya, North Korea, South Africa and Taiwan. While to the cynic, the CIA is generally regarded as a scaremonger recent reports derived from independent United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq and the investigations of the Dutch Government of the downed Israeli El-Al freight 747 appear to support their conclusions regarding both bio- and chemical weapons. Unscom and Iraq According to a document delivered to the Secretary General of the UN, that considered monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with part C of the Security Council’s resolution 687 (03.04.91; Cease-fire and establishment and mandate of UNSCOM), the threat of weapons of mass destruction included lethal agents and incapacitating agents. The scope of biological warfare agents worked on by Iraq encompassed both anti-personal and anti-plant weapons. The agents under consideration included anthrax (~8500 litres), botulinum (~20000 litres) and ricin toxin, aflatoxin (~2200 litres), mycotoxins 1 , haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus and rotavirus. Moreover, several of these agents were found to be loaded in tactical and strategic weapons. While these figures are frightening, perhaps even more alarming was the fact that Iraq claims that its biological weapons operation was only conceived in 1985. The accomplishments of the Iraqis, over a 6 year period (the point at which Kuwait was invaded), therefore, was nothing short of extraordinary and serves as a global warning as to the ease that such projects can be completed. Bioterrorism Because it is extraordinarily difficult to control the development, manufacture and delivery of biological weapons it is not surprising to find that certain terrorist groups have examined their potential applications. Moreover, bioweapons in particular, or as President Rafsanjani, and others have termed 1 http://www.ansci.cornell.edu/plants/toxicagents/mycotoxin.html 25 them: “the poor man’s bomb”, can be manufactured quite easily and rapidly without the hazards inherent in the production of a nuclear device. They also express a high degree of reliability and are less likely to be detected, are difficult to defend against, lack the so-called “signature” which may incriminate the user and hence may be employed anonymously. A recent example of terrorist application of weapons of mass destruction has been with the use of sarin 1 nerve gas by the Japanese Aum Shinri Kyo sect. On March 20 th 1995, small packets of lunch-box dimensions were placed on five trains running on three major lines of the Tokyo subway. Following the release of the gas, 12 died and 5,550 were injured, with many of the latter being hospitalized. According to McGeorge (1994), there have been over 200 bio-, or chemoweapon incidents2 occurring in at least 26 countries, of these over 50 were terrorist incidents3 . B BIIO OTTE EC CH HN NO OLLO OG GYY A AN ND DB BIIO OW WE EA APPO ON NR RYY In today’s world, it is comparatively easy to access pathogenic microorganisms either through supply houses (as was the case for Iraq’s biowarfare programme), or directly via isolation. Recombinant DNA technology has brought with it an increased risk of organisations, large and small, being able to manipulate the genome of highly pathogenic organisms with comparative ease and in quantities large enough to be of military significance. Again the tools required for such undertakings, fermenters, media, freeze-driers, filtration and containment equipment, harvesting and concentrating apparatus, aerosol generators etc., are freely accessible either directly in developed nations, or may be accessed using second and third parties (many of Iraq’s programmes were supported through third-party purchases). Moreover, the skill base needed for the production of genetically modified organisms (isolation, purification, cloning, amplification, insertion, expression etc) spreads daily without regard of the possible consequences. 1 2 3 http://www.osha-slc.gov/ChemSamp_data/CH_266495.html http://www.outbreak.org/cgi-unreg/dynaserve.exe/index.html http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/tabintre.html#toc 26 Biotechnology also provides the means by which agents can be produced wherein they provide a consistent effect, are more contagious and effective at low doses and express multi-resistance to, for example, a broad range of antibiotics. Another advantage of employing engineered versus natural bioweapons relates to the military significant factor that many of these highly purified products are generally less able to disseminate after release and thus their persistency is limited. Biotechnology too, provides the means to massproduce vaccines and antibiotics for battlefield and civilian protection. At present, vaccines are available for Botulinum A, B-G, Q fever, diphtheria, cholera, plague, anthrax, tularemia, salmonellosis and tetanus. Many vaccines were employed during the Gulf War. Unfortunately, many of these appear to have had unforeseen consequences 1. Besides this, it is doubtful that, following a major bioweapon attack that any nation would have adequate stockpiles of vaccines, antibiotics etc. with which to treat or protect non-essential personnel 2 . Accordingly, one of the methods by which technically developed nations attempt to restrict proliferation of biological capability 3 is through restricting or controlling the purchase of appropriate equipment and there are US and EU regulations regarding this. Restrictions are also in place with respect to the export control of biological agents including human viruses (e.g., dengue, ebola, lassa, yellow fever, Machupo, Marburg and Hantaan virus), rickettsiae (e.g., Coxiella, R. prowazeki, R. rickettsii) and bacteria (e.g., Bacillus anthracis, Brucella abortus, Chlamydia psittaci, Salmonella typhi, Vibrio cholerae, Yersinia pestis, Shigella dysenteriae, etc.) and their toxins and plant and animal viruses, bacteria and fungi. Other problems surrounding biological weapons and biotechnology relate to the increased potential for developing married chemo/bioweapons and the possibilities that fused-cell methods offer. Both are already possible in the laboratory environment. At a recent symposium, it was suggested that the enhanced understanding derived from the human genome project may provide the key to developing ethnic bioweapons - agents directed specifically at one group of humans (Dando, 1997). 1 2 3 http://www.gulfweb.org/doc_show.cfm?ID=233 http://www.darpa.mil/DSO/rd/Abmt/Bwd.html http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/other/disease.htm 27 R RE EF FE ER RE EN NC CE ESS C CIITTE ED D The following references provide interesting insights into a variety of issues covered in the present page. However, they represent only a small sample of a wide range of studies which cover the fields of plague, biological warfare and bioterrorism. The following, therefore, does not represent a suggested reading list. Benedict, C. (1996). Bubonic plague in nineteenth-Century China. Stanford. Brookesmith, P. (1997). Future plagues. biohazard, disease and pestilence. mankind's battle for survival. Blandford Press, UK. Carmichael, A.G. (1986). Plague and the poor in Renaissance Florence. CUP, Cambridge, UK Carmichael, A.G. (1997). Bubonic plague: the black death. pp. 60-67, In: Plague, pox and pestilence (K.F. Kipple, editor). Weidenfeld and Nicolson London, UK. Clark, R.C. (1980). Technological terrorism. Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair. Dando, M.R. (1997). Discriminating bio-weapons could target ethnic groups. International Defense Review (special issue: Chemical and Biological Warfare), 30, 77-78. Flood, S. (ed.) (1991). International terrorism: Policy implications. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago. Gottfried, R.S. (1983). The Black Death: natural Medieval Europe. The Free Press, New York. and human disaster in Horrox, R. (editor)(1994). The Black Death. manchester and NY. Jenkins, B.M. and Rubin, A.P. (1978). New vulnerabilities and the acquisition of new weapons by non-government groups, pp. 221-276, in: Legal aspects of 28 international terrorism. A.E. Evans and J.F. Murphy (editors). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Kipple, K. (1997). The plague of Justinian: an early lesson in the black death. pp. 26-31, In: Plague, pox and pestilence (K.F. Kipple, editor). Weidenfeld and Nicolson London, UK. Kupperman, R.H. and Smith, D.M. (1993). Coping with biological terrorism, pp. 35-46, in: Biological weapons: weapons of the future? Roberts, B. (editor). Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kupperman, R.H. and Trent, D.M. (1979). Terrorism: Threat, reality, response. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Livingstone, N.C. (1982). The war against terrorism. Lexington Books, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. McGeorge, H.J. (1994). Chemical and biological terrorism: analyzing the problem. ASA [Applied Science and Analysis, Inc.] Newsletter 94-3 (Issue No.42), 16 June, pp. 1 and 12-13. McGrew, R.E. (1985). Encyclopedia of medical history. NY McNiell, W.H. (1976) Plagues and people. Garden City, New York. Mullins, W.C. (1992). An overview and analysis of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism: The weapons, strategies and solutions to a growing problem. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 16, 95-119. Nikiforuk, A. (1991). The fourth horseman. A short history of epidemics, plagues and other scourges. Fourth Estate, London, UK. Nohl, J. (1956). The Black Death. Unwin Books, London, UK. North Atlantic Assembly (1998). Chemical and biological weapons: the poor man’s bomb. Draft General Report. Office of Technology Assessment (1993). Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Assessing the risks. OTA-ISC-559. Congress of the United States, Washington DC Slack, P. (1985). The plague in Tudor and Stuart England. London. Ziegler, P. (1982). The Black Death. Penguin Books, Markham, UK. 29 C CO ON NV VE EN NTTIIO ON NO ON NB BIIO OW WE EA APPO ON NSS Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10,1972 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate December 16, 1974 Ratified by U.S. President January 22, 1975 U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 26, 1975 Proclaimed by U.S. President March 26, 1975 Entered into force March 26, 1975 The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war, 30 Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them, Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925, Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents, Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end, Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk, Have agreed as follows: Article i Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 31 (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Article ii Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. Article iii Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention. Article iv Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 32 Article v The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Article vi (1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. (2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation. Article vii Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention. Article viii Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925. 33 Article ix Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes. Article x (1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Article xi Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. 34 Article xii Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Article xiii (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article xiv (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 35 (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article xv This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this tenth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-two. 36 Ratifications and accessions in chronological order Czech Republic acceded 05-04-93 Afghanistan signed 10-04-72, ratified 26-03-75 Albania acceded 03-06-92 Argentina signed 01-08-72, ratified 27-11-79 Armenia acceded 07-06-94 Australia signed 10-04-72, ratified 05-10-77 Austria signed 10-04-72,ratified 10-08-73 Bahamas acceded 26-11-86 Bahrain acceded 28-10-88 Bangladesh acceded11-03-85 Barbados signed 16-02-73, ratified 16-02-73 Belarus signed 10-04-72, ratified 26-03-75 Belgium signed 10-04-72, ratified 15-03-79 Belize acceded 20-10-86 Benin signed 10-04-72, ratified 25-04-75 Bhutan acceded 08-06-78 Bolivia signed 10-04-72, ratified 30-10-75 Bosnia, Herzegovina acceded 15-08-94 Botswana signed 10-04-72, ratified 05-02-92 Brazil signed 10-04-72, ratified 27-02-73 Brunei acceded 31-01-91 Bulgaria signed 10-04-72, ratified 02-08-72 Burkina Faso acceded 17-04-91 Burundi signed 10-04-72 Cambodia signed 10-04-72, ratified 09-03-83 Canada signed 10-04-72, ratified 18-09-72 Cape Verde acceded 20-10-77 Central African Republic signed 10-04-72 Chile signed 10-04-72, ratified 22-04-80 China acceded 15-11-84 Colombia signed 10-04-72, ratified 19-12-83 Congo (Brazzaville) acceded 23-10-78 Congo (Democratic Republic of, formerly Zaire) signed 10-04-72, ratified 16-09-75 Costa Rica signed 10-04-72, ratified 17-12-73 Côte d'Ivoire signed 23-05-72 Croatia acceded 28-04-93 Cuba signed 10-04-72, ratified 21-04-76 Cyprus signed 10-04-72, ratified 06-11-73 Denmark signed 10-04-72, ratified 01-03-73 Dominica acceded 08-11-78 Dominican Republic signed 10-04-72, ratified 23-0273 Ecuador signed 14-06-72, ratified 21-03-75 Egypt signed 10-04-72 El Salvador signed 10-04-72, ratified 31-12-91 Equatorial Guinea acceded 16-01-89 Estonia acceded 21-06-93 Ethiopia signed 10-04-72, ratified 26-05-75 Fiji signed 22-02-73, ratified 04-09-73 Finland, signed 10-04-72, ratified 04-02-74 France acceded 27-09-84 Gabon signed 10-04-72 Gambia signed 02-06-72, ratified 21-11-91 Georgia acceded 22-05-96 Germany* signed 10-04-72, ratified 28-11-72 Ghana signed 10-04-72, ratified 06-06-75 Greece signed 10-04-72, ratified 10-12-75 Grenada acceded 22-10-86 Guatemala signed 09-05-72, ratified 19-09-73 Guinea-Bissau acceded 20-08-76 Guyana signed 03-01-73 Haiti signed 10-04-72 Honduras signed 10-04-72, ratified 14-03-79 37 Hungary signed 10-04-72, ratified 27-12-72 Iceland, signed 10-04-72, ratified 15-02-73 India* signed 15-01-73, ratified 15-07-74 Indonesia signed 20-06-72, ratified 19-02-92 Iran signed 10-04-72, ratified 22-08-73 Iraq signed 11-05-72, ratified 19-06-91 Ireland, * signed 10-04-72, ratified 27-10-72 Italy signed 10-04-72, ratified 30-05-75 Mauritius signed 10-04-72, ratified 07-08-72 Mexico* signed 10-04-72, ratified 08-04-74 Mongolia signed 10-04-72, ratified 05-09-72 Morocco signed 02-05-72 Myanmar (Burma) signed 10-04-72 Nepal signed 10-04-72 Netherlands signed 10-04-72, ratified 22-06-81 New Zeal, signed 10-04-72, ratified 13-12-72 Nicaragua signed 10-04-72, ratified 07-08-75 Niger signed 21-04-72, ratified 23-06-72 Nigeria signed 03-07-72, ratified 03-07-73 Norway signed 10-04-72, ratified 01-08-73 Jamaica acceded 13-08-75 Japan signed 10-04-72, ratified 08-06-82 Jordan signed 10-04-72, ratified 30-05-75 Oman acceded 31-03-92 Kenya acceded 07-01-76 Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North Korea) acceded 13-03-87 Korea, Republic of (South Korea) signed 10-04-72, ratified 25-06-87 Kuwait signed 14-04-72, ratified 18-07-72 Laos signed 10-04-72, ratified 20-03-73 Latvia signed, ratified Lebanon signed 10-04-72, ratified 26-03-75 Lesotho signed 10-04-72, ratified 06-09-77 Liberia signed 10-04-72 Libya acceded 19-01-82 Liechtenstein acceded 30-05-91 Lithuania acceded 10-02-98 Luxembourg signed 10-04-72, ratified 23-03-76 Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) acceded 24-12-96 Madagascar signed 13-10-72 Malawi signed 10-04-72 Malaysia signed 10-04-72, ratified 06-09-91 Maldives acceded 02-08-93 Mali signed 10-04-72 Malta signed 11-09-72, ratified 07-04-75 Pakistan signed 10-04-72, ratified 25-09-74 Panama signed 02-05-72, ratified 20-03-74 Papua New Guinea acceded 27-10-80 Paraguay acceded 09-06-76 Peru signed 10-04-72, ratified 05-06-85 Philippines signed 10-04-72, ratified 21-05-73 Poland, signed 10-04-72, ratified 25-01-73 Portugal signed 29-06-72, ratified 15-05-75 Qatar signed 14-11-72, ratified 17-04-75 Romania signed 10-04-72, ratified 25-07-79 Russian Federation signed 10-04-72, ratified 26-0375 Rwanda signed 10-04-72, ratified 20-05-75 38 Saint Kitts (Christopher), Nevis acceded 02-04-91 Saint Lucia acceded 26-11-86 San Marino signed 12-09-72, ratified 11-03-75 Sao Tome, Principe acceded 24-08-79 Saudi Arabia signed 12-04-72, ratified 24-05-72 Senegal signed 10-04-72, ratified 26-03-75 Serbia, Montenegro signed 10-04-72, ratified 25-1073 Seychelles acceded 11-10-79 Sierra Leone signed 07-11-72, ratified 29-06-76 Singapore signed 19-06-72, ratified 02-12-75 Slovakia acceded 17-05-93 Slovenia acceded 07-04-92 Solomon Islands acceded 17-06-81 Somalia signed 03-07-72 South Africa signed 10-04-72, ratified 03-11-75 Spain signed 10-04-72, ratified 20-06-79 Sri Lanka signed 10-04-72, ratified 18-11-86 Suriname acceded 06-01-93 Swaziland, acceded 18-06-91 Sweden signed 27-02-75, ratified 05-02-76 Switzerland, signed 10-04-72, ratified 04-05-76 Syria signed 14-04-72 Uganda acceded 12-05-92 Ukraine signed 10-04-72, ratified 26-03-75 United Arab Emirates signed 28-09-72 UK of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, signed 10-0472, ratified 26-03-75 United States of America signed 10-04-72, ratified 26-03-75 Uruguay acceded 06-04-81 Uzbekistan acceded 11-01-96 Taiwan signed 10-04-72, ratified 09-02-73 Tanzania signed 16-08-72 Thailand, signed 17-01-73, ratified 28-05-75 Togo signed 10-04-72, ratified 10-11-76 Tonga acceded 28-09-76 Tunisia 10-04-72, ratified 18-05-73 Turkey 10-04-72, ratified 25-10-74 Turkmenistan acceded11-01-96 Yemen signed 26-04-72, ratified 01-06-79 Vanuatu acceded 12-10-90 Venezuela signed 10-04-72, ratified 18-10-78 Viet Nam acceded 20-06-80 Zimbabwe acceded 05-11-90 39 Non signaturie Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua, Barbuda Azerbaijan Marshall Islands Mauritania Micronesia (Federal States of) Moldova (Republic of) Monaco Mozambique Cameroon Chad Comoros Cook Islands Namibia Nauru Niue Djibouti Palau Eritrea St. Vincent & the Grenadines Sudan Guinea Tajikistan Trinidad, Tobago Tuvalu Holy See Western Samoa Israel Zambia Kazakhstan Kiribati Kyrgyzstan 40