The Arab uprising and the persistence of monarchy

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The Arab uprising that began in 2010 is noteworthy for the fact that it saw the removal of rulers in states with republican governments,[1] while monarchical rulers survived the generally smaller protests in their states.[2] This seems paradoxical in view of the fact that monarchs throughout history have tended to be particularly vulnerable to revolutionary movements. The current generation of monarchs in the Middle East promoted the economic development of their states; but, as Samuel Huntington said in the 1960s, modernizing monarchs are likely to hasten their own demise.[3] That did not happen in the recent episode, although the potential contagion effect of the Arab uprising certainly provided opportunities. What explains the toppling of rulers in the republican states but the persistence of the monarchs?

There is an ample literature explaining the exceptional longevity of monarchy in the Middle East in relation to the political impact of oil:[4] monarchs in oil-rich states have bought off their citizens in exchange for political acquiescence. In reversing the American Revolution's call for 'no taxation without representation', the monarchs have used their states' vast oil wealth to provide their citizens with huge resources on the condition that they accept the monarchs' right to rule and do not ask for political representation. When the Arab uprising began, the monarchs in the oil-rich states significantly increased payouts for their citizens in an effort to prevent protests similar to those they were witnessing in the surrounding Arab states. As Michael Ross says, the Arab uprising drowned in petrodollars in the oil-rich states of the monarchs.[5]

The argument based on oil, however, is not entirely borne out by the evidence. The monarchies in the non-rentier states of Jordan and Morocco survived. With

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1 The Arab uprising began in Tunisia in 2010 and spread to Egypt and other Arab states. It involved popular protests. The end-point is not clear.

2 The term 'monarch' as used here refers to absolute monarchs, not constitutional ones. The monarchs of the Middle East have been absolute ones, and the Arab uprising did not force them to become constitutional rulers.

3 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political order in changing societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 191.

4 For examples, see Giacomo Luciani, 'Allocation vs. production states: a theoretical framework', pp. 65–84, and Hazem Beblawi, 'The rentier state in the Arab world', pp. 85–98, both in Giacomo Luciani, ed., *The Arab state* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The price of wealth: economies and institutions in the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Jill Crystal, *Oil and politics in the Gulf: rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

5 Michael L. Ross, 'Will oil drown the Arab Spring?', *Foreign Affairs* 90: 5, Sept./Oct. 2011, pp. 2–7.

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the exception of Algeria—which can be largely explained by the fact that years of Islamist insurgency in the 1990s had exhausted the country's desire for revolution—all of the non-democratic republics (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen) saw regime change, and the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has had to use monstrous levels of violence in order to cling to power. Bahrain was the only monarchy that saw large protests, and even there the regime resorted to less violence than the failed republican regimes, and the protesters at first did not seek regime change as they had in the republics.

The monarchical states were to an extent immune to the Arab uprising because they had defined themselves in ideological opposition to the republics, and it was the republican states' constitutional embrace of revolutionary nationalism that made them vulnerable in time to the uprising. The republican states based on revolutionary nationalism established regimes that were exclusive and in time became brittle and unable to make big changes. Moreover, having opposed the republics' promotion of revolutionary nationalism, the monarchical states went on to resist transnational revolutionary movements emanating from the republican states, and the Arab uprising was reminiscent of these in its regional 'domino effect'. For the monarchical states, transnational revolutionary movements threatened their security. The monarchs' efforts to counter the republics' promotion of revolutionary nationalism came to comprise a large part of what was known as the 'Arab Cold War' during the 1950s and 1960s.[6] In differentiating the state from the nation, monarchy as an institution came to preserve the security of the state in preventing one revolutionary faction within the nation from capturing the state and potentially liquidating it in unifying with other revolutionary nationalists in other states.

In addition to promoting security and stability, the monarchical states did not suffer the negative institutional consequences that the Arab republics did in embracing revolutionary nationalism as their foundational principles. Like the Soviet Union in its adoption of Marxism-Leninism, the Arab republics in espousing revolutionary nationalism based themselves on a failed ideology.[7] The state in these republics, purporting to act in the name of 'popular sovereignty' and the interests of the heroic nation, in fact came to dominate and even crush the nation. Although revolutionary nationalism was in decline by the late 1960s, the republics failed to become politically inclusive, and state socialism gave way to crony capitalism. Paradoxically, and in spite of sharing authoritarian features with the republics, the monarchies showed more respect for the different interests of the nation than the republics in differentiating the state from the nation.[8]

[6] On this period, see Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

[7] Nationalism is defined as 'the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics': Jack Snyder, *From voting to violence: democratization and nationalist conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000), p. 23. Revolutionary nationalists can be defined in different ways; this article assumes that they implement social revolutions and radical policies. See the discussion below.

[8] The rule of law is one measure that the World Bank uses. On this gauge, in 2011 all of the monarchies ranked above the fiftieth percentile except Morocco (49.3%), while all of the republics ranked below the fiftieth percentile except Tunisia (51.2%): World Bank, *Aggregate indicators governance, 1996–2011* (Washington DC).

This article first examines why the republics were vulnerable to the uprising and then considers why the monarchical states were able to resist it. The next section briefly suggests that the failure of some social revolutionary states, such as the Soviet Union, serves as a model for understanding the structural weaknesses of the Arab republics. The following section, while acknowledging that a multitude of factors contributed to the Arab uprising, shows that the main problems of the Arab republics stemmed from their constitutional embrace of revolutionary nationalism. The final section demonstrates that the monarchical states were less receptive to the Arab uprising in having defined themselves in ideological opposition to the republics and in having become somewhat resistant to transnational revolutionary movements emanating from the republics.

Comparative theory and the failures of social revolutionary states

The claim that petrodollars have preserved the monarchies has been noted above. Might culture also have acted as a contributory factor?[9] In fact, the cultural dissimilarities between the republican and monarchical states of the region do not appear great enough to explain the divergent outcomes. Monarchs are associated with tradition, but Lisa Anderson demonstrates that the monarchies of the Middle East are quite modern.[10] Scholars of revolutions have tended to focus on either the features of states that succumb to revolutions or the groups that overturn them.[11] Both perspectives are necessary for a complete understanding of the Arab uprising, but as a first approach a focus on the state is more fruitful. Scholars of social mobilization have often stressed the resources—access to social media, ability to organize, etc.—at the disposal of revolutionary groups,[12] but the resources enjoyed by the protesters and would-be protesters in the republican and monarchical states respectively were fairly similar.[13] In fact, the one resource that lent strength to protesters in the republics and was far weaker in the monarchical states was the desire to overturn the regime. In taking the alternative focus on the state, Eva Bellin argues that authoritarian regimes persisted for so long in the Middle East because of the financial resources of the states and the neo-patrimonial or personalistic nature of the security forces.[14] Yet the Arab uprising demonstrates that we need a broader conceptualization of the state that goes beyond its security forces, which seemed to be strong before the event in both the republics and the monarchies.

[9] Bernard Lewis, 'Monarchy in the Middle East', in Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East monarchies: the challenge of modernity* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 15–22.

[10] Lisa Anderson, 'Absolutism and the resilience of monarchy in the Middle East', *Political Science Quarterly* 106: 1, 1991, pp. 1–15.

[11] For those who emphasize states, see Theda Skocpol, *States and social revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); for those who emphasize revolutionary groups, see Charles Tilly, *From mobilization to revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

[12] D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, eds, *Comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[13] The protesters in Libya were aided by the military intervention of some NATO states.

[14] Eva Bellin, 'The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East', *Comparative Politics* 36: 2, Jan. 2004, pp. 139–57; 'Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East', *Comparative Politics* 44: 2, Jan. 2012, pp. 127–49.

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In following a statist approach, this article emphasizes what can be called an ideological–institutional perspective. For a set of states, the institutions created at their founding significantly constrain their development, and for a subset of these states the creation of these institutions is based on highly ideological factors. An ideological–institutional perspective recognizes that institutions embody the rules and relationships that define the constitution in a non-formal way, leading to the process of forming political coalitions, which then produce policy.[15] These institutions remain in place even if the ideology prevailing at the time of foundation fades. Since this ideological–institutionalist perspective embraces or subsumes political, economic and legitimacy factors that theorists of revolution see as the causes of revolution, it is not a simple, monocausal explanation. Nor can this perspective predict the timing of revolution. Nevertheless, it does explain why, once the Arab uprising started, certain states (the republics) fell while others (the monarchies) survived.

The Arab republics were established on the basis of revolutionary principles similar to those guiding other social revolutions. Highly motivated by ideology, social revolutionary states created strong state apparatuses that suffocated their nations, and the nation was conceived as the undifferentiated masses. Social revolutions entailed the violent overthrow of the government, were led by a dictatorial vanguard, and were committed to promoting a radical transformation of state and society.[16] They privileged communitarian values over individual ones, favoured the planned economy over the market, and promoted dictatorship over the consent of the governed. Most importantly, they sought to vanquish their foes, repudiating the concept of pluralism. 'The trump card' of these revolutionaries was their 'scapegoating of enemies of the nation at home and abroad'.[17]

What causes a set of states founded on social revolutionary principles to experience upheaval years later? John Owen suggests that eras with sharp ideological cleavages internationally come to an end when one ideology proves more successful than the other.[18] Thus communism collapsed in part as a result of its failure relative to states based on liberal principles. Similarly, the Arab republics founded on revolutionary nationalism appeared antiquated in a new era that saw the worldwide spread of democracy and markets. Social revolutionary states suffered two problems in particular: first, their political and economic systems remained too exclusive; second, they proved unable to change sufficiently over time. Since both cases involved multiple countries and regional dynamics, the fall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the eastern bloc serve as evidence for the larger proposition about the Arab uprising that a set of social revolutionary states are likely to experience some kind of upheaval in time as a result of their foundational embrace of these radical principles.

[15] On institutionalism, see Douglas C. North, *Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
[16] See esp. Skocpol, *States and social revolutions*.
[17] Snyder, *From voting to violence*, p. 158.
[18] John N. Owen IV, *The clash of ideas in world politics* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 53–78.

The failure of the Soviet Union and communism serves as a model for understanding the Arab uprising. The idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union was due in large measure to the institutional legacy of Marxism-Leninism is based on the view that the ideology was foundational to the Soviet state itself. The Soviet state proclaimed itself as the embodiment of the revolution of the proletariat against capitalism and the bourgeoisie, and it had a missionary foreign policy in seeking the revolutionary triumph of the proletariat worldwide. In the 1980s, Soviet leaders saw that communism was not the wave of the future: capitalism and the bourgeoisie were becoming ever stronger, and Soviet efforts to gain allies in the world were faltering. More specifically, the Soviet state was too big; its economy was too centralized; its society was too stifled; and its foreign policy was based too much on conflict in a world that was becoming more cooperative.

Revolutions occur in part because states prove incapable of reforming themselves. Although the Soviet Union had moved away from some aspects of Stalinism over the years, Moscow found it difficult to change the basic features of its system. Several scholars emphasize the revolutionary legacy as the cause of the lack of flexibility in the Soviet state.[19] Philip Roeder argues that:

> The seemingly paradoxical elements of a regime with a transformational mission that led to stagnation, a Party that engineered social change but could not adapt to a changed society, and stability that gave way to collapse are all tied to one another. These contradictions are rooted in the design of Soviet politics. They inhere in the fundamental institutional structure of the Bolsheviks' vanguard regime—what I call the constitution of Bolshevism.[20]

Roeder says that Bolshevism was founded by design on not being accountable to the citizens. William Odom similarly claims that Soviet studies should not have scrapped its old idea that the Soviet Union was a 'totalitarian' state incapable of reform.[21] He identifies six features of the totalitarian model and maintains that Sovietologists moved away from the concept after Nikita Khrushchev removed terror as one of its prime features.[22] Nevertheless, the other five characteristics of totalitarianism remained, says Odom, and the system could not evolve to a more liberal order. He writes:

> If pluralism and group politics have been identifiable on a significant scale for nearly four decades, if authority based on legitimacy has been accumulating over that period, if social changes in education and urbanization have brought the Soviet population into line with the liberal democracies of the West, why then was it not a relatively easy matter for Gorbachev to move to liberal democracy?[23]

[19] For examples, see Valerie Bunce, *Subverting institutions: the design and destruction of socialism and the state* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Philip Roeder, *Red sunset: the failure of Soviet politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Vladislav M. Zubok, *A failed empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); William Odom, 'Soviet politics and after: old and new concepts', *World Politics* 45: 1, Oct. 1992, pp. 66–98.

[20] Roeder, *Red Sunset*, p. 3.

[21] Odom, 'Soviet politics and after'.

[22] Odom says that the totalitarian model included, in addition to terror: ideology, the vanguard party, the command economy, the party's monopoly of the media and the party's control of the armed forces.

[23] Odom, 'Soviet politics and after', p. 76.

Given the difficulty of reform, and given the importance of the idea of revolution, the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev promoted a 'counter-revolution' against the old system.[24] A counter-revolution is a revolution that defines itself in opposition to the basic features of the original revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution had been a revolution of the people, but Gorbachev's counter-revolution was a revolution from above. The bloated state was decentralized. Perestroika promoted market mechanisms as a way to counter the heavily socialized economy, while glasnost sought to revitalize civil society and encourage the empowerment of individuals and groups. Lastly, Gorbachev created a counter-revolution in foreign policy: instead of seeing the West as the enemy, he tried to make it a friend.

The failures of revolutionary nationalism

The Arab uprising came about as a result of the failed institutional legacy of revolutionary nationalism. Its cause was similar to that of the Soviet collapse: the domestic orders of the Arab republics became brittle and vulnerable to revolution as a result of their earlier constitutional embrace of revolutionary nationalism. Indeed, revolutionary nationalism was in many ways akin to Marxism-Leninism. Like Bolshevism, it established structures that were difficult to change. Just as the Soviet Union could not move beyond its totalitarian features in spite of renouncing terror, so the Arab republics could not significantly change their institutions even after shedding their ideology of revolutionary nationalism. Perhaps, like the Soviet Union, the Arab republics could have dramatically reformed themselves; but the inability of even one to do so, and the problems these states have encountered since the Arab uprising, suggest a strong inhibiting role for structural factors stemming from their foundation. As Arab nationalism receded and militant Islamism grew, the republican rulers—like the monarchs—bragged about their ability to promote security. Like Arab nationalism, militant Islamism has called for the dissolution of the nation-state system in favour of a new pan-Islamic order, and beginning in the 1990s it posed a serious challenge to several states, particularly Algeria and Egypt. But the republican rulers, having declared their *raison d'être* to be their commitment to revolutionary change, and having found it so difficult to make big changes, found their trumpeting of security eventually falling on deaf ears among the protesters of the Arab uprising.

The revolutionary nationalists who came to power in the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s were distinctive in several ways. Coming to power through the militaries, they created revolutions from above. They also emphasized pan-Arabism, the unity of all Arabs irrespective of state borders; and yet, ironically, these revolutionary nationalists each represented one faction or group that captured the state and claimed to represent the entire nation. In contrast with Marxist-Leninism, it was the charismatic leader rather than the party who embodied the nation and charted its course.

[24] Robert S. Snyder, 'Bridging the realist/constructivist divide: the case of the counter-revolution in Soviet foreign policy at the end of the Cold War', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1: 1, 2005, pp. 55–71.

Revolutionary nationalism embodied four other significant features. First, in representing the heroic nation, the state became big and monolithic. Its charismatic leader (Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya) charted the nation's course, and the state repressed dissent and the creation of alternative factions. Nasser outlawed all political parties except his own, the Liberation Rally; this became the Arab Socialist Union in the 1960s. Militaries dominated, and parliaments, if they existed, were subservient to the charismatic leader.

Second, given the unity and homogeneity of the nation in allegiance to revolutionary values, no need was seen for the development of civil society. Autonomous groups in society were scarcely tolerated. Nasser crushed the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, and eliminated freedom of speech and the press.

Third, since the nation was undifferentiated and equal, the revolutionary state had to have an economic system based on socialism. In contrast with Marxism-Leninism, Arab socialism stressed the unity of classes as opposed to class conflict. The revolutionary regimes embarked on extensive nationalizations and followed policies of import substitution. They created vast bureaucracies and rules to promote social welfare and to employ a large proportion of the labour force. In Libya, 'business owners were sidelined, traders were abolished, and entrepreneurs were described by Gaddafi as parasites'.[25]

Fourth, the nation largely defined itself in opposition to other nations, namely the colonial western states and Israel—the latter seen by some as an embodiment of western imperialism.[26] The West was evil; the Arab world was the embodiment of virtue. The West had dominated in the past; the Arab world would triumph in the future. Antagonism to the West and Israel justified the strong state, internal repression, and the mass mobilization of society in an undifferentiated fashion. Just as Marxism-Leninism saw the triumph of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, so in time the Arab nation—unified under the banner of pan-Arabism—would surpass and humiliate the West. Nasser's victory over the United Kingdom, France and Israel in the 1956 Suez War was seen as embodying this idea.

In a fashion similar to the Soviet Union's move away from Stalinism, revolutionary nationalism evolved into something different in the Arab republics. But the structures left by the old ideology could not easily be transcended. In claiming to represent the nation, the state still excluded many other groups. A contradiction existed between the republics' claim to represent popular sovereignty and the reality. Thus, four structural weaknesses led to the Arab uprising of 2010. First, the bloated and authoritarian state persisted in the Arab republics in spite of their proclamation of a commitment to accept democratic values in the future. Second, although the states allowed civil society groups to emerge, it sought to control them. Third, Anwar Sadat of Egypt and other leaders renounced socialism, but could embrace instead only crony capitalism. And fourth, when most of the republics

[25] Jeff D. Colgan, *Petro-aggression: when oil causes war* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 134.
[26] On regional conflict and domestic politics, see Etel Solingen, 'Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: the foundations of war and peace in East Asia and the Middle East', *American Political Science Review* 101: 4, Nov. 2007, pp. 757–80.

made a sharp turn away from their earlier hostility to the West in becoming its allies, these regimes found themselves beset by the new problem of appearing like defeated stooges.

An important feature of the Arab republican state was the heroic status of the founding revolutionary nationalist leaders. They achieved this status through attempting a radical transformation, and because in doing so they were defeating the western powers. The leaders who emerged after the founders lacked the same aura; they were not populists and were perceived as detached from the citizens. Indeed, as the Arab republics evolved the leaders became more like monarchs. But the republics claimed to support popular sovereignty. The following analysis examines a selection of states and issues in varying degrees of detail in order to demonstrate this article's argument about the exclusivity of the republics.

Egypt seemed to have changed quite substantially between Nasser and Mubarak, and there can be no doubt that some of the changes helped to preserve the authoritarian regime for a long time. One means of strengthening authoritarianism was the establishment of a ruling party that could include more diverse interests.[27] Sadat created three new political parties from the Arab Socialist Union, but just one of them—the National Democratic Party (NDP)—would dominate Egyptian politics until Mubarak's removal. Egypt under Mubarak allowed the courts to promote liberal values, leading some to call it a 'hybrid regime'.[28] Mubarak allowed for an opposition presidential candidate in 2005; in the country's freest parliamentary election, held in 2006, independent candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood captured 20 per cent of the seats.

Nevertheless, relative to the rest of the world, which saw democracy spread to many corners, Egypt found it difficult to make really substantial changes. Mubarak continued as dictator. The introduction of a ruling party may have broadened the regime's base, but it made political reform to promote openness difficult as doing so ran counter to assuring the continued dominance of the NDP.[29] The courts may have been more liberal, but the emergency state security courts and the military courts 'effectively formed a parallel legal system with fewer procedural safeguards, serving as the ultimate regime check on challenges to its power'.[30] Mubarak's legitimacy was eroded when, after the raised expectations of a political thaw following the 2006 election, the 2010 election was rigged to give the NDP total control of parliament. His eventual fall was in part due to a succession crisis: would he, ageing and ailing, or his highly unpopular son Gamal run for the presidency in the forthcoming election?

Tunisia, where the liberal revolutionary wave began, suffered from brittle political structures, again based on revolutionary nationalism and put in place

[27] Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an age of democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[28] Tamir Moustafa, *The struggle for constitutional power: law, politics and economic development in Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Bruce Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak: liberalism, Islam, and democracy in the Arab world* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
[29] Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring conflict in the Arab world: incumbents, opponents and institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[30] Moustafa, *Struggle for constitutional power*, p. 8.

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from the 1950s following independence.[31] The first president, Bourguiba, ruled as a dictator from independence in 1956 to his ejection in 1987, proclaiming himself 'President for life' and cancelling presidential elections thereafter. In contrast to Egypt, the ruling Neo-Destour Party formed alliances with other parties and at times allowed them some leeway. Nevertheless, opposition parties and labour unions were eventually curtailed, and Islamists were outlawed and forced to flee. Following the coup that brought Zine al-Adine Ben Ali to power in 1987, there was hope that the new President would begin the process of promoting pluralism; instead, the National Pact of 1988 attempted to control political groups and civil society. As in Egypt's presidential politics, Ben Ali's election to another presidential term in 2009 signalled the end of any hope for an imminent shift to a more liberal political order in Tunisia.

Gaddafi's Libya was the ultimate revolutionary state, continuing to promote its ideology of revolutionary nationalism long after it had receded in the other Arab republics.[32] Modelling his government on Nasser's, Gaddafi ruled for his first few years in power through the Revolutionary Command Council. In 1975, he wrote *The Green Book* with the goal of establishing an Arab *jamahiriya* (the masses). The idea was that there would be direct rule of the people and no government; the people would express themselves through the 'Basic People's Congresses'—with the exception of the agencies responsible for security, foreign affairs and the management of the oil industry, which were ring-fenced by Gaddafi. The resulting lack of formal institutions meant a complete lack of any checks and balances on Gaddafi, who held supreme power until his bloody demise at the hands of the people in late 2011.

Like Iraq under the Ba'ath Party, Syria epitomized the largely centralized, totalitarian state in the Middle East. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Syria under the Assads never relaxed the state's strong grip over time, although Bashar continued to suggest he would.[33] Ruling in the name of Ba'athism, the Assad regime proclaimed Syria's adherence to revolutionary nationalism. But the assertion of this nationalist creed masked the fact that, like its counterpart in Iraq, the regime ruled in the interests of a minority sect—the Alawites, who were supported by Shi'i Iran. Tehran gave both political and military support to the Assads, who faced opposition from a number of other Arab states.[34]

As revolutionary nationalism faded, Egypt and Tunisia promoted *infitah*: opening up the economy and moving towards a more market-based system. But these policies hardly led to a healthy capitalism, for the bloated state remained, and business did not flourish. For example, manufactured goods, an indicator of an industrial economy, represented only 19 per cent of Egypt's exports in 2007.[35]

[31] On Tunisia, see Béatrice Hibou, *The force of obedience: the political economy of repression in Tunisia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[32] On Libya, see Dirk Vanderwalle, *Libya since independence: oil and state-building* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

[33] On Syria, see Raymond Hinnebusch, *Revolution from above* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

[34] Mark L. Hass, *The clash of ideologies: Middle Eastern politics and American security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 124–63.

[35] World Bank, *World development indicators* (Washington DC, 2008).

What was new was a kind of crony capitalism, perpetuating exclusivity and the dismal economic performance of the Arab republics, which stood in sharp contrast with the booming economies of China, India, Brazil and other parts of the developing world. Indeed, the republics' standing relative to these other countries did a lot to undermine the regimes' legitimacy.

In the early 1990s, Egypt adopted more market-friendly policies, and by the early 2000s the NDP sought to expand them. 'Thus, in the context of the declining role of the Egyptian state in the economy,' the Mubarak regime 'substituted distribution of state largesse for access to market-based corruption via parliamentary office'.[36] One might see the revolution in Egypt on one level as a reaction to neo-liberalism: there had been a number of labour strikes in the preceding years, and the April 6 movement, which began as a labour protest movement, was at the core of the demonstrations in Tahrir Square on 25 January 2011. The uprising was, however, less against neo-liberalism *per se* than it was opposed to the decrepit political and economic structures that could not represent labour's interests as Egypt moved to embrace globalization. 'Perhaps surprisingly, the independent labor movement' was 'part of the broader convergence of opposition views around the importance of creating a more constrained, predictable, and law-abiding state.'[37]

A third aspect of revolutionary nationalism was its promotion of corporatism, with governments attempting to create and control interest groups. In Egypt and Tunisia this became more difficult; in both countries there emerged a kind of 'unruly corporatism'.[38] Some groups, particularly the business associations, sought more autonomy from the government, and many individuals resented the fact that most permitted groups were ones designed to serve the government's interests. The upshot of corporatism is the lack of development of a civil society. One major cause of the Arab uprising was an 'awakening' and empowerment of individuals and society in general throughout the Arab world.[39] The old corporatist structures were ill-equipped to include them.

The fourth feature of revolutionary nationalism was its hostility towards the West and Israel, and the high degree to which it defined its identity in opposition to the West. As revolutionary nationalism waned, Egypt took a dramatically different course in befriending the West and making peace with Israel in 1979. Thus, one might argue that here there was no institutional legacy from revolutionary nationalism, given the sharp change of course under Sadat that was maintained by Mubarak. Nevertheless, Egypt, and later Libya, could be accused of having shifted course as a result of defeat. Sadat proclaimed that the 1973 war had been a victory, but Egypt sought to regain what it had lost in the 1967 war. Revolutionary nationalism had promised victory, and for some the *rapprochement* with the West showed its failure. Another perspective recognizes that Sadat's

[36] Lisa Blaydes, *Elections and distributive politics in Mubarak's Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 10.
[37] Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, p. 229.
[38] Robert Bianchi, *Unruly corporatism: associational life in twentieth century Egypt* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
[39] See Marc Lynch, *The Arab uprising* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012).

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foreign policy represented compromise. Egypt under Mubarak seemed to be an outpost of the US Pentagon and State Department. 'Egyptians came to see their country's foreign policy was being warped for the sake of US largesse.'[40] They felt Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, its settlements on the West Bank, its harsh policies towards the Palestinians during the first and second intifadas, its conflict with Hezbollah in 2006, its conflict with Hamas in 2009–10 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a series of humiliations.

The Arab uprising represented a counter-revolution against revolutionary nationalism. If revolutionary nationalism had entailed the violent overthrow of the old order by the military and a revolution from above, the Arab uprising as it began in Tunisia and Egypt was a peaceful rebellion from below involving the masses. If revolutionary nationalism had promoted the all-powerful, charismatic leader, the Arab uprising was a largely leaderless revolt. Revolutionary nationalism had seen the nation as the undifferentiated masses; the Arab uprising stressed the role of individuals and groups, and promoted the ideas of pluralism and openness. Revolutionary nationalism had sought freedom from western domination; the Arab uprising wanted freedom from the oppressive and unjust state and did not define itself in opposition to foreign foes.

The resilient monarchs

The monarchs did not fall during the Arab uprising because, as noted above, they had not experienced the negative consequences of revolutionary nationalism, and because these states had become largely immune to transnational revolutionary movements from the Arab republics as a result of having survived the Arab Cold War and the Islamist challenge posed by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The Iranian Revolution concentrated on transforming the country under a revolutionary regime which rejected foreign influences and supported other Muslims and 'freedom fighters of the world'. Tehran in principle supported the revolutionary notion of toppling repressive regimes, but it made little progress as Shi'i Iran did not have appeal for the predominant Sunnis of the region. Instead, the regional powers became embroiled in conflicts, including the costly Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988.

This 'immunity' does not imply that monarchy as an institution is inherently less susceptible to revolution; rather, the monarchies survived through having been a stronger alternative to the republics. One might expect that the citizens of the monarchical states would have used the Arab uprising begun in the republican states as a spark to begin protesting in large numbers for their rights as well, even though their grievances were not as great. Nevertheless, with its regional domino effect reminiscent of the nationalist era, the Arab uprising risked, should the citizens of the monarchies have joined, the very security of these states. Indeed, revolutions

[40] Steven A. Cook, *The struggle for Egypt: from Nasser to Tahrir Square* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 303.

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often shift from moderate to radical phases,[41] creating particularly acute vulnerabilities for weak states in the international system. Except for Tunisia, the disappointing outcomes that have occurred since the Arab uprising have validated the fears of the security-obsessed citizens of the monarchies about participating in regional revolutionary movements. The institutional and ideological dimensions of the monarchies have not been fully recognized by scholars.

The persistence of monarchy in the Middle East has received little attention. Lisa Anderson attributes this persistence to the idea that monarchies were good at state-building in the early stages, and many monarchies emerged in the Middle East as new states were created after the First World War.[42] Monarchs (as opposed to revolutionary leaders) have been adept, she says, at getting the upper classes to cooperate, and leaders of the republican states even came to resemble monarchs in trying to achieve the goal of state-building. However, in the cases under review here the early phase of state-building has ended, and the Arab uprising differentiated between republican leaders who seemed like monarchs and the monarchs themselves. In the most extensive analysis of the topic, Michael Herb claims that dynastic monarchies (where family members serve in the government) are particularly good at maintaining a strong state, for they possess a couple of advantages that other authoritarian rulers do not.[43] First, a large ruling family that controls a major portion of the government prevents opposition to the ruler from easily developing. Second, a ruling family has strong incentives to select an excellent leader from the family in order to maintain the institution of monarchy. But this argument does not explain how the non-dynastic monarchs of Jordan and Morocco survived. Using statistical analysis, Victor Menaldo shows that the monarchical states were better able to provide for security, an achievement he attributes to a political culture that emphasized rules and set limitations on the monarchs.[44] He suggests that the rules-based institutions benefited the elites. Nevertheless, the monarchs were also respectful of different groups within their societies, and it was the masses in the republics who rose in revolt during the Arab uprising while the citizens of the monarchical states were largely quiescent.

Both Menaldo and Herb need to put their analyses in an ideological and international context within which transnational revolutionary movements are seen as the biggest security challenge. These transnational threats, which were ideological in nature, threatened not only the regimes but the survival of the monarchical states themselves.

The monarchies came to acquire their immunity from transnational revolutionary movements through having provided for security for their states in two

[41] Crane Brinton, *The anatomy of revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1938).

[42] Anderson, 'Absolutism and the resilience of monarchy in the Middle East'; see also Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III, 'Resilient royals: how Arab monarchies hang on', *Journal of Democracy* 23: 4, 2012, pp. 74–88; F. Gregory Gause III, 'The persistence of monarchy in the Arabian peninsula: a comparative analysis', in Kostiner, ed., *Middle East monarchies*, pp. 167–86; Russell E. Lucas, 'Monarchical authoritarianism: survival and political liberalization in a Middle Eastern regime type', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36: 1, 2004, pp. 103–19.

[43] Michael Herb, *All in the family* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999).

[44] Victor Menaldo, 'The Middle East and North Africa's resilient monarchs', *Journal of Politics* 74: 3, July 2012, pp. 702–22.

ways: they enhanced internal stability in not allowing the nation to contest the state's identity; and they promoted external relations with Great Powers, particularly the United States, which guaranteed their survival.

Monarchical states were able to provide for security and national stability because they avoided certain problems related to the state's identity. Following the principle of popular sovereignty, nationalists, revolutionary or not, maintained that the state should represent the nation. There were conflicts between those who supported the monarchy and those who favoured popular sovereignty, and there were conflicts among the nationalists as to how the nation should be represented and defined. These struggles threatened to weaken the state. Thus, supporting the monarch as the representative or symbol of the nation secured the state by preventing one faction from dominating the nation.

The problem of internal stability became acute during the Arab Cold War. Arab nationalists clamoured for pan-Arabism, the unity of all Arabs and dissolution of the nation-state system. As a consequence, if the monarchical states had been taken over by the nationalists, they might have sought unity with the republican states, as occurred with the United Arab Republic, created through the merger of Egypt and Syria in 1958. Internal stability posed two particular problems. Nationalists within the monarchical states could have invited the revolutionary republics to intervene; or the revolutionary republics might have seen instability as an opportunity to intervene. Jeff Colgan demonstrates that revolutionary states are aggressive in pursuing their ideological objectives.[45] Thus, in representing an idea opposed to popular sovereignty, the monarchs helped to protect the security of these states and preserved the immense benefits accruing to many of their citizens from oil wealth. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 showed that the monarchical states still needed to fear the Arab republics based on the founding principle of revolutionary nationalism long after the dynamism of the ideology had faded. Following the Iranian Revolution, the monarchical states had to resist a new kind of revolutionary nationalism—militant Islamism.[46]

The idea that a type of institution such as monarchy can promote security is related to a theory in comparative politics according to which the type of democracy adopted by democratic states may be based on their size and vulnerability to international factors. Small states that are highly dependent on trade for their survival are much more likely to have democratic systems based on proportional representation, which allows all segments of society to be represented.[47] A similar argument might be made with respect to monarchies in a region vulnerable to transnational revolutionary movements that could threaten the viability of the state itself. In monarchical states where revolutionary nationalist politics could

[45] Jeff Colgan, 'Domestic revolutionary leaders and international conflict', *World Politics* 65: 4, Oct. 2013, pp. 656–90; see also Robert S. Snyder, 'The US and Third World revolutionary states: understanding the breakdown in relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 2, 1999, pp. 265–90.

[46] Although Iran is not an Arab country, the Shah fell in 1979 in large measure because the state was too detached from the nation and because he used the state in an effort to crush the nation. See Said Amir Arjomand, *The turban for the crown* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[47] Ronald Rogowski, 'Trade and the variety of democratic institutions', *International Organization* 41: 2, Spring 1987, pp. 203–23.

pull the state apart, a monarchy as opposed to a republic based on popular sovereignty and regional integration may preserve the state.

Ian Lustick asserts that without the support of the western powers, the monarchies would have followed the European model and integrated with the Arab republics.[48] He argues that the Arab world would have seen the emergence of bigger states, similar to the political development of Europe, had it not been for western intervention based on its hypocritical norm—developed centuries after the European powers aggressively enlarged themselves within Europe—that states should not enlarge themselves through political violence, which the republics employed. But there are reasons to believe that the citizens of the monarchical states did not want integration, and Europe was not an appropriate model for at least three reasons besides the weaknesses of revolutionary nationalism. First, the monarchical states were geographically much further away from one another than the corresponding areas in Europe, which were largely contiguous. Second, they were culturally different from the other Arab regions relative to the contiguous regions of the Europeans. And third, most of the monarchical states with oil were much more prosperous than the other Arab regions, giving them strong incentives to resist pan-Arabism.

The second reason why the monarchical states came to represent security was their ability to gain the support of Great Powers to guarantee it. Like Britain before it, the United States was interested in the Gulf states because of their oil, but Washington also supported the security of other monarchical states such as Jordan. Meeting the challenge of the Arab Cold War, the monarchs and the United States became natural allies in resisting their common foe in revolutionary nationalism, in spite of US support in principle for liberalism and popular sovereignty. Other authoritarian states have been anti-revolutionary, but the monarchical states made this an essential part of their identity.[49] Moreover, Washington found it easier to deal with a stable monarchy than with traditional autocrats. For example, Egypt's foreign policy changed with the transition from Nasser to Sadat—a shift in stance that the monarchies were unlikely to make. Finally, monarchies, as different types of states, were perhaps less likely to attract international criticism of their human rights abuses than other types of dictatorships. The United States criticized Mubarak and allowed him to fall in 2011, yet kept quiet about the violent crackdown on the demonstrators in Bahrain.

In addition to providing for the security of their states, the monarchical states also resisted the Arab uprising because they had not experienced the negative institutional effects of revolutionary nationalism. The monarchs had to 'invent' an ideology in countering the revolutionary nationalism of the republics, and they chose traditionalism—a distinct alternative to revolutionism. The emphasis has been on custom, kinship and religion. Unlike the charismatic revolutionary leaders of the republics, the monarchs were constrained by customs that allow

[48] Ian Lustick, 'The absence of Great Powers in the Middle East', *International Organization* 51: 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 653–83.

[49] On ideology and alliances in the Middle East, see Hass, *The clash of ideologies*; on the ability of the monarchs to court the United States, see Yom and Gause, 'Resilient royals'.

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for the input of other elites through *shura* councils and other consultative bodies. And, contrary to the nationalists of the republics, who sought to legitimate only a small portion of the nation as 'progressive', the monarchs also responded to diverse interests across the nation. 'The ruler's authority would rest not only in his coercive power but in the respect of his people for a leader on the right path (Sunna) who observes customary procedures of decision making.'[50] Menaldo demonstrates that the republican states were much more prone to instability than the monarchical ones.[51] In spite of oil, he also shows that the monarchical states were better at protecting property rights and the rule of law; as a consequence, their economies grew faster. Moreover, in spite of country-specific effects like tribalism, he demonstrates that the institution of monarchy accounted for stability. The monarchies thus provided a better alternative in at least two of the areas—political exclusivity, statist and cronyist economy, stunted civil society, aggressive or inconsistent foreign policy—that characterized the republics.

In renouncing popular sovereignty, the Jordanian monarchy provided for security, stability and a degree of inclusiveness.[52] The Jordanian monarchy has its hereditary origns in the Bedouin tribes, who constitute a significant minority in the population and provided critical support. This fact might have alienated the majority Palestinians, as has been the case with the majority Shi'is in Bahrain who have opposed the Sunni monarchy; but a Palestinian-dominated state achieved through popular sovereignty and a democratic government would have allowed Israel to claim that the Palestinians have a state, and that it need not make concessions to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus, following the defeat of revolutionary Palestinians during Black September in 1970, the Palestinian majority acquiesced in monarchical rule. In removing the political space for different groups to contest, the monarchy preserved a stability that was impressive when viewed against conditions in the neighbouring states. Indeed, after 1970 Jordan under the Hashemite kings was an island of stability surrounded by extremely repressive Ba'athist regimes in Syria and Iraq, civil war in Lebanon, and recurrent violence between the Israelis and Palestinians. In contrast with the republican rulers, the late King Hussein and King Abdullah provided more political openness, and the Islamic Action Front recently emerged as an opposition party. The Jordanian economy depended on external sources of aid,[53] and the two monarchs proved adept at pleasing international donors.

Other monarchs also came to respect the nation and to support a more open political system. The Moroccan monarchy had the advantage at the country's independence of having nationalist legitimacy, though it never sought revolutionary change of society. The monarch was seen as the arbiter of the nation's varied interests.[54] Instead of taking a monolithic approach of the kind followed by

[50] Michael Hudson, *Arab politics: the search for legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 166.
[51] Menaldo, 'The Middle East and North Africa's resilient monarchs'.
[52] Marc Lynch, *State interests and public spheres: the international politics of Jordan's identity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
[53] Laurie Brand, *Jordan's inter-Arab relations: the political economy of alliance making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
[54] Ahmed Benchemsi, 'Morocco: outfoxing the opposition', *Journal of Democracy* 23: 1, Jan. 2012, pp. 57–69.

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revolutionary leaders, the late King Hassan II and King Muhammad VI encouraged a multiparty system, elections, and observance of human rights. Hassan II accepted a government of opposition, an *alternance*, in 1998. Likewise, Muhammad VI, in the wake of the Arab uprising, allowed the second *alternance* government to be formed following the Party of Justice and Development's impressive electoral victory. The party's general secretary, Abdelilab Benkirane, refused to support those demonstrators of the 20 February movement who had advocated a constitutional monarchy, claiming that Morocco needed the king to balance the different factions of the nation.[55] Although Morocco's political system remained authoritarian in vesting so much power in the king, the country had a more vibrant civil society than the republican states.

In Kuwait the monarch, the *amir*, did not rule as the sole dictator like the republican leaders. Kuwait is unlike the other Gulf monarchies in that its 1962 constitution gives the parliament considerable powers, so that there was some balance between the *amir*, the government and the parliament. Historically, the ruling family was kept in check by the merchants,[56] but since 1962 this role has been played by opposition blocs in parliament. 'In fact, the opposition wins most seats.'[57] In 2006 two deputies in parliament issued a motion to prosecute the Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser al-Mohammed, a leading member of the ruling Al-Sabah family. Such moves to impeach the prime minister were usually blocked, but in 2011 Shaykh Nasser al-Mohammed resigned following allegations of corruption. Like Morocco, Kuwait appears to be moving in the direction of reform, not revolution.

A second important difference between the monarchies and the republics is that the former promoted capitalism and the latter advocated the failed policies of socialism (later crony capitalism in Tunisia and Egypt) and statism. The literature on the impact of oil suggests that the monarchs have survived simply because they, in the oil-rich states, have made their citizens prosperous. It fails to recognize that some of the Gulf states have advanced a dynamic capitalism that not only transformed the Middle East but played a large role in globalization. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the United Arab Emirates, and in Dubai in particular. Dubai boasts the tallest building in the world, the biggest airport, the largest man-made archipelago, the two biggest shopping malls and the largest theme park. Of course, some at least of these might be looked at as white elephants, but, as Vali Nasr says:

> With Lee Kwan Yew's Singapore in mind, Dubai has reinvented the concept of Arab government, building an effective business infrastructure, with a proper regulatory environment … In Dubai, a phone line or a passport can be obtained in a day—whereas in the rest of the Arab world such routine services take weeks and months.[58]

[55] Driss Maghraoui and Saloua Zerhouni, 'Morocco', in Ellen Lust, ed., *The Middle East*, 13th edn (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2013), p. 682.
[56] Crystal, *Oil and politics in the Gulf*.
[57] Michael Herb, 'Kuwait: the obstacle of parliamentary politics', in Joshua Teitelbaum, ed., *Political liberalization in the Persian Gulf* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 133–56 at p. 141.
[58] Vali Nasr, *Forces of fortune* (New York: Free Press, 2009), p. 38.

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The government in the UAE established free-trade zones and industrial parks, and opened up financial markets to foreign investors. Indeed, Dubai's vulnerability to markets was shown starkly in 2009 when its housing bubble burst. Some multinational corporations moved their headquarters to Dubai. In Qatar, Al Jazeera became a media outlet with a global reach, having already transformed the media landscape and politics of the Middle East. In addition to building a huge 'sports city' that is scheduled to host the World Cup soccer tournament, Qatar established an education city that contains six US colleges. Doha has been trying to become part of the knowledge economy in creating the Qatar Science and Technology Park in order to attract international high-tech firms. Kuwait has also been striving to become the leading financial centre of the region and a destination for international tourism.

The differences in political outcomes since the Arab uprising between Libya and the Gulf states could not be sharper, yet their similar small sizes and oil wealth make for a good comparison. One might claim that Libya was different because Gaddafi himself did not give his vast oil wealth to the people. But the key point to recognize is that he chose the course he did for *ideological* reasons: he spent his petrodollars in trying to promote the global revolution.

The third factor to be examined in looking at the two sets of states is the degree to which governments have attempted to control society. Saudi Arabia would appear to contradict the argument about the monarchies, for it had an oppressive government and a statist economy. Yet it allowed another source of power—religion—to emerge in society. The House of Saud formed an alliance with the Wahhabis in the eighteenth century that has since served as the basis of the state. The Saudis control the government, but the Wahhabis dominate society: 'Unlike their counterparts in other Arab countries, Wahhabi scholars have considerable control over the social sphere.'[59] This arrangement hardly represents liberalism, but it repudiates the revolutionary notion of the unity between state and society. Saudi Arabia does not have a constitution; instead, it has relied on Wahhabism as the basis of the state. With respect to the law, the *ulama* or religious authorities have had a considerable independence from the government. 'Even with the expanding jurisdiction of statutory courts, religious law has remained the essential basis of legitimacy of Saudi rule.'[60] Moreover, the *ulama*, have played a big role in education. Even as state-run schools and universities have spread, the *ulama* have had a strong hand in promoting religious education and establishing religious universities in parallel to the more secular ones. Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia has been a dynamic and far from monolithic force: opposition movements have emerged to challenge the government on its own Islamist grounds. 'Under state control, Wahhabi discourse mutated and fragmented in an attempt to escape the straitjacket imposed by political power.'[61] For decades the Saudi state has worked

[59] Madawi Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices from the new generation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 4.
[60] David Commins, *The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: Tauris, 2006), p. 117.
[61] Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi state*, p. 6.

to advance pan-Islamism beyond its borders,[62] but it has been groups from within its own society—most notoriously including the global jihadists in Al-Qaeda—who have taken this cause and pushed it furthest.

The monarchies also had an advantage with respect to the last factor, foreign relations. In contrast with revolutionary nationalism, they maintained positive relations with the West and were on the winning side of the Cold War. They gained considerable economic and security advantages. Of course, the monarchies were accused of being lackeys of the United States, Osama bin Laden's principal charge. But although the citizens of the Gulf states had reservations about US dominance,[63] they recognized, contrary to Bin Laden's claim, that the regional revolutionary states posed a greater threat.

Conclusion

The Arab uprising should be seen as a rebellion against the remnants of revolutionary nationalism, an ideology similar to Marxism-Leninism, which likewise led through the institutions it established to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the ideology of revolutionary nationalism receded years earlier, the republics failed to create inclusive political structures: the old autocrats remained, civil society was squeezed and state socialism gave way to crony capitalism. The failure to build inclusive institutions goes a long way in explaining the difficulties the former republics have had since the Arab uprising. In Egypt, the liberal forces that led to the counter-revolution or rebellion proved too weak to establish a democratic order; the Muslim Brotherhood under Muhammad Morsi repeated the exclusive practices of the past; and the military under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has revived the old ways in the name of security and stability in even harsher form. Indeed, the government of el-Sisi has imprisoned thousands and given death sentences to many in the Muslim Brotherhood, including former President Morsi. In Libya, Gaddafi's failure to build institutions at all has left the country fragmented. In Syria, the exclusive nature of the Ba'athist regime has fractured the state itself.

The monarchies in the Middle East largely defined themselves in ideological terms in opposition to the revolutionary nationalism of the Arab republics; and it was by this means that they managed to survive the rough waters of the Arab uprising. In seeking to differentiate the state and the nation, the monarchies provided security and managed to avoid the suffocating effects of the state's attempt to crush society seen in the countries ruled through revolutionary nationalism. In not allowing for the contestation of the state by different groups within the nation, the monarchs prevented transnational forces from threatening the survival of their states.

Nevertheless, the monarchs should not breathe easily. The Syrian refugee crisis has put immense strains on Jordan and other states. The election of the Muslim

[62] Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: violence and pan-Islamism since 1979* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
[63] Haass, *The clash of ideologies*, pp. 230–73.

Brotherhood in Egypt empowered Islamists in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, and 'thousands of Saudis have traveled to join the Islamic State'.[64] The governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAE gave the new Egyptian government $12 billion after the Egyptian military removed the Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt have worked to combat the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 and other Sunni Islamists throughout the region. As regional sectarian tensions increase in Yemen and to the north of Riyadh, and as the Sunni jihadists in Iraq and Syria threaten the broader region, the Saudi ruling family could face a rebellion from within. If the House of Saud falls, the other monarchs in the Gulf will be in danger. Thus, as the turbulent tide of the Arab uprising recedes, and as the ashes of revolutionary nationalism disintegrate, the monarchies may yet face the dim prospects of other monarchies throughout history that have given way to a new totalitarian order or a more democratic one.

[64] David D. Kirkpatrick, 'Islamic State says it was behind suicide bombing at Saudi mosque that killed 21', *New York Times*, 23 May 2015, p. A4. A leading Islamist, Salman al-Awda, has threatened revolution: *As'ila al-thawra* [Questions of the revolution] (Beirut: Markaz Nama'li-l-buhuth wa-l-dirasat, 2012).

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